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ACAPULCO H.E.A.T.
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, This week's episode, "Code Name: Stalemate," was a two-parter. The Team goes to Venezuela to protect Andre Sokal, an ex-KGB agent, who is playing in a big chess tournament. Andre in now part of the Russian reform movement and Communist hard-liners want to assassinate him. H.E.A.T.'s archenemy, Strake, is hired to do the job. Strake is a violent but sensitive megalomaniac who eschews a simple bullet to the head because a good assassination is "a theatrical performance that must show the genius of the assassin" or something like that. Strake first shoots one of the real chess players in the back, which shows curiously little genius. He then replaces him with a surgically altered double. It goes downhill from there. The crypto and hi-tech angles are many. Ashley (Catherine Oxenberg, who I have been told was *not* Ringo's wife) replaces one of the other chess players. (No, she doesn't shoot her in the back, they were old friends. Ashley just happens to play at the grandmaster level and anyway, Chrissie will be feeding her computer generated moves via a radio receiver in Ashley's eyeglass frames. Strake's ringer is also strategically impaired and so Strake is helping him with a laptop with a screen that only the double can see because he is wearing special glasses. (Why not just use an LCD screen? Nobody can read those things either.) Unfortunately, Strake has brought in an electronics communication expert from Russia (Ivan something-or-other). Ivan spoofs the H.E.A.T. computers and satellite communications uplinks. When the Team discovers their communications have been compromised, Mike tells Ashley not to use their normal communications until the system is secure. When she asks how should communicate, Mike tells her to "use the phone." (Now *that's* secure!) Ivan is available to Strake, because his research funding dried up when the USSR went belly up. Too bad, because "he was on the verge of developing a microchip which would have been able to decrypt any secure computer." Yeah, right. To be continued next week. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: PGP 2.6 is dangerous in the long term ?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >What if (the cypherpunk community) comes out with a secure program that > >doesn't rely on RSAREF? Can it be done? > > Bizdos and gang will _still_ hold the patent on RSA-style public key > encryption. What you're suggesting is, in essence, exactly what Phil > Zimmerman did with PGP 1.0. There are three different problems here: - Doing secure programs without the RSAREF implementation of RSA; this has US patent license difficulties unless you buy their stuff. - Doing secure programs without the RSA algorithm - other public-key methods are available, such as Diffie-Hellman, though RSA has a lot of technical advantages for many applications. PKP/RSADSI own patents that expire in 1997 that they claim cover the whole field of public-key crypto, and nobody's challenged the breadth of those claims in court. - Doing secure programs without public-key algorithms at all - you *can* use secret-key algorithms to do security, as long as you're willing to do key distribution by some usable but inconvenient method, and security systems like Kerberos can do this. But Public-Key variants solve a lot of the technical difficulties and make implementations much easier.

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No Subject
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp.netcom.com//pub/mpj has source for new macpgp

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Re: compatibility with future PGP
by remailer＠jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ebrandt(a)jarthur.cs.hmc.edu (Eli Brandt) once said: EB> > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> EB> > People overseas want to be able to use this program, too. There are EB> > 250 million people in the U.S., which constitutes under 1/20th of the EB> > Earth's population. EB> EB> You dropped the part of his message where he said that he believed EB> v2.5 was available abroad. If it's not, I don't think it will take EB> long. And once it's escaped from this little prison state of ours, EB> overseas users incur no risk in using it: they can't even be EB> Noriega'd, since they've broken no law in any country. It can be obtained from IRC, /msg pgpserv help. Patrick

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Re: Email firewall etc
by remailer＠jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in once said: RI> Vincent.Cate(a)FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU: RI> > Companies like the idea of firewall machines to protect the security of RI> > their internal nets. I bet they would also like something called an RI> > "email-firewall". Names are important. :-) I think of the RI> > email-firewall as a slightly modified anonymous-remailer. RI> RI> I haven't delved into the wide world of remailers out there, but I'd like a RI> remailer that encrypted, though did not necessarily anonymize, incoming mail. RI> RI> I'm not really bothered about the NSA reading my mail. In fact, I'm not usually RI> concerned whether someone in New York, for instance read my mail. But I might RI> not want people closer to home (local sysadmins, etc) to read it. I'm sure many RI> others share this position. RI> RI> The problem is that I can't ensure that people encrypt their mail to me. They RI> may not bother, or be unable. An alternative would be for them to send it to RI> a remailer, which, knowing my public key, would encrypt and forward it to me. Version 1.99 of my Remail for Waffle actually does this: it checks if the recipient of the remailed message has a PGP public key, and if so, it encrypts the outgoing message, if it is not encrypted already. The remailers remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl and remailer(a)jpunix.com use this program. For testing you can also use remail(a)desert.hacktic.nl, or remailer(a)desert.hacktic.nl PAtrick

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Learning to divide ( again )
by Jyri Poldre 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RE every1. Recently i became involved in project of designing semi-custom VLSI device for endecryption. The device uses variable length RSA for key exchange and IDEA for data encryption. For pipelinig IDEA block we have to use 6 multipliers 16 bit ant that leaves us with 96 bit adder for RSA calculations. ( The chip should be reasonably cheap ). Otherwise the RSA speed would not be so cruicial but we have to generate both keys in chip ( involves physically random generator based on variable frequency being samled with constant clock, VF generator is inside chip ) to guarantee absolute secrecy - you cannot tell Secret component if you do not know it. To generate keys we have to use Fermat test for primality and that takes time. Although the RSA keys need not to be changed so very often it is still important to keep the process running in 'normal' time limits. So - I can use multiple operand adders ( meaning a+b+c+d with one carry-propagation time ) For RSA basic operation a*b mod Z i have decided to use radix4 modified Booth algoritm for multiply , but i am still not sure about divide. Has any1 encountered similar problems? I would greatly appreciate Feedback, cause i have to make up my mind in some weeks. If you are interested in more details about the design, let me know. I would like it to be good product for use in different applications. JP from PLDesign lab of Tallinn Technical University.

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Re: UNICORN VS. TMP@NETC
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Bob MorrisG <bmorris(a)netcom.com> : GT> Of course, no-one has considered the possibility that the tmp@netcom p : GT> was manufactured and played out over time solely in order to boost the : GT> credibility of the 'uni' persona :-) [does anyone have any proof that : GT> *either* of these people exist in real life : Aha, that means that you must be them too, huh??? Well, according to our hero David Sternlight, I'm the person behind Iolo Davidson! (Bwaha...etc.) (Wonder if I sue sue him - seems to be the new vogue internet game at the moment :-) ) G

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2.3 keys changed in 2.6 keys???
by ER CRAMER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A few people said that there public key was changed from a 2.3a key to a 2.6 PGP key. This can not be. The one reason that there is 2.6 in the armored file is because the keyserver uses PGP 2.6 ... If you outlaw Privacy, only the Outlaws will have Privacy! Eelco Cramer <crame001(a)hio.tem.nhl.nl> ------ --------------------------------------------------

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WNSTORM NOT on wuarchive...
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If any of you managed to get it off wuarchive, great.. if not, sorry... I've just looked and some sysadmin removed it... I haven't seen it in the msdos directories either so that's a big problem... I do however have the permission of someone to use theri ftp site, however, I cannot publically post the site name at his request. If you want it, email me and I'll tell you the site name, but please don't post it to the list.

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British and German citizens....
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the British or German citizens on the list could drop me some e-mail. (I'm interested in discussing some recent changes to citizenship requirements) -uni- (Dark) -- 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig!

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