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RE: MD5 weakness ? [was Re: Netscape Log
by agermain＠cmp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have unsubscribed from this mailing list. Please remove my name from your personal address lists. Thanks. ahg3 ---------- From: Steve Bryan[SMTP:sbryan@maroon.tc.umn.edu] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 1995 3:08 PM To: Dr. Frederick B. Cohen Cc: cypherpunks Subject: Re: MD5 weakness ? [was Re: Netscape Logic Bomb detailed by IETF] Dr. Frederick B. Cohen writes: >In the case of the trust being placed in MD5 by Netscape, the assumption >being made (without adequate support as far as I can tell) is that an >MD5 checksum cannot be forced, through a chosen plaintext attack, to >yield checksums of 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, ... on up to enough primes to >allow the known plaintext attack that gets the RSA private key used to >authenticate messages. As far as I am aware (and I may not be aware of >everything) there is no reference work to support this assumption. If >the assumption is wrong, then the whole SSL can fall to a selected >plaintext attack launchable (presumably) through those general purpose >Java aplets we have heard so much about. With a mailing list this large and diverse one can reasonably assume a range of interests and expertise. What I don't understand is your agnostic stance on something as apparently basic as MD5. If computer security is your purported area of expertise why have you not reached any firm conclusions about it? I understand that rigid conclusions are unsafe (eg they'll never prove Fermat's last theorem) but it is not like every question is equally open. Do you have a realistic attack on MD5 or is this sophomoric claptrap? How do you propose to generate messages with specific message digests? Assuming you could somehow, how do you proceed to use that information to your advantage? So let's say I have a message digest and I'm retrieving the allegedly corresponding message which you have the opportunity to alter to your heart's content. How would you proceed, even in principle, to defeat MD5? I realize I might be assuming too much when I posit that I have the true MD5 for the message but my understanding is that you feel that MD5 might be vulnerable. I've given you all the known plaintexts. Is there a next step? +---------------------------------------------------------------------- |Steve Bryan Internet: sbryan(a)gofast.net |Sexton Software CompuServe: 76545,527 |Minneapolis, MN Fax: (612) 929-1799 |PGP key fingerprint: B4 C6 E2 A6 5F 87 57 7D E1 8C A6 9B A9 BE 96 CB +----------------------------------------------------------------------

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RE: MD5 weakness ? [was Re: Netscape Log
by agermain＠cmp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have unsubscribed from this mailing list. Please remove my name from your personal address lists. Thanks. ahg3 ---------- From: Dr. Frederick B. Cohen[SMTP:fc@all.net] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 1995 4:01 PM To: cypherpunks Subject: Re: MD5 weakness ? [was Re: Netscape Logic Bomb detailed by IETF] ... > I believe Dr. Cohen's point is that no-one knows, AFAIK, how to prove that a > one-way hash is truly one-way (uninvertible). We cannot prove that MD5 is > secure, ergo we cannot (completely) trust it. [Please correct if this is a > substantially incorrect inference.] > > One of the standard responses is "it's the best we can do". When people said > this about PGP, FBC made some (IMHO) interesting comments about the > encryption he uses in various circumstances. Perhaps he would like to share > his personal choices of one-way hash functions with us. Since you asked: It's a really complex issue. As a fundamental, we know that any "one-way" hash function must be many-to-one, which means that, in practice, there are always large numbers (2^large numbers) of sources for any given hash. This means that forgeries are always possible. I know of no way to prove that (and no convincing argument that the workload for creating) a forgery is hard for any "one-way" hash function. This seems to mean that we are always betting on faith about these things. The techniques that seem to be reasonably good are; modular exponentiation in a modulus that's the product of two appropriate primes (a.k.a. RSA but throw out the private key when you create it); certain classes of non-linear feedback shift registers of high degree; and some general class of mixing algorithms like MD5. The RSA-type hash is slow, and some great mathematician may show up tomorrow and lay waste to the whole thing. Non-linear feedback shift registers have the advantage that we don't know how to factor high-degree equations, so we don't know how to make simple closed form solutions to find output values. MD5-type systems are good because they combine diffusion and confusion and avoid a lot of the more well-known flaws as far as we know. None of these reasons are particularly convincing, so I think we have to take a risk management approach. So the ultimate question here is, how much are we willing to bet that nobody can break one of these in the intended application over a particular time frame. I trust the RSA and NLFSR systems, if reasonably well implemented, for a single short time-frame low-valued transaction. For example, pick a good pseudo-random number and create an RSA one-way hash of 512 bits (the random number issue is of course another whole area), encrypt the first bloack, Xor with the second block, encrypt the result, etc. till done, then Xor again with the original random seed, send the file and the hash along with the one-way key, and get a confirmation back within a few days. I don't trust any of them as a basis for running a major part of an economy over open communications links, and I especially don't trust them when combined or when the security of one depends on another. To run an economy, I think you need more redundancy, more personnel security, more stop-loss capabilities, physically secure devices, independent checks and balances, etc. Someone on this list mentioned that the banking system trusts the RSA and MD5, etc. but this seems to me to be a mischaracterization. They trust these systems to an extent, but they have key change requirements, regular audits, physical security, relatively secured communications lines (when compared to the Internet), strong procedural controls (most of the time), and other such protections, and they still get hammered for a few million now and then. This is probably enough for now, since the list is probably getting tired of my posts and I have made the major points. -- -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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RE: (fwd) Chaum vs. Stein
by agermain＠cmp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have unsubscribed from this mailing list. Please remove my name from your personal address lists. Thanks. ahg3 ---------- From: Robert Hettinga[SMTP:rah@shipwright.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 1995 3:52 PM To: cypherpunks Subject: (fwd) Chaum vs. Stein --- begin forwarded text To: www-buyinfo <www-buyinfo.allegra..att..com(a)mail.checkfree.com> From: Andrew Barrett/CheckFree Corporation <Andrew_Barrett(a)checkfree.com> Date: 24 Oct 95 13:38:40 EDT Subject: Chaum vs. Stein Wanted to save my 'me too' until a time I could piggy-back it onto something a little more pithy (and I DO mean 'little'). Robert, thanks for taking the time and energy for filtering cpx and forwarding the best. David, thanks for providing the forum. Now that _that's_ out of the way ... I've just been handed a registration booklet for The Bank Administration Institute's Retail Delivery '95 conference December 2-6 in Atlanta. Notable speakers include The Bill, MasterCard CEO Eugene Lockhart, Visa International CEO Edmund Jensen, Intuit CEO Scott Cook and Checkfree CEO Pete Kight (among others). Featured on page 6 is a "Fireside Chat: The Financial Marketplace of the Future" moderated by Lou Dobbs... How warm and fuzzy. What really caught my eye was a panel discussion on Internet Security scheduled for that Wednesday. The panelists are David Chaum, Cybercash CEO William Melton, and FV CEO Lee Stein. If anyone goes, tell us all how it went! Kicker - the postal frank is of the "non-profit organization" variety. BIA's site is at http://www.bai.org --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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RE: Weekly Type-II Remailer List
by agermain＠cmp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have unsubscribed from this mailing list. Please remove my name from your personal address lists. Thanks. ahg3 ---------- From: John A. Perry[SMTP:perry@alpha.jpunix.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 1995 12:32 PM To: Mixmaster Mailing List; Remailer Operators; cypherpunks Subject: Weekly Type-II Remailer List Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ED: You might notice that gondolin has retired. 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PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! 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RE: MD5 weakness ? [was Re: Netscape Log
by dmandl＠bear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I have unsubscribed from this mailing list. Please remove my name from > your personal address lists. Thanks. > > ahg3 We heard you the first 15 times, Einstein. --D. -- ******************************************************************************* Bear Stearns is not responsible for any recommendation, solicitation, offer or agreement or any information about any transaction, customer account or account activity contained in this communication. *******************************************************************************

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Re: Welcome to cypherpunks
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Why am I getting this when I am already subscribed to the list?????? > Because someone signed the list up to the list...probably inadvertently. They probably sent something to majordomo with a line like: subscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com thinking it actually made sense for some reason...then again they might have done it on purpose. Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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Re: Mandatory ID in California?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:45 AM 10/25/95 -0700, Ian Goldberg wrote: >"The officer, in accordance with police policy, arrested Burton >for refusing to properly identify himself." ><snip> > >That last sentence seemed ominous to me... This has been chatted about for years. Under California law, failure to identify yourself is a minor violation. They always dismiss the next day at your hearing. You don't have to carry ID, you just have to identify yourself (there's a difference). "my name Jose Jimenez." You still don't need ID unless you are operating a motor vehicle on public streets and roads (or maybe catching a plane). DCF "The average seasoned citizen pays a higher percentage of his income for medical expenses today than he did in 1964 before the passage of Medicaid."

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17 Dec '03

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Re: textbooks
by koontz＠MasPar.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IP/FP and PC1 describe how to get from input bytes to L, R, C and D Blocks: The Initial Permutation The Initial Permuation (IP) is a description of how a byte wide interface is connected to a 64 bit block comprised of two 32 bit blocks (L and R). Consider a byte wide interface with the bits numbered 1-8. The event numbered bits go to the L Block and the odd numbered bits go to the R block. Note that the bit order is big endian, where bit 1 is most significant and bit 8 is least least significant. The input block is typically loaded as 8 successive byte loads: Port MSB7 Input (LR) Left Bit Bit Block (64 bits) Block (32 bits) 2------6-------58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 4------4-------60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 6------2-------62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 8------0-------64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Right Block (32 bits) 1------7-------57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3------5-------59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 5------3-------61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 7------1-------63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Input Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The Final Permutation The Final Permutation (IP-1) provides the inverse, it standarizes the output of the R16L16 output block to a byte wide interface. The Output block is ordered Right then Left to allow complementary operation for subsequent decryption. Were one to perform an IP followed by IP-1 without any intervening round iteration operations, one would end up with odd and even bits swapped: Right Output (R16L16) Standard Port Block (32 bits) Block (64 bits) Bit Bit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8---------6--------2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16---------4--------4 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24---------2--------6 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32---------0--------8 Left Block (32 bits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40---------7--------1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48---------5--------3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56---------3--------5 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64---------1--------7 Output Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 >From FIPS Pub 46-2: Final Permuation IP-1: Output Byte 40 8 48 16 56 24 64 32 1 39 7 47 15 55 23 63 31 2 38 6 46 14 54 22 62 30 3 37 5 45 13 53 21 61 29 4 36 4 44 12 52 20 60 28 5 35 3 43 11 51 19 59 27 6 34 2 42 10 50 18 58 26 7 33 1 41 9 49 17 57 25 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Port Bit 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 MSB7 Bits In the simplest hardware implementation of DES, the Left and Right blocks are comprised in hardware of four 8 bit register each. Each 8 bit register can be serially loaded (IP), serially unloaded (IP-1), or parallel output and parallel loaded (round interation). DES is an encryption algorithm originally required to be implemented in hardware, specified in 1977 - predating 16 or 32 bit microprocessor peripherals. Permuted Choice 1 PC1 performs a similar function loading the C and D 28 bit registers (comprised of three 8 bit bidirectional shift register and 1 4 bit bidirectional shift register, all with parallel outputs). The C and D registers can be serially loaded (shifting right), or serially shifted left or right in a closed ring for encryption or decryption. Port MSB7 Bits Bits Input (CD) C Block, 64 bits Block (28 bits) 1--------7------57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 MS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2--------6------58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 3--------5------59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4--------4------60 52 44 36 ----------- (C(28)) 25 26 27 28 D Block (28 bits) 7--------1------63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6--------2------62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 5--------3------61 53 45 37 29 21 33 5 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4-------(D(25)--------------28 20 12 4 25 26 27 28 8--------0------64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 LS (parity) Input Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Note that bit 4 is used as input for both C and D. This implies that C(28) output is used as the serial input to D(25). The least significant bit is used for odd parity.

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arg
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Frissell: "The average seasoned citizen pays a higher percentage of his income for medical expenses today than he did in 1964 before the passage of Medicaid." Do you set aside a quiet hour every day to think up this crap?

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