December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Clipper and Entrapment!
by Jonathan Scott Mallin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perhaps mandatory encryption will be struck down by a court. It seems to me that if the government portrays this as a "safe" method of encryption criminals can make the claim that they would not have committed crimes if they didn't feel that their encryption was secure. Since the government promotes this false sense of security the government may in fact "create" additional crime. I am not saying that I believe this argument.. it is, however, one that can be made. _ __ __ _ _ _ _ | |___ _ _ | \/ |__ _| | (_)_ _ <*> Jonathan Scott Mallin | |_| / _ \ ' \ | |\/| / _` | | | | ' \ <*> <jmallin(a)umich.edu> \___/\___/_||_| |_| |_\__,_|_|_|_|_||_| <*> Email for PGP key -> This entire message is (C) 1994 by Jonathan Mallin. Reproduction is <- -> prohibited without express written consent. <-

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ditz in office
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: cowen(a)glia.biostr.washington.edu > >now i wish i had not voted for the ditz in office. I wish everyone who voted either Republican or Democrat instead of Libertarian because they didn't want their vote to be wasted would take a moment to consider how their vote would have meant any less if they had voted for Andre Marrou and Nancy Lord in '92. Also, those who do not vote because they feel it just encourages the bastards should consider voting Libertarian next time. And those who voted for Perot as a protest, why not vote for freedom next time? tw

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Re: Dorothy Denning
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Number 2. People on this list have said that she's an expert in cryptography. When I read that damned Newsday article posted on cypherpunks, I thought that she was just a whiny college bitch. The argument was just very, well, flimsy is the word I guess. I believe that Clipper is wrong, but someone could at least write a paper that would influence more by pointing out its merits, rather than just saying that the government should start spying on all of us to stop drug deals.... Anyone know: A) Is she an expert in cryptography? B) Is she a college graduate? Dr. Denning is the head of the computer science department at Georgetown. She's the author of ``Cryptography and Data Security'', a classic (though now somewhat-dated) work in the field. In sort -- though she may be politically naive, and she obviously puts a different weight on personal liberty than do most of the people on this list -- she can't be accused of technical incompetence. There is no doubt that she knows more -- and perhaps far more -- about cryptography per se than do most of the people on this list. And of course, you don't want to put cryptographic details in an Op-Ed column in a tabloid newspaper; most of the audience won't understand them.

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A Push for Surveillance Software
by mikemck＠mrc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are some choice excerpts from the headline article of the NY Times Business section, 2/28. A Push for Surveillance Software by John Markoff In the age of computer communications and digital telephone calls, the American people must be willing to give up a degree of personal privacy in exchange for safety and security, the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation said. In an interview on Friday, Louis J. Freeh (note: is it really pronounced Free?), the FBI director, defended proposed legislation that critics say would turn the nation's telephone network into a vast surveillance system. He said taxpayers would be asked to pay up to half a billion dollars to develop and deploy the necessary network software. The administration wants to impose new technology that would enable law-enforcement agents to gather a wealth of personal information by monitoring citizens' calling patterns and credit card transactions over the telephone network - and over the two-way cable television networks being planned by cable and phone companies. The system would go well beyond current wire- tapping technology, because much of the information could be gleaned without the police or FBI actually having to eavesdrop on specific voice or electronic-mail conversations. "The costs are high, but you have to do a cost-benefit analysis," said Mr. Freeh, who insisted that fighting terrorists and criminals was the governments intention - not playing Big Brother to the citizenry. ... The administration is trying to line up congressional support for the legislation, called Digital Telephony and Communications Privacy Improvement Act of 1994, before having it formally introduced. ... ____________________________________________________________ There's much more but I don't have a scanner handy. I can't believe how quickly this appalling threat has developed. The government always veils its expansion of powers as a need for increased security: the War on Drugs, criminals, terrorists. What I'm really surprised by is that they foresee the endpoint of freely available information technology, a diminishing need for centralized government. If the net contributes to the end of centralized control, it's easy to extrapolate who the target terrorists are going to be. mikemck(a)mrc.com

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Need info on E-mail security
by KEPERRIER＠setpoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I need a some help from all of you crypto-literate people out in Net.Land. The company currently employing me has recently opened several overseas offices. We have connected ourselves to the Internet to send e-mail between the Houston office (corperate HQ) the new overseas offices. As to be expected, the powers-that-be here gave no thought to security for e-mail. I have brought this to their attention about 6 weeks ago and nothing has been done yet. I know 6 weeks is a short period of time but this is still a relatively small company (400 people) so something should have happened by now if anything was going to happen. That's the history of the current situation. I believe I need to provide some proof as to how easy it is to read unencrypted Internet E-mail. Not being an experienced programmer and not knowing how a lot of things work on the Internet, I do not know how easy it is to scan in-transit e-mail for keywords. Could some kind person please inform me as to how easy it is to do this, and, if possible, please direct me to a place that papers and/or programs have been written on the subject. I belive I need to "shock" the higher-ups that this could be a very big problem if we don't do something now while use of the Internet is light. Thanks, Kent Perrier keperrier(a)setpoint.com (work) kperrier(a)neosoft.com (play) Corporations don't have opinions, people do. These are mine.

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Re: Dorothy Denning
by nobody＠jarthur 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Anyone know: >A) Is she an expert in cryptography? >B) Is she a college graduate? Now you may not agree with Dorothy's stance on Clipper, but you can't mar her academic record. Yes, she is a college graduate and an expert in cryptography. She was a professor for a while at Purdue, and is now chair of the computer science department at George Washington University. She has written quite a bit, including _Cryptography and Data Security_ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLXJj5IOA7OpLWtYzAQGn8wP/S1AFr0SfdcZcJ/XNbCU2VbP9NkbTfNAz Zf3ZiokCyvt9MwZxt6oFKRS9FgePPNysWxNegJyLWmT7KGUKE3fqK+5NEX6k8ZCz /f5/W3s4RmemQWBT3+FYkybtfqWI7GfkH3xzr4D0L5fWcyaH2S+jSXDAbHdQOlC2 02hR4C5orj0= =YVfF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Dorothy Denning
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York Newsday, Tuesday, March 1, 1994 Letter to the Editor THESE YANKEE CLIPPERS ... Dorothy E. Denning asserts that the federal government needs to force telecommunications consumers to buy into a so-called "weak encryption" scheme using the National Security Agency's "Clipper" computer chip because the government needs to be able to decrypt communications traffic that criminals might generate in the future ["The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime," Viewpoints, Feb. 22]. Denning fails to offer any evidence that any criminal or terrorist group has ever used encryption in the past, and also fails to explain why they would be stupid enough to use a compromisable encryption scheme in the future. Denning glosses over past governmental abuses of intercept technology with assurance that Clipper intercept procedures are resistant to abuse. Denning fails to mention that federal documents confirm that government intercept procedures involving Clipper technology offer users no more protection from wrongful government surveillance than plain text. Intercepted data protected by so-called "strong" encryption cannot be told from data protected by weak encryption until somebody actually tries to break the code --- which would make random checking of the data stream necessary to expose users of strong encryption schemes. But the government disclaims the use of codebreaking except under court order. Universal adoption of Clipper technology is unlikely because now, just months after the government unveiled Clipper, designers are offering, through electronic bulletin boards and user groups, freeware [available for free tryouts before buying] programs using strong encryption. It is only a matter of months before true "military-strength" encryption software reaches the market --- making Clipper the Edsel of cryptography. If the government forces Americans to use nothing but Clipper encryption, we can kiss the First and Fourth Amendment rights good-bye. Hold out for military-strength encryption to keep your data safe! Ludwig R. Vogel Manhattan Editor's note: The writer is chair of the Libertarian Party of New York State. The views expressed are his own. ---- Keyboarding by Lois Roth --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Mar 17 IEEE mtg:Cryptanalysis of DES
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Santa Clara Valley Information theory Group will meet to talk about Cryptanalysis of DES. Topics will include differential cryptanalysis (Biham & Shamir) and Matsuis linear cryptanalysis. Spekaers will be Susan Langford, grad student in Stanford's EE Dept., & Dr. Martin Hellman, professor in Stanford's EE Dept. Dinner, 5:30 at Good Earth, University Ave., Palo Alto, CA Presentation, 7:00, Rm 450, Durand Bldg, Stanford. Reservations (dinner? pay for yourself?) Art Astrin 408-970-6826 ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave, MS 305-3B * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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Re: ditz in office
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Even if the normal parts of the Bush and Clinton Administrations are equally fascist, the Clinton Administration would win in net fascism since it includes an added (unelected) fascist element missing from the Bush administration: Linda Stasi reports in her column "Hot Copy" in the New York Daily News today (Tuesday, March 1, 1994) that she and some other gossip columnists were invited to have tea with Hillary Clinton yesterday. [Hillary was in town to boost her health care program with a visit to a very recently improved Kings County Hospital. The units Hillary visited were specially scrubbed for her visit and contained fewer patients than usual.] Linda says Hillary "...never wants to run for public office herself. But she'd probably get elected in a minute." Think again Linda. You also provided us with another one of those `Hillary's Ominous Quotes of the Day': "AT A CERTAIN POINT, YOUR RIGHTS MUST BE ABRIDGED FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD." The statement might simply be her response to a question about convicted rapists not having to submit to an AIDS test. And then again, it might not. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Reply-To: header
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I noticed taht the 'Reply-To:' header now replies to cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com. Is it supposed to be this way? ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> In the United States, they \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> first came for us in Colorado... -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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