December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Books, Loompanics, and other weird stuff
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Branch Cypherians, At the Saturday Cypherpunks meeting (60 people there for all or part of the 6-hour meeting, not counting the remote sites), I displayed a dozen or so books. I've had a number of requests that I post the names, authors, ISBN numbers, and Department of Justice Permission Numbers. These are by no means the most important books to have. We have mentioned the crypto books _many_ times, and also such seminal books as Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace," Kahn's "The Codebreakers," Brunner's "Shockwave Rider," Card's "Ender's Game," and of course Vinge's "True Names." I shall not dwell on these further. (Except to say I did look for used copies of Bamford, for possible mailing to some in foreign countries, but couldn't find any. And I couldn't find any copies at all of "When Harlie Was One," so can't check out the issue of who first talked about worms.) Several points: * I'll list some basic info about these books. * However, these were just a bunch of books I picked to show the range of information about there, the stuff your local library is unlikely to carry. (Things like "How to Create a New Identity," "The Secret Money Market," "Getting Started in the Underground Economy." etc.). Understand that I make no claims that these are the best books available, or that their contents are up to date, useful, etc. * This is why I strongly recommend you get yourself a copy of the wonderfully wacky 280-page catalog from Loompanics Unlimited, Port Townsend, Washington. Details are below. Most of these odd and controversial books I ordered several years ago (1988) from Loompanics...no doubt more current odd books are now available. * Alternative books stores often carry some of these books. For example, the "Anubis Warpus" bookstore in Santa Cruz (across from the Taco Bell on Pacific Avenue) has many of these books, in addition to offering tattoo and peircings (ugh!, but to each their own)...I haven't had my public key tattooed on my arm yet, but I'm considering having "Poor Impulse Control" put on my forehead. * These books are not "crypto" books....I showed them at the "politics" meeting as a change of pace from the usual number theory and crypto-oriented books we pass around. So, here are brief descriptions of the books. Best that you get the Loompanics catalog, which has nice summaries of each of the books and, of course, convenient ordering information. - "How to Launder Money," John Gregg, 1982, ISBN 0-317-03306-9. A small pamphlet, undoubtedly dated material. Useful to provoke ideas, but don't rely on this. - "How to Open a Swiss Bank Account," James Kelder, 1976, ISBN 0-690-01033-8. Also dated....Swiss accounts are passe these days. (I have several of these sorts of books, picked up in various places....your library may have some). - "Getting Started in the Underground Economy," Adam Cash (right), 1987, ISBN 0-915179-46-4. More ideas, but don't rely on it for legal or current advice. Loompanics has a dozen or more titles with themes about black markets, tax avoidance, etc. - "Low Profile: How to Avoid the Privacy Invaders," William Petrocelli, 1981, ISBN 0-07-049658-7. Similarly, Loompanics sells numerous books with this theme. - "How to Create a New Identity," Anonymous, 1983, ISBN 0-8065-1034-X. (Warning: This book comes with the "Law Enforcement Access Field," so that anyone reading the book can be electronically reported to the Witness Security Program, which holds the monopoly on creating fake identities, credit histories, and other legends.) Need I say more? Things are changing especially quickly here, so the material is just a starter. Fake passports and driver's license are now buyable on the streets of major cities (especially in the colored sections) for as little as $25. - "The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State," Bruce Benson, 1990, ISBN 0-936488-30-1. This book I threw in to show folks that the anarcho-capitalist system many of us favor does have some strong underpinnings in legal theory. There are several dozen good books on libertarian theory. Most are available by mail order from Laissez-Faire Book in San Francisco. (Dial 800 Info, or SF Info.) - I also showed a book on American Intelligence agencies (NSA, NRO, DIA, State Dept., etc.) by Jeffrey Richelson, but Whit Diffie has already borrowed it, so I can't provide the relevant info right now. Richelson has written several books on foreign intelligence agencies (BND, Mossad, MI5 and 6, etc.) and U.S. intelligence agencies, and is a good "post-Bamford" source. Enjoy finding and reading these. But your first priority should be to get the Loompanics catalog...other books may spark your interest more. I think the catalog is still $5 (well worth it), unless you order another book first, as described below. Good luck! --Tim May From: solmaker(a)pt.olympus.net (Stephen Schumacher) Newsgroups: misc.books.technical,rec.arts.books,alt.books.reviews,soc.libraries.talk,comp.security.misc,alt.politics.libertarian,alt.zines,alt.wired Subject: review: Secrets of a Super Hacker Date: 7 Mar 1994 11:17:44 -0800 Message-ID: <2lfuko$6rd(a)olympus.net> SECRETS OF A SUPER HACKER by The Knightmare, introduction by Gareth Branwyn, 205 pp., 8 1/2" x 11", ISBN 1-55950-106-5, March, 1994, Loompanics Unlimited, Box 1197, Port Townsend WA, 98368. Price: $19.95 plus $4.00 for shipping (includes a copy of their must-have 280 page catalog of unusual books). Credit card orders to 206-385-2230 (phone) or 206-385-7785 (fax). This is a very good practical book on breaking into computer systems. It's readable, interesting, informative, balanced, and accurate, with a nice spirit of fun and swashbuckling! Here's the contents: Introduction: Hackers: Heroes or Villains? I: The Basics II: The History of Hacking III: Researching the Hack IV: Passwords and Access Control V: Social Engineering VI: Reverse Social Engineering VII: Public Access Computers and Terminals VIII: On-Site Hacking: The Tresspasser-Hacker IX: Hacking at Hope: Dialing Up Computers With Your Modem X: Electronic Bulletin Board Systems XI: Borderline Hacking XII: What To Do When Inside XIII: This Lawful Land XIV: Hacker Security: How To Keep From Getting Caught XV: Conclusion Further Reading Glossary 8 Appendices The Knightmare covers lots of clever technical tricks for gaining access, but he shows most glee with scores of hilarious "Social Engineering" scams for seducing legitimate users into revealing their passwords. The striking thing about these spoofs is, just reading them, you realize through the laughter how often these simple Social Engineering techniques will produce results and how the credulity of non-security- minded naive users is the weak point of any security system. Sometimes while reading, I wished the book provided more specific info about phone numbers, brand names, specific techniques that work on specific bulletin board systems, etc. But I recognize that such information would go quickly out-of-date, or would be fixed in response to the book's publication, or could implicate the author. The Knightmare is presenting concepts that won't go out-of-date soon, giving the interested non-hacker a comprehensive and comprehensible survey of the field, and tipping off the potential hacker with just enough details to get him/her started and steered in the right direction and minimize the chance of getting caught. On this final point... a few times during the early chapters I thought The Knightmare was being cavalier about personal safety, favorably reporting (for example) Social Engineering advertizing scams that would likely bring the cops to one's doorstep. But The Knightmare was saving his warnings for 2 chapters towards the end, 22 sobering pages that make very clear the risks involved and what definitely NOT to do. A very balanced presentation. As usual with Loompanics books, this one can be read backwards, and pages 167-168 are directed specifically to System Administrators interested in beefing up security. I also appreciated all the hacker philosophy and pragmatic do-no-damage hacker ethics. The Knightmare disdains and derides "crackers" who break into a system in order to wreak havok; for him, "hackers" are peaceable, non- destructive puzzle-solvers and liberators of information. In a world where the govco is ever working to extend and centralize its control over financial data, encryption techniques, cyberspace, and every aspect of people's lives, the hacker may emerge as a modern-day Robin Hood. -- Steve (solmaker(a)pt.olympus.net)

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LEAF field encryption
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As promised, I asked Steve Kent -- a member of the review panel -- about how the LEAF is encrypted. Here's his answer, reposted with permission. ------- Forwarded Message To: smb(a)research.att.com Subject: Re: Key escrow review In-reply-to: Your message of Mon, 14 Mar 94 15:54:22 -0500. Date: Mon, 14 Mar 94 17:03:18 -0500 From: Steve Kent <kent(a)BBN.COM> Steve, You are right.... SKIPJACK is used to encipher the LEAF, but employing a complex mode. The FBI can decode the "outer layer" of the LEAF to get the chip ID, by using the "family key" but it cannot get at the traffic key which is encrpted using the device unique key, the splits for which are held by the escrow agents. Steve ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: Nature of RSA's patent
by jmueller＠gac.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I've got a guy who's telling me that PGP-encrypted communications sent > into the U.S.A. from abroad can be stopped at the border as infringing > "products," pursuant to this statute. I know you are looking for legal advice, but the idea of some stiff trying to stop a communication at the "border" just seemed rather ludicrous to me. Somehow I don't think he'll have much luck imposing national boundaries on cyberspace, which has no borders, save those of private, individual systems. Once something is on the net, they'd do better of thinking of it as instantly being everywhere, rather than beating their heads against the wall with old, hidebound ideas of restricting the flow of information. -- Joel Mueller - <Insert your favorite witty quote here; I'm tired.> GAT/O -d+(---) -p+ c++@ l+ u++ e m+ s+/- n- h-- f+@ g+(-) w+ t(--) ry? PGP 2.3a Public Key : finger jmueller(a)gac.edu or on keyservers. 0C6D75 01 0E 16 A7 29 C4 48 75 54 CD 99 09 88 88 3C 39

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Re: Canon Copiers
by Harry Shapiro Hawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jay @ The new models, the 350 and 550 do indeed have a currency recognition @ feature based on color. I was talking to a serviceman--interestingly, as @ I used to be skeptical of this feature--someone here conjected that it @ would be based on color. they were right. Smart. I was the one who said it might be color based. It maybe but once it finds the color it might do something else; I was able to copy one size but not the other. I thought it might be color as the copier has lots or routines for finding and shifting color; very helpful in the graphics are business. /hawk Harry Shapiro Hawk Manager of Computer Services Warwick Baker & Fiore habs(a)uucp.warwick.com

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Hey...
by jmueller＠gac.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's just occurred to me - say that all the petitions against clipper are ignored, clipper becomes mandatory, and other methods of encryption are outlawed, and clipper gets a user base of several million. One well-placed explosive device that destroys even one of the two escrow databases, and suddenly the government has supplied us with secure encryption that even they can't break. Of course, that is assuming that the government didn't lie and make extra backup copies (just for safety's sake, you understand, against just such a threat) that are kept somewhere out of public scrutiny, so that wiretaps can be made on a large scale without alarming people monitoring the access of the "official" database. Say all this happens. Maybe the government will even be the one to rig the explosion. Suddenly people lose all their reservations about using Clipper products. The government decides to give up escrowing keys (officially). But they can still listen in everywhere, and people won't be guarded. That first paragraph is also assuming that they didn't build in a back door to the encryption system. But then essentially the same scenario would apply. -- Joel Mueller - <Insert your favorite witty quote here; I'm tired.> GAT/O -d+(---) -p+ c++@ l+ u++ e m+ s+/- n- h-- f+@ g+(-) w+ t(--) ry? PGP 2.3a Public Key : finger jmueller(a)gac.edu or on keyservers. 0C6D75 01 0E 16 A7 29 C4 48 75 54 CD 99 09 88 88 3C 39

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Transcript: Barlow v. Denning on America On Line, 02/10/94
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

March 10, 1994 online debate between John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Dr. Dorothy Denning, over the Clipper Chip scheme, from the Time Online forum of America On Line. 3/10/94 8:49:41 PM Opening "Chat Log 3/10/94 CLIPPER" for recording. OnlineHost : Good evening and welcome to the Time Online Odeon! Tonight we look from both sides at the Clipper Chip, a semiconductor device that the National Security Agency developed and wants installed in every telephone, computer modem and fax machine. OnlineHost : In his article in the current issue of TIME, Philip Elmer-DeWitt writes: "The chip combines a powerful encryption algorithm with a ''back door'' -- the cryptographic equivalent of the master key that opens schoolchildren's padlocks when they forget their combinations. A ''secure'' phone equipped with the chip could, with proper authorization, be cracked by the government. OnlineHost: "Law-enforcement agencies say they need this capability to keep tabs on drug runners, terrorists and spies. Critics denounce the Clipper -- and a bill before Congress that would require phone companies to make it easy to tap the new digital phones -- as Big Brotherly tools that will strip citizens of whatever privacy they still have in the computer age. OnlineHost: "Lined up on one side are the three-letter cloak-and-dagger agencies -- the NSA, the CIA and the FBI -- and key policymakers in the Clinton Administration (who are taking a surprisingly hard line on the encryption issue). Opposing them is an equally unlikely coalition of computer firms, civil libertarians, conservative columnists and a strange breed of cryptoanarchists who call themselves the cypherpunks." RPTime: Lined up on our stage tonight are John Perry Barlow, Dr. Dorothy Denning and Philip Elmer-DeWitt. Barlow is co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which promotes freedom in digital media. A recognized commentator on computer security, he is arguing against the Clipper Chip Dr. Denning is the chairperson of the Computer Science Department at Georgetown University. A leading expert on cryptography and data security, she favors the adoption of the Clipper Chip. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, TIME's technology editor will lead the questioning of our guests. Audience questions may be sent up using the Interact with Host function....Phil? PhilipED: Dr. Denning, could you *briefly* make the case for why we need the key escrow encryption system. DDenning: The government needs a new encryption standard to replace DES. They came up with a very strong algorithm called SKIPJACK. In making that available, they didn't want to do it in a way that could ultimately prove harmful to society. So they came up with the idea of key escrow so that if SKIPJACK were used to conceal criminal activity, they would be able to get access to the communications. PhilipED: THanks. Mr. Barlow, could you briefly make the case *against* Clipper. We'll see if I can be brief. We oppose Clipper in large part because of the traffic analysis which it makes possible. We believe that it is in the functional nature of the chip as designed to greatly enhance the ability of government to observe who we are calling, when, and from where, all fairly automatically and centrally. We also oppose Clipper because of the many way in which we believe the escrow system could be compromised, by people and institutions both inside and outside of government. PhilipED: Dr. Denning, what about John's contention that Clipper makes it easier to detect calling patterns. DDenning: I don't buy this. First off, for law enforcement to access any communications, they need a court order. Even if the communications are encrypted. Second, with a court order, they can get access to call setup information and find out what other lines the subject of the investigation is talking to. This is of much more use than anything in the encrypted stream. PhilipED: John, is Dorothy right that you need a court order for call set up info? Barlow1: Dorothy, the government asked for and received over 100,000 calling records last year without a court order. I see nothing in the Clipper documents which indicates that they would require a court order to get this kind of information, which each chip would make readily available to the entire network. DDenning: You need a court order to do implement pen registers and dialed number recorders in order to find out who is talking to whom. Barlow1: Furthermore, my faith in court orders has been eroded by 30 years of government wiretap abuse. PhilipED: Aren't we talking about three different hurdles here, one for a wiretap... Barlow1: But that's only with the present system where putting a pen register on a line requires physical entrance to a phone company site. PhilipED: One for a pen register (to track calling patterns in real time) and one for phone records. RPTime: Let's take a question from the audience... How would you guarantee that this facility will never be misused? If you can't make that guarantee, why should a democratic society, with a prohibition against prior restraint, consent to this? John Barlow? Barlow1: There are three different sources of information, as you say. But there are not three "hurdles." That sounds like a question for Dorothy. I don't think we should, obviously. RPTime: Dr. Denning? DDenning: First of all, there has been no evidence of widespread abuse of wiretaps since passage of the 1968 and 1978 wiretap statutes. Second, there are a lot of security mechanisms going into it to protect against abuse. Third, it will provide much greater protection against illegal wiretaps than we have now, since almost all phone conversations are in the clear. It will make virtually all illegal wiretaps impossible. Fourth, if for some reason it doesn't provide adequate protection, we can destroy the key databases and everyone will have absolute privacy against government wiretaps. I don't think our society will tolerate that kind of abuse. PhilipED: John, isn't Dorothy right that you're better off with compromised encryption than none? Barlow1: Gee, where to begin... First of all, there was plenty of abuse after 1968. Remember Watergate, Dorothy? Second, I believe that Clipper in the Net will dramatically *enhance* certain powers of... DDenning: I was talking specifically about wiretap abuses. And there hasn't been any evidence since the 1978 law. Barlow1: surveillance over current technical abilities. One of the reasons that wiretap hasn't been more abused is the bureaucratic overhead of current practices. Make it so that it doesn't require 50 agents to conduct a wire tap and you'll see a lot more of it. And Watergate included quite a number of wiretap violations. Indeed, the burglers were caught trying to install one. As to the assertion that we can always back up and destroy the databases if we don't like it, I can't imagine that someone as bright as yourself would believe that this is possible. Technology and power ratchet into positions which almost never retract without a complete change in the system of authority RPTime: Care to respond Dr. Denning? DDenning: Clipper would prevent the watergate burglars from getting anywhere since they wouldn't have a court order. Clipper will not make wiretaps cheaper or easier. Wiretaps are becoming more diffiults. And there will always be more agents involved becasue they have to follow exacting procedures, including minimization (throw out all conversations that are not specific to the crime at hand). Barlow1: Dorothy, they were from the *Government* remember? I can't imagine that Nixon wouldn't have been able to find a sympathetic ear from somebody at NIST and somebody else at Treasury. Further, you're not talking about the truly insidious element of this, which is dramatically improved traffic analysis. Content is less important than context, and most agents will support this. RPTime: Another question from the audience. JCMaille asks... Does the government have a constitutional right of access to my personal communications? Dr. Denning, why don't you go first? DDenning: The Supreme Court ruled that wiretaps with a court order are Constitutional. At one time, communications were not even protected under the 4th Amendment. The government could wiretap without a court order! Now a court order is required. PhilipED: To put the question another way, do citizens have a right to use powerful encryption? DDenning: Right now there are no laws preventing the use of any encryption. Clipper is voluntary. You can still use something else. RPTime: We have to apologize. John Barlow has temporarily lost his connection... PhilipED: Dr. Denning, in your opinion... would a law outlawing powerful encryption be unconstitutional? DDenning: I don't think so. But that doesn't mean it will happen. RPTime: John Barlow is back with us. Sorry for the interruption! Barlow, Denning just said she didn't think a law banning powerful encryption would be unconstitutional What do you say? Hi folks. Don't know what happened. Gald to be back Gald indeed! Barlow1: Actually, I believe that our current export embargoes are a violation of the 1st Amendment which specify speech without regard to the manner of speech. If we could restrict manner of speech, it would be constitutional to require that everyone speak English. Which of course it isn't PhilipED: John, can you make the case why ordinary law-abiding citizens need powerful encryption? Barlow1: Because it is in the nature of digitally networked communications to be quite visible. Everytime we make any sort of transaction in a digital environment, we smear our fingerprints all over Cyberspace. If we are to have any privacy in the future, we will need virtual "walls" made of cryptography. RPTime: Another audience question... Isn't this like the gun argument? If guns are outlawed only criminals will have guns? Well, if clipper is standardized, won't criminals be the ones NOT using it? RPTime: Dr. Denning? If Clipper becomes the de facto standard, then it will be the chief method of encryption. That would be what you'd get at Radio Shack. What criminals use will depend on what is readily available and what their cohorts are using. Both parties of a conversation have to use the same thing. Criminals also talk to a lot of people outside their immediate circle - e.g., to buy goods and services. Also, they can be quite stupid at times. But the main thing is that criminals will not be able to take advantage of the SKIPJACK algorithm as a way of concealing their conversations. This is the whole point. It is not to catch criminals. It is to allow people access to a really high quality algorithm in a way that someone cannot use it to conceal criminal activity. Barlow1: The gun analogy is excellent up to a point. I can't for the life of me imagine why we would think that even a stupid criminal would use Clipper if something else were available. And when I talk to people in the administration their big hobgoblin is the "nuclear-armed" terrorist. Any fanatic smart enough to assemble and detonate a nuclear device is going to be smart enough to download PGP from a bulletin board somewhere. Also, I'd like to point out that the gun analogy doesn't go the whole distance. Crypto is by its nature a purely *defensive* technology. You can't shoot people with it. PhilipED: Speaking of PGP, Dr. Denning, is that encryption system secure, in your opinion? DDenning: I don't know of anyone who's been able to break the IDEA algorithm that it uses. RPTime: Back to the audience for a question from Steve HW.. This is for Dr. Denning. What is the evidence of harm if the Clipper proposal is not adopted? DDenning: The harm would be to the government. They would not be able to use it and would have to resort to something less secure. Also, Clipper is part of a larger project to make hardware available for encryption and digital signatures. This will be used, for example, in the Defense Message System. The goverment needs a new standard. I personally believe that making really powerful encryption like SKIPJACK available without key escrow could be harmful to society. Wiretaps have been essential for preventing and solving many serious crimes and terrorist activities. Barlow1: Why on earth would the government have to use something else if they failed to get the rest of rest of us to buy into this folly? Hey, they are already using SKIPJACK. It's a government algorithm and has been in use for a... DDenning: CPSR and others are asking the government to drop Clipper. Barlow1: long time. There are plenty other algorithms which we can use which are truly protected... unless of course, this is only the first step in a process which will outlaw other forms of crypto. And I believe that it must be. Makes absolutely no sense otherwise. EFF is not asking the Government to drop Clipper, though we would vastly prefer they did. We're merely asking that no steps be taken to require it either by law or practice...as, for example, would be the case if you had to use a Clipper chip to file your tax return. PhilipED: Dr. Denning, do you think this is the "first step in a process to outlaw crypto"? DDenning: No I do not. The government has not been using SKIPJACK to my knowledge. The Clipper initiative represents the first time that the government has put one of their really good algorithms out there in the unclassified arena. They are trying to do this in a way that won't backfire against the public. Other NSA developed algorithms are not available for purchase by the public. Barlow1: I appreciate their willingness to make some of that crypto research available to a public which has paid so much for it, but I'm afraid that I would never trust an algorithm which was given to me by any government. And I certainly don't trust a classified algorithm like Skipjack, even without a back door which everyone can see. I think I'll stick to systems which have been properly vetted to be clear of such compromises, like RSA. I hope others will do likewise and that RSA will become the standard which Clipper shouldn't be. RPTime: Time for one more question from our audience... To John Barlow. Isn't society becoming increasingly vulnerable to concerted criminal/terrorist disruption, requiring *stronger* law enforcement tools? Barlow1: Gee. I don't know. It's a scary world. However, I'm willing to take my chances with the few terrorists and drug lords there are out there rather than trusting government with the kind of almost unlimited surveillance power which Clipper and Digital Telephony would give them. It's a touch choice. But when you look at the evil perpetrated by government over this century in the name of stopping crime, it far exceeds that done by other organized criminals. RPTime: Dr. Denning, hasn't remote listening technology enhanced police abilities to eavesdrop to the point... where the loss of a few wire taps won't mean much? DDenning: No. They need to get the cooperation of the service providers to implement a wiretap. The loss of some wiretaps could be costly indeed. As an example, wiretaps were used to help solve a case that involved plans by a Chicago gang from shooting down a commercial airliner. There have been 2 cases where they helped save the lives of kids who were going to be kidnaped for the making of a snuff murder film. They helped solve a case where a man's house was going to be bombed. I could go on. If we take John's arguments about law enforcement to their logical conclusion, we'd just get rid of law enforcement. I think it's better to have it. The people in law enforcement hate it as much as the rest of us when some member of the community does something wrong. And they correct it, design new procedures and laws where necessary, and go on. Barlow1: Oh, please. I'm not proposing eliminating police. I'm opposing giving them unlimited powers. Also,these are the same cases cited over and over by everyone from you to Judge Freeh. Surely, we aren't going to fundamentally change the balance of power in this country because of these two (undocumented, to my knowledge) stories. DDenning: Clipper is not going to change the balance of power. It does not give law enforcement any additional authority to do wiretaps. Barlow1: Well, this is where we basically disagree, Dorothy. If we could continue the same level of LE capacity we presently have, I'd have no objection. But I believe, for reasons I'm not sure we have the bandwidth to discuss here, that we are talking about dramatically enhancing their abilities. For one thing, we would greatly reduce the bureaucratic overhead involved in wiretap, which is what keeps it under 900 cases nationwide at the present. RPTime: And that will have to be the last word on the matter for tonight... DDenning: The overhead of a wiretap is more likely to increase, not decrease. PhilipED: Not quite! Maybe not! ;-) RPTime: THAT will be the final word! Barlow1: Well, let's get together and talk, Dorothy. RPTime: TIME thanks Dr. Dorothy Denning and John Perry Barlow for being with us tonight... along with Philip Elmer-DeWitt. Thank you all, and goodnight! Thank you both. This was very interesting. DDenning: Thank you for the opportunity to be here!

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Spy Satellites For Sale -- lots of reasoning here should apply to cryptography
by farber＠central.cis.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Resent-From: farber(a)aurora.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) Posted-Date: Sat, 12 Mar 1994 02:27:15 -0800 Date: Sat, 12 Mar 1994 02:27:15 -0800 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: nobody(a)shell.portal.com Subject: Spy Satellites For Sale Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From line. It is from an automated software remailing service operating at that address. Please report problem mail to <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com>. Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Resent-To: farber(a)pcpond.cis.upenn.edu Resent-Date: Sat, 12 Mar 94 09:37:14 -0500 The New York Times Friday, March 11, 1994, p. A1 U.S. TO ALLOW SALE OF THE TECHNOLOGY FOR SPY SATELLITES ------------------------- Profit vs. Security Issue ------------------------- Marketing to Private Customers Assailed by Some Who Fear Use by Hostile Nations ------------------------- by Edmund L. Andrews Washington, March 10 -- The Clinton Administration announced today that it would allow companies to market sophisticated spy satellite technology to commercial customers around the world. The decision marks a big change from the comparatively strict limits now imposed on satellite-imaging systems, and it caps more than a year of intense debate among the Commerce Department, the Pentagon and Government intelligence agencies. The move, which could attract new business worth hundreds of millions of dollars to American industry, also marks one of the clearest examples so far of the Administration's intention to emphasize commercial and economic priorities over more traditional cold war-era concerns about national security. Change Raises Concern Some security experts questioned the decision to allow wider access to a technology that has been described as one of the most powerful tools in America's espionage arsenal. But others said the technology was already becoming available in other countries and that American companies should be allowed to profit from the trend. Under the new policy, American companies will be allowed to build and operate for-profit satellite systems that are powerful enough to take photographs from 22,300 miles above the earth and depict objects on the ground as small as one square yard, smaller than a subcompact car or a hot-dog stand. Several American companies, among them the Lockheed Corporation, are hoping to set up satellite imaging services for customers around the world. As envisioned by Lockheed, customers would be able to transmit instructions directly to the satellite, which would turn its cameras to the desired location and then beam the images back to the ground. Such customers might include oil and mining companies and environmental researchers. 'A New Era' Administration officials said that companies would also have greater freedom to export entire satellite systems to foreign countries, though such sales will still require approval from the State Department. "This is 1994," David J. Barram, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, said in an interview today. "This is a new era. We believe national security and economic security are intertwined. In order to have national security, you have to have vibrant and competitive industries that are allowed to do what they do best." But some experts warned that the decision could severely compromise national security by letting hostile countries use America's own spy technology to obtain detailed images of sensitive military installations in the United States or to plan military activities elsewhere in the world. "The main customers for these systems will be the intelligence agencies of other countries," predicted John Pike, director of space policy at the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit group devoted to science and public policy. "They have fairly strong safeguards here. But in practice it is going to be difficult to prevent North Korea or Iraq from using a front company to gain spy satellite photos in the same way they acquired nuclear and chemical missile technology." Numerous companies already market commercial satellite images, which can be used for mapping, geologic surveys and even agricultural purposes, like remote monitoring of cattle herds. But currently, the most sophisticated of these services is offered by Spot Image, a French company, and it cannot produce photographs showing land areas smaller than about 10 yards in diameter. And while the Spot system is being upgraded, it will still be unable to view areas smaller than five yards. Lockheed and other American companies have been arguing for permission to operate systems that could depict objects about a square yard in size, a request that had been resisted by the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency. Growing Market Despite the agencies' concerns, Administration officials said today that they fully intended to approve requests like those of Lockheed, and went on to argue that the higher-resolution images are essential if any significant commercial market is to be formed. The Commerce Department says that remote-sensing services, as they are known, currently make up a $400 million market worldwide; the market is expected to grow to about $2 billion by the year 2000. Besides Lockheed, two other American companies have sought permission to operate high-resolution satellite-imaging services. One is the Orbital Sciences Corporation, a small rocket and satellite company based in Dulles, VA. The other is World View Inc., a start-up company in Livermore, Calif. Administration officials said that while the companies intended to adopt the precise technology that has long been used on Government spy satellites, the new policy included a number of safeguards to prevent the technology from falling into the wrong hands. As happens now, the Commerce Department must still approve each application to operate a commercial satellite surveillance system or to sell such a system within the United States -- or to market the services around the world. Sales of such equipment outside the country, however, will be subject to the export-control procedures already in place for products that have military applications, which means that each sale must be approved by the State Department and that sales to hostile countries will likely be blocked. But under the new policy, the Government would be much more likely to approve spy satellite exports. Right to Decode To prevent the misuse of satellite data sold by the new commercial services, the Government said that the companies would have to maintain a record of every job the satellite had been instructed to carry out. Moreover, the satellites cannot scramble their transmissions with coding technology that the Government cannot decipher. An oil company could protect its business secrets -- for example, by transmitting its exploration photos in scrambled form -- but the Government would have the right to decode them. In addition, the new policy leaves room for the Government to shut down a satellite system during what an Administration statement described as "periods when national security or international obligations and/or foreign policies may be compromised." But industry officials who supported the new policy said they had been assured by Commerce Department officials that the country would need to be in a "Persian Gulf situation" before it began shutting down systems. Executives at companies that have pressed for more liberal rules said the new policy gave them virtually everything they wanted. "We are very pleased that the Administration put together such a forward-thinking policy that allows the application of defense technology for commercial purposes," said Brian Dailey, vice president at the Washington office of Lockheed Corporation. Gilbert Rye, corporate vice president at Orbital Sciences, echoed that view. "It's an outstanding development," he said. Security Agencies Sign On Today's decision was supported, at least in public, by the Defense Department and other agencies concerned with national security issues -- despite earlier resistance. Two Central Intelligence Agency officials were present at a news briefing for reporters today, though they did not make any comments. Some longtime national security experts said the new policy made sense, given the proliferation of satellite imaging technology around the world.

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NY UNIX Clipper Article
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vice President Says Clipper Chip Controls Inadequate Gore Indicates Administration's Position is 'Not Locked in Stone' By Jay Levin (C) 1994 >From New York Unix Vol 4 #3. For private use only. WASHINGTON, Feb 11 -- Vice President Gore said controls recently adopted by the Clinton administration that authorise two government agencies to safeguard the electronic "keys" in an encoding device called the "Clipper Chip" are inadequate. Under the Clipper plan, the keys would be stored at the Treasury Department and the National Insitute of Standards and Technology (NIST), whic is part of the Commerce Department. Both Treasury and Commerce are from the same branch of government, the executive branch. "When I saw that I said 'Wow. That is not right,' and I raised hell about that," Gore said in an interview Thursday. Having the key holders from the same branch of government raises concern because there is no systems of checks and balances, Gore said. "That's going to be changed," he said. Clipper gives law-enforcement agencies a key to eavesdrop on computer comunications under a court order. The selection of NIST and Treasury "was spun out of the process at the low level and was not vetted at the top," Gore said. Gore's comments were made after appearing before the first meeting of a private sector advisory panel on the development of a "national information infrastructure" in Washington, D.C. The administration announced Feb. 4 that it intends to push ahead with the voluntary Clipper Chip encryption scheme, despite vehement opposition from computer companies and watchdog groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsability. But Gore indicated Thursday that the administration's position is "not locked in stone." "Our determination to solve the problem is locked in stone, and our determination to proceed with this in the absence of of a better solution is locked in stone," he said "...the burden is on those who say there is a better solution because no solution for the national security dimention of the problem is acceptable to us." Mitch Kapor, EFF chairman and a member of the advisory comittee, said he was "encouraged" by the vice president's remarks. "This signals to me that [the administration] is very ready and willing to look at alternatives... both to the administrative procedures and the technology." Computer manufactures, telecomunication companies and civil rights groups argue that Clipper would undermine individuals' rights to privacy and cripple U.S. exports of computer products. "If I'm going to conduct business... engage in confidential conversations... send money and credit card numbers over this infra- structure, I want some guarantee that my communications are private and that some rogue law enforcement officer can't go in and compromise my information," said Esther Dyson, president of EDventure Holdings, Inc. and a panel member.

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REQUEST FOR FTP INFO
by THOMAS E. KADISH--WILSHIRE II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'M NEW TO THE INTERNET AND FTP. PLEASE REPLY WITH INFO TO COMPLETE THE DOWNLOAD OF INFO CONTAINED IN THE SCI.CRYPT FAQ. I CAN GET INTO THE COMPUTER AT MIT BUT CAN'T GET PAST THE BLOOM-PICAYUNE.MIT.EDU PROMPT. HELP WOULD BE APPRECIATED. TERRORIST

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Re: Super Bills and the US gov.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This message is in response to the person who implied that the "Super Bills" were created by the US government as a device to get Clipper implemented. I just thought I should put things in perspective. I refuse to beleive the US government would do such a thing for several reasons. <- I thought the implication was that the government had ANNOUNCED such a thing at an appropiate time to lay the seeds. Consider the most recent CIA scandal. The crime bill and digitel go through the pipes pretty easy after that. It's reason enough to think that if our skill-less spy had used IDEA or TDES, government would be shouting to high heaven about how we NEED CLIPPER NOW to get this crime scourage UNDER CONTROL. The contention that the federal government would mint billions of dollars of "bogus" money to implement an admittedly important but less than crucial scheme is just silly. -uni- (Dark)

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