December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Crypto Idea; Multi-Part Sigs
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Carl's comment that, for RSA, decryption and signing are really identical, gets to the heart of the matter. Hal posted a method for letting N people together do the operations. For N people separately, a trusted mailer run by one of the people can solve the decryption problem (RSA-decrypts the session key using its private key, RSA-encrypts it with the public keys for all the recipients, retransmits), and it's ok to trust it since the list-runner is allowed to see the messages anyway. This nethod tends to require the sign-N-times method of encryption or signature, whish is boring but adequate for many needs, unless you want the users to be anonymous. The N of M signature method from Shamir doesn't work will if you want to preserve anonymity of members of the group, and giving everybody in the group their own copy of the key also may have drawbacks.

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Re: Strong PRNGs
by Matthew B. Landry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Another point: it raises the possibility of an interesting loophole >in the ITAR. Cryptographic hash functions are exportable, as "systems >for authentication", or something to that effect. A random-number >generator based on a hash function should be exportable. After all, >as you say, >> I have many uses for random numbers and none of them is XOR encryption. > >But such an RNG *could* be used for encryption. If you package and >market it as such, you're asking for trouble. But packaged as a >library routine in a simulation library? It's not a fast PRNG, but >it should be pretty good statistically. Does it strike you as ironic that in this atmosphere where "exporting" basically secure products like PGP is illegal, that exporting the tools to generate one of the best possible (in the security sense) encryption systems known to current technology (better than anything that can be implemented in software, anyway) would be _legal_, because it also has ample uses that are unrelated to cryptography? If only One Time Pad style systems weren't so kludgey, this would present the _perfect_ solution to our problems with ITAR and the like. Unfortunately, there are some things they can't do. Oh well... Please don't bother to tell me that we'd need to physically build hardware to generate seeds for the hash functions, because I already know that. I didn't say it was entirely practical, just that it was an interesting bit of irony. -- Matthew B. Landry ml7694a(a)american.edu (Finally!) mbl(a)ml7694a.leonard.american.edu

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PGP removal
by KENUNGER＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I first got pgp2.2 from compuserve ibmsys forum downloads. A few day ago the file finder on cis listed PGP2.3. When I actually looked neither program was there. Sysop says the were removed on advice of his lawyer(not compuserve management ) because of government crakdown. and questios of legality. The not so subtle hand of intimidation by rumor seems to be at work here. Just thought this would be of interest. p.s. I FTPed it from the INTERNET anyway.=======Ken PPUBLIC KEY AVAILABLE ON PGP KEY SERVERS .

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Re: Crypto Toolkit Suggestions
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re: Hiding processes and data via subordinate processes, variables, et cetera... it will probably be a _lot_ better and easier to simply assume that a multi-user unix system isn't secure to begin with, and work out alternatives from there. Phil

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Network Etiquette Question
by DON_HENSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a quick question on network etiquette. Shouldn't it be considered bad form to post a PGP-encrypted message (readable by only one person) to a list like Cypherpunks? Don Henson PGP key on server or on request

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Posting Long Documents
by DON_HENSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the interest of saving money (for those of us who have to pay for our internet access), please DO NOT post long reference documents, such as the 'ASCII version of ECPA' directly to the list. A much better way to get this information out would be to post an anonymous FTP site where the document can be obtained. Would appreciate muchly. Don Henson PGP key avail on server or on request

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Macintosh System 7 Pro, e-mail, encryption
by msattler＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I installed Macintosh System 7 Pro (7.1.1) onto my PowerBook today. I'd heard that e-mail was part of the new package, but I was amazed to see how integral it is. When you start up for the first time you are asked for a userid and a password to protect your "PowerTalk Keychain". A mailbox and a "catalog" appear on your desktop; the latter is a list of entries in different domains (like AppleTalk, EtherTalk, etc.) so that you can authenticate yourself on all the places you exist with one login. E-mail comes free with the system and works automagically when multiple users install the new system. I haven't used a lot of this system since it's so new, but I sent this message because it heralds a new era of turnkey mail/network-identity. I'm investigating how this works with AppleEvents to see how PGP can be seamlessly integrated. A friend of mine went to the product launch at Apple and got a free "signed" RSA user identification voucher. I'd be very interested in hearing from others who have a clue about this stuff. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Michael S. Sattler msattler(a)netcom.com +1 (415) 358-3058 Digital Jungle Software Encrypt now; ask me how. (finger for PGP key) Evil will certainly triumph if good people do nothing at all.

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Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
by pierre＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu> > > The attitude expressed by the individual on io.com shows a problem we > will have in educating others - "anonymous posts CAN destroy a civil > conversation". Yes, maybe so, but in my experience on mailing lists, > bbses, etc. I've noticed that "flame wars" and "anonymous posts" have > NO correlation, and are quite independent of one another. > > Since I've seen "flame wars" on systems with absolutely no anonymous > posting facilities (or none that were used), I conclude that civil > conversation is destroyed by strongly held differences in opinions (or > some other factor I can't pin down). I'll second that. The main menaces against "civil conversations" have been, on Netnews, flame wars and wars between two individuals. After the first few messages, the flamers and the opponents are clearly identified. They are usually proudly posting under their usual Name (as they are all fighting for their Reputation, and for establishing their opponent's Incompetence) (... do we recognize anybody yet :-? ) I actually can't remember such a war involving an anonymous poster (as in "using penet or similar"). What destroys discussions (and forces people to leave them...) is the tendency of threads to start genuine, and to end as flame wars. Certainly, for-money systems would tend to shorten flame wars.. On the other hand in the few discussions against anonymous posting, some people were arguing for "accountability" who were clearly forgetting the proportion of people who use handles or pseudonyms as their default setup. These are not anonymous per se, but in the current fickle netnews, what's the difference? (BlackNet would make a difference :-) Only in the most outrageous fraud cases (votes, forgery...) are pseudonyms tracked back to their account holder. Solution (1/2 kidding): Build an anonymous remailer that gives a choice of "obviously anonymous output", or "random pseudonym output". You could even take the pseudonym from the phone book, or from the names of the people who used the newsgroup in the past :-) Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Digital Cash Primer
by DON_HENSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Shari Steele writes: -> Hey 'punks. Anyone know of an elementary primer on digital cash? I'm trying to get up to speed on this. <-- I would like an elementary primer also. How about posting the info to the list vice just to Shari. Thanks, Don Henson PGP key avail on server or on request

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brin on privacy
by peter honeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

david brin spoke in ann arbor recently at a library science school alumni meeting. his talk was titled "Information and the 21st Century: Privacy, Wealth and the Newest Threat to Freedom." here are my recollections; hopefully they're not too dim or biased. getting right to the punch line, tNTtF is this: privacy laws will be used as a weapon by the Rich and Powerful to restrict the free flow of information. brin feels that privacy laws will be ineffective against the RaP, will be sold to the rest of us through effective propaganda, and that they will be used by the RaP as a means to cement their power base. he argues that complete and open access to information provides the greatest social benefit and best serves The American Dream. asked about clipper, he suggested that key escrow was exactly the sort of tool that the RaP would use, and that we would all benefit by banning cryptography. asked whether private citizens should be barred from insuring personal electronic privacy, he replied that he felt that such measures would be ineffective agianst the RaP. (i concluded from these answers that cryptography is not brin's strong point.) brin's message was basically a populist one. he is concerned that the moguls of data will have the opportunity to control what we see and hear. what i found most fascinating about his talk was that while i generally agree with the social objectives he backs, i am in 180 degree disagreement on how to accomplish these ends. peter ps: anybody else get the willies (as it were) reading paul goggin's note about foia, where the asst atty genl was asked about fbi foias against individuals, and replied that the new foia regs presumed disclosure? hey brin, there oughtta be a law!

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