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Re: [Fwd: Netscape, CAs, and Verisign]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:55 PM 1/29/96 -0500, Peter Williams wrote, in response to Alex: >>I'd like to see a less centralized CA that's tied into the existing system >>of notaries. The idea is to make it necessary to spoof a notary in order >>to spoof the CA. That won't make spoofing the CA impossible (nothing >>will), but it will make spoofing the CA illegal. ... >I dont understand how you intend to make CA spoofing illegal. Who >who perform the enforcement? (By illegal, I assume you mean that >there is a criminal offence involved, rather than a tort.) Is providing false documents to a notary criminal fraud, or only civil? >>Fees for the whole procedure ought to be less than $30. The CA ought to >>operate off of the fees from the agents as a non-profit organization, and >>the agents ought to keep the fees paid by the people requesting the >>certificates. >Notary fees might be best controlled by the notary, not the CA. >Seems an unreasonable restriction of trade to price-fix, even at the low-end. Notary fees can be agreed contractually between the notary and the CA; if they want to do a list price / street price system, or a non-profit, or a dog-eat-capitalist-running-dog competitive system, the market can let you pick your favorites. >There is indeed a large body of legal ramifications in this >area. The best way to learn about it is to become a CA and do it. Risk >taking is part of being in the CA business, however you operate it, >even for free. >>Morevover, although I don't think it's reasonable to expect Netscape to >>agree to include a non-existent CA in their browsers sight unseen, at the >>same time it doesn't seem smart to sink money into setting up the CA >>without some indication from Netscape that they're willing to give the >>idea good faith consideration. >Navigator betas seem to already facilitate users configuring their own >trust points in a manner rather similar to adding a key to your >personal PGP keyring. Letting the user decide whom to trust certainly seems like the best approach, and makes it possible to build a Web of Trust on top of Netscape rather than being stuck with hierarchical certifications. Meanwhile, if Netscape wants to sell the top two slots in their CA list to the highest-bidding advertiser like they do with searchers, they still can. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs

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EFF Compromises, as described in "Wired"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If Eric Hughes can break his silence to comment on the FV "discovery" of keystroke-capture programs (funny, I've had a couple on my Mac for years, for error recovery), then I guess I can break my silence about "Wired" articles. This afternoon I sat in a bookstore and skimmed the article on what happened at the EFF, about the Digital Telephony compromise that was approved by the EFF board (our own John Gilmore was reported to have been the sole negative vote), and about how the EFF was effectively "chased out of town" as a result of trying to be a political entity. I can't comment on this outlook, as I am nowhere near the inner circles of the EFF. But it underscores a belief I have: that if you play _their_ game, they have already won, and you just don't know it. What's the alternative? Get them to play _your_ (_our_) game, and maybe they won't win. I'm still a member of the EFF, but the more I read about their problems, including a $200,000 debt, the more convinced I am that the Cypherpunks model is a better place to devote one's efforts and hopes to. We're still going strong after almost three and a half years, with no debt (no assets except ourselves, of course) and no "relocations" from Boston to Washington to San Francisco. So, maybe we're doing OK. --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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the Court's private encryption key
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wednesday 2/18/98 7:23 PM J Orlin Grabbe John Young I just spoke with Bill Goldrick. Read about Goldrick in Deep Black by William Burrows. Goldrick was the Sandia supervisor who supervised installation the Norwegian seismic system. And supervised the second data authenticator. And reviewed my SAND report. We talked about data authentication. And its problems. I looked at Svets February 10, 1998 ORDER And thought about Digital File Stamp This document consists of an official stamp of the Court and, if attached to the document identified above, servers an endorsed copy of the pleading. It may be used in lieu of the Court's mechanical file stamp for the named document only, and misuse will be treated the same as misuse of the Court's official mechanical file stamp. The Court's digital signature is a verifiable mathematical computation unique to the filed document and the Court's private encryption key. This signature assures that any changes can be detected. Think devious. By way of deception. But this for later. Allahu Akbar bill

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Re: PGP Shell Integrity
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:13 PM 1/29/96 -0800, you wrote: >Firstly, if this is viewed as "Noise" rather than "Signal", please accept my apologies. Looks like a real technical discussion instead of a flame - obviously the wrong list :-) >The matter at hand concerns my concern over my inability to check the > "integrity" of a PGP windoze shell written by Michael R. Lyman at Aegis Research Corp. > >I worry that since the shell has access to my secret ring that it might > be sending it somewhere without my knowledge. I don't know that package, but most of them act as wrappers around DOS PGP rather than filtering keystrokes or doing PGP internals. There are several risks - getting your secret ring, getting your passphrase, getting the RSA parameters without the passphrase itself. Obviously, having your secret key ring file leak is not good, but the fun parts _are_ IDEA-encrypted using your passphrases, so it's not too much of a risk. Having the passphrase or the raw keys stolen would obviously be worse. DOS/Windows is _not_ a secure operating system, if you believe that there's more than one person in the universe. (DOS doesn't believe that, so in some sense it's perfectly secure. :-) Nathaniel Borenstein's recent postings are a good reminder that keystrokes can be stolen, easily, in that environment. >The freeware was, according > to Mr.Lyman, developed "Project Manager, Forward Air Missile Defense, > United States Army Missile Command". That gvt. affiliation gives me > considerable pause as regards back doors and other ways my secret ring > and pass phrase could be compromised. > >Does anyone have any familiarity with this freeware? I do not think > I am being paranoid.. just careful. Lastly, if I am not a programmer, > what sort of inspection can I perform on the software to make sure it is not "bugged"? Without source code, if you're not a programmer, the things to look for are circumstantial evidence - is the copy of the program you got off the server PGP-signed by the purported author? Or by any programmers you trust? That doesn't tell you the program is trustable, but it does tell you if it's a fake replacing the real thing. Is the real thing trustable? (Well, probably...) There's also the problem of leaking your key back to the Bad Guys, but that's easy - the program could leak it out in your PGP messages (either obviously, as a second recipient, or in subtle nasty ways like playing with the system clock on timestamps.) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs

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rushdie list
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Orlin Best to try to keep off the list. August 1991, Shapour Bakhtiar and Soroush Katibeh are killed in Suresnes, France. Title: Iranian Martyrs This page is dedicated to all those who stood up against tyranny KNOW THAT BEHIND EACH NUMBER, AND EACH NAME, THERE IS A MAN, A WOMAN, A CHILD, A FACE, A SMILE, A TEAR PUT YOURSELF IN PLACE OF THE CONDEMNED AND IMAGINE THE SOLITUDE AND LONELINESS OF THE MOMENT WHEN THEY COME TO TAKE THEM AWAY, THIS LAST VOYAGE, WHERE ARE YOU AT THIS VERY MOMENT, PARTISAN OF HUMAN RIGHTS ? WHY HAS THE WORLD SUDDENLY BECOME A VAST DESERT WHERE THERE EXISTS ONLY THE VICTIM AND HIS EXECUTIONERS ? HOW MUCH LONGER CAN YOU STAY SILENT ? Below is a list of all those who were affiliated to NAMIR or its military wing - NEGHAB - and were murdered by the Islamic Republic of Iran : Date Location Name 04/07/1980 Tehran A.Mohagheghi (general) 04/07/1980 Tehran G.Ghayeghran (non-commissioned officer : pilot) 04/07/1980 Tehran F.Jahangiri (non-commissioned officer : pilot) 04/07/1980 Tehran A.Kamiani 04/07/1980 Tehran A.Karimbar 30/07/1980 Tehran H.Kazemi (non-commissioned officer) 30/071980 Tehran M.Moradi (non-commissioned officer) 30/07/1980 Tehran S.Norouzi (sergeant) 30/07/1980 Tehran A.Mohamadi 30/07/1980 Tehran M.Assangochai 30/07/1980 Tehran Y.Mahboubian 30/07/1980 Tehran E.Mamaghani 30/07/1980 Tehran N.Sedarat 30/07/1980 Tehran E.Baroukhim 30/07/1980 Tehran M.B.Fard (lieutenant) 30/07/1980 Neyshabur Y.Khadjeh 30/07/1980 Neyshabur G.Jafari 31/07/1980 Tehran M.Farzam (lieutenant) 31/07/1980 Tehran H. Karimpurtari (non-commissioned officer) 31/07/1980 Tehran D.Jalaii (colonel) 31/07/1980 Tehran N.Yahyaii (lieutenant) 31/07/1980 Tehran N.Najaf-Nejad (sergeant) 07/08/1980 Tehran I. Soltani (corporal) 07/08/1980 Tehran H.Lashkari (lieutenant-pilot) 07/08/1980 Tehran M.Saghafi (lieutenant-pilot) 07/08/1980 Tehran A.Zarineh (colonel) 07/08/1980 Tehran H.Gohari (major) 07/08/1980 Tehran K.Alizadeh (major) 07/08/1980 Tehran A.Morvaridi (sergeant) 07/08/1980 Tehran S.Pourfahmideh (lieutenant) 07/08/1980 Tehran M.Najafabadi (lieutenant) 07/08/1980 Tehran M.Zahedi (lieutenant) 07/08/1980 Tehran M.Asgharian (non-commissioned officer) 07/08/1980 Tehran H.Abedini 07/08/1980 Tehran F.Azarian (lieutenant) 16/08/1980 Tehran E.Arab-Shirazi 16/08/1980 Tehran A.Awazzadeh 16/08/1980 Tehran M.Sajadi (non-commissioned officer) 16/08/1980 Tehran M.Farahpour 16/08/1980 Tehran Z.Momeni 16/08/1980 Tehran G.Khergani (sergeant) 16/08/1980 Tehran M.Kiani (sergeant) 16/08/1980 Tehran D.Bakhtiar 16/08/1980 Tehran G.NaghibZadeh (non-commissioned officer) 16/08/1980 Tehran H.Zamanpour (flight-lieutenant) 16/08/1980 Tehran K.Azartash (major) 16/08/1980 Tehran A.Azmudeh (colonel) 16/08/1980 Tehran C.Ahmadi (lieutenant) 16/08/1980 Tehran S.Mahdiun (general-pilot) 16/08/1980 Tehran M.Farnejad (non-commissioned officer) 16/08/1980 Tehran K.Mohamadi-Koubaii (non-commissioned officer) 16/08/1980 Tehran M.Tightiz (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran M.Mirlaki (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran M.Abedini-Moghadam (non-commissioned officer0 18/08/1980 Tehran K.Rahmati (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran P.Bayani (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran L.Lotfolahi (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran A.Habibi (lieutenant) 18/08/1980 Tehran N.Zandi (flight lieutenant pilot) 18/08/1980 Tehran C.Karimian (sergeant) 18/08/1980 Tehran O.Boyeri (flight lieutenant) 18/08/1980 Tehran A.Soleimani (flight lieutenant) 18/08/1980 Tehran D.Mazaheri-Kashani 18/08/1980 Tehran D.Fatehjou (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran A.Pourkarbassi-Dehi (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran D.Fateh-Firouz (non-commissioned officer) 18/08/1980 Tehran K.Afrouz (flight lieutenant) 18/08/1980 Tehran M.Azimifar (flight lieutenant) 21/08/1980 Tehran M.Arad (lieutenant) 21/08/1980 Tehran M.Sadeghi (colonel) 21/08/1980 Tehran H.Izadi (colonel) 21/08/1980 Tehran Asghari 25/08/1980 Tehran D.Rahbar (non-commissioned officer) 25/08/1980 Tehran G.Hamedani (non-commissioned officer) 25/08/1980 Tehran F.Javaherian (non-commissioned officer) 25/08/1980 Tehran M.Zade-Naderi (non-commissioned officer) 26/08/1980 Tehran G.Hejazi (female) 26/08/1980 Tehran D.Shomali 26/08/1980 Tehran H.Ahmadi 26/08/1980 Esfahan M.Altani 26/08/1980 Esfahan H.Karimi 26/08/1980 Esfahan S.Mozaii 26/08/1980 Esfahan H.Dari 26/08/1980 Esfahan A.Allahverdi 26/08/1980 Esfahan S.Hemati 26/08/1980 Esfahan M.Vesaali 26/08/1980 Esfahan B.Nikbakht (female) 26/08/1980 Esfahan E.Biglari 26/08/1980 Esfahan J.Hemati 26/08/1980 Esfahan E.Karimi 26/08/1980 Esfahan M.Karimi 28/08/1980 Tehran S.Bassani (female) 28/08/1980 Tehran M.T.Bahrami (non-commissioned officer) 29/08/1980 Tehran A.Almasi (lieutenant) 29/09/1980 Tehran H.Haleki (lieutenant) 29/08/1980 Tehran M.R.Javadi (lieutenant) 29/08/1980 Tehran H.Ahmadi (non-commissioned officer) 29/08/1980 Tehran J.Ranjbar (non-commissioned officer) 30/08/1980 Tehran A.Azizian (major) 30/08/1980 Tehran R.Soltani (colonel) 30/08/1980 Tehran A.Faria (colonel) 30/08/1980 Tehran I.Derakhshandeh (non-commissioned officer) 30/08/1980 Tehran M.Bahrami 30/08/1980 Tehran S.Shahbeui (colonel) 30/08/1980 Tehran I.Khalafbegi (major) 30/08/1980 Tehran K.Keyvanfar 30/08/1980 Ahwaz M.Borati (corporal) 30/08/1980 Ahwaz I.Marvdashti (non-commissioned officer) 30/08/1980 Ahwaz R.Yahyapasand (lieutenant) 30/08/1980 Ahwaz M.A.Mehrabi (non-commissioned officer) 30/08/1980 Ahwaz O.Atashboro 30/08/1980 Ahwaz S.Sotoudeh 01/09/1980 Tehran D.Asghari (officer) 01/09/1980 Tehran D.Raastgu (lieutenant) 01/09/1980 Tehran M.Fatahi-Nourdehi (non-commissioned officer) 03/09/1980 Ahwaz M.Hokmabadtchi (sergeant) 03/09/1980 Ahwaz E.Ostad-Nazari (lieutenant) 03/09/1980 Ahwaz F.Reissi (lieutenant) 03/09/1980 Ahwaz S.Dehgan (lieutenant) 09/09/1980 Tehran M.Sayah (sergeant) 09/09/1980 Tehran M.Rahbai-Nejad (lieutenant) 09/09/1980 Tehran M.Tajvari (lieutenant) 09/09/1980 Tehran B.Partovi (major) 09/09/1980 Tehran H.Mostafavi 11/09/1980 Tehran K.Atri 11/09/1980 Tehran M.Sadeghi (colonel) 11/09/1980 Tehran M.Sohaneki 11/09/1980 Tehran N.Morovati (lieutenant) 11/09/1980 Tehran N.Sajadi (non-commissioned officer) 11/09/1980 Tehran A.Mohammad (soldier) 11/09/1980 Tehran A.Shafigh (flight lieutenant) 16/09/1980 Tehran M.Tabrizi-Khatun 16/09/1980 Tehran E.Azadighaneh (non-commissioned officer) 16/09/1980 Tehran M.Jalali-Ghajar (major) 16/09/1980 Tehran S.Nour 13/071981 Tehran M.Khadem 10/08/1981 Tehran Amir-Tahmasbi (major) 10/08/1981 Tehran A.Abdolmalek-Pour (colonel) 10/08/1981 Tehran Didehvar (colonel) 10/08/1981 Tehran Mohajeri 23/12/1981 Tehran R.Marzban 23/12/1981 Tehran A.Mohebi 30/01/1982 Tehran A.Amir-Tahmasbi (colonel) 30/01/1982 Tehran K.Yarahmadi 30/01/1982 Tehran E.Seyrafi (colonel) 30/01/1982 Tehran A.Foroughi (colonel) 30/01/1982 Tehran A.Abdol-Malekpour 30/01/1982 Tehran G.Rahimi (colonel) 30/01/1982 Tehran M.Sabah (colonel) 30/01/1982 Tehran G.Biglou 30/01/1982 Tehran A.Mohajeri 30/01/1982 Tehran M.Lotfzari 30/01/1982 Tehran G.Naghib-Manesh 30/01/1982 Tehran G.Didehvar (colonel) 30/01/1982 Tehran G.Shahandeh-Ashtiani 30/01/1982 Tehran M.Khashayar 11/09/1982 Tehran R.Shahbakhti 11/09/1982 Tehran H.Moghbelzadeh of these victims, none had the rights of an accused as foreseen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ............................................. Report on the Islamic Republic's Terrorism abroad Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, terrorist attempts have targeted exiled Iranians as well as citizens of other countries, condemned as heretics, around the world. These attacks were ordered by the Islamic government of Iran. 1. In July 1980, Shapour Bakhtiar escapes an assassination attempt in Paris, France. A French policeman and a neighbor are killed and one policeman is seriously injured. 2. In July 1980, Ali Tabatabai is killed in Washington D.C., United States. 3. In 1981, Shahriar Shafigh is killed in Paris, France. 4. In January 1982, Shahrokh Missaghi is killed in Manila, Philippines. 5. In April 1982, a young German student is killed during the attack of the residence of Iranian students in Mainzer, Germany, by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. 6. In June 1982, Shahram Mirani is fatally wounded in India. 7. In August 1982, Ahmad Zol-Anvar is fatally wounded in Karachi, Pakistan. 8. In September 1982, Abdolamir Rahdar is killed in India. 9. In 1982, Colonel Ahmad Hamed is killed in Istanbul, Turkey. 10. In February 1983, Esfandiar Rahimi is killed in Manila, Philippines. 11. In February 1984, Gholam-Ali Oveissi and his brother, Gholam-Hossein, are killed in Paris, France. 12. In August 1985, Behrouz Shahverdilou is killed in Istanbul, Turkey. 13. In December 1985, Hadi Aziz-Moradi is killed in Istanbul, Turkey. 14. In August 1986, Bijan Fazeli is killed in London, Great Britain. 15. In December 1986, Vali Mohammad Van is killed in Pakistan. 16. In January 1987, Ali-Akbar Mohammadi is killed in Hamburg, Germany. 17. In May 1987, Hamid Reza Chitgar disappears in Vienna, Austria and is found assassinated in July. 18. In July 1987, Faramarz-Aghaï and Ali-Reza Pourshafizadeh are killed and twenty-three persons are wounded in residences of Iranian refugees Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan. 19. In July 1987, Amir-Hossein Amir-Parviz is seriously wounded by the explosion of a bomb placed in his car in London, England. 20. In July 1987, Mohammad-Hassan Mansouri is shot dead in his house Istanbul, Turkey. 21. In August 1987, Ahmad Moradi-Talebi is killed in Geneva, Switzerland. 22. In October 1987, Mohammad-Ali Tavakoli-Nabavi and his youngest son, Noureddin, are killed in Wembley, Great Britain. 23. In October 1987, Abol-Hassan Modjtahed-Zadeh is kidnapped in Istanbul, Turkey. 24. In December 1988, an Iranian refugee is assassinated in front of the headquarters of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Karachi, Pakistan. 25. In June 1989, Ataollah Bay Ahmadi is killed in the Emirate of Dubai. 26. In July 1989, Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou and Abdollah Ghaderi and Fazel Rassoul are killed in Vienna, Austria. 27. In August 1989, Gholam Keshavarz is killed in Cyprus. 28. In September 1989, Sadigh Kamangar is assassinated in the north of Iraq. 29. In September 1989, Hossein Keshavarz, victim of a terrorist attempt, is paralyzed for life. 30. In February 1990, Hadj Baloutch-Khan is killed by a terrorist commando in Pakistan. 31. In Mars 1990, Hossein Mir-Abedini is wounded by an armed commando in the airport of Istanbul, Turkey. 32. In April 1990, Kazem Radjavi is killed in Coppet, Switzerland. 33. In July 1990, Ali Kashefpour is kidnapped and killed in Turkey. 34. In September 1990, Efat Ghazi is killed in Sweden by a bomb intended for her husband. 35. In October 1990, Cyrus Elahi is killed in Paris, France. 36. In April 1991, Abdol-Rahman Boroumand is killed in Paris, France. 37. In July 1991, Alberto Capriolo is wounded in Milan, Italy. 38. In July 1991, Hitoshi Igarashi is killed in Tokyo, Japan. 39. In July 1991, Ahad Agha is killed in Suleimanya, iraq. 40. In August 1991, Shapour Bakhtiar and Soroush Katibeh are killed in Suresnes, France. 41. In September 1991, Saïd Yazdan-Panah is fatally wounded in iraq. 42. In December 1991, Massoud Rajavi escapes a terrorist attempt in Baghdad, iraq. 43. In January 1992, Kamran Hedayati is wounded opening a letter bomb in Vastros, Sweden. He looses his sight and his hands. 44. In May 1992, Shapour Firouzi is killed in Iraq. 45. In July 1992, Kamran Mansour-Moghadam is killed in Suleymania, Iraq. 46. In August 1992, Fereydoun Farokhzad is killed in Bonn, Germany. 47. In September 1992, Sadegh Sharafkandi, Fatah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan and Nouri Dehkordi are killed in Berlin, Germany. 48. In January 1993, Ugur Mumcu is killed in Ankara, Turkey. 49. In February 1993, the fundamentalist terrorists in Turkey admit to have kidnapped and killed Ali-Akbar Ghorbani who had disappeared in June 1992 in Turkey. 50. In March 1993, Mohammad-Hossein Naghdi is killed in Rome, Italy. 51. In June 1993, Mohammad-Hassan Arbab is killed in Karachi, Pakistan 52. In October 1993, Turkish fundamentalists admit having tortured and killed for Iranian officials, Abbas Gholizadeh who was kidnapped in Istanbul, Turkey in December 1992. 53. In November 1993, William Nygaard is wounded in Oslo, Norway. 54. In January, 1994, Taha Kermanj is killed in Corum, Turkey. 55. In August 1994, Ghafour Hamzei'i is killed in Baghdad, iraq. 56. In February 1996, Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi were killed in Istanbul, Turkey. 57. In March 1996, Ali Mollazadeh was killed in Karachi, Pakistan. 58. In May 1996, Reza Mazlouman ( Kourosh Aryamanesh) was killed in Paris, France. Due to the lack of reliable information, this list of terrorist attempts is not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, since the advent of the Islamic Republic, the number of extra-judicial executions outside Iran, in particular in Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq is higher. Also, this report deliberately leaves out well known terrorist attacks ordered by Tehran, such as: the hostage crisis of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979; the kidnapping of British, American and French citizens in Lebanon by pro-Iranian Hezbollah; the explosive attack on the American and French military headquarters in Lebanon, which were publicly claimed by Mohsen Rafighdoust, then head of the Revolutionary Guards ; the wave of terrorist bombing in Paris in 1986, which resulted in the death of 13 persons and the wounding of hundreds of others; the death sentence against Salman Rushdie for writing The Satanic Verses; and the Dahran terrorist attempts that targeted the American military in Saudi Arabia. Title: NSA, Crypto AG, and the Iraq-Iran Conflict [Email Reply] NSA, Crypto AG, and the Iraq-Iran Conflict by J. Orlin Grabbe One of the dirty little secrets of the 1980s is that the U.S. regularly provided Iraq's Saddam Hussein with top-secret communication intercepts by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Consider the evidence. When in 1991 the government of Kuwait paid the public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton ten million dollars to drum up American war fever against the evil dictator Hussein, it brought about the end of a long legacy of cooperation between the U.S. and Iraq. Hill & Knowlton resurrected the World War I propaganda story about German soldiers roasting Belgian babies on bayonets, updated in the form of a confidential witness (actually the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S.) who told Congress a tearful story of Iraqi soldiers taking Kuwaiti babies out of incubators and leaving them on the cold floor to die. President George Bush then repeated this fabricated tale in speeches ten times over the next three days. What is remarkable about this staged turn of events is that, until then, Hussein had operated largely with U.S. approval. This cooperation had spanned three successive administrations, starting with Jimmy Carter. As noted by John R. MacArthur, "From 1980 to 1988, Hussein had shouldered the burden of killing about 150,000 Iranians, in addition to at least thirteen thousand of his own citizens, including several thousand unarmed Kurdish civilians, and in the process won the admiration and support of elements of three successive U.S. Administrations" [1]. Hussein's artful slaughter of Iranians was aided by good military intelligence. The role of NSA in the conflict is an open secret in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Only in this country has there been a relative news blackout, despite the fact that it was the U.S. administration that let the crypto cat out of the bag. First, U.S. President Ronald Reagan informed the world on national television that the United States was reading Libyan communications. This admission was part of a speech justifying the retaliatory bombing of Libya for its alleged involvement in the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin's Schoeneberg district, where two U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman were killed, and 200 others injured. Reagan wasn't talking about American monitoring of Libyan news broadcasts. Rather, his "direct, precise, and undeniable proof" referred to secret (encrypted) diplomatic communication between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in East Berlin. Next, this leak was compound by the U.S. demonstration that it was also reading secret Iranian communications. As reported in Switzerland's Neue Zurcher Zeitung, the U.S. provided the contents of encrypted Iranian messages to France to assist in the conviction of Ali Vakili Rad and Massoud Hendi for the stabbing death in the Paris suburb of Suresnes of the former Iranian prime minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and his personal secretary Katibeh Fallouch. [2] What these two countries had in common was they had both purchased cryptographic communication equipment from the Swiss firm Crypto AG. Crypto AG was founded in 1952 by the (Russian-born) Swedish cryptographer Boris Hagelin who located his company in Zug. Boris had created the "Hagelin-machine", a encryption device similar to the German "Enigma". The Hagelin machine was used on the side of the Allies in World War II. Crypto AG was an old and venerable firm, and Switzerland was a neutral country. So Crypto AG's enciphering devices for voice communication and digital data networks were popular, and customers came from 130 countries. These included the Vatican, as well the governments of Iraq, Iran, and Libya. Such countries were naturally skeptical of cryptographic devices sold in many NATO countries, so turned to relatively neutral Switzerland for communication security. Iran demonstrated its suspicion about the source of the leaks, when it arrested Hans Buehler, a top salesman for Crypto AG, in Teheran on March 18, 1992. During his nine and a half months of solitary confinement in Evin prison in Teheran, Buehler was questioned again and again whether he had leaked Teheran's codes or Libya's keys to Western powers. Luckily Buehler didn't know anything. He in fact believed in his own sales pitch that Crypto AG was a neutral company and its equipment was the best. They were Swiss, after all. [3] Crypto AG eventually paid one million dollars for Buehler's release in January 1993, then promptly fired him once they had reassured themselves that he hadn't revealed anything important under interrogation, and because Buehler had begun to ask some embarrassing questions. Then reports appeared on Swiss television, Swiss Radio International, all the major Swiss papers, and in German magazines like Der Spiegel. Had Crypto AG's equipment been spiked by Western intelligence services? the media wanted to know. The answer was Yes [4]. Swiss television traced the ownership of Crypto AG to a company in Liechtenstein, and from there back to a trust company in Munich. A witness appearing on Swiss television explained the real owner was the German government--the Federal Estates Administration. [5] According to Der Spiegel, all but 6 of the 6000 shares of Crypto AG were at one time owned by Eugen Freiberger, who resided in Munich and was head of the Crypto AG managing board in 1982. Another German, Josef Bauer, an authorized tax agent of the Muenchner Treuhandgesellschaft KPMG, and who was elected to the managing board in 1970, stated that his mandate had come from the German company Siemens. Other members of Crypto AG's management had also worked at Siemens. Was the German secret service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), hiding behind the Siemens' connection? So it would seem. Der Spiegel reported that in October 1970, a secret meeting of the BND had discussed how the Swiss company Graettner could be guided into closer cooperation with Crypto AG, or could even merged with it. The BND additionally considered how "the Swedish company Ericsson could be influenced through Siemens to terminate its own cryptographic business." [6] A former employee of Crypto AG reported that he had to coordinate his developments with "people from Bad Godesberg". This was the location of the "central office for encryption affairs" of the BND, and the service instructed Crypto AG what algorithms to use to create the codes. The employee also remembers an American "watcher", who strongly demanded the use of certain encryption methods. Representatives from NSA visited Crypto AG often. A memorandum of a secret workshop at Crypto AG in August 1975, where a new prototype of an encryption device was demonstrated, mentions the participation of Nora L. Mackebee, an NSA cryptographer. Motorola engineer Bob Newman says that Mackebee was introduced to him as a "consultant". Motorola cooperated with Crypto AG in the seventies in developing a new generation of electronic encryption machines. The Americans "knew Zug very well and gave travel tips to the Motorola people for the visit at Crypto AG," Newman told Der Spiegel. Knowledgeable sources indicate that the Crypto AG enciphering process, developed in cooperation with the NSA and the German company Siemans, involved secretly embedding the decryption key in the cipher text. Those who knew where to look could monitor the encrypted communication, then extract the decryption key that was also part of the transmission, and recover the plain text message. Decryption of a message by a knowledgeable third party was not any more difficult than it was for the intended receiver. (More than one method was used. Sometimes the algorithm was simply deficient, with built-in exploitable weaknesses.) Crypto AG denies all this, of course, saying such reports are ""pure invention". What information was provided to Saddam Hussein exactly? Answers to this question are currently being sought in a lawsuit against NSA in New Mexico, which has asked to see "all Iranian messages and translations between January 1, 1980 and June 10, 1996". [7] The passage of top-secret communications intelligence to someone like Saddam Hussein brings up other questions. Which dictator is the U.S. passing top secret messages to currently? Jiang Zemin? Boris Yeltsin? Will Saddam Hussein again become a recipient of NSA largess if he returns to the mass slaughter of Iranians? What exactly is the purpose of NSA anyway? One more question: Who is reading the Pope's communications? Bibliography [1] John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, Hill and Wang, New York, 1992. [2] Some of the background of this assassination can be found in "The Tehran Connection," Time Magazine, March 21, 1994. [3] The Buehler case is detailed in Res Strehle, Verschleusselt: der Fall Hans Beuhler, Werd Verlag, Zurich, 1994. [4] "For years, NSA secretly rigged Crypto AG machines so that U.S. eavesdroppers could easily break their codes, according to former company employees whose story is supported by company documents," "No Such Agency, Part 4: Rigging the Game," The Baltimore Sun, December 4, 1995. [5] Reported in programs about the Buehler case that were broadcast on Swiss Radio International on May 15, 1994 and July 18, 1994. [6] "Wer ist der befugte Vierte?": Geheimdienste unterwandern den Schutz von Verschlusselungsgeraten," Der Spiegel 36, 1996. [7] U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, William H. Payne, Arthur R. Morales, Plaintiffs, v. Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director of National Security Agency, National Security Agency, Defendant, CIV NO 97 0266 SC/DJS. November 2, 1997 Web Page: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/

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Re: Stego-empty hard drives... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 22 Sep 1998 11:32:03 -0500 > From: Mark Hahn <mhahn(a)tcbtech.com> > Subject: Re: Stego-empty hard drives... (fwd) > If you need fast random access, then neither version of CD will be > suitable. Hence the PCMCIA Hard Disk. However, you may have > difficulty coming up with a cover story if, indeed, you do not want > to tell a customs officer, "Oh, yeah, that's a portable disk drive". It occured to me that it might be feasible to ship such devices seperately via Fed-Ex or whatever. The question becomes, what do such countries as Great Britian plan for materials crossing their borders in this manner? Are they going to search each package and examine its contents? What does this mean for Dell and their ilk? The ramifications of this aspect are of some interest... ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: [rant] A thought on filters and the V-Chip
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:38 PM 1/26/96 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: >On Fri, 26 Jan 1996, jim bell wrote: >> On the other hand, this would be an EXCELLENT "argument" to bring in front >> of a Congressional committee considering the adoption of any V-chip type >> proposal. Once they discover that a ratings system could be used for the >> diametrically opposite reasons of their reason for having it in the first >> place, they'll try to modify their proposal to prevent this. >> >> If we're lucky, this'll have the effect of killing the whole concept of >> government-sponsored (required?) V-chip-type technology. >> >> OTOH, I agree with other posters who think that truly voluntary content >> selection would be an excellent addition to television: In effect, an >> automatic, programmable TV-Guide search engine. > >While it's hard to find a general theme here, I think I disagree. What? You mean you LIKE to read TV guide every week, cover to cover, in advance, to scedule your TV viewing habits? >Anyway, >I don't think that even truly voluntary content selection is a good idea, >because it reduces art to numbers, which is wrong. Aw, admit it. You're just still pissed 'cause I called you a f------ statist. <G>> Me, I'd like to be able to tell my "TV-Guide search engine" to: 1. Look for this particular show or movie. 2. Look for this particular star, director, or other participant.. 3. Follow a subject thread, say on the news. 4. etc. Maybe even a more complex (artificially intelligent) agent that "knows" me well enough to anticipate my desires. > lead to a balkanization that diminishes the common >culture. I think it was good the way network TV was limited to the lowest >common denominator, but with variety. People who wanted something with a >little more flavor than WonderBread [tm] were able to find it, but they >did have to look, which often involved *meeting other people* with common >interests, and they still tuned in to Ed Sullivan to see what the Joneses >were watching. Give people 1024 bits' worth of channels to choose from, >classified by arbitrary criteria involving no human contact, and you get >something entirely different. I'm not sure what's happening now, but I >don't think I like it. You're entitled to NOT like it. But I'm equally entitled to use modern technology to sift through 60+ cable channels, or 300+ DSS-type channels.

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Let a Thousand Zundsites Bloom
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure that Rich vs Declan is exciting but I have to agree with Declan that the more Zundsites the merrier. It rarely pays to be subtle with nation states. They don't have good information processing capabilities. It helps to really hit them over the head with things. It also means more to the public if you can say "Sure the Germans banned this site but we put up a dozen copies within a few hours." It is this casual ability to defeat nation states that is the significance of the net and should be emphasized. DCF "Few Generals have ever lost a battle because they brought too many troops."

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Y2K...
by concerned＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10/22/98 Y2K Solution... 8 Pine Circle Dr., Silicon Valley, Calif. OTC Company "TCFG" 21 st. Century Frontier Group has through several members of their administrative research department leaked vital information about their companies efforts. Everyone was tight lipped and interviews were refused, and through un-named sources we have learned that the technology and software solution are in the process of being patented! In over 1640 trials, using various data systems the use of the new technology and software solved the Y2K problem 100% of the time. This small publicly traded company "TCFG" which is just 3 years old is through various sources now negotiating with the "Big Boys"! "TCFG" the letters to look for..... ----------------------------------------------------------------

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NOISE: Borenstein's Fatal Spam (Was: Plonk, Dr. Fred)
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

please don't try to make sensible replies to this type of tar-baby garbage. What's the point in arguing with someone who only wants you to argue with them and make sure you spell their name right? First Virtual, you lost a lot of ground with me. (sounds like others feel the same way, too). ... that sucking sound is your reputation capital being snarfed off your keyboard and encrypted by tempest-bots lurking just under your tinfoil helmet. I'd be worried. The corrupted keyboard buffer of "W. Kinney" <kinney(a)bogart.Colorado.EDU> wrote: . . . > Followed by an hysterical essay on how FV has "discovered" the keyboard > sniffer. Oh, please. You people should be ashamed of yourselves. To which FV's own replied: I trust you've seen by now that we made no claim to have discovered keyboard sniffers. Please read our claims more carefully, and I'd be delighted to discuss them rationally. -- Nathaniel ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ delighted to discuss them at all, I would bet. Anyone interested in a discussion of whether or not keyboard sniffers work? a pox on your virtual house for a bad spam, poorly aimed at this list, in particular. NEVER TYPE CYPHERPUNKS(a)TOAD.COM IN THE TO: LINE

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