- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

My comments to NIST
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

7431 Teasdale Avenue San Diego, CA 92122 karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org September 27, 1993 Director, Computer Systems Laboratory ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard Technology Building, Room B-154 National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Re: A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) Docket No 930659-3159 RIN 0693-AB19 Comments of Philip R. Karn, Jr Sirs: I am writing in response to your call for comments on the aforementioned matter that appeared in the Federal Register on July 30, 1993. I am writing as a concerned individual with BS and MS degrees in electrical and computer engineering and 15 years of professional experience in communications, computer networking and security at leading edge R&D organizations. I currently work in the digital cellular telephone industry, a ripe application for robust encryption if there ever was one. I feel that my experience in this field qualifies me to comment on the practicality of the proposed standard. First of all, I am totally opposed to the entire concept of key escrow. It is a dangerous, un-American and fatally flawed idea that should never have been proposed. In my opinion, everyone has the Constitutional right to use the encryption scheme of their choice, whether or not the government can break it. The impact of strong encryption on the enforcement of legitimate laws is and will remain minimal. Even unbreakable encryption is incapable of thwarting standard investigational techniques such as informants, testimony compelled through grants of immunity, "end point" surveillance (e.g., hidden microphones), the gathering of physical evidence of crimes and so forth. Strong un-escrowed encryption will, on the other hand, finally put an end to illegal, often politically motivated interceptions of private electronic communications without having to rely on anyone's goodwill, such as the still-unnamed "key escrow agencies". Precisely because eavesdropping has been so easy to do and so hard to detect, the government has repeatedly proven itself untrustworthy in this regard, as documented in great detail by the Watergate investigations and the Church Committee hearings of the 1970s. Why should we trust it now? Although the government currently claims that the EES will be a "voluntary" standard, many of its features make no sense whatsoever in this context. For example, why must the Skipjack algorithm be kept secret if individuals remain free to use other algorithms such as triple-key DES or IDEA that are quite probably even stronger? The government's claim is completely transparent, as one simply cannot escape the conclusion that the EES is a prelude to a ban on all other encryption schemes, or at least a ban on those the government can't crack. And this presents a profoundly disturbing threat to some very important Constitutional principles. Countless others have argued forcefully against the proposal on these and other grounds. For example, see the points made by the Computing Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) in the attached Appendix. I fully agree with CPSR and feel that they alone should have been enough to stop the proposal long ago. However, the fact that the Escrowed Encryption Standard has advanced so quickly despite these serious problems reveals the totally one-sided nature of the decision process. Far from being an independent and impartial agency, NIST has proven itself to be merely a pawn for the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other powerful intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Despite (or perhaps because of) encryption's enormous potential to put real "teeth" into the Constitutional principles of privacy and freedom of speech and association, these agencies are notably unsympathetic to tFrom owner-cypherpunks Tue Sep 28 05:51:28 1993 Received: by toad.com id AA02707; Tue, 28 Sep 93 05:46:19 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA02651; Tue, 28 Sep 93 05:41:49 PDT Return-Path: <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> Received: from bsu-cs.bsu.edu ([147.226.112.101]) by toad.com id AA02647; Tue, 28 Sep 93 05:41:46 PDT Received: by bsu-cs.bsu.edu (5.57/Ultrix3.0-C) id AA08271; Tue, 28 Sep 93 07:43:59 -0500 Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 07:43:59 -0500 Message-Id: <9309281243.AA08271(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> From: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> X-Ttl: 0 X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software- automated anonymous remailing service. Subject: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps Organization: Coalition for Cryptographic Freedom In the paper written by Delaney, Denning and Kaye (Wiretap Laws and Procedures -- What Happens when the U.S. Government Taps a Line, September 23, 1993), a few numbers were presented from a 1992 report which reflect the wiretaps put into place during that year. Without further details concerning the specifics surrounding some of these numbers, it should certainly raise eyebrows on a couple of points: - All 919 "interceptions" were authorized. The numbers presented in this report indicate that none were denied. - Out of this number, 303 were in single family homes, 135 were in apartments and 289 were categorized as placed in "other" locations. - Out of 919, 634 were placed into service for interception of information involving narcotics. The closest contender in this area involved racketeering, in which 90 was the magic number. - The number of persons arrested was 2,685. Of that number, only 607 were convicted. These statistics alone should concern YOU.

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FORGED POSTING
by an4914＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The following message gave an error when I checked its signature! Chalk up another reason we should all be using the ASCII Armor option... Could someone check *my* sig and see if it's working? >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I'm sure I'm missing something obvious here, but why are all >these keyservers being forced to shut down? The possession of >PGP *keys* should be perfectly legal, no? Or is the logic the >same as that used to close down drug paraphernalia shops: if >people are buying bongs, they must be smoking pot, and so we >can't allow it? > >And exactly what grounds does PKP have for suing? Is it because >the servers themselves are using PGP, rather than just storing >keys? What if a server is using a legal (ViaCrypt) copy of PGP? >(Problem: this argument can only be used for DOS boxes currently.) > > --Dave. > > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.2 > >iQCVAgUBLP+fvsfNklulBrsJAQGTCQP8DFF77E7zpB6nOzAwcLNbEgezVjt/yQTg >DEtdmeY+hO9rcOUJoXwWMPbai2EhBHiyriAMYD5kcHrsbdiS99PW5A5kh4htaFDr >Zrrkmn7KK0LXNL0fo2aJZVLKpiy9FxcJPmQvasTqe6EVltxbi4coTNR1wUoD5FE8 >0sGj9AsGr+s= >=2tQH >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLP+tJOyu9liBvjrdAQFClAQAsWulTDSCG6bE8tAa7YqcMpUvITEesB84 tRzNWHGcBxLRlsteaTj0V/n+N7Bs/jf0MhspPPdO/IpIuDa2IpEi43FLYFaCuBSa dnq6Sgn588kPvk0ATwpkGAapViIZBlA2c0TlSsQHgaH5tVd5RRqyZSrq1miEyBFH b0FhJ05hr7k= =7hn1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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CRYPTO & TAXES
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, It might look as though Duncan, I and others are piling on Hal Finney. If we are, it's because the topic of the technological obsolescence of government is near and dear to our hearts. We aren't just arguing to argue, but rather believe what we are saying with all our hearts. I believe Hal is completely sincere in his skepticism. I also believe he would like to be convinced. Therefore, I offer my posts to help him--and others among you, with similar doubts--to believe. Hal quoted me about using offshore techniques to rent cars, homes, etc. without creating an audit trail. He than continued: How does this bear on the issue of government collapse due to failure of income tax? This example actually strikes me as an unobjectionable use of cryptography, one in which individual privacy is protected. . . . I don't see how this brings down the government. This bears on income taxes in two ways: One way the government estimates your income is based on your consumption. If public records show you own a big house, a nice car, a boat or a plane, this is an indication of your income. If it looks like you are "living beyond your means," the IRS may conclude you have more means than you report. Similarly, if your *US based* credit card records show lots of expensive purchases, the same conclusion might be drawn. Expenditures without audit trails help you keep a low profile. Owning few or no seizable assets makes you effectively immune from serious collection efforts (i.e., "judgment proof"). Unless you have given the government some PR reason to go after you, they will leave you alone if there is nothing for them to grab. What all this means is that the government is denied revenue. Do that enough, and the state collapses or withers away. On the issue of "de-nationalizing" one's self, I mentioned that a Cayman Islands corporation is a non-US citizen even if it is owned by an American. Hal wrote in response: I gather that he is suggesting that people could set up corporations in the Cayman Islands and somehow divert some of their income to them, so that the income would be shielded from taxes. Can this be done today? Can and is. What Shell Oil did in the Netherlands Antilles, many folks can do in Cayman or elsewhere. Add in strong crypto, and the entry-level threshold drops orders of magnitude. Can I go to my boss and ask him to start sending my salary to this numbered bank account in the Cayman Islands, and to stop troubling the U.S. government with information about how much he is paying me? When you apply new technology, you get more bang for the buck if you avoid applying it linearly. No, you don't go to your boss (you still have a boss?) and ask for such an arrangement. But when you start your new business, you base it in a tax and privacy haven. In the US, you will be its loyal but "low-paid" representative. Over time, you convert all your work to this sort of offshore independent contractor business. Why doesn't everybody do it, and why will everybody start doing it in the future? Because strong crypto tied into traditional privacy techniques is just coming on line. When digital banking is fully deployed, people will jump on the bandwagon because it will be cheap and easy to do so. They will follow their own best interests. They will follow the money. . . . I am willing to accept that people will be eager to avoid paying taxes, but I still doubt that cryptography will bring down the United States government. Particularly when we consider the lack of sophistication (both financial and technical) of the vast middle class . . . Strong cryptography will be an essential part--but not the whole--of the solution. Don't underestimate the ability of the middle-class to become sophisticated if it's in their interest to do so. Middle-class Europeans, Asians and Latin Americans have learned similar lessons when it became advantageous. Americans are no less equal to the challenge. Plus we have an ace in the whole. We are heirs to the American Revolution. The only ideologically explicit anti-government revolution in history. Don't count us out. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLTrSQk5ULTXct1IzAQHi2wP7BstRuI9ERqgXPhRxs47QET5Lc8j7Ht4Y 1dUdpMHutotDSqD3p/vZPtbjzeCqbno6IYox8oKpH3xOV6NRapzB3UGAU4NEuc+Q rmG/NlMOKclAdwlctG0LDU5CmKlzNNJ9+TtOk/krrIWHCEPVJp08U++L6Yt0ipfx fru8djP9yS8= =Gv3n -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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American Eagle Scherzando!
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AMERICAN EAGLE SCHERADO Cypherpunks, I have found a source of info. that I just must share! American Eagle Publications, Inc. P. O. Box 41401 Tucson, AZ 85717 I'm sure they will send you a catalog just for the asking. So, what are they about? They are about VIRUSES! They don't just carry a couple of virus things - they are the VIRUSES-ARE-US of the virus world! They have a journal: Computer Virus Developments Quarterly. They have books on viruses, virus protection, cryptanalysis, the science fiction book "Heiland", a CD-ROM for $99.95 of several thousand live viruses, disks of viruses with source code, executable & utilities, programs & cards for boot protection, & even a virus IDEA computer system protector. Copy follows for two items of particular interest to Cypherpunks: POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE, KOH By the "King of Hearts" A sophisticated piece of software which uses ideas first developed by computer virus writers to secure your computer system against those who would like to get their hands on the information in it. You give KOH a pass phrase, & it uses state of the art IDEA data encryption algorithm to encrypt all of the information on your hard disk & your floppies. It is, for all intents & purposes, unbreakable, & works well with DOS & Windows. Many encryption programs offered commercially are easily cracked, but this one is not. Some people call this program a virus, come say it is not. In ways, it acts like a virus to do some of your security housekeeping for you. Yet at worst it is a friendly virus that lets you choose when & how it will replicate. program & manual on disk, $10 program, full source, & manual on disk, $20 (Overseas customers add $12: KOH cannot be exported from the US, but since it was not developed in the US, we will forward your order to the overseas distributor. Please allow 6 weeks for delivery) HEILAND By Franklin Sanders 276 pages, Paperback, 1986 Here's an entertaining book about America in the year 2020. If you wonder if it's proper to use viruses in wartime or if such a virus could be termed "good", this book will give you some food for thought. Sanders makes use of computer "worms" when the oppressed people of the US attack the federal government in an all-out war against tyranny. Sanders uses his worms right too - not as some all-powerful monster. Rather, they are deployed as part of a larger military strategy. For a book written in 1986, that's not bad! And if you're fed up with the government, this book is sure to give you a vision for the future. Sanders has been part of the mounting tax protest in this country. He's fought the IRS in court for years & won some important battles. Unfortunately the government seems to be con- firming some of his worst suspensions about them. Now you can get a good dose of his philosophy & his ideas about remedying our problems. And if you work for the government, don't be offended - this book is doubly recommended for you! Book, $8.00 for shipping add $2 per book. 5% sales tax for AZ. residents. It is my belief that in the next few years more uses for viruses than just being a vandal will be found. Also, they may find a place in protecting our electronic freedom. - for instance virus remailers. Also see my previous post - The FREEDOM DEAMON. Also, they have a place in my CHATTERBOX concept(a remailer for chat mode or commands). "Viruses aren't just for Sociopaths anymore!" Also, I suspect the state may start cracking down on virus tech- nology. Incidentally, did you all know that crypt has a place in modern viruses? Encryption is used to hide "nasty" code & virus signatures until they get into the system & decrypt. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKK! BBBEEEAAATTTTT STATE !

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[NOISE] (Was: Re: US government department for crime...)
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- John Young wrote, in his unique style: >Still, anonymous does make an astutely ironic observation, in >humorous lifting of the customary FinCEN cloak: > >That the hydra-headed agency may be literally aim at financial >*crimes* enforcement rather than enforcement of the laws >against such deeds. > > >Especially given the participating renegade agencies who seem >to absolve themselves of these laws. > > >Perhaps anonymous is right, they are a band of outlaws, daring >to overtly flaunt it, expecting no opposition from the gullible >cowed. > <I take the bait...> Actually, it's *two* bands of outlaws in concert, and the "gullible cowed" are beginning to clamor for anything else. This could be an interesting election year, if the media would ever-in-hell get out of lap-dog mode and into watch-dog mode. [I know...I'm not holding my breath.] JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh iQCVAwUBMJjAB21lp8bpvW01AQHnrQP/XU5uwUfR0e9ZpJ2y8+d7MExdruGwrnyW llp4rC6mNJl8IoyAkZG4ox79rK1mKqd4KzG/XP9lLzuqHCp9Cc5rR0ECe0I5RHnx WFv66KkcsvVlGSflyMiuDi3R/Ul6y4wEOCaxus4OSHM+NhOcVKQddlg0F5AgOPbL mzi7SF9/p0I= =DVN9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Jim Ray "Thank God we don't get all the government we pay for." Will Rogers Visit my "Pretty Good Homepage" at http://shopmiami.com/prs/jimray/ Featuring cypherpunk privacy stuff and some of my babypictures! ----------------------------------------------------------------------- PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Key id. # E9BD6D35 (key on page & servers) <liberty(a)gate.net> IANAL ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Help Phil! email zldf(a)clark.net or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________

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Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition
by norm＠mediacity.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Stanford University Book Store (om compus) has a bunch at about $49.

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Re: Re: Chaum's cash: backup?
by Jiri Baum 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Marcel van der Peijl, > From: "Marcel van der Peijl" <bigmac(a)digicash.com> > Date: Tue, 24 Oct 1995 14:10:58 +0100 Sorry about taking so long to reply... I'll quote more than usual to make up for it. > > > I could give a hint: your random state initializer is not the too-often > > > used srand( time( NULL ) ) but user-chosen during installation. > > This sounds great... Will the bank be running crack against the proto-coins > > it gets? (Say, at the behest of a LEA?) > It is not the bank's intention to screw the clients, but mostly the > other way around. I was referring to the claim that the system is payer-anonymous. Thinking of it again now, what's to stop Eve the eavesdropper from spying on the proto-coins, running crack against it, and then (later) eavesdropping on the bank-signed coins and unblinding/depositing them before Alice/Bob does? (No, being encrypted by the bank's public key is not enough.) > If the bank wants to screw the clients the easiest > way is to change their account balance. Remember, you trust them with > your money. That's why they're a bank. Yes, but is the bank really interested in protecting privacy? > > Is there any way for the user to re-initialize the random state? > > > Write that initializer down and you can re-generate all coins. > > ... > > That's going to be one hell of a valuable piece of paper. > > (Certainly to your enemies/prosecutors - it reveals the blinding factors > > for every coin you ever spent.) > You may choose to burn it or change random state and have no > recoverability. What do you value more? Your privacy or your money? > Each user will have too choose. a) It would be nice if the protocol didn't require this choice. b) This choice should be made explicit to the user. c) As I noted above, wouldn't it also strongly reduce security? See you! Jiri - -- <jirib(a)cs.monash.edu.au> <jiri(a)melb.dialix.oz.au> PGP 463A14D5 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMJnEeCxV6mvvBgf5AQF2BwP/XdMn6ktMGjToDltqo014kT1i3Z/GGXPr HPW1gBN3RT3Ba9F2Ac+24IVVFqauo1sT+Ecc872UrlQzoF8S524oZfhjh3IW5xRF mpZX48tnQn5nJE/U4XgvcuQ6yw5JOhc2eEVPs2PnKT+RdUogNb9UDAXOKn6+EILc nqosNXK+aMU= =geHb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Market Value of Web Pages
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 9 Nov 1995, Timothy C. May wrote: > At 6:51 PM 11/9/95, Bill Frantz wrote: > > >BTW - I don't think we should be talking about a penny/page cost because it > >is way too high for the current market. For example, my copy of Applied > >Cryptography V2 cost about $.067/page AND came with the media to keep it > >"forever". My (used) copy of Snow Crash cost closer to a penny/page and > >also came with the media. I would think that somewhere between 1/100 to > >1/10 of a penny/page is closer to the current market value of the page > >content. > > With all due respect to Bill--his mention of agorics tells me he knows > something about computational ecologies and markets--, there is no > reasonable way to say what price is "closer to the current market value of > the page content," except by what the market will bear! > > Yes, a paperback novel is a penny a page or so. But a 5-page consultant's > report that sells for $2000 has a "market value" to someone of $400 a page. > You can all think of all kinds of other examples. Actually, Tim, there are many examples we each could think of. As an example, I'm presently preparing an unsolicited Security Review report for a Fortune 500 company. It's *priced* if you will in the mid five figure range per page (and that includes the title page, the appendices, and the pages which say on them, "this page left intentionally blank"). (It's the short report ... the one which references RFC's rather than including them. The report that includes RFC's is priced significantly lower when measured by weight ... i.e. cost/page metering.) But the report's information value is truly *worth* a factor many, many hundreds of times what the invoice rate bears or what the cost per page would indicate. For me, my current report is in fact a loss leader. Since my report IS unsolicited, I really don't even have any real expectation that the invoice will be approved for payment. My invoice is not submitted on that basis. I realize that I might not even receive re-imbursement for my out-of-pocket expenses. The beneficiary might well think that the information is only worth the value of a promotional mug or of a promo T-shirt, or maybe even worthless. Alternatively, the company might offer a complementary copy of their product or even just info-freeload as Netscape did with those Berkeley hombre stud-muffins, some time ago. But the information within my unsolicited report is hopefully utilized none the less, no matter what financial consideration is extended, because the information is _actually_ priceless, even though the recipient might consider that information to have only a nominal or "no, or little compensable value". Information is interesting that way. Because information is/was provided to them "freely" most firms will not (generally) see any value in the information at all. They happily become information free-loaders. It's paradoxical and ironic in an information age. The huge bill I send out is, literally, the reality check. No honest person would expect to take a dress home from a shop without paying, but a lot of normally honest folk don't give a thought to taking an armload of free information. Which I guess is an interesting segueway into a basic briefing on "information value" theory. But that part will have to hold for a bit ... once I collect my thoughts on how information philistines and information connoisseurs have differing value judgments. The implications might surprise people. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: NYT on Internet Flaws
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I understand though, that we can't control what the reporters >say and how they interpret what we say. It is very important to word >your posts carefully such that when you post a bug a reporter won't >think that they should write an article on it until it is verified. NO! Something like Perry's "Do not redistribute without permission" should be the only modification needed. /r$

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Bidzos and RSA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dave Otto posted today: < I think the issue, at this point, is not so much whether the NSA goons <actually threatened his life, but that they have consistently attempted to <suppress crypto anyway they can. That the NSA has tried to intimidate <Bidzos is no secret. That the NSA considers PGP a threat to their domain <is also well known. < Given that the purpose of the ITAR restrictions appear to be to prevent <an international standard from forming, I think we need to refocus on the <issue of presenting strong crypto as "a right", inevitable, and ubiquitous. < CPSR and EFF are doing an admirable job of taking the fight to the beltway; <but outside the net, the grass roots support just isn't there. As has been <pointed out by PRZ et al., the primary reason to avoided hacks to PGP is <that doing so fragments what standards we have now. The release of the <MIT PGP was the first step in legitimizing cryptography. The next step is <to install interoperable crypto on EVERY box out there. While I don't <advocate bypassing your local sysadmin, try to get PGP installed on each <machine you touch. Use 2.6 (MIT in U.S., _ui_ elsewhere). Publish your <key. Tell your friends. Annoy your family. Irrate your boss ;-). < My wife suggested that my activities would have gotten me "black-listed" <40 years ago. I suggest that the NSA would like to do exactly that to <individuals like Bidzos and PRZ, but it is too late (and the net would make <it virtually impossible anyway). Besides, some things are worth fighting for. Dave rightly suggests that black-listing and other such stigmatizing and threatening offenses inhibit the rights of citizens. These attacks also intimidate others who learn of the aggression on organizations and persons and who fear they may become targets themselves. To oppose these offenses it seems also right that any attack we learn about should be posted in this forum, at the least. Please post who else NSA -- and its like -- has threatened besides Bidzos and PRZ. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLhCBFyC2hhsUMyZpAQGUnwQAqFgV+nYmG+yaDMfEp7jc3KIsU3dFddvO 8pRKo9049PZMMhScksExpgmQmTQAeXRuShKiRNFzaiO8RGCPOSX/iU8QaGPI/d8o DMvoNYSDrK7IUEjTinaAGtCdHXvRE0JwtEXA/dgvj5X/s4eEzRFu4ZK3nvxsi2ey YtcH8dQ2SnI= =PdKJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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