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Re: Jump Start ecash With IPhone
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell writes: >At 11:37 AM 3/6/96 -0800, Jim McCoy wrote: >> 2- The phone companies (actually ACTA, the telco lobby) petitioned >> the FCC on Monday to regulate the Internet phone software >> companies. >> >>IP phone systems themselves may need to move underground just to >>escape regulation. OTOH, there is nothing to prevent people from >>building their own systems once some free software is out there... > >That would be a super neat trick since the LD business is currently >deregulated (and in fact was never a government monopoly) and the local loop >is in the process of deregulation, and Vocaltec is in some senses an Israeli >company anyway and need not have a presence in New Jersey if it doesn't >want do. > The regulation in question was regarding things like local/state/federal telecom taxes and levies, and all of the BS hoops that LD carriers must jump through. Regarding where such companies are located, I am also at a loss as to how this recent action will be enforced; that does not necessarily mean that a bureaucrat somewhere will not try to do something stupid. Just because LD is "deregulated" does not mean that it is without any governmental oversight, much as I wish it were... LD companies still have to pay certain taxes (take a look at your next phone bill, they are clearly listed in addition to your actual phone charges) and I am certain that they have entire office buildings stuffed with drones filling out paperwork for Uncle Sam... jim

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Boycott "Applied Cryptography" and AT&T and RSA
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bruce Schnier (Author of applied cryptography) and Matt Blaze (Who is a crypto bigwig at at&t) have made it clear that they support key escrow. Both have written letters in favor of the new crypto law, it creates a key escrow system and also other restricts on crypto. The letters are on the CDT homepage and i think were posted here. WHAT THE FUCK?????????????????????????????????????????? EFF, EPIC, VTW and almost everyone else (except for Bizdos at RSA, hmmmm) have all come out against this piece of shit. But with these so called experts baking it it could pass anyway. Maybe the ltrs are a forgery? We should ask them, and if this is true, LETS SEND THEM A MESSAGE!!!!!!!! SWITCH YOUR PHONE SERVICE AND TELL AT&T WHY!!! STOP RECOMMENDING APPLIED CRYPTO (THERE ARE EASIER BOOKS ANYWAY). DEMAND THAT THESE PEOPLE STOP GIVING AWAY YOUR RIGHTS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! their addresses are schneier(a)counterpane.com mab(a)crypto.com jim(a)rsa.com

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Re: Boycott "Applied Cryptography" and AT&T and RSA
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bruce Schnier (Author of applied cryptography) and Matt Blaze (Who >is a crypto bigwig at at&t) have made it clear that they support >key escrow. Both have written letters in favor of the new crypto >law, it creates a key escrow system and also other restricts on >crypto. The letters are on the CDT homepage and i think were >posted here. Whoever wrote this crap is an idiot. In the preface of Applied Cryptography, (Page xx) on the subject of government key escrow, Schneier states: "Some dangerously Orwellian assumptions are at work here: that the government has the right to listen to private communications and that there is something wrong with a private citizen trying to keep a secret from the government. ...this is the first time people have been forced to make themselves available for surveillance. These initiatives are not simple government proposals in some obscure area; they are pre-emptive and unilateral to usurp powers that previously belonged to the people. Clipper and Digital Telephony do not protect privacy; they force individuals to unconditionally trust that the government will respect their privacy. ... The lesson here is that it is insufficient to protect ourselves with laws; we need to protect ourselves with mathematics. Encryption is too important to be left solely to governments." Schneier goes on to state that the purpose of the book is to ensure that people will have access to strong crypto, even if it is outlawed. It is hard to interpret this as support for government key escrow. Check your facts before slandering people. Jonathan Wienke

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Re: art-stego
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- JonWienke(a)aol.com wrote: > Another thing--just a wild idea--test the randomness of encrypted data > storing it in an 8-bit mono .WAV (your choice of sample rates) file and > listening to it. Any correlations or patterns in the data should show > the playback as hums, clicks, squeals, or something. It may even be > to determine the algorithm by the sound patterns--a sort of "audio > cryptanalysis." Has anyone tried this? Are there any .WAV stego > out there? s-tools is an audio stego utility(s), but I've not used it. As for testing methods, noise spheres are an interesting graphical method for testing randomness (check the archives from late Dec/early Jan, I posted a short Turbo Pascal program that implements them). I'm not entirely sure if noise spheres will capture any crypto-relevant correlations, but it seems worth investigating. The reference to the article on noise spheres and other graphical methods for testing PRNGs is: Pickover, Clifford A. 1995. "Random number generators: pretty good ones are easy to find." The Visual Computer (1995) 11:369-377. - --Rob - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTwF5ioZzwIn1bdtAQG/ogF5AdudaHeEb+b2eOWs/XA3ZCIYGKrW1alg abs4UNS5OC2jjqr5UPfrVq5LB8lMwLS7 =OjB4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Announce: 155mbps ATM 3DES crypto gateway
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Secant Network Technologies announces: The Key Agile Encryption System is an affordable perimeter security system that provides privacy through high speed cryptography for information traversing public Asynchronous Transfer Mode networks. The cryptographic units function as "bump in the fiber" security interfaces between a secure LAN and a public network. As data crosses this interface, the system encrypts each ATM cell's payload without affecting the header. Encrypted cells pass through the public network infrastructure and are decrypted upon arriving at the destination LAN. The benefit is that the user can conduct business as usual within the LAN and only encrypt the data as it enters the non-secure public network (or non-secure area of a LAN). Many individual workstations, servers or other end nodes may be protected by a single encryption unit. The system provides privacy and access control guarantees when using public ATM networks today, eliminating the need to wait for implementation and availability of pending ATM Forum security standards. System operation is transparent to all network and end user systems. Available: summer 1996 Physical interfaces: single mode SONET OC-3c, multi mode SONET OC-3c, T3 carrier, T1 carrier. Key management: proprietary method, transparent to network and end user equipment, compliant with UNI 3.0/3.1 specifications. SVC's handled transparently, PVC support available. Public key based authentication. PKCS and X.509 compliant public key certificates are supported. Dynamic key update based on policy - transparent to end systems. Key agility: up to 65,534 active VC's per cryptographic unit. Each active VC has a unique key. Encryption algorithms used: triple DES for cell payload encryption, triple DES, RSA, and MD5 for key management. DES mode agility: single DES, 3DES ECB or 3DES long cycle chaining. True hardware random number generation (Johnson noise). Performance: full duplex encryption/decryption at the OC-3c (155Mbps) rate. Key management support for up to 35 secure calls per second Approximately 16 microseconds latency. See: http://www.secantnet.com/ for more details and for contact information. Based on over 2 years of ARPA funded research: http://www.mcnc.org/HTML/ITD/ANT/Enigma2.html

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Hmmm
by eggplant＠inlink.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >(Lots of stuff deleted) > >>I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and International >>Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >>Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >>Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. > >>During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >>and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >>entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >>the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >>Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >>similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >>as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. > >>Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >>remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >>Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >>the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >>respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they >>mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >>encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >>to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >>bit keys. > >>I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >>paused then said that he can be quoted. > >>So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you >>think? > >(more stuff deleted) > > I don't know about everyone else, but I consider this, if true, to be a >MAJOR worry. It never ceases to amaze me how lightly the government takes >lying to the people. Unfortunately I don't have the contacts or resources >to do any further investigation, I hope this thread is resolved one way or >another soon. > >nobody@unimportant Ther is always the posibility of disinformation. That is one of the governments specialties. I'm not saying the posibility isn't there, I'm sure there are anon remailers run by the government. An I remember from a show on PBS I watched months ago in which someone from inside the CIA said that the government does actively monitor the Internet and has for a long time. The thing to remember is to PGP your important mail and sign everything.... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMTvIw4WnykIBM1nhAQEnpAgAjVDhjgKrLQWxzRIL6nc8WQLCOLxTkGI7 ybr6cse/ARbdhNv+FD+XHEEtXngxA+p45jJHUE4OHyIKUTy6AVa3wi1U5DlBmTB8 XbFHF4YwTwpMhBpBnGl5iBMwO3ZYrtQ/3SE4mIi99DhVzpQHywlJeo0DbHAdrPJU UunZF0nhZyz0ycCQWMJ8yZL6iVkuZXnCkZfMjNtMIttEgh+I/R3hRiGNisZPJQvX krbrJsRZhpYv7Fk72zXD9YxqizczJuom63jPQNqkUK/XqfuulQD4b632BS1gmhNc jHwLw9tUkV5bne2digLe5FDL2Jxhi7TsZ56MzAgB8D8SDBf/I6Dphw== =XBqQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "... In Germany they first came for the Communists and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for Catholics, and I didn't speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me-and by that time no one was left to speak up..." Pastor Martin Niemoller ++++++++++++ ************************************** * Matthew Murphy ------------ eggplant(a)inlink.com * ---------- * http://www.inlink.com/~eggplant * The Web page is under construciton at this time though.. * Please don't mind the mess.... * ************************************** ++++++++++++ finger eggplant(a)inlink.com for my PGP key.

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Anonymous remailers and Leahy bill
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I am assuming they fix the obvious error in the phrasing above. Until they do, we can only guess at the intent. >"Thanks for the use of your nifty anonymous remailer. Under a different >name, I intend to use this remailer (along with others) to transmit child >pornography, plot terrorism, and do all of my drug deals. You've made my >life so much more secure!" At this point, Bob has no choice other than to reply with: "I assume you are joking however since what you have stated is in violation of numerous laws, we have no choice other than to disable your account. If we find that illegal acts have been committed using this remailer, we will have no choice other than to report such actions." Anyone stupid enough to make a statement like this deserves to be disabled. >At that point, Bob is GUILTY of violation of the Leahy bill, because his >encrypted anonymous remailer: No, if Bob were to follow the above scenario, he would already be guilty of terminal stupidity. >So maybe the word gets out, occasionally. At that point, usage of anonymous >remailers declines, and people willing to risk operating one declines. A >few come up which are run by the Feds, which log anyone who attempts to use >it... Declines ? They are only protection from amateurs. Do you really not believe that everything in and out of anon.penet.fi & others is not monitored *at the ISP/carrier level* ? Warmly, Padgett

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Re: Jump Start ecash With IPhone
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:37 AM 3/6/96 -0800, Jim McCoy wrote: >On another related note the IRS is getting somewhat concerned >about the opportunities the Internet offers people to avoid taxes >according to the Treasury department's international-tax counsel. The >government will "maintain [tax] toll booths on the information superhighway." >(WSJ, 3/6/96) The note in the WSJ's regular Wednesday "Tax Report" column specified that the IRS was most concerned about the possibility that electronic payment systems could lead to "extensive transactions outside of normal banking channels." As well they might worry. "When money is data, data switches are money switches." Talking about toll booths is easier than erecting them on a system built by consensus. I can see the ETF meeting when the Service presents its proposal. And as for those who say that the ETF will be replaced by the 'Big Boys' now that the Net is a hot item, I say so what. We can have our own net running on any infrastructure. What counts is how many hosts run the protocols not who wrote the protocols. And how successful will the Service be in convincing lots of hosts to run its new and improved Simple Tax Collection Protocol (STCP)? DCF

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Re: NYT login
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just Rich wrote: > > On Sun, 3 Mar 1996 hallam(a)w3.org wrote: > > > >The tobacco companies need a forum. And they are used to spending big > > >bucks on sponsoring things. > > > > That misses the point. There is no shortage of potential sponsors. > > What these people are asking me is "how much business will Web > > advertising create for me". > > This misses another point. The question was, how do *we* pay for this > stuff (emphasis mine). > > If someone develops a reasonably easy-to-use and reasonably secure digital > cash micropayment system, then I would be happy to pay to read the New > York Times on the Web. I would rather they were dependent on my money than > R.J. Reynold's. I am attempting to support the largest number of models possible. Micropayments is only one model, I have an internet draft out describing a scheme based on a suggestion by Ron. I don't think I should choose how people will raise revenue. I don't think that the NYT will want to be associated with cancer sticks in any case. There are plenty of sponsors such as IBM, Intel etc who will be happy to pay cash for a Web site ad, provided it makes them money. Phill - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTuaOCoZzwIn1bdtAQF5DQGAsdUiYsmP0EwHZUWA2ijeAZf/pBoqFtzR VDYY2760gf0QLqNBDbLHo6LnJp7T4b5h =vjES -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Newest CACM and Key Escrow
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The newest Communications of the ACM (March 90) is entitled "How to Use Key Escrow." I haven't read it yet, but on a quick glance, I don't see some of the newer schemes I've heard of, but there is an article "taxonomy of key escrow encryption systems" by Denning and Branstad -- Which does briefly mention of the Lotus scheme and some of the other published schemes that I was thinking of. _______________________ Regards, 8146th member of the CIEC coalition Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu 0C 69 D4 E8 F2 70 24 33 B4 5E 5E EC 35 E6 FB 88

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