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Some info on file/memory erasing on NT
by Andy Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The subject of protecting memory and files from other users in a multi-user environment always seems to come up here every few weeks, so the following short article culled from the MS Win32 SDK might be of interest. - Andy [...] SUMMARY File systems under Windows NT currently have virtual secure erasure (when a file is deleted, the data is no longer accessible through the operating system). Although the bits could still be on disk, Windows NT will not allow access to them. MORE INFORMATION The NTFS file system does this by keeping a high-water mark, for each file, of bytes written to the file. Everything below the line is real data, anything above the line is (on disk) random garbage that used to be free space, but any attempt to read past this high-water mark returns all zeros. Other reusable objects are also protected. For example, all the memory pages in a process's address space are zeroed when they are touched (unlike the file system, a process may directly access its pages, and thus the pages must be actually zeroed rather than virtually zeroed). Note that file system security assumes physical security; in other words, if a person has physical access to a machine and can boot an alternative operating system and/or add custom device drivers and programs, he/she can always get direct access to the bits on disk. [...]

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Re: Info on Netscape's key escrow position
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "James M. Cobb" Blanc, On 12 02 95 you pointed to: ...an underlying problem, which is of not having a sense of freedom to stand up to the Dark Side. You have put your finger on perhaps THE problem: Why did we cast aside our sense of freedom? How may we re-ignite the spirit of freedom? ......................................................... Yes, I think it's a pretty important element to ponder, this lack of the sense of freedom. I don't think that "we" all (especially on this list!) have cast it aside. I do notice that it seems to dissipitate the closer that one gets to govmt agencies (or vice versa). I have often heard people say "well, if it becomes a law, we'll have to uphold it". That seems to be the end of all effort towards reality, as though no further advancements toward truth were possible. It's a continual problem, fostered from being in the lower rungs of the pecking order of "authority" and then beginning to think that one rightly belongs there. Yet how often, especially lately, does technological progress make obsolete what yesterday was an "important" social/political issue requiring "offical intervention" from higher authorities to impose the lowest standards of functioning so that everyone could "get along". Sometimes the issue just goes away from atrophy or obsolescence, once certain talented individuals discover new, improved ways of getting things done. Of course, there's still always another social fear to overcome, and the more that inventors & scientists & techonologists push back the envelope of what is possible (especially in the field of electronics & communication), the closer they get to the gist of the problem with people's attitudes & behavior toward each other, and the closer also to the governing agencies which were created to deal with these concerns. Some things I know which inspire the sense of freedom to stand up to the Dark Side is to have definite knowledge, integrity, a personal vision of the future (an ideal), and some really useful tools (be they hardware or software). This list is intended to focus on the tools of cryptography in relation to privacy, James, and far-off digressions are discouraged because of the volume of mail which this would result in. So do try to focus on that, won't you, or you'll continue to hear from Perry, who works tirelessly to keep everyone in line. :>) .. Blanc

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Secret Clearance (was: re: NIST GAK export meeting, sv)
by Pete Loshin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm definitely opposed to GAK, but the conspiracy theory approach to considering what it means to employ people with SECRET clearance may be getting a bit paranoid. >From working at an organization that did a lot of government work, my understanding of the process of clearing employees is this: -certain tasks require knowledge or access that must be restricted -you have to have a high degree of trust in the people doing those tasks -people with money troubles, out-of-control addictions, skeletons in the closet, and histories of "troubles" are prime targets for subversion -doing a clearance check (in theory) eliminates the possibility that these people will be blackmailed/bribed into revealing their secrets Not that this stuff always works in practice, considering that Aldrich Ames was an alcoholic with money troubles who then turned up with a lavish lifestyle, and no one he worked with noticed until it was pretty much too late. The point is, if you want to keep your organization's systems secure, you need some mechanism to do so. Security clearance is one way; banks and other financial institutions do other things (like finger prints, background checks, etc.) My big question is, do any of the companies providing Internet services, or Internet software, or digital commerce services/software, employ any of these security mechanisms on their employees? Comments or (preferably) references to actual practices? -Pete Loshin pete(a)loshin.com

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Re: The "Future" Fallacy
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell Bill Gates (like Mister Newt before him) committed what I call the Future Fallacy in "The Road Ahead." Page 106. "Soon any child old enough to use a computer will be able to transmit coded messages that no government on earth will find easy to decipher." ................................................... Billg is an optimist. What's wrong with this picture, Duncan? .. Blanc

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Solution for US/Foreign Software?
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Manufacturers of handheld ham radios have to make them for at least three markets: Japan, US, and Europe. Since these devices are usually based on the same LSI chip for control, customization is usually done by installing/not installing certain tiny surface-mount devices (diodes?) on the PC board, which tells the "boss MOS" which frequency band edges to work with, etc. Getting these radios to receive or transmit "out of band" is usually a simple matter of modiying these radios by adding/removing/moving these diodes to a different position. The instructions on how to do this custom operation are not included with the radio itself, but the information always seems to get out there, and you can buy books which show the mods for practically every such radio in existence. Okay, the problem as I see it is that USG doesn't want to approve encryption software for export that can use "excessively long" keys, yet Netscape (and others) want to be able to sell outside the country with full-feature encryption. I think I have a solution. 1. Write a program with limited encryption (40 bit?), with the encryption module in a file external to the main program. 2. Get export approval for this program. 3. Write a module which replaces the encryption file, increasing key size to whatever you REALLY wanted in the first place. (128-bit IDEA, 2000-bit PGP, etc.) 4. Ship that new module with the old software to US customers. Naturally, that new module will "leak," so anybody who buys the old program out of the country can convert to a fully-functional version by downloading it from a foreign bbs that just happens to have it. The module can be encrypted/signed by the manufacturer so everyone can be sure of its identity and genuineness. Better than nothing, I suppose.

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re: NIST GAK export meeting, sv
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Hieronymous" says: > (Thanks for the summary, Pat.) > This last bit is really rich. I can't think of a single publically > defensible reason for the stipulation that every escrow agent must employ > someone with SECRET clearance, but I *can* think of a publically > indefensible reason for it -- to facilitate those spooky non-court wiretap > authorizations that've been alluded to in the fine print of the GAK > proposals. This is probably one reason. Another is that they could shut down an escrow agent at a moment's notice by pulling the clearances. We haven't seen the other requirements, but an interesting question is what happens when an escrow agent goes out of business. Speaking for myself.... Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: Solution for US/Foreign Software?
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>1. Write a program with limited encryption (40 bit?), with the encryption >>module in a file external to the main program. >>2. Get export approval for this program. >>3. Write a module which replaces the encryption file, increasing key size >>to whatever you REALLY wanted in the first place. (128-bit IDEA, 2000-bit >>PGP, etc.) >>4. Ship that new module with the old software to US customers. >>Naturally, that new module will "leak," so anybody who buys the old >>program out of the country can convert to a fully-functional version by >>downloading it from a foreign bbs that just happens to have it. The >>module can be encrypted/signed by the manufacturer so everyone can be sure >>of its identity and genuineness. >> >> >>Better than nothing, I suppose. > >"Crypto hooks," basically the scheme you are proposing, were thought of by >the authorities and are not a bypass of the crypto export laws. >--Tim May I'm not saying they are a "bypass" of the laws. Rather, I'm saying that if the goal is to: 1. Let companies like Netscape make foreign sales. 2. Still comply with the letter of the law. Then this would be an excellent way to achieve both those goals. (I accept as axiomatic that if the only exportable encryption is GAKked, they're not going to be viewed seriously as a product. A way around GAK would actually increase their profits.) BTW, the fact that they might be "thought of" by the authorities is not going to be enough to stop them. If the USG claims that it WILL approve GAK-ified software, it is unclear how they will decide if a given program qualifies. Since every program of length "N" is only an XOR away from every OTHER program of length "N", modifying or disabling this software is always possible. Remember, the reason (or, at least, one of them!) they put Clipper into a physical chip as opposed to releasing the algorithm was to prevent modifications that would subvert the algorithm. Their decision to allow software key-escrow presumably forces them to accept certain possibilities they otherwise wanted to avoid. If the USG tries to take the position that "any program which can be modified into another program that gets around GAK is prohibited from export," then they're going to have to stop allowing the export of pre-formatted floppy disks because they're likewise an XOR away from PGP. So we're back to square one: Does the USG intend to allow ANY programs to be exported?

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re: Secret Clearance
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:00 12/5/95, Pete Loshin wrote: >>From working at an organization that did a lot of government work, >my understanding of the process of clearing employees is this: > >-certain tasks require knowledge or access that must be restricted >-you have to have a high degree of trust in the people doing those tasks >-people with money troubles, out-of-control addictions, skeletons in the > closet, and histories of "troubles" are prime targets for subversion >-doing a clearance check (in theory) eliminates the possibility that > these people will be blackmailed/bribed into revealing their secrets The problem is that they are subject to blackmailed/bribed/subversion ONLY because the employer will use the info as an excuse for firing/restricting the employee. If someone has a "skeleton in the closet" such as being gay, so long as the employer does not discrimate against gays who INFORM the employer of their sexual orientation or if the employer does not care about the person being gay (ie: removes it a potential blackmail threat) there is no problem so far as I can see. It is only when there is something that is WORK RELATED which would affect the person's performance if not known that the question of a background check is relevant.

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Re: GAK
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:56 AM 12/6/95 EST, SBinkley(a)atitech.ca wrote: >I heard a while back about being able to "split" up a PGP key. I suppose you could, with some variant of Shamir's secret- sharing scheme. I'm not familiar with any specific applications that do this. (But that's irrelevant.) >What about splitting up the key into many parts, and giving >them out to multiple INDEPENDANT agencies. ie: One piece >goes to the FBI, one to the NSA, one to some other committee, >and so on. That way, no goverment body could just tap your >conversations without getting approval from others, and >gaining the pieces of your key. That still doesn't address the basic issue - that the government has NO RIGHT to access our _private_ keys. If you want to assume a fairly paranoid threat model, each of these different agencies will instantly combine their parts to generate the whole key. If you trust the government, it might work. Personally, I trust the government about as far as I can throw the typical Man In Black. Dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMMXoeAwyfvCScyE5AQEFqQQAihutub3GQDi/FtiDkAfxgb8dzFAEnZ/H LD588iuIxX3G3M0fLmAkRuUKE7fdhExkAO1IYFwH0oM/bI8KdSrY/RyeqnQFRwVo /Vvr6nwVMdLP94Vt9Gi4QXJ4dVBHXwfvRUm5/HdLqqh8UH2HLKO1jdt82H539paM ZhiZkMmNlCs= =0kWW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1210 Towers South, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63701-4745 +1(573)339-3814, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0x92732139 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/

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Re: Geodesic Payment Systems? (was Re: Meeting notes from ANSI X.9Meeting on Electronic Payment)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"nsb+limbo(a)nsb.fv.com" "Nathaniel Borenstein" 6-DEC-1995 07:21:19.03 I had assumed that there was a market discount, but it's still not quite that simple. It's very hard for markets to deal with *unbounded* risk. The biggest problem I see with most of the crypto-cash schemes is that there is a legitimate scenario -- however low-probability you might assess it to be -- of break-the-bank catastrophic failure, i.e. in which someone gains the keys that allow him to essentially print money. This kind of low-probability, infinite-cost risk is the kind of thing that gives underwriters the heebie jeebies. There's a good reason that most companies have "Ltd" after their name instead of "Unlimited", in those countries where that's the naming convention. -------------------------- The risk in question is not infinite-cost. If the person who gets ahold of the keys starts simply making lots and lots of money, in a free market the prices in digital cash for everything will start going up. This phenomenon will be spotted, and those taking the particular variety in question will stop accepting it. Losses are limited to however much was out there at a given time, and if there are multiple systems with free-market interconversion between them, that may not be very much. People will move out of a decaying monetary system if: A. the new system is as easy to get as the old; and B. the new system is as easy to spend as the old. If the person who gets the keys simply uses them on a small scale, then the resulting inflation and loss of value can simply be dealt with using the discount mechanism. It's no longer infinite risk. -Allen

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