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Re: Chaum's cash: backup?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 PM 10/22/95 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >say I download $1000 to my hard drive and it crashes. what to do? > >if it was like "real" cash, then it really would be lost. It is really lost. Your disk drive contains information the bank *cannot* know. If you do not know that information either, you cannot prove to the bank or anyone else that you rightfully possess a legitimate coin. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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[reformatted] how secure can privasoft be?
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

heres a version with eighty character lines: ============================================================================ How Secure Can PrivaSoft Be? Introduction PrivaSoft is a communication security product, and the user is entitled to know how secure it is. This document addresses the question of cryptographic strength of PrivaSoft. Export license regulations In some advanced countries, cryptographic products are categorized as "munitions" and their use, sale or exportation is controlled by local licensing regulations. PrivaSoft has obtained an export license from the governments of Israel and the USA. Licenses in other countries are obtained in coordination with the local distributors. The typical policy is to limit the allowable cryptographic strength of commercial products to a level that is strong enough for commercial purposes. The basic intention of this regulation is to protect the state from abuse of too strong cryptographic products by terrorists and criminals. Some countries do not practice such law because it is viewed as a denial of freedom of expression. PrivaSoft willfully complies with these regulations as it is a commercial product, and it is not intended for national security applications with its current key length which is the maximum legally allowable for commercial users. The cryptographic engine of PrivaSoft PrivaSoft uses a pseudo-random generator that is seeded by a 9 digit number uniformly normalized from the user's secret key. The engine is proprietary, designed according to the rules of modern cryptology to make the best use of the allowable key length. Like other dependable cryptographic engines, the structure of the encryption software can be disclosed without compromising the security of the user. However, the coding and specific parameters of the mechanism are considered a trade secret and will be disclosed for the purpose of cryptoanalytic validation when necessary and under an appropriate non-disclosure non- competition agreement. The use of default keys When secret keys or passwords are used by laymen, there is always a conflict between security and convenience: The user tends to use fixed, easily memorized keys again and again, while the cryptoanalyst only waits for an opportunity to see many messages encrypted by the same key. PrivaSoft, being a secure commercial product must live in peace with both - allow the user to use a repetitive, default key, and deny the cryptoanalyst the pleasure of having many messages encrypted by one key. This is done by using the pseudo- random "key extension" feature which is described in the PrivaSoft user's guide. The information contents a clear message If a cryptographic product is properly designed, then the almost only way to crack it is to try all possible keys. If the process is done by a computer, the "cracking"" software must be taught to tell the correct key from the wrong keys. This can only be done if there are some properties of the decrypted message that are known a - priori. With the PrivaSoft analogue graphical encryption, and with the naturally noisy fax images, a significant portion of the page must be reconstructed, and a significant amount of mathematical correlation must be calculated between neighboring areas of the image, before the cracking software can tell whether the candidate key is wrong. This makes the cracking process much slower than in alphanumeric encryption of the text in a natural language. The 9 digit key, when applied to analogue, the graphical encryption is equivalent to a much longer key applied to alphanumeric encryption. The cryptographically oriented user can make it very much harder by some smart pre-processing of the image prior to its encryption. A simple example: For a short message, increasing the font size of the text by a factor of 10 will significantly increase the time required for breaking the encryption. Customized versions of PrivaSoft PrivaSoft is unique in being a one-stop product than can serve all types of modern correspondence, including E-mail, fax and paper printouts. Special applications that need and can obtain a license to use non-commercial cryptographic engines can be accommodated by special versions of PrivaSoft. The cryptographic engine can be customer-furnished and customer integrated, however - since in some areas the integration of this product with certain cryptographic engines may be considered "munitions", each customized version of the product has to be licensed separately in accordance with the laws of the territory where it was created and used. ==========================================================================

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The trial of the century?
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Any reports on todays outing to the Bernstein case? Any gifs of courtroom sketches to upload? Simon ----- Johnny Cochran - Sears spokesman: "If it doesn't fit, you can take it back and change it."

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Lack of secrecy in U.S. Banks
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I ran across an interesting fragment of the U.S. Code. Apparently, the Federal Government may access any banking records whatsoever if the Director of the FBI (or the Director's designee) certify that the information is sought for "foreign intelligence purposes." Further, it is illegal for anybody to disclose that the records were turned over to the government, or even sought. I do not know the penalties for disclosure. The Attorney General appears to set guidelines for the dissemination of the information obtained through this law. Note that if banking privacy is violated for reasons which are not related to counter-intelligence operations, the victim is unlikely to be in a position to seek relief from the courts because the privacy violation is likely to remain secret. I've enclosed the law below. I'm not a lawyer, so it raises more questions than it answers. Perhaps the more skilled readers on the list will be able to deduce the implications. The U.S. Code is available at http://www.pls.com:8001/his/usc.html This particular law is available at the improbable URL: http://www.pls.com:8001/cgi-bin/taos_doc.pl?unix+0+uscode+17566+query+a+Gov… Here is the law itself: -CITE- 12 USC Sec. 3414 01/24/94 -EXPCITE- TITLE 12 - BANKS AND BANKING CHAPTER 35 - RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY -HEAD- Sec. 3414. Special procedures -STATUTE- (a)(1) Nothing in this chapter (except sections 3415, 3417, 3418, and 3421 of this title) shall apply to the production and disclosure of financial records pursuant to requests from - (A) a Government authority authorized to conduct foreign counter- or foreign positive-intelligence activities for purposes of conducting such activities; or (B) the Secret Service for the purpose of conducting its protective functions (18 U.S.C. 3056; 3 U.S.C. 202, Public Law 90-331, as amended). (2) In the instances specified in paragraph (1), the Government authority shall submit to the financial institution the certificate required in section 3403(b) of this title signed by a supervisory official of a rank designated by the head of the Government authority. (3) No financial institution, or officer, employee, or agent of such institution, shall disclose to any person that a Government authority described in paragraph (1) has sought or obtained access to a customer's financial records. (4) The Government authority specified in paragraph (1) shall compile an annual tabulation of the occasions in which this section was used. (5)(A) Financial institutions, and officers, employees, and agents thereof, shall comply with a request for a customer's or entity's financial records made pursuant to this subsection by the Federal Bureau of Investigation when the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (or the Director's designee) certifies in writing to the financial institution that such records are sought for foreign counterintelligence purposes and that there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the customer or entity whose records are sought is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 1801 of title 50. (B) The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate information obtained pursuant to this paragraph only as provided in guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence collection and foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and, with respect to dissemination to an agency of the United States, only if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency. (C) On a semiannual basis the Attorney General shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to this paragraph. (D) No financial institution, or officer, employee, or agent of such institution, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to a customer's or entity's financial records under this paragraph. (b)(1) Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a Government authority from obtaining financial records from a financial institution if the Government authority determines that delay in obtaining access to such records would create imminent danger of - (A) physical injury to any person; (B) serious property damage; or (C) flight to avoid prosecution. (2) In the instances specified in paragraph (1), the Government shall submit to the financial institution the certificate required in section 3403(b) of this title signed by a supervisory official of a rank designated by the head of the Government authority. (3) Within five days of obtaining access to financial records under this subsection, the Government authority shall file with the appropriate court a signed, sworn statement of a supervisory official of a rank designated by the head of the Government authority setting forth the grounds for the emergency access. The Government authority shall thereafter comply with the notice provisions of section 3409(c) of this title. (4) The Government authority specified in paragraph (1) shall compile an annual tabulation of the occasions in which this section was used. -SOURCE- (Pub. L. 95-630, title XI, Sec. 1114, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3707; Pub. L. 97-320, title IV, Sec. 432(b), Oct. 15, 1982, 96 Stat. 1527; Pub. L. 99-569, title IV, Sec. 404, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3197.) -REFTEXT- REFERENCES IN TEXT Public Law 90-331, as amended, referred to in subsec. (a)(1)(B), is Pub. L. 90-331, June 6, 1968, 82 Stat. 170, as amended, which is set out as a note under section 3056 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. -MISC2- AMENDMENTS 1986 - Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 99-569 added par. (5). 1982 - Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 97-320 struck out ''of'' after ''financial institution''. -SECREF- SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS This section is referred to in sections 3402, 3409, 3421 of this title. __________________________________________________________________________

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Re: textbooks
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have also heard good things about a book by Warwick Ford.

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faxes are not secure
by an407769＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BBC Discovers Faxes Are Not Secure (no shit, Sherlock) BLACKPOOL, LANCASHIRE, ENGLAND, 1995 OCT 19 (NB) -- The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) found out late last week that faxes are not a secure transmission system. After faxing a copy of a top secret internal management document to a BBC senior staying at the Pembroke Hotel in Blackpool, where the Conservative Party Conference took place all last week, BBC executives were aghast to discover that the fax was sent to the room of Nigel Nelson, a journalist with The People newspaper, who was also staying at the hotel. The mis-route for the fax was caused by the fact that Nelson had advised hotel staff that he was expecting an urgent fax, while the BBC did not notify the recipient that a fax was on its way. Reception staff at the hotel assumed that the incoming fax was meant for Nelson and passed it along to him. Like all good journalists, Nelson realized he had a potential scoop and passed along the story to the paper, which duly published details of the fax, along with a brief mention of how the fax came into its hands. The BBC, meanwhile, has complained loudly that the fax should have been dispatched to Colin Browne head of the BBC's corporate affairs office, who was hosting a reception for conference delegates at the hotel. The fax was send from Leigh Jackson, head of the BBC's Communication Planning office, and outlined management's worries over job losses and the potential effects of a likely strike if the British Government goes ahead, as many think it will, with privatizing the BBC's TV and radio transmitter network in the UK. The fax also allegedly said that the BBC would press the government to pass along at least some of the expected UKP100 million that the sale of the 1,400-strong transmitter network would generate, to the BBC as income for the state TV service. Neither the hotel nor the BBC is making any comment about the incident, but the paper claims that it ran the story with the interest of the public in mind and that how the fax fell into its reporter's hands was not its concern. In an editorial in The People newspaper, which was published on Sunday, Nelson said that "firing off secret faxes to busy hotels without someone ready to receive them is asking for trouble." Nelson went on to say that the story was printed, as it was in the public interest to know what the country's TV company was planning to do with its assets. In the UK, any TV owner or user has to pay the BBC a license fee of around $150 a year to receive any form of terrestrial TV transmissions. Nelson claims that privatizing the transmitter network, while not impinging on the BBC's operations itself, may not be in the public interest in the long run. "Privatization could lead to foreign companies muscling in on the most famous broadcasting network in the world," he said in his editorial. In a prepared statement, the BBC said that the document was not policy and was written by a junior member of staff, and therefore was not as sensitive as the newspaper had made out. "We were victims of technology," the BBC said. (Steve Gold/19951018) --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Challenge: Hack Elementrix!
by Dana W. Albrecht 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Everyone, I think that with all the recent attention to Netscape and Microsoft that another target has been altogether overlooked: Elementrix POTP <spit>. > New encryption method announced > > Sept. 29 -- Elementrix Technologies has announced a breakthrough in data > encryption that does away with the need for passwords and public/private > keys, instead working transparently at either an application or hardware > level. Using the One Time Pad method of encryption -- acknowledged for a > long time as being a superior encryption method -- Elementrix has released > both an FTP and E-Mail package that makes sending secure messages as easy > as just clicking a button. Its Power One Time Pad (POTP) technology > promises to ensure that in the very near future, the entire Internet can > become a fundamentally secure place. Elementrix is on the Web. http://www.elementrix.co.il/ Reposted from sci.crypt: In article <30803C0E.2781E494(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org>, Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> writes: > This announcement pegs my bogometer (a device for measuring bogons, > the elementary particle of bogosity). > > Readers of the Skeptical Inquirer and other similar publications will > recognize all the classic signs of a scam, either deliberate or > self-delusionary: > > 1. Breathless, overhyped language ("revolutionary", "breakthrough", etc) > > 2. Clear misstatements of well-established theoretical principles > (the discussion of the one-time pad) > > 3. Reluctance to get specific, usually by citing proprietary concerns. > When this is combined with a claim that a patent application has been > filed, this is a clear sign of bogosity -- one's patent > rights can be compromised only by publishing *before* filing, not after. > > Unless, of course, the claim is rejected by the patent office, > which is almost unheard of these days even for clearly bogus and/or > trivial "inventions". > > Phil While Elementrix has failed to provide any detailed technical information (specifications, source code, etc.) this is not entirely out of reach. You can obtain an evaluation copy of their "secure" FTP client from ftp://ftp.elementrix.co.il/pub/secftp/ This appears to be a binary for Microsoft Windoze. The server at ftp.elementrix.co.il is a "secure" server. Note: ftp> open ftp.elementrix.co.il Connected to ftp.elementrix.co.il. 220 sunex FTP server [Elementrix POTP(1.51) Secure FTP(1.5-3)] ready. Name (ftp.elementrix.co.il:dwa): anonymous 331 Guest login ok, send your complete e-mail address as password. Password: 230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply. ftp> close 221 Goodbye. ftp> So there you go. Sure, commented source code with accompanying specifications for an implementation are nice, but did Ian and David have such luxuries for their Netscape hack? I will confess that I have not actually tried running their software, let alone reverse-engineering it, as I am Windoze-challenged (running on SunOS 4.1.x as we speak). However, I'm sure there are probably many people on this list with suitable Windoze platforms complete with the necessary reverse engineering tools. In many ways, Elementrix is a more enjoyable target. Their claims of security reek of more marketing hype than even Microsoft would stoop to, and their use of the term "One Time Pad" is disgusting. At least Netscape is trying to use respectable crypto algorithms and is being open about their code. These people deserve to flamed far more than Netscape (and even Microsoft) ever did. Perhaps someone could even convince Sameer to do T-shirts. I'll even agree to cover the cost of one for the first exploit. How about it, Sameer? :) Dana W. Albrecht dwa(a)corsair.com

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FidoNet Remailer
by Jim.Cannell＠f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have been a long time lurker on this list, as well as having a long time interest in crypto. Most of my activity in this area has been on FidoNet rather than the internet. Due to the control phreak nature of much of FidoNet, I've spent a lot of time and effort in an attempt to just simply route around the bastards. I created the SecureMail system, which is a network of FidoNet nodes that agree to route any and all traffic without monitoring or censorship. Within SecureMail, encrypted traffic is not only permitted, it is encouraged. Which brings me to the point of this message. I have written a anonymous remailer program for FidoNet. It is currently running on my FidoNet node in an alpha test mode. It has only been running a couple of weeks, and seems to be doing quite well. I have just added internet addressability to it. What this means is that now anonymous messages can be remailed between FidoNet and the internet. Having still another routing path should further decrease the traceability of these messages. I would like to ask the cypherpunks to help me test the remailer across the gateway. Please send many messages through this remailer from both the FidoNet and the internet side of the gateway. Try to break it. I want a good reliable piece of software, and if it can survive attempts by this group to break it, there will be a lot more confidence in it. Following are instructions for using the FidoNet remailer: - From FidoNet, send your message to Remail at 1:216/21. From the internet, send your message to: remail(a)f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org In all cases, the first text line of the message must contain a double colon. The second line contains the remail command, and the third line is blank. The actual text to be remailes starts on line 4. To send a message to Joe Sixpack at FidoNet address 1:102/903, enter: :: remail-to: Joe Sixpack @ 1:102/903. To send a message to an internet address, enter: :: remail-to: tcmay(a)got.net (Sorry, Tim -- couldn't resist using you as an example :-) To get a short help file, enter: :: help To post a message to the FidoNet SYSOP Echo, enter: :: remail-to: SYSOP I'll welcome discussions of this remailer on the list, or in private mail. Bug reports and/or comments are encouraged. I can be reached at Jim.Cannell(a)f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org BTW, I will be at the cypherpunks meeting in Anguilla next week. Hope to meet some of you there. Jim - International SecureMail Host (ISMH) PGP key 1024/B7822B3D fingerprint = 0F F4 79 06 3B 33 99 D1 07 36 66 66 80 85 76 B3 Protect your right to privacy. Say no to GAK. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMIg6pSWTIMO3gis9AQEKLQP/TVodxgTJiik3KQK1C8QgSp/O3wzdxi+P eC2flE6qgtlmwh6X4vbBNTmj4bKAfGLgbJyvdcMAZCESYab1dxO8q1lwOAnayW8d qoSRhL+zT0KepmV5FXyLscq+SbzgxKoX3gkWgHlhrhHbmycr3rFGLKz6ZsoR/xmb WX16LX2JVFk= =vBaR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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WinNews Special Issue (fwd)
by Tim Philp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am on a Microsoft mailing list that is for developers of Win95 stuff. Today I found this in my mailbox. This file details a security bug in Win95 that I thought might be interesting to the group. Regards, Tim Philp Brantford, Ontario, Canada =================================== For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to: pgp-public-keys(a)swissnet.ai.mit.edu In Subject line type: GET PHILP =================================== ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 20 Oct 1995 17:15:33 -0700 From: WinNews(a)Microsoft.com To: WinNews(a)microsoft.nwnet.com Subject: WinNews Special Issue Microsoft(R) WinNews Electronic Newsletter Special Issue, October 20, 1995 *********************************************************** Here is some important information on Windows 95 that may affect some of you. Please make certain to read it. UPDATED DRIVERS FOR WINDOWS 95 FILE AND PRINTER SHARING SECURITY ISSUE - October 20, 1995 Microsoft wants its customers to know that it has discovered and fixed a potential security problem with file and printer sharing in Windows 95. Only customers who have enabled file and printer sharing - a non-default option - may have been at risk, and, to the best of our knowledge, no users have been harmed. Nevertheless, Microsoft regards this potential problem with the greatest seriousness and, we have worked hard over the past week to resolve it. Microsoft recommends customers using File and Printer Sharing upgrade to the newer drivers. How do I know if I am affected? Only customers that use the File and Printer Sharing option to share their files with other users on a network are affected. This option is not enabled by default so unless you have manually enabled it, you are not affected by this issue. To determine if File and Printer Sharing is enabled, choose the Networks Option in the Control Panel. If file and printer sharing is enabled, you will see either "File and Printer Sharing for Microsoft Networks" or "File and Printer Sharing for NetWare Networks" in the list of installed network components. What are the issues? File and Printer Sharing for NetWare Networks Microsoft was recently made aware of an issue with File and Printer sharing for NetWare Networks which may affect data security for corporate users. Only users whose environments meet both of the following conditions may be affected: 1. They configure their machine to share files and printers with other users on the network using File and Printer Sharing for NetWare networks (This option is not turned on by default) 2. They enable remote administration or install Microsoft Remote Registry Services (These options are not turned on by default) If your configuration matches that listed above, it is possible for another user on the network to gain read-only access to your machine after the administrator has logged off the machine and until you restart your computer. To correct this problem, Microsoft has issued an updated driver for File and Printer Sharing for NetWare Networks. The updated driver ensures that only valid administrators have access to the computer's drive. File and Printer Sharing for Microsoft Networks (not MSN: The Microsoft Network online service) Microsoft is also issuing an update for a known problem with File and Printer Sharing for Microsoft Networks and a certain UNIX shareware network client (Samba's SMBCLIENT). The update corrects a problem with share-level security documented in the Microsoft Knowledge Base on October 9th. The update also includes a correction for a similar problem with user-level security that Microsoft recently discovered as part of its internal testing of the new driver. Customers whose environments meet all of the conditions below, may have their data susceptible to network or Internet hackers: 1. They configure their machine to share files and printers with other users on the network using File and Printer Sharing for Microsoft Networks (This option is not turned on by default) 2. They share a LAN, Internet, or Dial-Up connection with a UNIX-based computer running Samba's SMBCLIENT software 3. The network administrator does not disable peer services using System Policies The Samba SMB client allows its users to send illegal networking commands over the network. The Samba client is the only known SMB client at this time that does not filter out such illegal commands. SMBCLIENT users do not automatically have access to the Windows 95 drive, and must know the exact steps to send these illegal commands. The updated driver prevents these illegal commands from being executed, preventing SMBCLIENT users from accessing the drive on which sharing is enabled. With the updated driver, the SMBCLIENT user will only have access to those shared folders that the Windows 95 user has designated. How do I get the Updated Drivers? (Please note that this only affects English language versions of Windows 95.) Both drivers are available for immediate download from the Internet (http://www.microsoft.com/windows) The Microsoft Network online service, and is being made available to other online services including CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy. The updated drivers will also be mailed to any user free of charge if they call Microsoft's FastTips line, 800-936-4200, beginning Monday, October 23rd. Microsoft is committed to providing safe connectivity solutions for customers. Microsoft takes this responsibility seriously and has worked, and will continue to work, with great speed to provide solutions for customer issues.

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Re: Polymorphic e-cash schemes was: digital cash and identity disclosure
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:03 PM 10/20/95, Hal wrote: [Bryce's proposal elided] >Unfortunately, in order for a coin to be POTENTIALLY spent in an off-line >way, the protocols require that the identity of the withdrawer be >embedded, in blinded form, within the coin data. It is this step that >Tim and others object to, because among other things it requires >participants to securely identify themselves to the bank, hence does not >work well in a fully anonymous society. The reason for this requirement >is that if the coin is double-spent, this is not found out until >afterwards, and so the identity of the cheater has to be available so the >bank can go after him. > >So letting the payee choose whether to deposit the coin right away or >wait until later will not address this basic privacy problem with offline >cash. Indeed. And let me clearly state that I am not proposing an either-or situation. In a real ecology of competing digital cash schemes, unconstrained by the software patent issue we now are facing, there would likely be "online clearing only" systems, "offline clearing only" systems, and various hybrids and variants. The market would then decide, based on transaction costs, convenience, security, anonymity features, etc. As with the "real" economy, where a variety of financial instruments coexist. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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