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TIS--Building in Big Brother for a Better Tommorrow
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:47 PM 2/22/96, Carl M. Ellison wrote: >http://www.tis.com/crypto/cke.html > >have you guys checked out this page recently? It shows TIS's change >to a dual [domestic, international] approach to key recovery. > I hadn't looked at the TIS site in a while, so thanks for the heads up. I just looked at it, and am not cheered by what I see. It looks to me that any company with international sites it wishes to include in its overall system (meaning, integrating key recovery in overall communications), must use the more restrictive Commercial Key Escrow (tm) system: "CKE meets the following U.S. Government requirements: 1.) tamper-resistant escrow functionality, 2). no interoperation with non-export-approved cryptosystems, 3). Data Recovery Centers must meet government ownership qualifications, and 4). escrow access must be available at either end of a communication (sender or receiver)." Item #2 indicates that a company or organization--such as Intel or Amnesty International or Bank of America--has two choices: 1. Use the stronger Commercial Key Recovery (CKR) for domestic communications, the weaker, BB-Enabled (Big Brother-Enabled) Commercial Key Escrow for offshore sites, with no interoperability... or 2. Use the BB-Enabled CKE for all communications, thus allowing domestic sites to communicate with their offshore sites. My hunch is that NSA is hoping that the escrowed system, complete with weak 64-bit keys!, will be adopted as the default system, thus allowing one less system to worry about and letting multinational companies (and what company isn't multinational these days?) use one system. Or that Netscape and other such companies will adopt CKE as a standard. I haven't studied the Commercial Key Recovery (CKR) variant....I'm no expert on these confusing protocols and see no need to become one. It is also complicated, and it's not clear to me just how free users are to select, say, their grandmother or their lawyer, as the holder of their "lockbox key." I'm not claiming they're not free to do so, just that CKR may also have unacceptable intrusions into private communications that aren't obvious from the TIS statements I read. (The TIS statement points out that: "Separate licensing arrangements are necessary for organizations desiring Data Recovery Center ownership.", so there is the chance that if I want Grandma to be my spare key holder she might have to pay bucks to TIS and pass their scrutiny...if so, not a very nice option, and one which could turn even CKR into BB-Enabled software with a change in DRC policies...see point below.) One thing to look out for is a TIS/Netscape/Lotus/etc. situation wherein both services are offered, but the BB-enabled version is much easier to get approval for, or even easier to set up and use, so that the skids are greased in favor of the BB-enabled version and companies just say, "Oh, to hell with the CKR version, let's just standardize on CKE...we have nothing to hide." Another thing to look for is any structural evidence in the specs for CKR that indicates it could be "turned into" the CKE BB-Enable version by the flip of a switch. What I mean by this is that we should always be wary of systems which look to preserve liberties but which can be "switched" easily once widely deployed. (Not to make a gun rights argument here, but this is essentially what the folks worried about "gun registration" are concerned about: any system in which guns can be registered could be converted with the stroke of a pen into a system for confiscation; this is the main reason they fight gun registration. I would look to see if any such parallels can be found in the CKR variant: can the CKR variant be turned into the CKE variant when President Buchanan decides he's had enough of these U.S. companies communicating with those foreigners and their un-Christian ways?) Be worried, be very worried. (Side note: Of course, we're back to asking what the policies of the offshore site countries may be. Imagine how thrilled the Department of Commerce and NSA will be when Intel informs them that the government of Japan insists that all communications with Japanese sites must use "Nippon Key Escrow," to ensure that Chobetsu (Japanese NSA) can read Intel's discussions of chip yields and production plans. Or that Israel wants the Jew bits set....) Thanks, TIS, for putting a "Big Brother Inside" sticker on your products. No thanks. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Stop by HotWired's Club Wired tonight...
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the spirit of unabashed self-promotion... -Declan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 22 Feb 1996 07:03:00 -0800 (PST) From: Jon Lebkowsky <jonl@well> To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well> Subject: tonight I'm spreading the word about our HotWired discussion tonight... if you want to post the info anywhere, here's the extract: Electronic Frontiers Forum, Club Wired http://www.wired.com/club telnet://chat.wired.com:2428 Thursday, 22 February: 7 p.m. PST (Friday 03:00 GMT) Online activist Declan McCullagh discusses recent attempts at direct and indirect censorship of content on the Internet. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Jon Lebkowsky <jonl(a)well.com> http://www.well.com/~jonl Electronic Frontiers Forum, 7PM PST Thursdays <http://www.hotwired.com/club> Vice President, EFF-Austin <http://www.io.com/~efaustin> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

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TIS--Building in Big Brother for a Better Tommorrow
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In my last message I wrote: --- .... statements I read. (The TIS statement points out that: "Separate licensing arrangements are necessary for organizations desiring Data Recovery Center ownership.", so there is the chance that if I want Grandma to be my spare key holder she might have to pay bucks to TIS and pass their scrutiny...if so, not a very nice option, and one which could turn even CKR into BB-Enabled software with a change in DRC policies...see point below.) .... --- Well, I've been looking at the DRC licensing steps, and it makes it clear that becoming a DRC is an expensive proposition: "A DRC technology license is priced at $30,000 for the first DRC, and $10,000 for each additional DRC to the same customer. A mandatory secure DRC computer system is available for $20,000 for each DRC location, plus an annual maintenance fee of $10,000 for the first DRC and $5,000 for each additional DRC. In addition, a royalty is charged against DRC service fees at the rate of 10% of the revenue stream." Not so expensive for a bank or other such business, but not something Mom and Pop will be getting into anytime soon! Also, it's clear to me that a DRC located in the United States is subject to court orders and subpoenas to release keys (there is no "protection against self-incrimination" in such cases, as the DRC is not in danger of being incriminated....there _may_ be attorney-client privilege, depending on whether the DRC is one's lawyer....lots of legal issues to explore). And it's not clear from the documents if TIS (or the government) will license/approve DRCs located in offshore locations, such as Anguilla or Switzerland. (I don't mean for CKE use, and with CKE strength, I mean DRCs for U.S. users of CKR.) (Depends on what channel the DRCs use to communicate with U.S. operations, doesn't it? If the Anguilla-based DRC must use CKE itself, then the stronger CKR is only as strong as the weaker CKE used in the offshore operation! Cache-22.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Let the Snake Oil Flow
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There have been several purveyors of (potential) snake oil here. Predictably, critics have been drawn into "trying to break" these allegedly strong systems. Some of the purveyors are even saying things like [paraphrased, but with charming misspellings emulated]: "See, even the smarty-pants Cyphurpunks are unabble to brake ouir system! Our virtuel one-time pad, which converts 10 randumly picked bits into 1000 or 10,000 or even a bazillion!, by our patented processo of "entropy enhancemate," has defeated even immacarthy and metzger. Our system rulez!" And so it goes.... Predictably, others are asking/expecting "the Cypherpunks" to break their systems. Just as predictably, many of us are patiently (and impatiently) explaining that breakages cost money and resources. And so the "developers" gleefully respond that this proves the "Cyperpunks" [sic] are helpless before their software. Well, it seems to me that letting some real snake oil out there could be a Good Thing. Being the Neo-Calvinist Darwinist that I am, I set that anyone who puts valuable information into "PowerPads" and "Stream-of-Consciousness Ciphers" pretty much deserves what he or she gets. I am not losing any sleep that Snake Oil Enterprises is hyping a conceptually flawed system. A few highly publicized failures could be educational, and ultimately help to strengthen the Net. You don't get better bridges without some highly-visible bridge collapses. Raises consumer awareness of what good design really is. Personally, I'm much more worried about the behind-the-scenes goings on with key escrow, the pressures being applied to Netscape, Lotus, Microsoft, TIS, etc., than I am in Yet Another Clueless Crypto Product (tm). --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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TIS--Building in Big Brother for a Better Tommorrow
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To supplement TIS's Web site information on CKE, here's a mailing from Steve Walker earlier this month: TRUSTED INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. February 2, 1996 There has been amazing progress on TIS's Commercial Key Escrow (CKE) initiative since my last status report. In November, we submitted a Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) request to the U.S. Department of State for our Gauntlet Internet Firewall Product with CKE-based IP Encryption, which constitutes our Global Virtual Private Network (GVPN) system (see figure 1). Our Gauntlet system has had a Virtual Private Network (VPN) capability using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm to encrypt firewall-to-firewall communications for the past year. But because of U.S. export controls, we have not been able to sell this option outside of the U.S. and Canada. By adding CKE technology to our firewalls, the Gauntlet system with DES and CKE now meets the U.S. government requirements for export to most parts of the world. In the course of several meetings with U.S. government representatives. we were told that it will take a while longer for all the details of the CJ process to be worked out, but that the U.S. government was willing to consider a temporary (up to 4-year) export license until the CJ process is in place. In early December, we submitted such a request and on January 19, 1996, it was approved (see figure 2). While this temporary export license has limitations (there must be a Data Recovey Center in the U.S. as well as in the foreign country because reciprocal agreements do not yet exist between the U.S. and foreign governments), it represents the first export approval of a DES-based key escrow encryption system, a small step but a giant leap toward full exportability of good cryptography when equipped with user-controlled key recovery. We are now discussing Global Virtual Private Networks, based on our Gauntlet-CKE system, with several multinational companies. In December, I attended a special meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris to discuss the international ramifications of the U.S. key escrow initiative. The consensus of the meeting was that user-controlled key escrow provides the only workable solution to the long-standing dilemma between the private sector's need for encryption protection and governments' needs to be able to decrypt the communications of criminals, terrorists, and other adversaries. Other meetings will follow, but it appears that most major governments endorse the U.S. government's user-controlled key escrow initiative as the only practical way through the cryptography maze. In mid-January, Microsoft announced its long-awaited Cryptographic Application Programming Interface (CAPI). This development promises to finally provide a well-defined separation between applications calling on cryptography and the actual performance of the cryptography. Now users will be able to request cryptographic functions in hundreds of applications and select precisely which cryptography to use at the time of program execution rather than program purchase. Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs) can now evolve independent of applications, and users can choose whatever cryptography is available wherever they are in the world. TIS is working closely with CSP vendors to ensure that CSPs with good cryptography are available in domestic and exportable versions as soon as possible based on the U.S. government's key escrow initiative. In a presentation at the recent RSA Conference, I tried to put all this in perspective by conducting a "thought experiment" (see attachment 3). + Suppose the U.S. government had never thought of placing export controls on cryptography... We would now have widespread use of encryption, both domestically and worldwide; we would be in a state of "Utopia," with widespread availability of cryptography with unlimited key lengths. But, once in this state, we will face situations where we need a file that had been encrypted by an associate who is unavailable (illness, traffic jam, or change of jobs). We will then realize that we must have some systematic way to recover our encrypted information when the keys are unavailable. When we add a user-controlled key recovery capability to our Utopia, we find ourselves in an "Ultimate Utopia," with unlimited key length cryptography, widely available through mass market applications, and user-controlled key recovery. + But, unfortunately, the U.S. government *did* think of cryptographic export controls. And over the past several years, we have been frustrated by repeated unsuccessful attempts to resolve this dilemma... In 1992, the U.S. government allowed the export of 40-bit keys, a solution so weak no one wanted it. In 1993, the U.S. government announced Clipper, an attempt to give users good cryptography while preserving the U.S. government's prerogatives. But almost everyone hated U.S. Government-controlled key escrow, including most foreign governments. In 1994, industry rebelled with the proposed Cantwell legislative initiative to remove cryptography from U.S. State Department control. And, behind the scenes, the U.S. government orchestrated a massive counterattack. The result: a study that acknowledged the widespread availability of foreign cryptography yet proposed no change in U.S. government policies on cryptographic exports. + Then in 1995, the U.S. government announced its key escrow initiative: allow the export of up to 64-bit cryptography (a remarkable concession) when accompanied by an acceptable form of user-controlled key escrow (critical component to this policy being that "an acceptable escrow system" must have sufficient integrity to give the government confidence that, with a warrant, the keys will be available.)... Some in the computer industry labeled this just another form of Clipper and vowed to continue the fight against U.S. government regulation of encryption in any form -- presumably forever. On the other hand, once the new escrowed encryption policy was announced, U.S. government agencies -- the FBI, NSA, White House, DoD, DoJ, NIST, and NSC -- closed ranks behind it and have shown little interest in discussing any other approaches. In addition, neither political party has shown any interest in taking up the argument in the Congress, probably because it is a complex issue and there is no obvious "winning" position. But, depending upon how the definition of user-controlled key escrow is resolved, the new escrow policy could just be the long-sought compromise between government and industry that gets us through this morass. + If we can ensure that organizations can control the security of backup access to their encrypted information through well-designed commercial key recovery systems -- yet also ensure that governments have access when justified via normal legal procedures -- we may have truly found the "Ultimate Utopia" solution to a dilemma that has existed all of our professional lives and threatens to continue through the next generation... Thus, in my thought experiment I have come to the conclusion that we (industry and government) are all heading towards the same objective, but on a different path from what some of us originally wanted. Yet, to my way of thinking, that path has to accomodate us all if we are ever to arrive at any mutually agreeable destination. When one group of participants raises insurmountable barriers for another group, it simply blocks everyone from progressing down any path, and the net result is that U.S. industry is not able to export any good crypto-based security. We at TIS are dedicated to finding a solution acceptable to all sides. We ask your help in this struggle. If you want exportable cryptography routinely available in your lifetime and believe that user-controlled key recovery is an important, if not vital, capability, please contact us at <cke(a)tis.com>. If you want to integrate exportable CKE into your product line, we are ready to help. If you want to buy internationally deployable good cryptography with your favorite applications, tell your application vendor you want escrow-enabled applications. We all have an opportunity to make a major difference here. The opportunity is ours to take or forgo. Help us make this happen. Visit our www site, at http://www.tis.com/, and learn more about this vital initiative. Sincerely, Stephen T. Walker Attachments: 1. Global Virtual Private networks with CKE/Gauntlet transaction security diagram. 2. CJ Application for "Escrow-enabled Gauntlet Firewall Model 3.2 with Gauntlet Data Recovery Center." 3. Diagram of cryptography evolution from 1992 to 1995, with Yesterday, Today, "Utopia" and "Ultimate Utopia." -----

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Re: Digital Signature Legislation
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I find it interesting to note that Dr. Biddle's concerns on the economic aspects of the legislation are almost the reverse of those on the cypherpunks list. For instance, he is concerned about too much liability by the consumer (and I would agree that the "strict liability" rather than "negligence" model is a problem). The concern on the list has been that there is too much liability for the CA, given the potential of unlimited liability for all transactions such as Dr. Biddle appears to be favoring. -Allen

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Re: Public Access Obsolete. Capitalism offers free email
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"fletch(a)ain.bls.com" "Mike Fletcher" 22-FEB-1996 03:53:16.20 > Who says the code has to run on their machine. Just forward >all incoming mail off to another box, and send all the outgoing mail out >from the free account. Depending of course on whether it's some sort >of shell account or if you POP/SMTP to their box. I'd guess it's some sort of dialin (possibly via tymnet or some such). In that case, you'd simply have your remailer on your system at home, calling the system up at some (probably randomly determined) time and downloading the incoming mail and uploading whatever outgoing mail that (given latency) you wanted to go out at that point. (Any on-encrypted email, such as their ads, you'd be able to filter out very easily). You could even potentially run it off of a portable computer. For unattended running, the hardware RNG would be best, of course. -Allen

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Re: Digital Signature Legislation (fwd)
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 20:54 AM 2/20/96 -0500, C. Bradford Biddle <biddle(a)pwa.acusd.edu> wrote: >---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >DIGITAL SIGNATURE LEGISLATION: SOME REASONS FOR CONCERN > >[Copyright 1996 by Brad Biddle; permission granted for non-commercial >electronic redistribution] > >... >LIABILITY > >The Utah Act makes two policy choices concerning liability allocation >Under the Utah Act, consumers are held to a negligence standard in >guarding their private encryption key. Thus, if a criminal obtains a >consumer's private key and commits fraud, the consumer is financially >responsible for that fraud unless the consumer can prove that the consumer >used reasonable care in guarding the private key. ... One important point here is what is "reasonable care"? In a very real sense, all consumer computer operating systems are not secure. I have posted a theoretical virus born attack on PGP's secret key to the cypherpunks mailing list (archives at http://www.hks.net/cpunks/) Nathinal Borenstein of First Virtual has posted to the same list, a description of a partially implemented attack on credit card numbers which has received heavy response. If there is enough reward, these attacks will occur. The question I have is, does "reasonable care" include keeping your machine "virus free"? >There is a second troubling policy choice relating to liability. The Utah >Act limits the potential liability of one actor in the infrastructure -- >the certification authority -- to a fixed amount (termed a "suitable >guarantee" and determined by a complex formula or by administrative rule). The historic precedent is the liability limit on nuclear power plants. For both these problems, a relatively low liability limit would force people to use other techniques (e.g. old style signed contracts) for large transactions. While we are working the bugs out of a new technology, with new standards of "reasonable care", everyone might win if the risks are limited. >PRIVACY I believe the area of privacy is where the real problems lie. I will let other, more qualified, people suggest alternatives to the Utah law proposal. > >Brad Biddle, Legal Intern <biddle(a)acusd.edu> >Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Ctr for Public Interest Law >http://pwa.acusd.edu/~prc > >[The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the >Privacy Rights Clearinghouse or the Center for Public Interest Law.] Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: url
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:52 PM 2/22/96 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Mike McNally writes: >> At <URL:http://www.osf.org/~loverso/javascript/track-me.html> find >> some interesting "surveillance" applications of Javascript. > >Okay. We have some netscape people here on this list. > >When is the patch to let you disable JavaScript inside Netscape going >to go out? Its more than time. Why Perry, it's called Netscape 1.1N. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Analysis wanted
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone is interested in helping out the gentleman quoted below by ruthlessly savaging :-) his algorithm and assumptions, would you please e-mail me so I can hook you up with him? (He decided not to post to the list directly to avoid the usual signal-to-noise problems. Can't blame him. But I offered to forward along relevant info and queries.) >Is there a way of someone trustworthy to try and break VGP and express an >opinion on it's strength or weakness. I can basically describe the >encryption approach and the reencryption, number of passes, final conversion >to clean text from a binary etc. with you to try to give you some level of >comfort without sharing the code. I would also like to have someone >competent run it through the paces, and then if it is not worthy, go back to >the drawing board. > >In short, I appreciate your comments and frankness, and assure you I am >interested in your opinion or anyones opinion, and interested in making the >system rugged. I agree with your point, and perhaps it sums the whole issue >up in one line, and that is that "bad encryption is worse than no >encryption". encouraging a false sense of security is not something I want >to be part of, I do want to be responsible to others. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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