December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(fwd) Re: Error in RFC1 321 (MD5)?
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought (perhaps) this may be of interest - Forwarded message: > Newsgroups: sci.crypt > Subject: Re: Error in RFC1 321 (MD5) ? > Date: 18 Oct 93 09:10:29 > Organization: RSA Data Security, Inc. > Lines: 27 > Distribution: world > Message-ID: <BURT.93Oct18091029(a)chirality.rsa.com> > References: <29u8jqINNn0s(a)umbc7.umbc.edu> > NNTP-Posting-Host: chirality.rsa.com > In-reply-to: olson(a)umbc.edu's message of 18 Oct 1993 10:18:34 -0400 > > In article <29u8jqINNn0s(a)umbc7.umbc.edu> olson(a)umbc.edu (Bryan G. Olson) writes: > > I just ftp'd RFC 1321 ( MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ) from > rsa.com, and I believe there is a minor error in the > specification of the algorithm. > > On page 5, the four operations used in the four rounds are > defined, and the operations for round 3 and 4 seem to have > mis-matched parameter names. Specifically from page 5: > > [...] > >> /* Round 3. */ > >> /* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation > >> a = b + ((a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ > >> /* Do the following 16 operations. */ > [...] > >> /* Round 4. */ > >> /* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation > >> a = b + ((a + I(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ > >> /* Do the following 16 operations. */ > [...] > > Yes, the 't' should be an 'i'. Not a major source of confusion, but > something that should be noted and corrected. > > -- Burt Kaliski > RSA Laboratories > _____________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson Mindbank Consulting Group fergp(a)sytex.com Fairfax, Virginia USA ferguson(a)icp.net

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Re: PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ah, the infamous Shred Scott decision.

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Re: pseudospoofed out
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

on Wed, 20 Oct 93 09:23:03 PDT, hfinney(a)shell.portal.com (Hal Finney) writes: < A basic principle of < discourse is that the validity of an idea is independent of its source < (which is why ad hominem attacks are considered invalid). Yet this < principle is not widely followed (which is why ad hominem attacks are < considered effective). i believe the reason this principle is not often followed is because so much context is gained from knowing who a person is. not just the message history, but knowing what a person's experience and profession are can be extremely helpful in understanding the intent of the communication. removing the sender's identity also removes a substantial amount of semantic information. computers might be able to send billions of bits per second over a network, but it's up to us humans to remove the degrees of freedom and figure out what is really meant. < Dug's solution enforces the discipline of judging < each piece of mail on its own merits. Maybe more people should consider < this approach. i don't think that's what he meant. Doug Luce <doug(a)lm.net> says: < if i can't figure out who it is by the context, the sender loses. which means to me, doug is still using contextual information gained by his knowledge of the sender. as an example, i often find mr. detweiler's posts to this list difficult to interpret, since i don't know him personally. is he playing devil's advocate? is he just trying to be entertaining? is he deliberately behaving in a schizophrenic manner, or is he just a victim of MPD? i can't tell from his posts alone. which is why i believe that honest humans for the most part will have no good reason to spoof. trusted communication just won't work without reputation. both the sender and receiver rely on context provided by reputation to send comprehensible messages. ---- i liked the point made recently that e-mailing lists are often like discussions at a coffee house, and are not formal environments for objective culling of opinion.

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taggnets
by kone＠COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Taggnets are also found in the main components of "home-made" bombs. At least as early as '85. (call it a childhood indiscretion.) Components like high nitrogen fertilizer and heating oil #5. This alows the investigator to narrow down about when and where the components were bought. (I had bought a large quanty with my fathers card.) Most cases are solved because the "mad-bomber" is follish. i.e. keeps on buying more components or explosives, after the first bombing. Or, like me, bought in large quantys with no real reason too. Just something to think about. Kone. (yes it is a real name.)

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Re: crypto technique
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >So, if I could prevent you from finding c, then you couldn't solve it. >How can I do this? By adding another constant. [...] >136.375x^4 + 139.25x^3 + 33.625x^2 + 110.75x + 179 >So what values for A,B,C,D,E,& F did I use? Have fun factoring! :) Sure, I'll give it a whirl as soon as my exams are over. Offhand, it looks like you get five equations in six unknowns, which is under-specified. So possibly one parameter can take on any value (or maybe any odd value), and the rest are then solved in terms of the fixed variable. The variable paramter can only take on values less than P (maybe only odd values under P), the number of unknows is then 2*(nestings) - 1; everything still looks linear. However, I haven't actually tried yet, so we'll see! This isn't meant as a flame (in fact, this method is very interesting), but you've posted two or three methods and declared them all impossible to break. Are you yourself trying to break these schemes? The very first method posted would have fallen under scrutiny. Also, mail any additional info to me directly; I'm behind on list mail. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMV1CIOA7OpLWtYzAQGQRAP8CT79JpMKxVb/R//GVUfmCJ2ybtf8ASGY BZa8bsL1VG49sxpoe7LsnQH2mJVAv3GloJhnuVN0d/MbTmohN6mgtGXbrQxvTdyn r0eaTYcrXI0hiR5ahPp5SdfAHGuQ9LeQDermiiU+DK8I6lc+K6tzG0ZOUvs4r80n cF4K9aXSaLQ= =wMas -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re:backing
by F_GRIFFITH＠CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: CCSVAX::F_GRIFFITH 19-OCT-1993 16:06:40.42 To: SMTP%"owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com" CC: F_GRIFFITH Subj: Re: backing? peb:if a currency loses reputation (value) people will switch to a better reputation (value) currency (paraphrase) Greshams law: "bad money drives out good" i.e. where people have a choice (e.g. gold vs greenbacks post Civil War), in making payments, they will use the lesser value money and keep the higher value. Thus, the lesser value money will circulate, the higher value money will not.

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defeating traffic analysis
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 22:43:46 PDT >From: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com (Hal Finney) >Message-Id: <9310200543.AA22959(a)jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com> >Subject: Re: JUDGMENT PROOFING >This is exactly what anonymous remailers are for - to defeat traffic >analysis. The goal is a situation where you, and everyone else, receives >and sends out a bunch of encrypted traffic every day. There will be >no way a snooper can find out exactly what you are reading, what you >are writing, or whom you are communicating with. That's what I call >private. To really defeat traffic analysis you also have to remove any information from volume of traffic. If I don't know any message routing but I do know that cme sent 10 MB of traffic and you received 10 MB of traffic and the other 30 people on the anon subnet dealt with only 100B each, .... So: have everyone send and receive exactly the same size message to/from the same sites at the same time every day. - Carl

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Re: why anon bank acct?
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor(a)foretune.co.jp> > Not at all. I recognise that, however inefficient, taxes pay to maintain > the legal and physical environment that makes my life more comfortable. > There are many oppressive things about governments, but _by_and_large_ > the US government is one of the least oppressive, and the vast majority > of the people who work in it are honest and well-intentioned. I don't know if I'd go so far as to say that myself. But the reality is that no matter how much some of us would like to replace the current government with a more libertarian one, or how much we would like to see the current government back off from its current course, its not gonna happen. > What I hope comes out of groups like cypherpunks are ways to make the > government better and more responsive to the needs of the citizenry > (in other words, some good checks and balances), rather than petty > ways to avoid a few bucks in taxes. Rather than aspire to join the > alleged clique of rich and powerful tax evaders, might it not be better > to aspire to develop techniques that both maintain privacy but guaran- > tee that they have to pay their share of the load. Hint: develop > something that makes it worth their while. exactly, this is exactly what I have been getting at. LUX ./. owen

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Please add me to mailing list
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to be added to the cypherpunks mailing list. Thanks, Jim_Miller(a)suie.com [Sorry for broadcasting this to the entire mailing list, but I don't know of any other address to use.]

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US Privacy Council Seminar
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

US Privacy Council Seminar 10/22 *********************************************************** [please post] US Privacy Council Brown Bag Lunch Seminar Series "Privacy and the National Informational Infrastructure" Patricia Faley US Office of Consumer Affairs CPSR Washington Office Friday, October 22, 1993 12:00 - 2:00 pm Pat Faley is Acting Director of the United States Office of Consumer Affairs and Chair of the Working Group on Privacy, Information Policy Committee, Information Infrastructure Task Force. She will discuss the Clinton Administration's privacy proposals for the NII for the NII and for the health care reform program. Following Ms. Faley's talk, there will be a general meeting of the US Privacy Council to discuss the agenda for the Clinton administration on privacy issues such as health care, the SSN, the Clipper Chip, and amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. CPSR Washington Office 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 303 Washington, DC 202/544-9240 (one block from the Eastern Market metro) In cooperation with Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. For more information on the US Privacy Council, please contact Evan Hendricks at 202-829-3660. [if you would like to be notified of future USPC Seminars, please send a note with e-mail address to banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org] ***********************************************************

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