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Re: Best Computer School?
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

moscow state university in russia is not bad also. they teach lots of theory... which is good. - Igor.

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Re: Handbook of Applied Cryptography
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the publisher's URL for Handbook of Applied Cryptography, which amplifies Patrick's summary, and gives ordering info. http://www.crcpress.com/PRODS/8523.HTM Just reading the mouthwatering summaries and the extensive, detailed list of topics is a good primer on crypto.

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Re: Best Computer School?
by Ciro Maria 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 27 Jan 1997, SpyKing wrote: > This is a little off topic but maybe someone can help. I've got a teenage > son (HS sophomore) who's interested in majoring in computer science in > college with a particular interest in cryptography. He's leaning toward MIT. > Any suggestions from list members as to colleges to investigate? > > > Yeah Stevens Institute in Hoboken. Its pretty good I got there. Also Caltech is good, I don't really know which else.

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<<Vitamin B>>(January 27, 1997) Affirmative Anonymity
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: DAILY DOSE <DAILY_DOSE(a)smtpgw.worldcom.com> From: VitaminB <VitaminB(a)maxager.com> Date: 27 Jan 97 15:44:12 Subject: <<Vitamin B>>(January 27, 1997) Affirmative Anonymity Mime-Version: 1.0 Vitamin B: Your Daily Dose of Bionomics January 27, 1997 Affirmative Anonymity In response to the January 24th Vitamin B ("Anonymity and Reputation"), Greg Waddell, Policy Coordinator for U.S. Senator Connie Mack (R-FL) and 1996 Bionomics Conference Speaker, made the following comments, which we'd like to share. "There are aspects of the anonymity paradigm that relate to a whole host of social issues that Machine Age liberals usually seek to remedy with strong and heavy hand of government. Namely, these are issues of discrimination by race, gender, disability, etc. etc. After the Joint Economic Committee's hearing on the 21st Century Economy, held in summer of 1995, I suddenly realized (better late than never!) that communicating via computer over the Internet forces each of us to deal with others without regard to physical attributes. Neither color, race, gender, disability, religion, nationality, nor any "class" markers are apparent over the Net. The Information Age economy, if left to evolve freely, could bring us closer to our American ideals of equality for all than any law, affirmative action program, diversity training, or anything else. I think that is the most compelling aspect of what we identify as the anonymity of the Net." --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/ "If *you* don't go to FC97, *I* don't go to FC97"

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Re: S/KEY (was: 2 Questions)
by privsoft＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Bill and Peter for your help. Steveo

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Libel/slander & crypto relevancy
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I have received several private emails inquiring into what possible crypto relevance the recent exchange over libel/slander and the law. It is clear that even in democratic countries like Canada (not know as a freedom of speech protectorate) slander/libel is covered under criminal codes. While it is true that currently these statutes are not heavily used, if at all, this will change as businesses and special interest groups move even further onto electronic networks. Consider the zealous use of the law by the CoS. Ask Julf if the ramifications are not 'real world'. Consider a trial where a person is purported to have altered a transmission by some party. It is not in the juries best interest to rule in the favor of anyone other than the person claiming the damage. Why you might ask? Simply because they are going to see themselves in that same situation and will want to know that they are protected both in spirit as well as actuality. What company will want to use an environment where their contracts and other exchanges can not only be viewed by unknown third parties but are subject to a man in the middle attack, potentialy ruining a company. Consider the ramifications in a political venue. Now some will quickly point out that they can encrypt the entire document, hardly suitable for web pages and other forms of advertisment. I predict that within the next five years these slander/libel laws will be used by some organization to prosecute defamation of their Internet presence (eg web page graffitti). Within 10 years this area will be one of the hotest areas of the new communications law. Now some have held that list operators and such will be protected, most probably not in reality. Consider, we live in a time where a person can get drunk and kill somebody with their automobile and the bar or store they bought the drink(s) from can be charged. There is a current trend in the legal industry to find the person that is easiest to prosecute in the chain of events and it has nothing to do with personal responsibility or other quaint but possibly naive views. I want to thank Toto for acting as the unknowing and unwilling dupe in my taking advantage of his emotional outburst and its results, it wasn't personal I was simply trying to create a suitable environment to make my point. It was a happenstance occurance I could not resist taking advantage of. It is clear that here we have a lawyer in Canada who is not even aware that there is a little used criminal statute in the country he practices in which could be used by citizens sufficiently motivated and having suitable quantities of cash at hand to pursue the matter. This is not a unique occurance by any means, consider the outburst from some list members, supposed legal experts, over some of the references that I forwarded (not what I would call a consistent understanding of the law by any stretch of the imagination). The reality is that the legal industry (after all the main motivation for the legal profession is money) has a serious lacking in trained individuals. This should be a warning sign to everyone in any society which has hopes of embracing communications technology. Lawyers don't make law, they survive by taking their views of the law and convincing juries of from 6 to 12 (YMMV) persons that this is the way to protect 'society' and its best interests. If they don't understand the technology (eg forwarding private email to publicly accessible lists by accident) how in the world are they going to understand what is best, let along convince anyone else? Is this the kind of self-interest you want to trust your criminal communications case, let alone your liberty, to? It has been proposed by at least one party that a district attorney or other public prosecutor would not act on such events. This is also naive. The ramifications for their political opponents to use this 'insensitive and clearly self-interested' refusal to act as a perfect example of how that prosecutor is interested in their own political career and not in the interest of the people they are charged with protecting as well as a good demonstration of their technological ignorance. It would be very difficult to get re-elected in such an environment. Now the crypto relevancy, one of the methods to help reduce if not completely abort such attempts is digital signatures. Recently a couple of co-workers for Tivoli-IBM went to the Usenix conference and while there did some key signings. However, after discussion upon their return it was clear that having had their keys signed and signing others there was no clearly useful way to apply those keys in commen communications. Last year the Austin Cypherpunks did a short term experiment with a system (kourier.ssz.com) which was involved in encrypted file systems, encrypted transfers, traffic analysis, and heterogenous key-ring management. This also made it clear that the legal ramifications, economic issues (eg who pays) as well as the technical hurdles have not been studied sufficiently to call this technology mature. All that I ask is that instead of jumping the gun and saying 'it ain't so' you simply consider the ramifications from 'their' perspective. It truly is amazing what one can learn by walking a mile in another mans shoes. For if there is one truth to be learned it is that this discussion is not about how it is, but rather how it will be and how it should be. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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The Bell Curve
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

.-. .-. .-. .-. .-. .-. .-. --/---\---/---\---/---\---/---\---/---\---/---\---/---\---/- `-' `-' `-' `-' `-' `-' `-'

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> wrote in article <5ch8v4$co9(a)life.ai.mit.edu>... > blanc wrote: > > From: Dr.Dimitri Vulis > > However U.S.G. is able to say that people of Iraq or Lybia or Cuba should > > not be permitted on the 'net. It also bombs Iraq and murders their > > civilians > > in retaliation for something their governments supposedly did. > > > The U.S.G. has many more resources than most of us to do these things, > > including equipment, cooperative troops, money, and recognition from other > > governments. If other nations disagree with the U.S.G. they have the > > resources to discuss, bargain, negotiate, criticize, form alliances, take > > their chances and retaliate, etc. > > I wish this were true, at least of nations which would be friendly > to someone like me (white, Western, etc.). A bully on a school > playground can always be knocked down, no matter how big or how > vicious he is. Sadly, the U.S. bully cannot be knocked down. Bad > enough you get nuclear, chemical, and/or biological stuff waved at > you - if you get into a hot war like Desert Storm, your country is > carpet-bombed with fleets of B-52's until it is thoroughly debilitated. Actually the US is being remarkably ineffective in keeping Cuba etc off the Net. If you don't believe me just try the cuban home page. We had a Web server running in Sarajevo during the siege back in '93. There is no way that the US govt. can hope to control the Internet any more than it can control the phone system. What is astonishing is that the Cuban authorities are so keen to import a technology that breaks down their propaganda. The Cold War was not won by the arms race, it was won in Eastern Europe which was never a major participant. The main instrument that won it was West German TV which broadcast pictures of supermarkets with full shelves into the homes of East Germans every night. The viewers could see that it was not mere propaganda and their relatives confirmed the fact. As a result the East German guards on the Berlin wall simply decided to leave their posts one night. The East Germans couldn't stop the TV signals either. When Dresden started to become a ghost town because people wanted to move to a town which could recieve the broadcasts the East Germans ended up installing their own relay to keep the locals happy. Phill

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Re: Reuters article: "Unstoppable Internet will defy controls"
by Name Withheld by Request 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>More broadly, modern governments rely on their ability to control >information and money to maintain control over their citizens. >But does the Net mean we no longer need government in its present form? The German law professor Alexander Rossnagel has published an article titled "Globale Datennetze: Ohnmacht des Staates - Selbstschutz der Buerger" (global networks: state's impotence, citizens' self-protection) in Zeitschrift fuer Rechtspolitik 1997, p. 26 ff. He describes that decentral networks are difficult to control, and anonymizers, encryption and steganography can be used to defy surveillance. "[The state] can neither enforce matters of public interest, nor offer protection to its citizens", including protection of privacy and legally protected secrets. The state cannot effectively face law violations: "If it somewhere suppresses information, it will be 'mirrored' by many other servers world-wide. If it blocks communication lines, the message will find a way around. Sattelite transmission also renders the question of location almost irrelevant. Theresa Orlowski was denied a license for her porn channel here. Now she is broadcasting from Britain. In cyberspace, functions of social relevance, such as protection of minors, can no longer be fulfilled by the state. They are transferred to the parents exclusively." "The state can only interevene where the immaterial world of the network touches the physical world: It can arrest criminals, seize devices and data storage, when these physically are in its control. It can enforce adherance to its laws where it physically can exersize its power. But in the incorporeal world of the network, to a large extend it is powerless. All these examples indicate a new fact: The networks constitute a new incorporeal social space. Increasingly more social contacts, economic and legal exchanges are being transferred to it. In it, conditions are different from in the social relationships of the physical world. In this new world, the state has no means of coercion, no monopoly of power, and no sovereignty." "Law to be enforced requires power. The democratic constitutional state depends on sovereignty and obediency to laws. Only with these it can universally enforce democratic decisions and protect the citizens' basic rights from violations by third parties. To guarantee this is the fundamental reason for the modern state to exist. Its protective mission continues to apply. However, it has expanded with the civilisatoric development. With Hobbes, the focus was on the procetion of life and limb, with Locke the protection of freedom and property were added, and in this century, facing new threats, the protection of privacy. [... The states'] sovereignty is based on the authority to exclusively exercise physical power in [their territory]. This sovereignty has limits in the immaterial space of global networks. But when the citizen no longer receives the state's protection in the special sphere of the networks and the state can no more enforce matters of public interest there, then its basic legitimation in so far is in danger. According to Thomas Hobbes, 'the citizen's obligation to the sovereign can ... only last as long as he is capable of protecting the citizens'." But that would also endanger democracy and the constitional state. Stating that the normative strategy at large is obsolete, the author proposes new solotions: "When the democratic constitutional state can no longer reliably protect its citizens in the new social space of the networks, in compensation it must enable them to protect themselves." Information and communications technology offers various means of protection: * encryption and steganography * digital signatures * untraceable pseudonyms * certified electronic mail * ecash * software agents * connectivity management programs [whatever that is...] * cellular phones without location data * PICS * secure portable user-controlled devices that support these measures "Some of these measures - for example the encryption program PGP - can be used without any advance concession. The state only has to abstain from impeding regulations. Others - such as digital signatures - depend on an infrastructure that allows the individual to use these protective measures. The citizen of information society still depends on infrastructural prerequsites. But there is a fundamental difference in whether the individual can decide about using self-controlled protective measures himself, or the state or an other large organization offers protection that he cannot influence." "In order to protect and preserve the /old/ goals of freedom and self-determination in the /new/ social space of the networks, law must permit and support /new/ technologies." The article ends with the author's vision of a 'civil information society' as a free democratic society where basic rights are guaranteed by technology. "In this information society, the state has a limited, but fundamental role. [...] it creates a framework for the citizens to protect themselves. Thus they are enabled to freely inform themselves, solve conflicts in free self-organization, and negotiate and practice mutual security without depending on a big brother."

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RE: Fighting the cybercensor
by Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

blanc <blancw(a)cnw.com> writes: > From: jim bell (in response to Dimitri Vulis') > > Look, I've proposed what I consider to be a remarkably consistent method to > prevent the kind of political tyranny that you criticize, and I don't see > any recognition of this fact. > ........................................................ > > 1) Jim, why do you insist on discussing this on an forum for encryption? Assassination politics is certainlyhighly crypto-relevant (being an important application of anonymity and untraceable payments). It's of interest to a number of participants in the forum. So, why not? > 2) Why do you suppose the Iraqis haven't already thought of doing this > themselves? Perhaps because they love Saddam, who really is a great guy. Stop listening to what U.S.gubmint and media tell you and use your brain. What did Saddam do to _you? > 3) The Mafia uses this method all the time - why then haven't they achieved > a more rational society among themselves? The Mafia in the U.S. doesn't work. The sicilian Mafia is very successful at assassinating any public officials that fucks with it. > 4) Weren't governments (like the U.S.) instituted to prevent this sort of > thing (even if they don't work out as expected)? i.e., there were systems > of courts and lawyers and such instituted to openly deal with "criminal" > activity so that a) people could receive assistance against low-life > degenerate killers, and b) it could be proven that the accused were indeed > deserving of punishment. When I was taking political science at Columbia, one of my most memorable insights came from reading Aeschil's tragedies. Consider this recurrent thread: why are people rude on highways, and is shooting them justified? I claim that if a driver felt that the likelihood of him getting a ticket for cutting people off was high enough, they wouldn't do it. But of course the cops are busy chasing the drug dealers :-), so the only remaining deterrent is the likelihood that someone will shoot you for cutting them off (which happens occasionally). > Humans being what they are, this hasn't worked like it's supposed to, but > the point is that there is a reason why such ideas for systems of justice > were introduced in the first place. That reason, as I eloquently read in > a book, was "So That Reason May Live". That is, so that people who choose > to live in a "society" may do so by the method of solving problems through > the application of intelligence, rather than merely knocking each other off > because a voting majority decides they don't like someone. Re-read your Hobbes - but don't believe him. The state did not come about because the people thought they'd be better off under it. The state came about as one tribe conquered and enslaved another tribe; and gradually most members of the winning tribe became slaves too. > Destructive people often ascend to positions of power not simply because > they are ruthless, but because they have 1) many sycophantic followers and > 2) many ignorant, vulnerable people unable to prevent it. You might be > able to kill off one Saddam, but potentially many others would be waiting > in the wings to take his place. The situation surrounding the existence > of someone like Saddam is part of the contributing factors which keeps him > there, not simply that one man himself. It was the same with Hitler and > with so many others - they don't just have an excess of "power" > concentrated within themselves which puts them in positions of control over > others - there will have been many people who will have helped put them > there, expecting to derive benefits from it. I don't like your Saddam example, having much admiration for the man, but again this goes back to the perceived likelihood of future assassination. If Saddam is killed in an unlikely event, he will be succeeded by someone who does not fear assassination. If all potential successors are convinced that the rubout can be repeated, they won't go for the job. Remember, the purpose of "terrorism" is not just to kill someone, but to "terrorize". > And what will be done about all those people who made this "power" > possible? You don't just kill the one man and be done with it - you have > to also "kill" the conditions which maintained him. You rub out enough key people and terrorize their potential successors into not wanting to take over their jobs, and the system collapses. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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