- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Too Much!
by Brian Lane 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yet again I have un-subbed from the list because of the S/N ratio. And things were looking so good there for a while. Advice to Carol Ann: Take your crusade to e-mail. Brian ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Everyone is a prisoner holding their own key." | finger blane(a)seanet.com -- Journey | PGP 2.6 email accepted ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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procnail
by Nesta Stubbs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in response to the recent barrage of nonsensical bullshit here, I was wondering if anyone knew the archive site or procmail, the mail filtering program? I think this is a good time to school everyone in the basics of Killfiles. I have never wanted to killfile a person before, this is a big step for me. 8) i want to know everything http://www.mcs.com/~nesta/home.html i want to be everywhere Nesta's Home Page i want to fuck everyone in the world & i want to do something that matters /-/ a s t e zine

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Remailers, Linux, & Help ...
by root 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Normaly I use(d) 'ravage(a)bga.com' to access this list but the times they are a changin' ... I have successfuly gotten my network at home on Internet via a ISDN link. We are interested in setting up a remailer which among other things supports anonymity. If anybody has experience or learned input on doing this under Linux please contact me. A reminder that RoboFest 6 in Austin, TX will occur this year on April 1 & 2. If there are any c-punks interested in giving a talk or doing demo's then please contact me. If any of you folks are in the area then stop by and say Hi. I will be working at the Wired Society booth. Take care!

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Re: Peter D. Lewis
by nissim＠acs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm unfamiliar with what it is people have against Kevin Kelly. Why "wanton scum"? people might want to send mail not cc:ed to cypherpunks to keep the list from experiencing too much of a burden here. -A

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RE: CP meeting lost&found
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Did anyone notice a left over coat at the CP meeting? My friend seems to be >unable to locate his. It's a purple Timberland with white leather trims. >The coat has very important mail in the inside pocket. Yes. As we were leaving, Katy was asking around for the owner of the jacket. I assume she probably still has it or it is at SGI for safekeeping. == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov

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Re: Too Much!
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.NXT.3.91.950106202333.12708A-100000@kisa> you write: > Yet again I have un-subbed from the list because of the S/N ratio. And >things were looking so good there for a while. You might want to try reading it from NNTP, via c2.org or hks.net. You can then use Kill files. Wonderful beasts, those. (And if more people do this, we could actually try to use some distributed mechanisms such as that that strn uses.) - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLw32/xNhgovrPB7dAQEUBwQAhWOYKkqwHGyi2eFfnYt+8LsFU+Af3Lsl sT1VDjICu1XIAhswVfKL+h7Dn9r1pmeNHtJFF0V8S/fKGVOU5dhv+gZZwVOTjbnL a2g+MTZkh/vonVy5PLDELrpeRlcVdxR+abcg9AWahjYCFlua8NR5GjiN6iKeC1C8 o3F377//PSU= =rxxD - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLw4xuCoZzwIn1bdtAQHTNgF/T9OR6yUCu05KZW4s3MSHptRoclc31xO8 5O0jAXDA0c9oE/39smLZ++I6OoGh7Wiq =5/FC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Files and mail
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anybody want to offer odds on whether or not this merry little exchange will be reported in Wired as news? - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLw301xNhgovrPB7dAQFj3gP8CJV4TyRUl+sEQRHX6qH2TKK+B+JKLrwk kUM7Y0yaY2ZwScBnYRva5/Pyu8r70i2Z3yQUQFF7ECasxHwrYftfWweD0/4Pc4ws qEGNfGIheHtnP/J0B7G7xsIyAMSZIlUD3RCQ49o4BOpWk6bev4t5i/RP10yK9sit dA1go4Jiaag= =eQPF - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLw4vqSoZzwIn1bdtAQER/QF/SkRQGEEjHn+E0SZEiWs0McAvRccuzxFQ Uv76Kmmya6EMxTJOJFtatP1uQ7V6JmSA =g1Bd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailer Abuse
by doumakes＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > One thing to keep in mind, though, is that it's really the _last_ remailer > in the chain that's taking the most heat, and it would be nice if they got > payed. There's also an issue of some remailers refusing to be last in the > chain, so they dont' expose themselves so much. I agree, this is an important issue. But I think it's a separate one from the question of how users pay for the service. In other words, once there's a consensus to have a Guild of for-pay remailers, all the users should have to do is pay the Guild once. The Guild can then haggle over how to divvy up the money. Hard jobs, such as posting anon news, should command more money. On the issue of the medium of exchange, I favor blinded digital cash with its absolute anonymity. The "remailer in a box" that we spoke of earlier would do well to include this capability. - -- ______________________________________________________________________ Don Doumakes Finger doumakes(a)netcom.com for PGP public key Foxpro databases built to your specifications. Email me for details. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLw3RTBtumcu2AjihAQF+DQQAmhQxuMl4C6VzZLD+mHF5i0OAjLUZAhV+ eNOi4F6bUBsDyfm7TmxxWMsiJRlJFrKhIMT+A16lmBZPdQ/pnZjQSk2keLyXgs0N phsPmZsTWGZMOyWGH+Hh2ggBc5syhmZxuTWwHFqqbAKTVoYRC4esxW8g/lTKot7F drI0amkbq20= =pHqY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ben writes: > Paul, I think we're after two different objectives here. > You want Alice to be sure that Dave can't read her file; > I want Dave to be sure that he can't read Alice's files. Yeah. Picking threat models is important. Alice's job is easy; she can just encrypt stuff. The problems are a bit different if the file can only be retrieved by Alice, or if she can give retrieval tokens to Bob, Carol, and alt.sex.spam. If Dave is running a free or cheap service, he also may need to prevent his site from becoming load-spammed by the permanent floating warez+porno crowd. (As Eric pointed out, it's a policy-vs-mechanism issue; it's easier to run a service if you've got mechanisms to support any policy you want.) If Dave's charging for service, charging separately for storage and retrieval can help - that lets the one-storage, many-retrieval model work without having to use mechanisms like automatic deletion-after-reading, which may not be useful for some applications. For Dave to be sure he can't read Alice's files, he can't depend on Alice encrypting them - aside from entropy models which are generally not very useful, Alice could always encrypt the data and then publish the key. So he has to do it. Here're 1.5 approaches that can work for some threats: Alice wants to store message M, using a key K known to Alice. (K could be hash H(M) if desired, or sent to Dave along with M.) Dave calculates H(K), encrypts M with K, stores E(M;K) under name H(K), and then discards K. To retrieve files, Alice sends either K or H(K). There's some risk at storage - Dave is receiving the file, so he's vulnerable to cops between the time he PGP-decrypts the message and the time he re-encrypts and destroys the key, but it's brief, and can be automated so he doesn't see it in person; he could still be coerced into eavesdropping future storage unless there's a good blinded variant on the method. Alice needs to keep or K or give it to her friends. If retrievals use K, Dave can decrypt on transmission (some risk, some potential revenue). This has the advantage that Dave doesn't know the access token to retrieve a given file across the net, so he can't tell the cops what to scan for. If retrievals only use H(K), he can't decrypt on retrieval, so even if the cops coerce Alice or bribe Bob into retrieving it, Dave doesn't see the content again; it's probably a lot safer for Dave. The risk is that cops who break Dave's system or coerce him into giving them the files will know to look for H(K) on other systems; scanning the net for anything that might hash to H(K) is much harder. Also, Alice might want to give Bob and Carol H(K) to retrieve the files, but not give them K to decrypt until later, or might send K through other channels that only the In Crowd get. Another extension is for Dave to store the file as H(H(K)), to make it more work to match access tokens against files - Dave has the advantage of not even knowing the access token (which the retrieve-with-K method has) as well as not letting Dave decrypt. Using user-selected keys instead of message hashes is obviously a lot faster, since Dave doesn't have to calculate them, and makes it a bit easier for Alice to memorize the keys instead of storing them, but it requires more Syntax in the requests, and increases the chances of wimpy keys and especially collisions (which essentially never happen in hash-based systems, but are more common if people want to use keys like "Secret Plans".) And Alice can always store the hashes encrypted and stegoed, or store an index file on the datahaven and give her friends the access tokens for that instead of her whole collection. Hashes are also safer for Dave if Alice is compromised or spam is a problem, since he doesn't have to respond to requests for "spam1.gif" or "Nuclear Narcoterrorist KiddyPorn Monthly" or "Windows_for_95.c", which is riskier than requests for 0x402930be89a9c901. Bill

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what to do about live video - all the time?
by nissim＠acs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just invented a big hassle, and if I don't start the patent process someone else will. Picture a near future in which your shirt or walkman is a 360 degree video camera sensing live video across visible and other spectra. Your shirt sends out a signal to your home computer, Your home computer archives your daily environment and activities for you. You have been sold this device on several premises. 1) crime reduction - no sane low level criminal would harass you; you have him, his biometrics, unique thermal signature etc. on video. Talk about neighborhood watch. 2) life/work productivity enhancement. What was said when? what could you have looked into today but slipped your mind? 3) warm fuzzies. Kodak style "your life in pictures." For now I'll assume the device actually works as claimed. It is affordably priced. Any normal person who has a car alarm, walkman, or laptop PC is apt to have one. You even get a small discount on your health insurance. Maybe your local taxes go down as your district votes to reduce the # of cops. For now, we assume that all the output of your video shirt is securely encrypted when it leaves the Vshirt. ISSUE 1: Who controls the data? Year 0: The devices are so rare the police don't think to ask people to supply their tapes if they witness a crime committed re: a third party. Year 3: The police subpeona Vshirts they know to be in the crime vicinity. Presumably they use their current abilities with cellphone companies to locate who's where when. Year 3.1 While reviewing Vshirt tapes police note that non-case related illegal activities are going on. Jaywalking. Speeding. Recreational drugs. Verbal assault. Life and property threatening felonies are also discovered. At this point the scene bifurcates wildly: Do the police say, "look, this is happening anyway, we need 24 hour video surveillance of everything - if nothing else to protect ourselves in court." Evidence: in the UK they video the motorways, and several public areas in the cities (soc.culture.british Jan '95) -for crime/security purposes. In the US, there are utility poles wired for sound. Design News had an item on this in their Yellow newsflash section in '93 I think. The utility poles were/are in washington DC, and supposedly only listen for gunshots. I'm pretty sure the poles could call the cops in using triangulated crime location data too. However slight the infraction, we are all lawbreakers. Do we have a right to 'not testify against ourselves" by refusing to decrypt? Can we buy (ugh.) an "attorney-client privlege" box that hold all of our data Keys in a legal fiction that the courts currently respect? Will the 5th fare any better than the 1st and second amendments? Will the state issue a "statute of limitations" on data-recorded crime, so that you can't be arrested for last year's public drunkenness? Will Vshirt makers make, or be allowed to make, devices that create -absolutely no residue- data keys? that way, if you want to protect yourself from what you happened last thursday you can set the keystrip on fire and nobody, not even you, has a hope of ever decrypting? Evidence: in the US Digital audio tape Mfrs. are required to put in some sort of copyguard. Also scanners w/image signature. In the US, reconstructed deleted files for legal purposes is considered legal evidence. There is a firm in Seattle that has even reconstructed harddisks written over with 0s for criminal (tax) cases. Citizens or their employers are required to keep and prepare documentation adequate to prepare a valid tax return. i.e., some records you _have_ to keep. and of course the digital telephony bill... What thoughtful Pro-freedom arguments can be constructed to deal with this device and its social fallout? What thoughtful software and hardware can be created? The device does not yet exist, but component parts can be assembled for less than $2000 and 17oz weight that do a fair job of mimicking it. Moore's "law" suggests that by 2000, these oughta be $19.99/month plus data charges. VoicePGP is a great jumping-off place...will there be a VideoPGP, or rather an optimized-for-videoPGP coming soon? If I've christened its existence now. I hereby declare the application of Public+private key cryptography as it especially applies to picture, live picture, and/or video transmission to be public domain. (Surely I'm not the first, but this can't hurt.) Write. Talk. Create. Protect yourselves. ObLameJoke: Well, as far as I know none of my relatives were killed by Stalin, or Mao, or interned in WWII, or blacklisted, or even jailed. I suppose a few were drafted. I guess it's about time for the forces of authority to reach into my little corner of the gene pool and crush me too. I mean, I'm missing out! Treon Verdery, posting under the auspices of Adam Almog

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