December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Will I be on a wanted poster?
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of "cypherpunks > > writing code" because of the implications that this program has > > on privacy. (I'm using it to keep a personal space for my tax > > records, private correspondence, PGP dir, etc.), but Mike's > > suggestion for encrypting an entire BBS itself is a good point. > > What if *every* sysop encrypted their BBS with Secure Drive? > > No more Steve Jackson Games cases. I hope this happens. Computer > theft and unreasonable seizure is a real problem. As far as I know, a system like SecureDrive, KFS, or CFS, is really only as secure as the running machine is. Generally, when a BBS is 'seized' (forfeited? ;), it is running when the feds get there. Right now, if they have any clue (and from what I hear, the FBI has much more of a clue than the SS when it comes to this type of investigation), they usually take pictures of the setup to make sure they can put the machine back together when they get it to wherever they are taking it to. If encrypting file-systems become a problem, a disk could be developed (probably pretty easily) to retrieve the key from memory before they power it down. andrew "Touch that keyboard and die!!"

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Pablo and NSA
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, so I take it back. +++ From: theprez(a)whitehouse.gov.com Subject: WE ARE INDEED WATCHING ! Lines: 10 Organization: University of Zurich, Department of Computer Science X-Newsreader: IBM NewsReader/2 v1.00 Date: Fri Dec 03 09:03:21 EST 1993 NEUTERS - Botoga 3.12.93 Police and military officials announced yesterday that they had help from American National Security Agency officials in tracking down Pablo Escobar. The NSA provided Columbian officials with the tools necessary to decipher communication between the Columbian drug lord and his cohorts. Escobar had been communicating by computer using the American Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) software product which was compromised by NSA officials working at a remote listening station in the Columbian jungle. +++ Haw Haw Haw. -uni- (Dark)

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(fwd) Re: Keyserver going down
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In light of the recent closure of the .toxicwaste keyserver, I thought that this message from Vess was rather timely. Forwarded message: > From: bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev) > Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,alt.security.pgp,alt.security.keydist > Subject: Re: Keyserver going down > Date: 3 Dec 1993 13:14:21 GMT > Organization: University of Hamburg -- Germany > Message-ID: <2dne3d$ofc(a)rzsun02.rrz.uni-hamburg.de> > References: <WARLORD.93Dec2161745(a)toxicwaste.mit.edu> <gbeCHFxIy.42F(a)netcom.com> <2dn9re$6n5(a)news.mantis.co.uk> > NNTP-Posting-Host: fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de > X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > > Tony Lezard (tony(a)mantis.co.uk) writes: > > > >With both toxicwaste and iastate now out of business, what key servers > > >are still operating? > > > The folling list comes straight from keyserv.doc, in the PGP source files > > Unfortunately, I have the impression that the information there is > slightly out-of-date. I would prefer to get a direct reply to the > question asked from the people who run the keyservers. > > > archive. I must say, although I'm not one for conspicacy theories, the > > sudden and unexplained closure of *two* key servers in such a short time > > does make me a bit ... suspicious. Why were they closed? > > Yes, me too... Two keyservers, both in the USA, both were closed with > no explications given, both were closed rather fast... Is it what > we're all thinking about or are we just paranoid? > > > Internet sites: > > [list deleted] > > I have installed a public key server at our site as an experiment. It > took quite a long time, because I am not root on our machine and a > regular user installing such software is not a trivial task and has > some security implications. > > Till now, our server was syncronized only with one of the US ones. > Now, after two US servers have been closed down, I would like to > activate ours and to syncronise it with all other servers around the > world. It is currently working (you can get and send public keys); it > is just not syncronized with the other servers. > > Could please those who are running such servers and agree to have them > syncronized with ours contact me, so that I can include their site in > my CONFIG file? > > The information for our server is: > > pgp-public-keys(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de > Vesselin Bontchev > bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de > FTP: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/misc/pubkring.pgp > > Requests to the server are processed every 15 minutes. > > Regards, > Vesselin > - -- > Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg > Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226 Fachbereich Informatik - AGN > < PGP 2.3 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C > e-mail: bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de 22527 Hamburg, Germany > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.3a > > iQCVAgUBLP87VTZWl8Yy3ZjZAQHKIQP9GKbCGpdMNNQwKbWOrg5jk3Cam7YDrcpq > VYLO3p3yJ6JHHDKl/XJBXd4OGwbG6RY9H6E1vyb0VwfGDuwYxH8/1gp/b+Cod5Rb > GilZ9b2OiqornVAvAYwrg6XtsuOOTh1dpHUJB66YRudJ4UCCnju53XQ40V/7mylV > Bzv5idC4Iq0= > =Nl7x > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >

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Highway song
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: alt.politics.datahighway,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: The Data Highway Patrol Message-ID: <tcmayCHGF7E.Cu1(a)netcom.com> Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8] Date: Fri, 3 Dec 1993 10:16:26 GMT The Data Highway will no doubt be patrolled by a new elite police force, the "Data Highway Patrol." Patterned after the California Highway Patrol, also known as "CHiPS" (as in the terrible-but-campy t.v. show of the 1970s), the Data Highway Patrol will presumably be dubbed the "ClipperCHiPS." They'll be sent out on their Harley-Davidson cybercycles to check for discriminatory data packets, for illegal use of encryption technology, and for "heavy loads" that strain network resources. And occasionally they'll stop and help a stranded Internetter. They'll have the top-rated Data Highway show in the 2002-3 season, ironically and recursively enough. Will President Reno send them in to raid the Cyber-Waco havens? --- Seriously, I haven't been following this group (alt.politics.datahighway, that is) too closely, after posting early on to it, as it seemed like the two camps--pro and con--were settling down to restating their positions. So, sorry if I'm now intruding. I was writing an essay for the Cypherpunks mailing list on the way strong crypto will make local gambling laws unenforceable (through "telegambling," where a casino in the Bahamas, or "somewhere" in cypherspace, is only a phone call through some digital mixes away). It became clear to me that the authorities will hardly countenance the use of the Data Highway---the taxpayer's NII--for such uses. (And a lot of other "interesting" uses I could describe. If interested, join the Cypherpunks mailing list by sending a request to "cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com". We were featured on the cover of the second issue of "Wired" and in the Summer, '93 issue of "Whole Earth Review," etc. An interesting bunch of folks.) No, the Data Highway won't likely tolerate "sealed loads" that might be accessing offshore gambling dens, kiddie porn rings, or weapons secret information markets (not to mention the ever-worrisome anonymous markets for assasinations...child's play with digital remailers and digital cash). Not any more than they now accept trucks carrying loads across state and national borders without the possibility of inspection. A national data highway will have lots of rules and regulations for "fair access," for the allowable data packets that can travel on it, and for taxation of the explosion in commercial traffic which will inevitably come. Hence, the Data Highway Patrol. Or maybe they'll call it the "CyberSpace Patrol." Personally, I hate government programs. I don't want the government "helping" with networks, and I don't want a streamlined data highway. I like the developing system we've got of zillions of cables, satellites, fiber optics, and the like, With lots of suppliers of services and lots of rerouting of packets, it makes it real hard to enforce the kind of restriction cited above. And that's a good thing. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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The Tentacles of Cypherspace
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy From: ld231782(a)casco.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT Sender: news(a)yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account) Message-ID: <Dec04.105319.36526(a)yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1993 10:53:19 GMT References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F(a)netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw(a)netcom.com> Nntp-Posting-Host: casco.lance.colostate.edu Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3] Timothy C. May (tcmay(a)netcom.com) wrote: : "Medusa" (me, others). I gave up long ago trying to convice Larry : Detweiler (alias an12070, The Executioner, S. Boxx, The Pervert, The : Psychopunk, and apparently such pseudonyms) that I am a real person, : that Nick Szabo is a real person not the same as me, and that several : other "Tentacles" and "Snakes" are easily verified to be real people : with real lives. That's interesting. Perhaps you would like to enumerate these attempts. Here are a few I can think of off the top of my head. I asked J.Gilmore to send me his phone number to ask him about pseudospoofing by Cypherpunk leaders and he told me that he only gave out his phone number to his friends. I ask other cypherpunks for phone numbers and they call it an `invasion of their privacy'. I asked Szabo about his claims in RISKS and he exploded that I was `digitally stalking him.' I got a message from a Geof Dale (roommate of a college friend) who said generally he could assert that every cypherpunk I had ever wondered about being a pseudonym was a `true name' but refuses to give me his phone number to so I can ask specific questions. Nick Szabo has also resisted simple requests of mine to verify that `Nick Szabo' is not a pseudonym. I also asked you, a long time ago Mr. May, to state a simple sentence to me in the form `I have never posted under the name J.Dinkelacker'. You refused to do so. You did say `The assertion that I am J. Dinkelacker is too bizarre to believe.' Ha, ha, and that time I asked you what sites you have ever posted from, and your personal knowledge of multiple sites, you emailed my postmaster and said that I was `harassing' you. Oh, and that contained another reference to my `violent threats'. You seem to be quite sensitive to quotations like `death is the ultimate form of censorship.' Hee, hee. The truth is that every attempt I have made to verify certain identities has failed and led only to more grisly conclusions, such that Cypherpunks have gone to the length of registering NIC domains and buying out-of-state phone numbers. Do not tell me this is impossible! A businessman friend of mine has a local phone number in NY that forwards to Denver! It seems to me cypherpunks could use this very readily! (My kingdom goes to anyone who can provide me with the ability to trace the ultimate destination of phone calls in this way, and help uncover the amazing extent of the Cryptoanarchist conspiracy! volunteers desperately needed!) As for what the paranoid ranter and conspiracy theorist an12070 thinks, who gives a damn? I'm always amazed at top cypherpunks, supposedly interested in anonymity, attempting to equate me with this email address. The cypherpunks have made an art, science, and religion of deceiving others on the Internet and in the media. I do not consider the leaders respectable. If they were, they would have long ago answered my honest questions in a straightforward manner. And T.C.May is definitely the classic cryptoanarchist! Nice of you to keep holding onto your infamous signature (now widely discredited) promoting tax evasion, black marketeering, and the overthrow of governments. : Poor deluded Larry takes any such efforts to resolve his delusion as : _further proof_ of the Grand Conspiracy to drive him crazier than he : already is. Yes, I am quite insane. : What a strange world the Net is becoming. No thanks to you. : --Tim May, a Real Person Owner of many tentacles. Please list all the sites you have ever posted from, Mr. May. Ooops, that would be an Orwellian Invasion of your privacy. A McCarthyist Inquisition. Hee, hee. You cryptoanarchists are so silly. I am having great fun using your techniques of cyberspatial warfare and against yourselves. I will not relent until top leadership issues unequivocal statements on your involvement and knowledge of pseudospoofing. Lies like that by E.Hughes in RISKS, `I have never posted under any other name than E.Hughes' obviously do not count, although they may fool some people. I do thank you, Mr. May, for your posting directly on this topic after my attempts to date have failed. Perhaps you would like to invite your cohorts on the cypherpunks list including E.Hughes and J.Gilmore to start a cyberspatial attack campaign on this thread the way you infiltrated RISKS 15.27 and 15.28x! I await the fireworks! The most serious problems with the Cypherpunks may involve deception of the media. I'm trying to figure this out as we speak. These lies are very difficult to untangle! volunteers welcome! oh, BTW Mr. May, when did you decide my first name was Larry and not Lance? You called me Lance for 10 months or so on the cypherpunks list. hee, hee. I would give so much to be at the next CA Clique Conspiracy meeting in a week or two, to see how the leaders masterfully evade all charges of misbehavior. -- ld231782(a)longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy From: ld231782(a)casco.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT Sender: news(a)yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account) Message-ID: <Dec04.110527.69270(a)yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1993 11:05:27 GMT References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F(a)netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw(a)netcom.com> <dasherCHH7s6.4rF(a)netcom.com> Nntp-Posting-Host: casco.lance.colostate.edu Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3] Followup-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy : Ah. I could say that I've seen Nick and Tim in the same room, but : that would prove I'm just another pseudonym. (We're all at Netcom, : after all.) So why did I ask the question above? That just shows : how subtle Tim is. (I wish I were that subtle.) Y'know, after all this hullaballo I still have no idea what Szabo does for a living. Maybe he would like to post information about where he works. Just general information that can be verified, nothing that would invade his privacy. Ooops, I guess all cryptoanarchists believe that any inquiry into identity (even those who claim to have one) is an `invasion of their privacy'. Well, we can't get very far in that case. I will just have to stick `szabo(a)netcom.com' into my `untrusted pseudonym' file. hee, hee. Sort of a like a McCarthyist Witchhunt Inquisition list. Those darn Cryptoanarchists. My experience with Szabo started only after I read neat mail by Szabo stating how he had mastered the art of surreptitious posting from multiple sites. Mr. Szabo, could you please elaborate on your techniques? I had to guess at what you were accomplishing in RISKS 15.28x (or 15.27, hard to remember) because you are certainly not voluntarily going to reveal this information, eh? that's the name of the game with pseudospoofing. Also, you blew up when I followed up on your claim in 15.27 that many cypherpunks had attempted to help me verify their identities. `Which ones?' I asked. `What have they done for me?' You got really upset, remember, and threatened to stop posting from the name szabo(a)netcom.com entirely! I thought this highly suspicious, but perhaps you can explain it all. Some of Mr.Szabo's comments and those by another tentacle I have discovered suggest they are actually running sophisticate software to maintain their arsenals of tentacles. This is my Holy Grail, to get information on that! I suspect it was written by E.Hughes. He hasn't said a word on it. Oh, many, many things for me to wonder about. Please enlighten me. I am just another scientist in search of the truth, by iteratively refining his sense of what is not. Sooner or later I will have to post an analysis of cryptoanarchist disinformation as posted by either Szabo or May (some of the very best purveyors, IMHO). -- ld231782(a)longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU

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Re: Pablo and NSA
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> NSA provided Columbian officials with the tools > necessary to decipher communication between the > Columbian drug lord and his cohorts. Escobar had been > communicating by computer using the American Pretty > Good Privacy (PGP) software product which was > compromised by NSA officials working at a remote > listening station in the Columbian jungle. > Hopefully this is a joke. However, it does bring up a point. The NSA can put fear into people's minds by simply *claiming* the ability to compromise PGP. They don't have to really be able to. Just start a rumor, sit back, and watch what happens. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Speaking of hard disk encryption...
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone out there have any experience with SafeBoot(tm) from SmartDisk Security Corporation? Here's what you get in the mail when you call them for info: [disclaimer: I am not accociated with SmartDisk Security Corporation] -------------- SafeBoot - The SmartDisk PC Security System - SafeBoot is an extremely secure and easy-to-use access control system for the personal computer. - SafeBoot is the first access control system to use the SmartDisk. It is the only hardware-based PC security system that is suitable for all PC's including notebooks and portables. - SafeBoot provides two factor access control; your PC cannot be used unless it is booted from your SmartDisk and your SmartDisk password is entered at the SafeBoot log-on screen. - SafeBoot keeps your data confidential and protects your computer from unauthorized users. EASY TO USE SafeBoot is simple to install and easy to use. During installation SafeBoot generates a unique encryption key, stores it one your SmartDisk and encrypts your PC's hard disk using this key. The next time you want to use your PC, you simply boot your PC from your SmartDisk. The SafeBoot log-on screen will appear and will prompt you to enter your SmartDisk password. If you enter the correct password, your computer will start-up as normal. You can then remove your SmartDisk and forget that SafeBoot is installed, as it will not interfere in any way with the normal operation of your computer. SafeBoot will work with all disk utility tools and compression software, including Norton SpeedDisk and MicroSoft DoubleSpace. DATA ENCRYPTION AND BOOT PROTECTION When you boot your computer using your SmartDisk and enter your password, SafeBoot will read the encryption key held on the SmartDisk into the PC's memory. SafeBoot will then transparently encrypt and decrypt all hard disk accesses until you switch off or reboot your PC. Unlike most software-based PC security systems, that have to store the encryption key on the hard disk itself, SafeBoot uses the SmartDisk to store the key. By doing this, SafeBoot prevents unauthorized users from using low level PC recovery tools to discover the key, and 'undo' the hard disk protection. FULL OR PARTIAL HARD DISK ENCRYPTION You can choose how much of your hard disk SafeBoot will encrypt. For most purposes 'partial encryption' is more than adequate and is very quick to install. 'Partial encryption' encrypts the structure of the data on your hard disk - the information which MS-DOS uses to find the files and directories. 'Full encryption' takes a little longer to install, but will protect all of your data against even the most determined hacker. BOOT SECTOR VIRUS DETECTION Software-based virus protection products cannot prevent your computer from 'catching' a boot sector virus. Boot sector viruses can also be the most difficult type of PC virus to detect, as they are loaded into memory before any virus detection software can be run. Once loaded, a virus can pretend that the boot sector has not been modified, thus prevent itself from being detected. Because SafeBoot runs before the PC's boot sector is loaded it can detect boot sector viruses that otherwise hide themselves from virus detection software. THE SMARTDISK Although the SmartDisk looks like a 3.5" floppy disk and fits into a normal floppy disk drive, it is not a floppy disk. It is actually a hardware device with its own microprocessor that provides secure, password protected storage. The SmartDisk differs from all other hardware PC security solutions, for example, a smartcard, because it needs no special readers, extra circuit boards, or power supplies, and no connectors or cables. The SmartDisk operates in a standard PC 3.5" diskette drive without modification to the drive or the PC. SmartDisk directly enhances protection of the PC's data by retaining the encryption key, the password, and the encryption algorithm - none of which remains resident on the PC. This ensures that the SafeBoot software is run before any other software is loaded on the PC, thus enabling SafeBoot to verify system integrity before continuing to load your PC's operating system. LOST SMARTDISK OR FORGOTTEN PASSWORD When SafeBoot is installed, it creates a backup of your encryption key on the SafeBoot system disk. If you forget your password, of lose your SmartDisk, you can use this floppy disk to remove SafeBoot. SECURING MULTIPLE PCs WITH ONE SMARTDISK A single SmartDisk can be used to secure any number of PCs without incremental cost. SafeBoot will generate a unique key for your SmartDisk the first time that SafeBoot is installed, but will allow you to use the same key for subsequent installations. SAFEBOOT FOR CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTS Various utilities are available to facilitate the installation and management of SmartDisks and SafeBoot encryption keys within large organizations. SmartDisk Security Corporation 4073 Mercantile Ave Naples, Florida, USA 33942 (813) 263-3475 voice (813) 643-6357 FAX ----------------- Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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The Psuedospoofing Saga Continues
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: ebrandt(a)jarthur.cs.hmc.edu (Eli Brandt) Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT Date: 5 Dec 1993 00:14:51 GMT Organization: Harvey Mudd College, Claremont CA Message-ID: <2dr95r$6dg(a)jaws.cs.hmc.edu> References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F(a)netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw(a)netcom.com> <Dec04.105319.36526(a)yuma.acns.colostate.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: jarthur.cs.hmc.edu In article <Dec04.105319.36526(a)yuma.acns.colostate.edu>, L. Detweiler <ld231782(a)casco.lance.colostate.edu> wrote: >As for what the paranoid ranter and conspiracy theorist an12070 thinks, >who gives a damn? I'm always amazed at top cypherpunks, supposedly interested >in anonymity, attempting to equate me with this email address. Oh, come off it. Your rants under various names (including your own) are very similar: in tone and style, in topic, in their universal fixation on PSEUDOSPOOFING, "top cypherpunks", and "cypherpunk leaders", in time of night sent to the list, in 0 of punctuation. Then we have an12070 quoting from private mail to you -- you tried to weasel by saying you'd "communicated with your colleague", whom you're now calling a "paranoid ranter". And just today you made a blatant foul-up in your rant on drug conspiracies: > Message-Id: <9312041519.AA16672(a)anon.penet.fi> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi (Pablo Escobar) > puts the life of everyone in the group at deadly dangerous risk. He > said something very bizarre to me, `so Lance, just HOW ARE YOU FEELING > TODAY?' The strange tone was entirely uncharacteristic of him, and I Oops. I find it ironic that for all your rants about PSEUDOSPOOFING, your practices are the most blatant and long-running example I have ever encountered. I would not count your an12070 account as more than one identity, except that you constantly change the name and use different ones to contradict others: "The Executioner" <an12070(a)anon.penet.fi>, says: > I thought that the infamous L. Detweiler had stopped his posting, but it > appears that he is back, and more neurotic than ever. but "S. Boxx" <an12070(a)anon.penet.fi> says: > BTW, many thanks to L.Detweiler for his lone help in helping me break a > corrupt conspiracy and massive cyberspatial hoax. Enough. >Timothy C. May (tcmay(a)netcom.com) wrote: > >: "Medusa" (me, others). I gave up long ago trying to convice Larry >: Detweiler (alias an12070, The Executioner, S. Boxx, The Pervert, The >: Psychopunk, and apparently such pseudonyms) that I am a real person, >That's interesting. Perhaps you would like to enumerate these attempts. You may recall that your very first paranoid claim was that Tim May and Jamie Dinkelacker were the same person. You were given the phone numbers of both -- this was before people became nervous about giving you any personal information. Did you ever attempt a reality check? >If they were, they would have long ago answered my honest questions in >a straightforward manner. Oh, you mean like: >that by E.Hughes in RISKS, `I have never posted under any other name than >E.Hughes' obviously do not count, although they may fool some people. It's not an answer because he didn't ADMIT to his heinous CRIMES, I guess. Rot in place, will you? >ld231782(a)longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU Eli ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail "I have noticed an interesting overlap between radical libertarians, crypto- anarchists, psychopunks, and people who promote sodomy." -- L. Detweiler

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Quote of the Week
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 4 Dec 93 22:20:44 -0500, Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> wrote - > "I have noticed an interesting overlap between radical libertarians, > crypto-anarchists, psychopunks, and people who promote sodomy." > -- L. Detweiler

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Anonymous Digicash
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to write a simple digicash program. This will use code from PGP as much as possible. It will probably be online digicash, but it needs strong anonymity. For that you need a blind signature protocol. What is the best one, and where can I get a description of it? What is the best/simplest digicash system to implement? Is it possible to have a partially blind signature? For example, the customer generates the cash (random string), blinds it, and sends it to the bank. The bank adds an expiration date and signs it. The customer unblinds the random string, leaving a signature on both the cash and the expiration date. --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com

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