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adv....ATTENTION : INVESTORS...HOT press release on developing mining company!
by goldpromo＠investormail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NOTE: Your name was added to our list because you have shown an interest in smart investing. If your name was added erroneously or you no longer wish to be on our mailing list, simply send "remove" to the "from address". For further information regarding this investment opportunity: Phone: (604) 681-6186 The Board of Directors of El Misti Gold Limited is pleased to summarize current diamond drill results for its wholly owned Sinchao Project in northern Peru located some 450 km north of Lima and 30 km from the Yanacocha Mine, South America's largest gold producer. These results confirm the presence of a large copper-gold-zinc-silver system with potentially economic grades amenable to open pit mining. The deposit remains open laterally in all directions and there is potential for several hundred million tonnes of mineralization. The analytical results were provided by Intertek Testing Services (Bondar Clegg). The quality assurance for all aspects of the diamond drill program has been provided by Howe Chile Ltda., a subsidiary of ACA Howe Ltd. Drill holes SDH-10, SDH-5, SDH-6 and SDH-7 have delineated mineralization over a length of 640 metres and a width of 300 metres with an average thickness of 478 metres. Preliminary test work indicates a specific gravity of 2.6. These measurements indicate a potential for a mineralized zone of approximately 239 million tonnes at a grade of 1.45g/t gold equivalent (Cu equiv. 0.84%). This includes 163 million tonnes at a grade of 1.70 g/t gold equivalent (Cu equiv. 0.99%) which includes 111 million tonnes at a grade of 2.18 g/t gold equivalent (Cu equiv. 1.27 %). The mineralization is polymetallic whose value is derived approximately 38% from copper, 24% from gold, 23% from zinc and 15% silver. The accompanying map (not available in e-mail format, please check the Company's web site) shows the area of mineralization defined by the current diamond drill results. Additional results for drill hole SDH-10 and previously released results are set out in Table 1 and are summarized below. Gold and copper equivalent grades have been calculated for each of the significant mineralized intercepts on the basis of in-ground values using the following metal prices: US $287/oz gold, US $5.55/oz silver, US $0.72/lb copper, and US $0.52/lb zinc. Hole SDH 10: 490 (1,181 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.61 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.94 %). Hole SDH-5: 495 (1,636 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.59 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.92 %). Hole SDH-6: 602 (1,850 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.22 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.71 %). Hole SDH-7: 592 (1,810 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.36 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.79 %). At Sinchao, to date, the Company has undertaken geological mapping, geochemical sampling and ground geophysics followed by drilling. During 1997, twelve RC holes (1,768 metres) were drilled and during 1998, seven RC holes (1,174.5 metres) and ten diamond drill holes (5,176.25 metres) were drilled. The Board is highly encouraged with the mineralization and potential of the Sinchao project and has retained well known and highly respected independent geologist Lindsay R. Bottomer, P. Geo to review all Sinchao project data and help the Board formulate the appropriate next steps for 1999. NOTE: We strive to comply with all laws and to send information to interested parties only. This message is not intended for, nor was it intentionaly sent to Washington state residents. Mistigold has paid a fee of $500.00 for advertising on 2-14-1999 For further information regarding this investment opportunity: Phone: (604) 681-6186

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Re: DNS queries
by jose 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanx 4 da help, but it isnt the answer to ma question. I tray to know, ..... All the pc's on Internet use a server (Remote o local ; named ,etc ) that resolve the queries 4 non ip's domains, like www.microsoft.com 4 example 200.37.129.2 ---- use 207.17.220.2 to resolve the queries (of the domains ) in internet. I like to know if there be a program that say me Remotly that 200.37.129.2 use 207.17.220.2 to resolve the domain ( 4 da Internet ) queries. Best wishes Jose A. Freyre Security Admin - UNI - Networks

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usubscribe
by Ixion 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

usubscribe Life is a dream

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Re: e$
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408091402.AA23089(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > point. The US government does not object to the use of financial > > instruments so long as they are backed by the US $ (or another > > accepted currency). > > Yes it does. Bearer bonds are illegal in the US. Perhaps my use of terms was insufficiently precise. Bearer bonds do not actually represent money in the same sense that a check does. Their value [usually] fluctuates. They are a different kind of financial instrument. > > Most of us use such financial instruments daily > > -- checks and credit cards, for examples. Most financial transactions > > involve no cash at all. > > The point is that anonymous transactions are coming under increasing > regulation. Commercial paper and the like is not a problem. Hmmm. Neither of the types of financial transactions that I listed is anonymous. If A writes a check to 'cash', pays B with it, and B passes it on to C, and so forth, are you saying that this is or will one day be illegal? -- Jim Dixon

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Receiver anonymity in DC-nets...
by Phil Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A method occured to me that obviates the need for public-key cryptography as a method of receiver anonymity in a dining-cryptographer network. I'm *sure* someone has thought of this before. I don't, however, have access to netscape or mosaic just now to search the archive with. If this topic or method has come up before (if you know of it, you'll know what I'm talking about; if not, and noone has come up with it before, which I doubt, I'd still like the patent ;-) and one of you guys has the relevant messages handy could you send them to me? Don't go through any great trouble, you understand... Phil

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John Gilmore the fascist cocksucker
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) John Gilmore is a fascist cocksucker Sandy Sandfort is a censorous motherfucker John Gilmore is a fascist cocksucker Sandy Sandfort is a censorous motherfucker John Gilmore is a fascist cocksucker Sandy Sandfort is a censorous motherfucker John Gilmore is a fascist cocksucker Sandy Sandfort is a censorous motherfucker Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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STEALTH OCEANS
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

note: This letter is composed of 2 different ideas: FIRST GREAT IDEA & SECOND GREAT IDEA. Firstly, congratulations to the cypherpunks that are realizing that strong civilian crypt needs "stealth". For some time I have thought that a crypt file with a crypt header on it was like saying "yes, I am in contempt for refusing to give a password" or "yes, I do require surveillance". A crypt file should look like random bits. The only problem is that files of random bits are not usual & might look a little suspicious. The cypherpunk needs to be able to deny having crypt files even if he is found with random bite files. So how do we do that? Then an idea came into my head! Why not make random bit files rather popular? Then, we would be like stealth fish swimming in stealth oceans. So, how do we make these files popular? Some may find the following ideas foolish. Others may find them unethical. Still others may find them both foolish & unethical. 1. Write a "wipe" program & put it in the public domain. The wipe program uses md-5 to generate random numbers over the user file & then delete the file. A very nice wipe program. However a bug is put into the program: a random number generator is used to decide that in a small number of cases, the new random number file is not deleted! This would leave around a lot of random number files if the program were to become popular. 2. Modify existing programs to generate random number files on occasion. Programs to be found on boards; loose diskettes; etc.. 3. Viruses that generate small numbers of random number files per disk partition or diskette. 4. send random files anonymously over the internet. 5. think up some of your own. note: in all the above, the file lengths should vary randomly & should be well tuned to avoid extremes. SECOND GREAT IDEA (self extracting encrypt/decrypt programs) (when an encryption program is itself an embarrassment.) A self extracting encrypt/decrypt program. That is,like, change PGP so that it looks like a random number file. But with a few cycles would start to unravel itself. Suggestion: 2 "random Number" files that when XOR'ed yields PGP. Probably nothing quite this bare bones & simple. Although something this simple could save your ass if your interrogators were technically unsophisticated, lazy, short of time or short of investigation funds. To do this very nicely would mean some tricky programming & would make the reputation of the programmer/ cypherpunk who did it. IMPORTANT NOTE: I am not a lawyer & do not know the law. In no case do I advocate breaking any law. I see that great idea first may be of questionable legal value. The cypherpunk is urged to consult with local, state, & federal authorities before pursuing these suggestions. Admittedly, that idea could also just be dumb & improper. Think about it. I heap big blessings on the heads of my fellow cypherpunks. Yours truly, Gary Jeffers

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Quicken's new version
by Christopher Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If I am out of place for posting here, forgive me; however, I do believe this germane. Compass Bank here in Alabama is joining twenty other banks around the country to offer dial-in banking via Quicken's new software release. Does anyone know or have heard of the security mechanisms which are to be built in to this product, specifically authent and encryption?

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http://www2.pcy.mci.net/whats-new/editors/meeks/index.html
by alan pugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mostly old news for the readers here, but relevant to the list. this was found at the net editors off of mci's webpage. > > The Assault on Private Encryption > > by Brock N. Meeks > > Washington, DC -- The other shoe has dropped now, several times. > > The political backlash and emotional fallout of the bombing of the > federal building in Oklahoma City still lingers here. FBI Director > Louis Freeh is using that event as a lever to wage a kind of private > war against the use of private encryption schemes. > > According to Administration sources, several different proposals are > now being discussed on how the government might go about implementing > a policy of government mandated, government "certified" encryption. > The most hardline of these proposals would outlaw your ability to > choose an encryption scheme which the government couldn't break, under > the authority of a court order. > > Freeh has left no doubts that his next target -- after successfully > getting Congress to pass the $500 million Digital Telephony Bill, > which gives law enforcement agencies an "easy access" method of > eavesdropping on telephone conversations-- his is private encryption. > > During an appropriations hearing in May, Freeh told a congressional > panel: "[W]e're in favor of strong encryption, robust encryption. The > country needs it, industry needs it. We just want to make sure we have > a trap door and key under some judge's authority where we can get > there if somebody is planning a crime." > > That means an end any non-government approved encryption technology > that doesn't have some means of providing the Feds with it's treasured > "back door." Under this scheme, for example, the widely-used Pretty > Good Privacy (PGP) encryption program would be, essentially, illegal > to own or at least, illegal for a U.S. citizen to use inside U.S. > borders. > > Private encryption schemes allow a person to scramble an electronic > message so that, if intercepted by an unintended party, it is rendered > unreadable. These scrambling programs are useful to a wide range of > people and interests, including researchers that want to keep their > proprietary breakthroughs safe from prying eyes to corporations > sending trade secrets to a distant office across the Net to ordinary > folks sending a steamy love letter to a lover. > > But these same encryption programs are being used by "terrorists and > international drug traffickers," as well, claims FBI Director Freeh, > and that makes private encryption schemes a threat to national > security. > > Freeh's crusade against encryption is being backed by been joined the > Justice Department, with the gleeful back alley goading of the > nation's top spook group, the National Security Agency. > > To meet the "challenges of terrorism," Freeh said, several things must > be done, among them, deal with "encryption capabilities available to > criminals and terrorists" because such technology endangers "the > future usefulness of court-authorized wiretaps. This problem must be > resolved." > > While Freeh has used the Oklahoma City bombing as convenient "news > hook" to again make a pitch to "resolve" the private encryption > "problem," the Director was basically reading from a dog-eared script. > Within the last several months he has repeatedly testified publicly > before Congress about the "evils" of encryption. > > On March 30 the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime he > said: > > "Even though access is all but assured [by the passage of the Digital > Wiretap Act] an even more difficult problem with court-authorized > wiretaps looms. Powerful encryption is becoming commonplace. The drug > cartels are buying sophisticated communications equipment.... This, as > much as any issue, jeopardizes the public safety and national security > of this country. Drug cartels, terrorists, and kidnappers will use > telephones and other communications media with impunity knowing that > their conversations are immune from our most valued investigative > technique." > > Then during a May 3 appearance before the same Committee, Freeh said: > "Encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists, both > now and in days to come, must be dealt with promptly. We will not have > an effective counterterrorism strategy if we do not solve the problem > of encryption." > > But there's nothing to be alarmed at here, according to Freeh. Just > because he's asking the Congress and the White House to strip you of > the right to choose how you scramble your messages, using a program > that the government doesn't hold all the keys too, doesn't mean that > the Director isn't a sensitive guy or that he has suddenly taken a > liking to wearing jackboots. > > Freeh steadfastly maintains all these new powers he's asking for are > simply "tools" and "not new authorities." These new powers are "well > within the Constitution," Freeh told Congress. > > Freeh hasn't publicly outlined just how he proposes to "resolve" the > "encryption problem." However, according to an FBI source, several > plans are in the works. The source refused to detail any specific > plan, but added: "Let's just say everything is on the table." Does > that include outlawing private encryption schemes? "I said > 'everything,'" the source said. > > The encryption debate has been raging for years. Two years ago the > Clinton Administration unveiled a new policy in which it proposed to > flood the market with its own home-grown encryption devices -- a > product of the National Security Agency -- called the "Clipper Chip." > > The Clipper is based on a "key-escrow" system. Two government agencies > would hold the keys "in escrow", which are unique to each chip, in a > kind of "data vault." Any time the FBI-- or your local sheriff -- > wanted to tap your phone conversations, they would have to ask a judge > to give the two government agencies to turn over the keys to you > Clipper chip. With those keys, the FBI could then unscramble any of > your conversations at will. > > That policy raised a huge firestorm of controversy and the Clipper > sunk from sight, down, but not out. The intent of the White House, > acting as a front man for the NSA and other intelligence agencies > along with the FBI, was to have Americans adopt Clipper voluntarily

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Re: Sgt Russell
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Tue, 19 Apr 1994 12:29:25 -0400 >From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)snark.imsi.com> > >Strikingly, these people feel gravely insulted >when one points out the fact that their posts read like random text >generators driven off of markov chains, the statistics for which were >derived from bad xeroxes handed out by drooling individuals on the >streetcorner who rave about the aliens who are remote controlling us >through our shoelaces. It's not our shoelaces, it's invisible wires in our heads, that's how they put the thoughts there, they couldn't possibly be doing it through our shoelaces, get real. tw

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