- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

ironic
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's a bit ironic that the Administration is crying foul so loudly over the Soviet/Russian spy in the CIA -- as if this was unfair -- while they're openly proclaiming the right to spy on citizens and foreigners via Clipper. (IMHO) - Carl Carl M. Ellison cme(a)sw.stratus.com RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A PGP 2.4 Key fingerprint = E0 41 4C 79 B5 AF 36 75 02 17 BC 1A 57 38 64 78

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quetion about Multi-user systems
by Grand Epopt Feotus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I myself have a Linux system at home, all set up with PGP and rather secure from outside thrats since it is unconnected from the net except for when I dial-up. I was wondering what strategies some people use in order to make it easier to write and respond to mail. I dont feel like writing a message at home, encrypting it and then U/Ling it to my acount and mailing it. Is there another wya to use PGP on my mail account wihtout severely reducng mysecurity? I know the Sysop can read my secring etc.. at any time and can also intercept my passkey for my secring, BUT I would still like to perhaps use a low security key from my Unix account and then have a high security key on my home system that is very safe. The problem is, figuring out which message goes to where and all. Could someone with extnsive knowledge of PGP use on a Unix system help me out here>? You're eqipped with a hundred billion nueron brain, that's wired and fired, and it's a reality generating device, but you've got too do it. Free youself ----Tim Leary----

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Dorthoy Denning editorial, Newsday
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note: I'm just passing this on. I am only the messenger. ------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: research!cs.georgetown.edu!denning Received: from big.l1135.att.com by codex.UUCP (4.1/4.7) id AA26751; Wed, 23 Feb 94 16:18:14 EST Received: from research (research.research.att.com) by big.l1135.att.com (4.1/4.7) id AA08487; Wed, 23 Feb 94 16:18:13 EST Posted-Date: Wed, 23 Feb 1994 16:16:09 -0500 (EST) Received: by ninet.research.att.com; Wed Feb 23 16:17 EST 1994 Received: from cs (cs.cosc.georgetown.edu) by guvax.acc.georgetown.edu (PMDF V4.2-11 #5850) id <01H98BXBMQA88YCH3A(a)guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>; Wed, 23 Feb 1994 16:16:33 EST Received: from chair by cs (4.1/SMI-4.1.2) id AA01896; Wed, 23 Feb 94 16:16:09 EST Date: Wed, 23 Feb 1994 16:16:09 -0500 (EST) From: denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Subject: Newsday Editorial Errors-To: Postmaster(a)cs.georgetown.edu Message-Id: <9402232116.AA01896@cs> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT ====================================================================== | Newsday, Tuesday, February 22, 1994, Viewpoints | ====================================================================== The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime By Dorothy E. Denning Hidden among the discussions of the information highway is a fierce debate, with huge implications for everyone. It centers on a tiny computer chip called the Clipper, which uses sophisticated coding to scramble electronic communications transmitted through the phone system. The Clinton administration has adopted the chip, which would allow law enforcement agencies with court warrants to read the Clipper codes and eavesdrop on terrorists and criminals. But opponents say that, if this happens, the privacy of law-abiding individuals will be a risk. They want people to be able to use their own scramblers, which the government would not be able to decode. If the opponents get their way, however, all communications on the information highway would be immune from lawful interception. In a world threatened by international organized crime, terrorism, and rogue governments, this would be folly. In testimony before Congress, Donald Delaney, senior investigator with the New York State Police, warned that if we adopted an encoding standard that did not permit lawful intercepts, we would have havoc in the United States. Moreover, the Clipper coding offers safeguards against casual government intrusion. It requires that one of the two components of a key embedded in the chip be kept with the Treasury Department and the other component with the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. Any law enforcement official wanting to wiretap would need to obtain not only a warrant but the separate components from the two agencies. This, plus the superstrong code and key system would make it virtually impossible for anyone, even corrupt government officials, to spy illegally. But would terrorists use Clipper? The Justice Department has ordered $8 million worth of Clipper scramblers in the hope that they will become so widespread and convenient that everyone will use them. Opponents say that terrorists will not be so foolish as to use encryption to which the government holds the key but will scramble their calls with their own code systems. But then who would have thought that the World Trade Center bombers would have been stupid enough to return a truck that they had rented? Court-authorized interception of communications has been essential for preventing and solving many serious and often violent crimes, including terrorism, organized crime, drugs, kidnaping, and political corruption. The FBI alone has had many spectacular successes that depended on wiretaps. In a Chicago case code-named RUKBOM, they prevented the El Rukn street gang, which was acting on behalf of the Libyan government, from shooting down a commercial airliner using a stolen military weapons system. To protect against abuse of electronic surveillance, federal statutes impose stringent requirements on the approval and execution of wiretaps. Wiretaps are used judiciously (only 846 installed wiretaps in 1992) and are targeted at major criminals. Now, the thought of the FBI wiretapping my communications appeals to me about as much as its searching my home and seizing my papers. But the Constitution does not give us absolute privacy from court-ordered searches and seizures, and for good reason. Lawlessness would prevail. Encoding technologies, which offer privacy, are on a collision course with a major crime-fighting tool: wiretapping. Now the Clipper chip shows that strong encoding can be made available in a way that protects private communications but does not harm society if it gets into the wrong hands. Clipper is a good idea, and it needs support from people who recognize the need for both privacy and effective law enforcement on the information highway. ====================================================================== | Copyright Newsday. All rights reserved. This article can be freely | | distributed on the net provided this note is kept intact, but it may | | not be sold or used for profit without permission of Newsday. | ====================================================================== ------- End of Forwarded Message

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NIST Fed. Info. Processing Standard for EES (Clipper/Skipjack)
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

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A technical question re crypto technologies: DES and RSA
by Herb Lin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks -- can I get your input on the following technical questions? When implemented with "ordinary" hardware and software, I understand that RSA is very slow compared to DES for "equivalent" levels of protection. Question 1: How much slower? I've heard the possibility exists of designing special purpose hardware that would greatly speed up RSA. Question 2: Please comment on the feasibility of this scheme. thanks herb

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pgp tools
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, is soda still the archive (have I missed a major announcement?)? Is there a later version of pgptools? Try csn.org:/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp_tools See csn.org:/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? Is there an approved of pool or newsgroup to send messages to Pr0duct Cypher? I hate to add to the cypherpunks traffic with comments directly to him/her. (We NEED to get the return addresses working, or Pr0duct Try posting to alt.test, with the subject "ignore Pr0duct Cipher"

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Re: Give me your privacy and I will protect you.
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Michael Johnson <mpj(a)csn.org> > > Just say "NO!" to harmful drugs, promiscuous sex, the ITAR's restrictions on ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Please, tell me this is a joke. > strong cryptography, and Key Escrow! Write YOUR Congressional Representative > NOW and express support for Maria Cantwell's bill to ease restrictions on > privacy software! --Dave.

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Re: quetion about Multi-user systems
by mch＠sqwest.wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Re: quetion about Multi-user systems > sOn Wed, 23 Feb 1994, Eric Johnson wrote: > > > : would still like to perhaps use a low security key from my Unix account > > : here>? > > > > Why not use UUCP? > > > > --Eric > > > I was just advised to do that. the problem is I would > need to write something to allow me to do it without the > sysadmins knowledge here. He doesnt take kindly to The simplest solution is to get UUCP service from a commercial provider. (The cost should be somewhere around $20/month) Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLWvwreULSAGiySfVAQGa3wP5AVIiNtKJx95YHzXm54xVRlEMEUhJ8CCV gkVXF/GoqZolBA0kZJ7nLIXnocV9n676LFqyN8/wRHqLGJKr8hIM2o/ipEg4dOgr qWpkWm+uLQlZOLxclvFSptOygwMS2AMz4OVID2kAVCPJGmCrO8rxnUXT8j4dY4gK ME7l/naYYPY= =Oul+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: STEALTH OCEANS
by Sergey Goldgaber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is my first post to this list, so please don't flame me if I make some trivial mistake. %-> IDEA Re: making random noise files "undetectable"... ~~~~~~~ On many machines the file system allows users to "delete" files without actually deleting them. This is usually accomplished by simply marking the disk blocks that make up the file as free. Thus it should be possible to write an encrypted (noise) file on to disk, pad the rest of the disk with more noise and "delete" the whole thing, making the disk look blank to all casual observers. PROBLEM: If the above idea is implemented, one could not write on to the ~~~~~~~ the disk for fear of accidentaly overwriting the "free" disk blocks. SOLUTION: Knowing the _exact_ location and size of the file, one could write ~~~~~~~~ directly to those block which are _really_ free. 2nd PROBLEM: In order to decrypt the file, one needs to know it's ~~~~~~~~~~~ _exact_ location and size (or use some undelete util)... Which brings me to the... 3rd PROBLEM: An undelete utility could make recovering the encrypted ~~~~~~~~~~~ file trivial for _anyone_. SOLUTION: Make the file undetectable to udelete utilitys by modifying ~~~~~~~~ the FAT table, or equivalent. One would, of course, have to keep track of the file in some other, non-standard, way. FINAL(?) PROBLEM: Implementing the above idea is trivial for the average ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ user. Making and recovering truely undetectable files may not be. All feedback welcome, Sergey PS: I originally posted this message on Feb. 18, '94 I am now reposting in hope of recieving more feedback from other readers. PPS: Please forgive me for my previous repost. I just realized it is illegible to anyone without MIME.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This question has come up a couple of times lately, and nobody seems to be talking. Does anyone know the budget size and sources for CERT? Is CERT 'officially' part of the government or do they operate independently? And could a FOIA request yield results, do you think? *waves to the CERT guys reading this letter. They are monitoring this group, I have proof!*

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