- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: NYT login
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just Rich wrote: > > On Sun, 3 Mar 1996 hallam(a)w3.org wrote: > > > >The tobacco companies need a forum. And they are used to spending big > > >bucks on sponsoring things. > > > > That misses the point. There is no shortage of potential sponsors. > > What these people are asking me is "how much business will Web > > advertising create for me". > > This misses another point. The question was, how do *we* pay for this > stuff (emphasis mine). > > If someone develops a reasonably easy-to-use and reasonably secure digital > cash micropayment system, then I would be happy to pay to read the New > York Times on the Web. I would rather they were dependent on my money than > R.J. Reynold's. I am attempting to support the largest number of models possible. Micropayments is only one model, I have an internet draft out describing a scheme based on a suggestion by Ron. I don't think I should choose how people will raise revenue. I don't think that the NYT will want to be associated with cancer sticks in any case. There are plenty of sponsors such as IBM, Intel etc who will be happy to pay cash for a Web site ad, provided it makes them money. Phill - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTuaOCoZzwIn1bdtAQF5DQGAsdUiYsmP0EwHZUWA2ijeAZf/pBoqFtzR VDYY2760gf0QLqNBDbLHo6LnJp7T4b5h =vjES -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Newest CACM and Key Escrow
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The newest Communications of the ACM (March 90) is entitled "How to Use Key Escrow." I haven't read it yet, but on a quick glance, I don't see some of the newer schemes I've heard of, but there is an article "taxonomy of key escrow encryption systems" by Denning and Branstad -- Which does briefly mention of the Lotus scheme and some of the other published schemes that I was thinking of. _______________________ Regards, 8146th member of the CIEC coalition Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu 0C 69 D4 E8 F2 70 24 33 B4 5E 5E EC 35 E6 FB 88

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Re: TET cryptosystem
by B. Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************************************************************************* This is a temporary e-mail address; I am in Cambridge until 12 March. Continue to send mail to schneier(a)counterpane.com; it forwards by itself. ************************************************************************* > Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a > competitor against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. > They are claiming a non-linear approach in which (as best I can > tell) they are permuting the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry > substitution tables. > > They are also asserting that these "key generated substitution > tables and inter-round permutations" are supported by "nonlinear > orthomorphic mappings generated from arbitrary key" (and that this > is patented) and "row-complete Latin Squares generated from an > arbitrary key" (and that this is also patented). > > The claimed benefits include being invulnerable to differential and > "linear" cryptanalysis, no linear key/data interaction to hide, > that this results in the tables and permutations being > "transient/secret," and that fewer rounds are needed (fewer than > what, I don't know) to attain "resistance to cryptanalysis." This explanation is so laced with nonsensical buzzwords that the algorithm is probably absolute nonsense. I can't tell you (because of NDAs) how many times I've seen proprietary algorithms that make all sorts of grandeose claims of security and are actually terrible. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 * schneier(a)counterpane.com **************************************************************************

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Re: What's anyone know about Teledyne Electronic Technologies?
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:42 AM 3/7/96 -0500, you wrote: >>Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a competitor >>against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. They are claiming >>a non-linear approach in which (as best I can tell) they are permuting >>the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry substitution tables. > > A couple of points: 1. DES is nonlinear and (I believe) provably not a group; that TET is alluding to DES being linear casts grave doubt. If their S-Box "permutes" I'd also be concerned! >Dont trust it unless you are a good cryptanalyst and have a copy of the >source code. Most commercial crypto products are crap. > >Jonathan Wienke > 2. Most NEW UNPROVEN CRYPTOSYSTEMS are crap, not crypto products. That's too strong an assertion. Plenty of commercial crypto products(and perhaps "most" which in significant commercial disctribution) are based on strong DES/RSA, etc. proven technologies.

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Re: Square pegs in round holes, matchmaking, corporate mailservers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dimitris Tsapakidis <dimitrt(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk> wrote: >Bob must find out whether Alice has declared (commited) her interest >in him, if and only if he has declared (commited) his interest in her. >Before he does so, he can at most know that a girl is interested in him. >Another description: Bob and Alice can have a date if they both commit >to each other. If only one commits, nobody will ever find out about it. To avoid a trusted intermediary, the problem can be thought of as a secure multi-party communication problem with private inputs, which is much studied in the literature. The easiest formulation is pairwise: Alice and Bob mutually engage in the calculation of "Alice loves Bob" AND "Bob loves Alice". Each inputs his feelings as an input bit, and the output will be true only if they have mutual feelings. Each pair of potential lovers would then go through the protocol with each other. This problem is solved in "Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party's Input and Correctness of the Result", by Chaum, Damgard, and van de Graaf, in the proceedings of the Crypto 87 conference. They even discuss this application directly: "Note that this AND-gate computation, where both parties want to hide their input from each other, has a meaningful application: consider the situation where Alice and Bob have just met, and each considers dating the other. Neither wishes to lose face in the following sense: if Alice wants a date but Bob doesn't, Alice does not want to let Bob know that she wanted the date. And the same holds for Bob. In other words: if a party does not want the date it does not find out the other party's decision." The solution is reasonably practical, involving scrambled truth tables and bit commitments, and is related to some of Chaum's work on zero-knowledge. The paper is a bit theoretical and hard to read, though. I can write up the protocol if anyone is interested. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBMT8p4RnMLJtOy9MBAQHUAQIAv6tTbhLvTnbxX+7BlSIQcxCBfF+FhL1E mR57Ks8Rklg2PxEotSl9BDEtKWVFoqXg8UdNhsj6d3ASFzdQe0B6Hg== =tCch -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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DoubleSpeak
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. Is there anyone her who has *not* "developed systems to break encrypted messages" ? One is called brute force and can run on any PC. The two pieces missing from the statement is the *cost* and *time* involved in breaking keys of X length & would suspect the algorithm might have something to do with the answer. (Can generate a LOASDR key of 1024 bits real easily, breaks just as fast). I use a PGP key of 1024 bits simply because I am too lazy to go to 2048 so why was this turkey posted twice ? Lacking meaningful parameters, it does not really say anything. Warmly, Padgett

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Re: PGP backdoor? (No, I'm not paranoid.)
by David Weiss 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >perry(a)piermont.com wrote: >> [...] >>Your informant is taking extremely good drugs. You should find out who >>his connection is should you want to get any. >> >>Perry > >Dear Perry, > [interesting statement of why nothing one hears should ever be discounted] > >So, why waste bandwith with a post that apparently mainly seems to be aimed >at dismissing somebody but brings *absolutely no* new knowledge to >the discussion? Please, next time, post privately. Sure it does; Perry's opinion. And what that is worth, depends on the reader's opinion of Perry. >Funny jokes are, IMHO, welcome because they have some life-enhancing value. > >So please, at least be funny... I thought it was pretty funny (more so than your post, anyway). David (I feel another really silly and pointless thread starting...)

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 7 Mar 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > However, a CA operating outside the licensing structure of current CA's > would have very low costs and hence no investment to lose in litigation. > Costs would be almost entirely marketing related and as long as you stayed > out of jurisdictions with some of the new CA law, no regulatory costs or > barriers. > I don't think this is definitional. If nothing else they can take the equipment. If you don't incorporate, your personal assets are at risk; if you do, you have to keep a real separation between the corporation and yourself, pay the taxes, etc. Ok, make it a non-profit labor of love; low risks, no returns, then maybe you are right. Just hope that there ar no punitive or large consequential damages, and no one pierces the corporate veil (unlikely, I admit, but not impossible). What law applies to a certificate used in a multi-jurisdictional transaction is less obvious to me than I would like. I think I have talked a student in my seminar into writing a paper to educate me. [The above may have been dictated with Dragon Dictate/Win 2.0 voice recognition. Be alert for unintentional strange word substitutions.] A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, it turns out that (according to a nice person at SurfWatch who put up with the rant I mailed in and send back a denial rather quickly) io.com isn't actually blocked. At least, so they say. No comment on whether there's anything like the "25 complaints" policy. I don't own SurfWatch, but if anybody does and finds www.io.com blocked, I'll send in another rant. I wonder whether they've actually considered the liability situation in re: blocking sites that shouldn't be blocked? I mean, sure, they seem nice enough about setting things right (like with the Nynex sites whose url's had "xxx" in the paths), but it seems to this non-lawyer that a case could be made for damages inflicted by being known as a purveyor of filthy indecency for even a short while. ______c_____________________________________________________________________ Mike M Nally * Tiv^H^H^H IBM * Austin TX * pain is inevitable m5(a)tivoli.com * m101(a)io.com * <URL:http://www.io.com/~m101> * suffering is optional

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surfwatch filtering
by mutant＠compuville.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- someone wrote: >[homepage on IO] > >BTW, did you hear that IO got on the SurfWatch "bad list" because there >were more than 25 complaints about objectionable material in the io.com >domain. (Apparently, when SurfWatch hears more than 25 complaints >against a particular domain, the just deny access to the whole domain >rather than particular URLs.) A quick phone call to the Surf Watch people revealed that they rarely block whole domains, and that they are not currently blocking all of io.com. - -- mutant(a)compuville.com "They that can give up essential liberty to mutant(a)cypher.net obtain a little temporary safety deserve (send mail with Subject: neither liberty nor safety." send-pgp-key for PGP key) -Ben Franklin ~1784 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT9NaH0ndmRPxibdAQFSJwQAtq/s1c+GZlHvgVOhNgM8Dseq0SQ+6L8U bx8FV0l85anNk+fjRnY5hD8RflHFeVzLis2yDmn8BLjYzVnHBEWBXXncpwg3okoQ FOMJJTZZbOec10ESy3pvRPwgie60IaR3qIcHUmUHRqbv5dOjgDg5GhYWeZ8rhCCN 0pisfaQBsVc= =qgSw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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