So, is soda still the archive (have I missed a major announcement?)? Is there a later version of pgptools? Try csn.org:/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp_tools See csn.org:/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? Is there an approved of pool or newsgroup to send messages to Pr0duct Cypher? I hate to add to the cypherpunks traffic with comments directly to him/her. (We NEED to get the return addresses working, or Pr0duct Try posting to alt.test, with the subject "ignore Pr0duct Cipher"
Michael Johnson wrote, appearantly quoting someone else:
Is there an approved of pool or newsgroup to send messages to Pr0duct Cypher? I hate to add to the cypherpunks traffic with comments directly to him/her. (We NEED to get the return addresses working, or Pr0duct
Try posting to alt.test, with the subject "ignore Pr0duct Cipher"
Well, s/he could get an anonymous address thru my Andrew remailer... if e's willing to trust me. :) I'd like to see some more sites offer anonymous return addresses, so people wouldn't have to rely on a single remailer. Anyway, the address is: mg5n+getid@andrew.cmu.edu On the subject of return addresses, let me know what you think of this: It would be theoretically possible to write a RSA key generation program that would create keys in which all the moduli matched, except for the last 20-30 digits. This was discussed awhile ago in the discussion of how to forge keyids. (You could also create keys which had the last digits the same, but the first digits different so that they'd have different PGP key IDs.) What if a remailer was designed such that it would accept addresses of the format: <modulus first 50 bits><exponent>@anon.pool.org The remailer would then take that information, append a pre-defined ending to form the modulus, then use the exponent (which could be relatively small) to encrypt the message in PGP format, and then post it to a mail pool. This would allow you to make PGP public keys small enough to easily fit inside the To: header, something which can't be done with current PGP-encrypted return addresses. That way, even the most crypto-illiterate technophobe could send a message to an anonymous person simply by hitting the R key. The remailer operator would not have to keep a database of anonymous addresses, either, (a problem with anon.penet.fi, which has over 75000 users) Key generation would be somewhat more difficult, but I don't see how generating keys with similiar moduli could be a security problem.
participants (2)
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Matthew J Ghio -
mpjohnso@nyx10.cs.du.edu