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Re: Another view of the CFP
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Harry Shapiro Hawk wrote: > The White House Guy wrote: > - Clipper-encrypted messages may be further encrypted with another > cryptosystem. However, messages may not be encrypted before being > encrypted with Clipper. > I can understand why they would want to do this as a policy. > e.g., they can see who is using other encryption > 1) Was he saying they would make this the law? > 2) Is there any technical reason it should be this way? The proposed standards I've seen on the net say you can't encrypt *after* using Clipper, because that makes Clipper key-theft useless. On the other hand, encryption with real systems before encrypting with Clipper is undetectable until after they decrypt the Clipper, so it's hard to enforce except on people who are already suspects, and is unlikely to be convenient to implement (for interoperability) on some of the major Clipper targets, like cellphones and fax machines. ...... Wiretap the usual suspects!

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Re: The dumbest question...
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

... is the one you don't ask. So here I go... #1 Isn't "part of the deal" of patent granting a requirement that the details of the thing being patented be revealed. If so, why isn't IBM required to reveal the details of s-box design? After all, they hold the patent on DES. They revealed the values of the S-box. Unless the patent included claimes relating to its design criteria, they didn't have to disclose them. Of course, then they wouldn't be protected if someone else were to reinvent and use those criteria in a cipher that isn't covered by other parts of the DES patent. #2 Skipjack has a 80 bit key which is proposed to be "escrowed" in two parts. Now considering that the likeliest attack on DES is a brute force key search of 2^55 keys, isn't it true that a compromise of one half of a "Clipper key" would allow a brute force attack to "discover the remaining 40 bits. If 2^55 is possible, then 2^40 is even easier, no? As several people have pointed out today, the two halves are 80 bits apiece, and they're XORed together to make the full key. You can't do a brute-force search on 80 bits.

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Crypto and new computing strategies
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

British physicist David Deutsch has been writing for several years on the theoretical properties of computers which would exploit quantum mechanics. Here is the abstract from his paper in Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A, v 400, p97-117, 1985: Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer "It is argued that underlying the Church-Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: 'every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means.' Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the 'universal quantum computer' are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include 'quantum parallelism,' a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett's. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the 'complexity' or 'knowledge' in a physical system than does classical complexity theory."

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crypto software/papers/docs CD -- is there any interest?
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forgive the somewhat commercial nature of this message, but I think it is well within the lines of the cypherpunks mission of getting code out to people. --- I'm considering the possibility of producing a CD (for distribution in North America only) of crypto source code, information/papers and binaries for common platforms. It would include the software available from the common ftp archives (soda.berkeley.edu, wimsey.bc.ca, ripem.msu.edu, ftp.dsi.unimi.it &c.) plus other assorted tidbits I've collected over the last few years. The cost would be somewhere around US$50 depending upon the demand (more CDs pressed translates into a lower price; there would be some equipment costs to offset). The CD doesn't exist yet; I'm just considering the possibility of putting this together. So, would anyone be interested in such a CD? -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca (personal account) RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp -- wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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Data on clipper phones
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Subject: Another view of the CFP >From: Eric Blossom <eb(a)sr.hp.com> > >Wow, I'm pretty sure I have some 4100 data sheets I got ~9 months ago >that said the 4100 did not use clipper, but used some "proprietary" >algorithm. The 3600 sheets I rcvd at the same time did make reference >to clipper. I'll have to dig them out and check. > >> Security features >> >> - Clipper encryption algorithm - Display window for (sp) >> - Secure Access Control authentification identification >> System (SACS) - Information to create a call > >Anybody know what SACS is? > >Eric Blossom The data sheet is labeled 5/93. I received in in July 1993. I just called up a marketing guy at AT&T and asked. The 4100 is not available with clipper now, but should be available in late summer. It is unclear whether 4100s will be able to interoperate in clipper mode with other 4100s or just talk to 3600s in clipper mode. The clipper systems delivered to date are 3600s. The 4100 is currently available with one of two proprietary encryption algorithms, one for export. SACS is a screening mechanism to prevent you from going secure, except with expected callers. It also provides user and security level authentication. By definition, data transmission is not available on clipper phones now. From the FIPS Pub it is permissible (see the following). You'll have to wait to see if AT&T will produce a product that can this summer. The reason would not be that it is forbidden (its not), rather muddying of product definitions and competition between products. >From FIPS PUB 185: ... The SKIPJACK encryption/decryption algorithm has been approved for government applications requiring encryption of sensitive but unclassified data telecommunications as defined herein. The specific operations of the SKIPJACK algorithm and the LEAF creation method are classified and hence are referenced, but not specified, in this standard. Data for purposes of this standard includes voice, facsimile and computer information communicated in a telephone system. A telephone system for purposes of this standard is limited to a system which is circuit switched and operating at data rates of standard commercial modems over analog voice circuits or which uses basic-rate ISDN or a similar grade wireless service.

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RE: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke)
by Jeff Gross 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Get real! Lirpa Sloof spelled backwards is April Fools. You're right, it's not a sick joke, it's an April Fools joke. ---------- > From: Ophir Ronen (Rho) > To: Eric Geyser (Computer People); cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Jeff Gross; Ofer Bar; > Greg Malinski (Apex PC Solutions) > Subject: FW: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke) > Date: Thursday, March 31, 1994 1:56PM > > > > > ---------- > From: Setheni Davidson (CompuCom) > > Trust Congress? Not With This Unbelieveable Lair of Slop > PC Computing, April 1994, page 88. > By John C. Dvorak > > When Vice President Gore began talking about the Information Highway, we > all knew the bureaucrats would get involved more than we might like. In > fact, it may already be too late to stop a horrible Senate bill from > becoming law. > > The moniker -- Information Highway -- itself seems to be responsible for SB > #040194. Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, it's designed to prohibit > anyone from using a public computer network (Information Highway) while the > computer user is intoxicated. I know how silly this sounds, but Congress > apparently thinks that being drunk on a highway is bad no matter what kind > of highway it is. The bill is expected to pass this month. > > There already are rampant arguments as to how this proposed law can > possibly be enforced. The FBI hopes to use it as an excuse to do routine > wiretaps on any computer if there is any evidence that the owner "uses or > abuses alcohol and has access to a modem." Note how it slips in the word > 'uses'. This means if you've been seen drinking one lone beer, you can have > your line tapped. > > Because this law would be so difficult to enforce, police officials are > drooling over the prospect of easily obtaining permits to do wiretaps. Ask > enforcement officials in Washington and they'll tell you the proposed law is > idiotic, but none will oppose it. Check the classified ads in the > "Washington Post" and you'll find the FBI, National Security Agency, and > something called the Online Enforcement Agency (when did they set that up?) > all soliciting experts in phone technology, specifically wiretapping. > > It gets worse. The Congressional Record of February 19, 1994, has a report > that outlines the use of computerized BBSes, Internet, Inter-Relay Chat, and > CompuServe CB as "propagating illicit sexual encounters and meetings > between couples -- any of whom are underage... Even people purporting to > routinely have sex with animals are present on these systems to foster their > odd beliefs on the public-at-large." A rider on SB #040194 makes it a felony > to discuss sexual matters on any public-access network, including the > Internet, America Online, and CompuServe. > > I wondered how private companies such as America Online can be considered > public-access networks, so I called Senator Barbara Boxer's office and > talked to an aide, a woman named Felicia. She said the use of promotional > cards that give away a free hour or two of service constitues public access. > You know, like the ones found in the back of books or in modem boxes. She > also told me most BBS systems fall under this proposed statute. When asked > how they propose to enforce this law, she said it's not Congress's problem. > "Enforcement works itself out over time," she said. > > The group fighting this moronic law is led by Jerome Bernstein of the > Washington law firm of Bernstein, Bernstein and Knowles (the firm that > first took Ollie North as a client). I couldn't get in touch with any > of the co-sponsors of the bill (including Senator Ted Kennedy, if you > can believe it!), but Bernstein was glad to talk. "These people have no > clue about the Information Highway or what it does. The whole thing got > started last Christmas during an antidrinking campaign in the Washington > D.C., metro area," Bernstein said, "I'm convinced someone jokingly told > Leahy's office about drunk driving on the Information High and the idea > snowballed. These senators actually think there is a physical highway. > Seriously, Senator Pat Moynihan asked me if you needed a driving permit > to 'drive' a modem on the Information Highway! He has no clue what a > modem is, and neither does the rest of Congress." > > According to Bernstein, the antisexual wording in the bill was attributed > to Kennedy's office. "Kennedy thought that technology was leaving him > behind, and he wanted to be perceived as more up-to-date technologically. > He also though this would make amends for his alleged philandering." > > Unfortunately, the public is not much better informed than the Senate. > The Gallup Organization, at the behest of Congress, is polling the > public regarding intoxication while using a computer and online "hot > chatting." The results are chilling. More than half of the public thinks > that using a computer while intoxicated should be illegal! The results > of the sexuality poll are not available. But one question, "Should a > teenage boy be encouraged to pretend he is a girl while chatting with > another person online?" has civil rights activists alarmed. According > to Kevin Avril of the ACLU, "This activity doesn't even qualify as > virtual cross-dressing. Who cares about this stuff? What are we going > to do? Legislate an anti-boys-will-be-boys law? It sets a bad > precedent." > > I could go on and on with quotes and complaints from people regarding > this bill. But most of the complaints are getting nowhere. Pressure > groups, such as one led by Baptist ministers from De Kalb County, > Georgia, are supporting the law with such vehemence that they've managed > to derail an effort by modem manufacturers (the biggest being > Georgia-based Hayes) to lobby against the law. "Who wants to come out > and support drunkenness and computer sex?" asked a congressman who > requested anonymity. > > So, except for Bernstein, Bernstein, and Knowles, and a few members of > the ACLU, there is nothing to stop this bill from becoming law. You can > register your protests with your congressperson or Ms. Lirpa Sloof in > the Senate Legislative Analysts Office. Her name spelled backward says > it all. > > >

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Update to finger keyserver at wasabi.io.com
by pgpkeys＠wasabi.io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Following suggestions on the net, the wasabi.io.com keyserver has been upgraded to allow arbitrary comments to be attached to public keys in the archive. This is primarily for the benefit of people who lost their master keyring and had not prepared a revocation certificate in advance. For an example of how this might be used, try finger 0x445051(a)wasabi.io.com finger 0xbdfe4d(a)wasabi.io.com As you see, the key is still returned. It is up to you to read the attached comments and to decide not to use the key. This solution to the lost key problem was chosen in order to prevent a denial of service attack on the keyservers. Anyone who wishes their key to be revoked in this way, please post publicly to alt.security.pgp The Mgt.

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Re: Collapse of the Wave Function Predicted, Timing Uncertain
by ub075＠freenet.victoria.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>- Encrypting while drunk is specifically forbidden. Apparently recent >work in the Cryptologic Science Section of the Agency, and since >confirmed by noted Russian quantum theorist Dmitri Jokovich, is that >careless use of RSA and other NP-confusing algorithms could produce >superluminal effect-before-cause cryptoquantum fluctuations. Based on >the Choate Effect, these fluctuations could cause the collapse of the >universal wave function! The other problem with encrypting while drunk, is that the cleartext is impossible to decrypt, because it doesn't make any sense in the first place... even with the right key, it looks something like this: Esopbew rje sruha ro,,peiw. :) -- Ryan Perkins - 1:340/13 | I feel that suicide jumpers see a glimpse of ub075(a)freenet.victoria.bc.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge. Ask for PGP 2.3 public key | That's why they scream all the way down. 8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E

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Cryptography banned in the Netherlands....
by mrs＠tinac.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote: > >But now the government is proposing a law that totally outlaws the use > >of encryption methods. > > >Any comments???? And hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) replied: > Yes. Find the coalition that has repeatedly prevented the imposition > of national identity cards, and educate them about cryptography. It's > much the same issue. Well, first of all, it seems that the identification requirement seems to have passed anyway. But it's not as strict as it was proposed. But you do have a point, it's the same issue, although I believe that completely banning the use of cryptography is an even bigger violation of civil rights than requiring the people that they should be able to show some ID at any time of the day. It's exactly the same coalition that argued against national identity cards that now just says that banning cryptography is not an interesting matter so they will not even join the debates. It looks like the biggest hope comes from the industry. Companies in the Netherlands really feel threatened by this ban on cryptography and I hope that they will be powerfull enough to stop this law. For once, the corporate lobby seems to be on the side of the people! Mike

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Traceable Digicash?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Magic Money digital cash system, which is based on one of the earliest papers on electronic cash, is traceable. That is, the payer can collude with the bank and together they can recognize when the payed-out cash is turned in. In some situations, this could be beneficial. If people have bank accounts in their True Names, or are otherwise physically traceable when they turn in money, then if someone steals cash or otherwise uses coercion to acquire it, then they will not be able to turn it in without being caught. Virtually all of the digital cash proposals that I am aware of have this property. They protect the payer's privacy very strongly, but they don't offer much protection to the payee. Technically it is difficult to protect the payee because the cash would have to be changed while in his hands so that it is not recognizable to either the bank or the payer. This would require two re-blinding operations, one by the payer and one by the payee, and it is hard to have a system which could do this and still detect double- spending. People might want to think about the pros and cons of traceable cash. It could limit some possible applications. On the other hand, it may be good to help prevent coercion. One of the cash papers (I can't remember which one) mentioned this as an explicit advantage of the cash that was proposed. Does anyone know of any cash systems which protect the payee's privacy? Hal

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