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Ultimate Paranoia
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fellow Cypherpunks, I have been lurking around for some time and I have learned alot, But I have a few questions that I either haven't seen posted or I've missed all together. I keep PGP stored on a removable hard drive and keep it under lock and key when it's not in use. I write and encrypt messages on a stand-alone computer, that I only have access to. My passphrase is rather long and full of gibberish, But I still fear the other things that I can not control. Does anyone make and sell a device that emits white and pink noise? How do you take the randomness collected from radation sensors to create a truly random sample for creating a PGP key? Is there anything else that I might be missing besides lining the walls & computer in tin foil? :^) Thanks for your help! -Murphy --

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 22 Jan 96 6:49:09 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail(a)c2.org *******+**+* 16:05 100.00% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ######*##### 28:53 99.99% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++++++-+++ 53:51 99.99% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net *******+**** 15:49 99.98% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++..++-+* 2:48:04 99.96% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org #**** 3:24 99.96% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com ##+#-#*** ## 11:04 99.69% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ----------- 1:41:10 99.58% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ##+#*### ## :57 99.39% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #*+++*-*## # 4:56 99.29% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *+****+*#+ # 4:35 99.23% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ----__....- 18:15:09 98.38% hroller hroller(a)c2.org -# ######## 1:11 97.93% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ------.. - 15:40:28 92.22% rahul homer(a)rahul.net * ##*#**+*** 1:30 99.87% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net .- + #+# 8:52:40 79.39% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de *++++++-+ 2:30:08 63.32% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu *---*##* 8:49 56.61% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *+ 6:03 41.80% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ******* 8:05 41.23% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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CIA Stashes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reuter has a brief story today about "80 secret U.S. weapons arsenals that remain scattered across Austria for 40 years after they were hidden in case of a Soviet invasion" for use by resistance fighters. It says the CIA stockpiled the weapons without telling the Austrian government. The Austrian paper Kurier quotes the U.S. Ambassor as saying the CIA only recently informed Congress about the weapons stash. Does anyone in Austria or elsehere have more on this? ----- In a related matter, on Friday C-SPAN 2 aired several hours of comments and proposals by intel experts before the US Commission on Intelligence Reform. Mephistophelean former NSA head Admiral Bobby Ray Inman proposed among other brain-wavers to reorganize the thirteen or so bloated, bumbling, cat-fighting intelligence agencies: 1. Establish a new International Operations Agency to combine all operations units -- civilian and military -- into one, separate from the CIA -- which he thinks has irretrievably lost operations credibility. 2. CIA to do all intelligence analysis, but no collecting, to avoid contamination caused by "ownership of the data." The military to do intelligence collection and analysis only needed for immediate operations. 3. FBI to do all counter-intelligence, domestic and international, with agents stationed overseas. 4. Defense to do all imagery. 5. NSA/NRO/???, though not named in open session, presumably would continue ELINT and SIGINT. 6. All this will be very expensive, he roostered, intelligence on the cheap is worthless. 7. The total intelligence budget to be made public but no further breakdown of how the the pot of gold is distributed to supplicants is to be confessed. Former Ambassador to China Tilley, a 25-year veteran of CIA operations, emphasized the importance of continuing Non Official Cover operations, which, he said, are invaluable very-long term penetrations. He cited those he set up in China as COS and then revisited fifteen years later as ambassador -- still ferreting deepest of demon red-commie secrets, he black-comicly glowered to the glazed-eyes. NOC, while very expensive, is crucial, he, too, parroted. For the full eye-opening pack of lies to replenish the pot of gold, Tilley co-conspired that a closed session was needed. But all the intel gold-digging experts testified to that, grinning malevolently, thus continuing the grand tradition of looting national treasuries top-secret cloaked by national interest. So, where are all those not-yet-reported CIA Non Official Cover stashes of gold bullion (or $100 bills) to pay the world-wide "resistance fighters" for illusory supremacy?

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Re: Hassles taking App. Crypt. to Taiwan?
by pclow＠pc.jaring.my 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>If this were Singapore, they might consider it subversive literature, >because it is :-) ...............and the next thing you'll probably say is that Asians live in tree houses and have pet gorillas or whatever :)......

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Re: Why is blowfish so slow? Other fast algorithms?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:00 AM 1/22/96 -0500, David Mazieres wrote: >Failing that, can anyone suggest other secure, preferably unpatented, >shared-key encryption algorithms that could encrypt at ethernet speeds >(1 MByte/sec) without using most of the CPU on a fast Pentium or >equivalent processor? RC4 is of course unpatented and faster than anything else. Of course the name RC4 is trademarked, so you could simply call it "the well known algorithm" in your documentation and give the algorithm explicitly. RSA's present legal gimmicks seem to me to be based on the "trade secret" that RC4 really is the well known algorithm, so if you refrain from using the name "RC4", you should be OK. (I am not a lawyer.) T > >Thanks a lot, >David > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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German home banking (fromn RISKS)
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 17:32:56 +0100 From: Klaus Brunnstein <brunnstein(a)rz.informatik.uni-hamburg.d400.de> Subject: Homebanking NonSecurity demo A German private TV channel (SAT 1) displayed, Monday Jan.22 night (10 pm), a demonstration of how easily homebanking may be attacked in Germany. In this demo, a person used T-Online (a navigation tool similar to CompuServe) to send his ID, PIN, the amount to be transferred (500 DM) and the account to which to transfer, plus a transaction number (TAN) via telephone line. All these data were intercepted on a portable connected to the user's phone line in the basement of the building (indeed, most telephone boxes are rarely locked). Actions of the customer and the "hacker" were shown in parallel, so one could see all data (including PIN which was not displayed on the Customers' screen) on the hackers' display. Before the customer could start the booking process on the bank computer by sending the requestor, the hacker interrupted the telephone connection. As he now possessed all relevant "secret" information of the user, he now started an order to transmit 5,000 DM from his victim's account to another one, successfully (as the customers' vouchers proved. After the demo (about 10 minutes), a short interview (with the author of this report) discussed evident risks; it was made clear that software solutions are available since some time, to replace the old PIN/TAN structure with digital signatures and to encrypt sensitive data using asymmetric encryption. Risks? Presently, there are several risks in telephone-based homebanking. First, ALL sensitive information is transmitted in cleartext. Secondly, interception of line-based communications of German Telekom is easily possible at several sites, from the basement of a customers' house where lines from different customers are collected in a unit, to units collecting lines from several blocks, streets etc. Thirdly, in contracts between banks and customers, the latter will often have difficulties to prove that an order carrying their personal ID, TAN etc was NOT issued from them, esp. when there is evidence that the order came from the customers' telephone line (though not from his telephone :-). Customer protection (both technically and legally) therefore requires immediate action, as Chaos Computer Club commented in press. Interestingly, German banks offer enterprises a secure solution based on RSA-licensed encryption software. So far, this is NOT offered to private customers as it canNOT interoperate with T-Online. Financial institutions are discussing presently a solution (either with a chipcard including sort of DES or a solution using an RSA-implementation with 784 bit key, which may be distributed via diskettes) but it is unclear when this solution will be available. As long as such solution is not available, "every day may become payment day even for the most lousy hackers" as one German newspaper (TAZ) wrote. Klaus Brunnstein (Jan.23,1996) ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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Censorpore as a Terror State
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:29 AM 9/2/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >While Tim's article title was clearly intended to be provocative, Indeed, I write many things to be _provocative_. Not to be insulting, but to challenge orthodoxies. And when I hear mealy-mouthed platitudes along the lines of "foreigners do not understand the special needs of our nation, and do not understand why Benevolent Father Yew channels our thoughts in more productive directions," I have to call a spade a spade. (quoting James Seng) >>In addition, you need to see the method of censorship deployed in >>Singapore. For press media like papers and magazine, it is done in a >>passive manner. They _do not_ read every issue of every magazine available >>in Singapore. They only do so when there is enough complains. > >This also means you don't know what is safe to print and what isn't. >You have to restrict yourself very strongly, because otherwise >some politically influential person will complain to the government, >and you go to jail. At least if the government tells you what >the rules are, you know it's safe to say things that don't violate them. Yes, what James Seng calls a "passive manner" is often worse than censorship in a direct manner. Psychologists would mention "random reinforcement" at this point. When there is _direct_ censorship, with clearly defined rules, publishers will skate as close to the edge of the envelope as they can, and even test the limits. When there is _passive_ or _vague_ censorship, with rules not carefully spelled out but with the possibility of prosecution and jail time always looming, then publishers and others will rein themselves in, taking the cautious route. This is, of course, often the result desired, that people invoke "the policeman inside" (to use the Burroughs term). This is really the essence of a "terror state." The rules are not known, the fear of a knock on the door is omnipresent, and the Beloved Ruler may dispatch his enforcers on a whim. >>ps: Sorry for the off-topic discussion. > >It's not off-topic. Building tools to prevent censorship is >distinctly on-topic for cypherpunks, and an occasional digression into >whether it's a good idea is worthwhile. Exactly. A discussion of routing-around Censorpore's policies is at least as on-topic as the 17th discussion of some snake oil cipher. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Someone find Jim Choate a job!
by David Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sensory deprivation has caused Mr.Choate to finally go haywire. I suggest that someone from the state of TX (who have IDs from Hell) transport him to the nearest University. --David Miller middle rival devil rim lad

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Using Compromised Remailers to Get the Goods
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:21 PM 9/4/96, jim bell wrote: >Perhaps the most ominous part of making "use of encryption to thwart an >investigation" illegal is _not_ that remailer operators might be prosecuted, >but that they might NOT be prosecuted in a deal where (in exchange for not >being prosecuted) they continue to operate the remailer, "cracked" or >sabotaged so that they share all the info with the cops. While even that >won't make chained remailers totally useless, eventually suspicions of such >a crack will surface, which will help sabotage the credibility of all >remailers, >not just the ones that have been "stung." A very valid concern. As Jim must be tired of hearing by now, this was brought up a couple of years ago in discussions about the pressure that could be brought to bear on remailers. One suggestion was a duress signal, effectively saying "I have been compromised." (Also known as a "wave off" in criminal circles.) The issue of whether a remailer can be trusted to wave off others, via covert channels, is of course another issue. One can hope that additional channels will be acquired to produce the necessary information. (For example, full sender untraceablility means that sources within police departments can go home, log on with the own PCs, and sell information about pending investigations, modulo their concerns about pointing to themselves with information provided (see "canary traps"). What an exciting world we are entering.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: "Trustworthy" PGP Timestamping Service ??
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:51 PM 1/21/96, Matthew Richardson wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I have recently setup a free PGP timestamping service which operates >by email. > >The objective of the service is to be able to produce "trustworthy" >timestamps which cannot be backdated without detection. It achieves >this by:- > >(a) giving every signature a unique sequential serial number; > >(b) every day making a ZIP file of that day's detached signatures >and feeding the ZIP file back for signing (and hence the assignment >of another serial number); ... It sounds like a variant of the Haber and Stornetta work on digital timestamping, about which much has been written on our list (check the archives, and/or sections of my Cyphernomicon). They have a company, Surety, which is doing this (or was, last time I heard). www.surety.com will get you there. My hunch is that your scheme implements a version of a hash (the idea of hashing the doc and then publishing the hash as a "widely witnessed event," in Haber and Stornetta terms) that could infringe on their patents (assuming they applied, as I recall hearing they did). Before you go much further on this, it would behoove you to check on what they are doing and on what patents, if any, you might need to license. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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