December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

What's a "real encryptor"?
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Typo correction from first post: If PGP outputted such a hard-to-distinguish-from-random data format, it opens up many different possibilities for sending your messages. Ideally, no one would be able to tell if it was an encrypted message except by successfully decrypting it. As it is now, such schemes have to rely on "encrypting" an already encrypted PGP message to hide the fact that it IS a PGP message! Many of us just want to be left alone and are tired of having our files tagged as BEING encrypted. Personally, I suggest using PGP as a Clipboard utility so I can cut a message out, encrypt it, paste it back in and save it as a word processor file which I then Macintosh BinHex encode as text, and e-mail off. Now I'm just sending a BinHexed word processor file, just like thousands of other Macintosh e-mailers out there every day! This isn't good enough since it is so easy to reverse, AND can be automated. Honestly, I'm not doing this much yet with distant friends, but then there are only two of them ;-), and they are still struggling with just e-mail. PGP is still a program only used by those why really need it. It may remain that way, so for those people, having a random data block output would mean they wont set off alarms and catch the attention of the government, just for sending a love letter to their mistress ;-). It would also render the Clipper issue moot. -=Xenon, who never could type, and breaks things a lot still=-

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keyservers
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just downloaded the demon.co.uk public keyring...but, since I don't have mosaic or WWW and can't use the ai.mit.edu server, how would I add my public key to such a keyring? Thanks for any thoughts.

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How do I choose constants suitable for Diffe-Hellman?
by 0x7CF5048D＠nowhere 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- How do I choose constants suitable for Diffe-Hellman? According to _Applied Cryptography_ n should be prime, also (n-1)/2 should also be prime. g should be a primitive root of unity mod n. n should be 512 or 1024 bits long. Are there any other requirements? How can I choose such numbers? Are such numbers published anywhere? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLmNv5g2Gnhl89QSNAQEnOQQAq8N8NyL9aTFEFq7BfhmXp4J/K8cSiIZU pP+yaIymt69Ne4fqxv2R26wqgRtqSw/jENgmCOJpK1SIeqeRX0/X4WikAh/v+4uC UhvJ48aBiS5Yosct6I2NiFMINS91m0IoCicqNU2IyRG8mzSSzKUWvSivIGSy87VR 8LPgC/AvH8Q= =iDBs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: REAL WORLD ENCRYPTION
by an57322＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy wrote: > >I would like to start a new thread. I want to know what the >people on this list intend to do with cryptography in the "real >world." There are a number of Cypherpunk projects on the drawing >board or already deployed: Stego, encrypted phones, encrypted >and anonymous remailers, stealth PGP, a digital bank, etc. Do >the folks on this list intend to use these tools, or is your >interest only theoretical? > [stuff deleted] >My interest is more than academic. I am one of the Cypherpunks >involved in creating a digital bank. If the 700 or so people on >this list wouldn't open an account in a digital bank, chances are >no one else would either. The same goes, of course, for secure >phones, encrypted e-mail, and all the rest. If the bank provides international transfers then I would be your first customer. -=T.A.Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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tracking contacts with clipper
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May notes; >This is an important point, which I've seen mentioned a few times >over the past 10 months, but not given nearly enough attention. To >wit, if Clipjack phones are ever used by dissidents, subversives, >Cypherpunks, etc., then the key block that goes out with every >call--from both ends of course--will make recording the identities >of both parties trivial. I agree with Tim whole-heartedly on this one. If the NSA gets it's much desired "Digital Telephony Initiative" passed it will be a trivial matter both politically and technologicly to intercept and record all clipper key block transactions. The ability of the NSA to do this, and the usefullness of this kind of traffic analysis is left as an exercise for the reader. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLV+pGdCcBnAsu2t1AQGKJQP+KFDQpldLphqjmZAKlLXHE5Hv/uN01OwN jK6Dg0gCuS/ffCyzX3G0E7Zu9EcyMN8v6LWFCDTtpTVJCmsGrxjlapzyyS3QAH3r +HdflypHtd0XEwLIdG2j2XJ3t7sATk5hYgfFG68J2Qw0WSuCrWNc0P2uOCK8XFQ7 meOESkfnsKs= =GOf2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tracking Contacts with Clipper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A comment in sci.crypt about how Clipper will make it much easier for the Feds to track who's talking to whom... This is an important point, which I've seen mentioned a few times over the past 10 months, but not given nearly enough attention. To wit, if Clipjack phones are ever used by dissidents, subversives, Cypherpunks, etc., then the key block that goes out with every call--from both ends of course--will make recording the identities of both parties trivial. The "webs of trust" of PGP get replaced by "webs of co-conspirators." An easy way to track down associates. Further, merely using an encrypted phone with a "racketeer-influenced" person could conceivably enmesh one in the conspiracy. (This is merely speculation.) Whatever happened to the "phone remailer" project? The idea, floated about 15 months ago by parties who can speak up should they wish to (I only contributed some ideas, but was not the originator), was to create commercial phone banks that would scramble the origin and destination of call. Somewhat like call forwarding schemes (which wreak havoc with some wiretap procedures) and like the old stand-by of renting a room and having one phone wired to another phone. The idea here was to put these capabilities into a central switch and sell access, various optional services, etc. Out of the country would be even better. (Did you know that some of those ee-vil 900 phone sex outfits have moved to non-U.S. locations? Seems that U.S. law about blocking access, not to mention, antipornography laws, doesn't apply in places like Tijuana.) I could see some tie-ins with Voice PGP (the Soundblaster-based projects supposedly being worked on by several different groups). --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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Typo in article I quoted
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jay Freeman has informed me that the recent NYT article mentioned in a talk.politics.crypto posting I quoted contained an obvious typo: "9/12/94" instead of "2/12/94." Ordinarily this would be of no consequence, but Jay points out--quite properly--that I have a well-known penchant, not to be confused with my well-known pynchont, for using fictional accounts of happenings for satirical effect. The inclusion of a _future_ date was merely a typo, not a hint at satire. So, the article really did appear, or so said the talk.politics.crypto article. (We out here on the beach have to visit our nearest bookstore to actually get a copy of that there New York City paper.) And today's Safire article, provided by Duncan Frissell, is a compelling critique. Admiral Bobby must be really fuming now. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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No Subject
by Dirk Elmendorf 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscribe delmendo(a)trinity.edu

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Detweiler remailer abuse
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I can't take life seriously enough to censor old Larry. I can't take the IDEAL of the First Amendment lightly enough to do so either. And afterall, he wasn't the one who wrote that "Blacknet" blurb. I find it amusing to see uptight fuck-wads from specialized narrow minded Usenet groups yelling about someone sending something to their precious little group that upset them. Abuse away Larry. Show us that we really DO need dumb optical fibers between laptops instead of this tight-assed RFC standardized World Wide Wiretap we call our playground. We need a new net guys. -=Xenon=- <qwerty(a)netcom.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWA4nQSzG6zrQn1RAQE1ygQAhOXiq/M11xIMNHxfdQUjgC+qBtWVx6IL WklpjXroNgb2mc4Xjqh2i/Pw4PZ39ecZYsdeIs7BViWw3FuAE+GAvqCAL8+tI5Hv Il5NxyNj/k8NqRhZY9YjWv7zzFZ9VKl1ifj4/eScEKcF6ZkbyaCrUAVJTXkJlcyx nTRfsFFYFLA= =Fbyt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by Dirk Elmendorf 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anybody know any anonymous news reader cites? Please send replies to delmendo(a)trinity.edu

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