- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work
by dmandl＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Ed Carp wrote: Duncan Frissell wrote: > > It used to be said that no country would be allowed to move from Communism > > to Capitalism. It can now be said that it is inconceivable that a modern > > country will move from a Market to a Command Economy. Market discipline is > > strong. > > Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old > Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying > that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free > market economy. > > Never underestimate the value of human stupidity and shortsightedness. In other words: If people dump communism for capitalism, it shows how the free market will always triumph, and if people dump capitalism for communism, it shows how stupid and shortsighted humans are. Hmmmm... --Dave. -- Dave Mandl dmandl(a)panix.com http://www.wfmu.org/~davem

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Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:29 AM 1/2/96 -0600, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: >Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old >Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying >that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free >market economy. I said "modern" country. Even so, Russia and the rest are much more market dominated than they used to be. Transition will not be easy but I doubt if they'll go back. As for an eternity of slavery being superior to too rambunctious freedom -- we won't let them be that stupid. The "cancer of Anglo-Saxon values" is pretty powerful. >> Where are the pressure points where regulation can be applied? > >How about on the backbone itself? Since everyone goes through the htree >major backbones, all one would have to do is control access at those >points. Of course, that would lead to clandestine use of >store-and-forward LEOsats, s&f UUCP sites, etc. UUCP might even make a >comeback ;) That would require outlawry of crypto over the backbone and some way of convincing the backbone to run government approved code. Quite a bit of resistance would ensue. Have the Feds ever successfully mandated that large numbers of people run government code? DCF

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Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 03, 1996 14:47:35, 'anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com' wrote: >My original post, "US calls for measures against Internet porn" was a >satire. The entire point was that, by changing a few words in the >"China calls for measures against Internet porn" story, a statement by >a totalitarian communist regime could be made to look like official US >policy. Obviously, the project was a success, as people are taking it >seriously in spite of the fact that it had telltale clues, and that >the original source was revealed. > I was going to post on this topic, especially on a paraphrase of the (ostensible) original. I still want to, but let me play either the skeptical or responsible journalist (reader's choice of adjectives). Anonymous has *not* revealled the original source as he/it/she claimed. They have asserted it came from Xinhua news agency. Will Anonymous post a pointer to where we can access on the internet the original? News feed, date, and time of posting, as well as message ID should suffice. -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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A Mondex like Protocol
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two Mondex units, upon command of their respective operators, can pass money from one to the other via infra_red signals. I think that this requires tamper proof units. I understand that the Mondex protocol is currently undisclosed. I have no information about that protocol but am merely trying to find a protocol that fits the little that I know about Mondex. Are there other guesses? Here is one way it might work. Upon an operator receive command, the payee unit transmits a DH greeting along with the value of a counter located in the payee unit. (The integrity of the counter value in the greeting is somehow ensured.) It continues to send this greeting while it awaits a greeting. Upon a pay command from its operator, a payer unit transmits a DH greeting and continues to send that while it awaits a greeting. When either unit receives a greeting it computes the shared secret key ala DH. The payer decrements its cash value and generates a pay order enciphered under the secret key. The pay order includes the counter value from the payee's greeting. This order is transmitted repeatedly until an acknowledgement is received or times out. If it times out then the money is lost. When the payee receives a pay order, it verifies that the counter value is correct and then increments the counter, preventing replay. The payee then increments its cash value and sends ciphered acknowledgements for a brief period. The payer may give one final acknowledgement acknowledgement which, if lost, merely means that the receiver will time-out sending acknowledgements. The common DH modulus is known to all units and but otherwise secret. This, of course, requires a extraordinary tamper resistance. Only the state must be kept secret, not the hardware behavior. Here is the money integrity argument for this protocol. The units are collectively responsible for preventing counterfeiting. For counterfeiting to happen some unit must increment its cash value when there was no corresponding decrement in another unit. A unit increments its cash value when it decodes a pay order from someone who knows the global secret DH modulus. That someone must have been a legitimate unit that decreased its cash value. Replay is impossible because each such transaction is uniquely identified by the recipient's counter value. The recipient never increments its cash value twice for the same counter value.

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Re: DOS/Windows remailer chaining
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:27 PM 1/2/96 +0100, nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) wrote: >Cypherpunks write code. With that phrase and the wave of attempts to >censor the 'Net, I've embarked on a quest to make remailers easier to use. > >Has anyone written an easy to use Windows or DOS application that will let >someone chain a message through several remailers, perhaps with support >for the mailer at alpha.c2.org? Yup. Private Idaho, www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ does just that, along with calling PGP to do things you commonly want done. >Would the writer of such a program, if in the US fall under the provisions >in ITAR? Obviously, calls to the PGP program would have to be made. I >recall reading that such hooks do fall under the ITAR. If this is true, so >much for a more user friendly version of chain for the masses. Depends on whether it's a "component" of an encryption system or not. But if you're not doing PGP, no problem at all (except of course that _real_ remailers only talk encrypted....) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

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Re: [FACTS] Germany, or "Oh no not again"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:10 PM 1/29/96 +0100, Thomas Roessler wrote: >In particular, they are right now >*checking* whether providing internet access is a criminal >offence due to the possibility to gain access to `inciting >material' (the German word is `Volksverhetzung') via the Net. Whether providing mail service is a criminal offence due to the possibility to gain access to `inciting material.' Whether providing phone service is a criminal offence due to the possibility to gain access to `inciting material.' Whether selling radios is a criminal offence due to the possibility to gain access to `inciting material.' Whether selling satellite dishes is a criminal offence due to the possibility to gain access to `inciting material.' Whether teaching reading is a criminal offence due to the possibility to gain access to `inciting material.' >Quite similar to the RSA T-Shirt story in the States. ,-) But with much more reaction from the prosecutors. I guess Germans are easy to set off. That means BTW that others can control them since they "have to react." Has German jurisprudence ever encountered the concept that the person who requests something like a web page is the "actor" in this drama not the carrier. The carrier is not doing anything. The requestor is controlling the system momentarily. DCF

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Re: Lotus Notes
by Charlie_Kaufman/Iris.IRIS＠iris.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: > > At 11:09 1/30/96, Charlie_Kaufman/Iris.IRIS(a)iris.com wrote: > > >p.s. re: the fact that it's 64 bits rather than 128. That was the limit on key > >size of the crypto software we licensed from a third party. That crypto > >software also limited us to 760 bit RSA keys. > > I find this very interesting. RSA prohibits its licencees from using RSA > software with truly secure keylenghts. What may have incenitvised them to > take this bizzare position? The problem is not with the license, but with the software. And not with the latest software, but with some antique software we started using a long time ago (before RSAREF was a twinkle in anyone's eye) when 760 bit RSA keys and 64 bit RC2/RC4 keys seemed impenetrable. Given that interoperability with the installed base is a higher priority than resistance to some theoretical attack, we can't increase key sizes until the market rolls over to the latest software. We do have plans to get there. --Charlie Kaufman (charlie_kaufman(a)iris.com) PGP fingerprint: 29 6F 4B E2 56 FF 36 2F AB 49 DF DF B9 4C BE E1

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Re: Fooling people with Java applets
by Michael Peponis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Monday, 29 Jan 1996 Benjamin Renaud wrote :All graphical UI elements spawed by an applet, which are the only ones :that can get user events, are clearly marked as "untrusted applet :window"s. :So unless you type your password in a pop-up marked "untrusted applet :window", you should be fine. And if you do, you arguably deserve :whatever happens to you.... As sad as it sounds, I actually had this happen. Some shmuck put in sensitive information into a window clearly maked "Untrusted Java Applet" Unfortunatly, the smuck was a Sr. Vice President, so what can you do. Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server,or via finger

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PoM 4: Anti-Government Growth
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's fourth article of The Washington Post series on "The Politics of Mistrust" is: "Public Grows More Receptive to Anti-Government Message." The public sees the quality of life deteriorating or not improving from the 1960s, with family breakup, increased violence, a failure to produce better jobs, and, in addition, with the Cold War over, they don't see any real reduction in the risks of the possibility of a third world war. All this occurs at a time when taxes have been increasing. The small government, low tax environment creates a real opportunity for Republicans.... The general force of this sense of no progress is to favor the more conservative party. Next: Generation divide Series to date available at: http://www.replay.com/young/

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Afternoon Conference: UCC 2B: Information Contracts - Correction
by Steven C. Perkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excuse x-posting. Please forward to appropriate lists. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- February 14 -- 1:30-4:30 PM -- UCC Article 2B: Information Contracts Rutgers School of Law-Newark and the New Jersey State Bar Association will co-sponsor a program to introduce lawyers, business, and others to the current draft of new Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, Digital Electronic Information and its Transfer. Professor Raymond T. Nimmer, University of Houston and the Uniform Laws Commission Drafting Committee Reporter, and two members of the Committee, Professor David A. Rice of Rutgers School of Law-Newark and Professor Amy Boss of Temple University School of Law, will present the draft, seek comments, and respond to questions. Other panelists include Donald Cohn, Esq. of DuPont Corporation, Co-Chair of the ABA Software Contract Law Task Force and Holly Towle, Esq. of the Seattle law firm of Preston Gates & Ellis. This program is free; however, there is limited seating available. Please call Assistant Dean Margaret C. Bridge at 201/648-5968 to reserve seating. RELATED CONFERENCE: COPYRIGHT ISSUES AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE - February 15, 1996. Please see the Conference home page at URL:"http://www.rutgers.edu/RUSLN/copyconf.html". ----------------------------------------------------------------------- February 14, 1996 UCC 2B REGISTRATION DEADLINE: February 10, 1996 (Walk-in registration permitted beginning at 8:30AM) Number Attending: ________ Name(s)_____________________________________________________________________ ________ Affiliation_________________________________________________________________ ___________ Address _______________________________ City _________________ State _____ Zip _________ Telephone (_____)__________________ Mail to: Rutgers School of Law-Newark 15 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102-3192 Attn: Assistant Dean Margaret C. Bridge For further information, call Assistant Dean Margaret C. Bridge at (201) 648-5094, or send email to Professor David A. Rice at drice(a)world.std.com. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- **********||||||||||\\\\\\\\\\*//////////||||||||||********** Steven C. Perkins sperkins(a)andromeda.rutgers.edu User Services Coordinator Ackerson Law Library http://www.rutgers.edu/lawschool.html Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, School of Law at Newark http://www.rutgers.edu/RUSLN/rulnindx.html VOX: 201-648-5965 FAX: 201-648-1356 |||||||||||||||\\\\\\\\\\\\\||*||///////////////|||||||||||||||

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