December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

DCASH: ACM Digital Cash Paper Available via FTP
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The following is excerpted from the Internet Business Journal Electronic Currency NetCash: A Design for Practical Electronic Currency on the Internet, proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Computer Communications Security (November 1993), Medvinsky, Gennady and B. Clifford Neuman. This document is available via FTP: prospero.isi.edu /pub/papers/security/netcash-cccs93.ps.Z. Note: PostScript documents can be printed/viewed without a postscript printer with "Ghostscript", which is available from the SIMTEL archive. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLQ+n9N4nNf3ah8DHAQHEpwP6Arilf9L7wyRhaDPVFlXsbK9JQDwYhcMM WQmVTkU1BtDX7RKV1zfU3QcmKUqo5/VY/EopMAqNI0GqEbnaSU9kNkAzlS0eK1CP 9CdRDXrl0Gv4HTOKJWrWkoYwQdCxpuQLr28foBebGsKXPVwVDWSfJvAU4QZWoubY yyveAX87McM= =H5Fs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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traffic report: expect delays on the 93
by Eric Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Commuters should expect random delays of between 0 and 20 minutes on the 93 (the 128.32.182.93, or cicada.berkeley.edu) remailer. I'm starting my project of modifying my remailers to thwart traffic analysis, so as the first step I put in a random delay. The next step is to add an "ignore me" header command and also a "bounce me to neverneverland" header command. Other header commands (all in an encrypted header, which will have to wait until I finish configuring encrypted remail on cicada) will say things like "chop off the last X bytes and continue" or "add X random bytes to the message and pass it on", all with random delays. I also want to set it up so that it just spontaneously mails stuff to random places. e

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more traffic delays!
by Eric Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've "upgraded" all of my remailers (hh@soda, hh@cicada, hh@pmantis, 00x@uclink) to insert a random delay in the remailings. e

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No Subject
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Keyservers and anonymous Mailings Newsgroups: mail.cypherpunks In-Reply-To: <199312160710.AA28701(a)access3.digex.net> Organization: An Teallach Limited In article <199312160710.AA28701(a)access3.digex.net> you write: :If PKP is going to employ this tactic, it seems that even the :'new' keyservers that run as simple databases and thus are not a :copyright question are subject to harassment in the least, even if :unfounded. If this is true, would anonymous remailing provide a :buffer of some type? First of all, I wrote the new replacement keyserver and I happen to know it isn't even released yet (except to a handful of people for the purposes of testing portability and ease of installation etc), so it is not *possible* that the new sites have been harassed, and I think you should wait until it happens before you start worrying about it. As I've said before, all these keyservers will be doing is *publishing* information, and that's a protected right in the US. Now, if pkp choose to start chasing down people who publish their keys and asking them if they have a license (assuming they're in the US and need one), that's a different thing altogether, but that could happen at the moment given that the actual keys are up for ftp all over already. A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) infringe *cannot* be closed down even if the people whose keys are published *are* harassed. Anyway, the keyservers have to exist for the benefit of both ViaCrypt customers and European FreePGP users. G

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Digital Telephony Threat Returns
by jim＠Tadpole.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Digital Telephony Threat Returns According to FBI Dir. Louis Freeh, the development of sophisticated digital telecom and networking technology threatens the ability of the Feds to wiretap. In a Dec. 8 speech at Washington's National Press Club, Freeh annouced a renewal of the FBI's 'Digital Telephony' legislation scheme: the return of the controverial 'Wiretap Bill'. The bill is strongly opposed by organizations and individuals concerned about privacy, as well as the telecommunications and computing industries at large. The FBI's 'need' for this legislative action is under review by the Administration as part of its examination of security and encryption issues. The reappearance of this Bureau effort contradicts statements by Special Agent Barry Smith of the FBI's Congressional Affairs Office, who stated less than a month ago that the 'Wiretap Bill' had been tabled. According to classified documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the FBI and the Electronic Communications Service Provider Committee or ECSPC (an ad hoc industry working group, which formed in March), are attempting to decide if technical solutions can be found to satisify law enforcement. According to a Nynex representative co-chairing the group, Kenneth Raymond, no solution has yet been found, but that FBI has yet to prove any solution is needed at all. Raymond likened Freeh's tactics to "yelling out the window" - an attention-getting move that needs some sort of clarifying followup. Though the ECSPC claims to be attempting to evaluate the problem and to solve it "in some reasonable way that is consistent with cost and demand", Raymond indicated that the group considers one 'solution' to be building wiretap access into future telecom hardware - like the Clipper chip backdoor, but a 'feature' of all switch specifications for phone and data lines. This news was just received, and a more detailed analysis and statement from EFF will follow soon.

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Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn <uunet!access.digex.net!unicorn> writes: > It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for > alleged copyright violations. Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess. > Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a > keyserver? A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a > good deal of heat. As far as I can tell, the copyright issue exists only in David Sternlight's addled mind; and even he has conceded that he's got no factual basis for asserting that PGP might infringe someone's copyright. I can't tell if his messages about this reflect actual confusion about the difference between patent and copyright, or if he's simply stumbled across another FUD tactic to use against PGP. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLQ7bV33YhjZY3fMNAQGG1QP/XbLehbgzvvdsSeN1YSKeKQGoZM0XigBt 0JClAQXHaoMeu2PDh4et7Txhq+IOvhAwrW3xCB+0aEXWiyZ3XGU0Z5rYL4e57/q6 Z5IgeYyPO/5DSIc+45XlwdC24X2MPENvex2IN2dYypGU4fUIff2GxaTW4hc4458u Agno8lsCjs4= =cjSg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles Lemon Detweiler Pledge? greg(a)goldenbear.com You're soaking in it.

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addme
by Ophir Ronen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Eric, Please add me to the list. *Thx, -Ophir

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Anonymous Video Rental
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P>So, when I go to Huntsville Utilities and ask them to turn on the P>power at my house, rather than writing a check or giving them personal P>information, I just tell give them a blinded token which they could P>use to withdraw $X from my account at the Austin-Internet Credit P>Union. As always the UK is ahead of the curve on this one. It is still possible in certain UK apartments to pay gas *and* electricity bills anonymously. The electricity and gas meters have coin boxes on them. You want electricity or gas and you just put the coins it. True. This used to be the standard method of paying for utilities. This is less common for electricity now but any office of British Gas will still sell you plastic "keys" that are shaped like keys. They turn on your gas for a set period of time and presumably break off in the process so they can't be reused. Cutting-edge high tech! DCF "Buy Extra Gas Tokens For the Holidays" Poster inside BG offices this time of year. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Use foreign key servers
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)access.digex.net> thus posted: > > It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for > alleged copyright violations. Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess. > Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a > keyserver? A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a > good deal of heat. > (I thought it was a patent problem rather... but that's not the point) Let me know if I'm missing some essential point here, but why are people insisting on running key servers in the US, the only country where there may be a patent claim? I doubt mailers would care one way or the other if you used foreign keyservers. I do understand how some of us would make it their Duty to actively protect their Konstitooshunol Right to run PGP key servers in their Own Country, free from interference from evil commercial and governmental entities :-) (no, really, I understand) but what other reason could there be for that? In this case, to the user, it should not matter where the keyserver if physically located. I'm not really up to speed as to which key servers are running where, but the current versions of PGP being developped outside of the US, there must be a few keyservers here and there. Keys crossing the border cannot be the problem, they are all over Netnews and all over mailing lists too. So, I do not understand why this could be a "nice tactic if you are PKP". Surely they cannot be spending much ressources on this when the easy counter move is to use foreign key servers. I do not understand what reason there is to start (or even develop) keyservers in the US, apart from annoying PKP. Pierre Uszynski pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Anonymous remailers and keyservers.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) ()() oops, did I say copyright...? First of all, I wrote the new replacement keyserver and I happen to know it isn't even released yet (except to a handful of people for the purposes of testing portability and ease of installation etc), ()() I hadn't realized that my message implied this. so it is not *possible* that the new sites have been harassed, and I think you should wait until it happens before you start worrying about it. As I've said before, all these keyservers will be doing is *publishing* information, and that's a protected right in the US. ()() Again, I did not mean for my message to so imply, my point was that it was a possbility and considering past behavior, not way beyond PKP. I really wanted to point out that it might be an interesting statement on other internet services (none come to mind which might be the most revealing statement on the applicability of the idea) and the use of anonymous remailers. Now, if pkp choose to start chasing down people who publish their keys and asking them if they have a license (assuming they're in the US and need one), that's a different thing altogether, but that could happen at the moment given that the actual keys are up for ftp all over already. ()() I had not considered this, it was a little beyond the scope of my message. I was more concerned with the operators of the servers not the end users. It's a good point none the less. A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) infringe *cannot* be closed down even if the people whose keys are published *are* harassed. ()() You use the word *cannot* pretty strictly. I think you mean legally cannot. Consider that the keyservers that have been closed down (if they have...?) may fall into the legally *cannot* be shut down group. They just haven't been tested yet. What I think you mean is legally cannot, as opposed to practically cannot. Political pressure is plenty enough to make university administrators jumpy. Private machines are immune of course (to some extent anyhow). Anyway, the keyservers have to exist for the benefit of both ViaCrypt customers and European FreePGP users. ()() And argueably those who don't hold ViaCrypt licenses. -uni- (Dark)

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