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No Subject
by nobody＠vegas.gateway.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought that this was worth reposting: >I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. > >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. > >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. > >I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. > >So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you >think? > >Best > >Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger >Information Law Project >Austrian Institute for Legal Policy > Groundfog(a)alpha.c2.org

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RNG method
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I thought of that for a long time. - Use a microphone on your sound card and locate it close to the computer fan. - generate a (relatively short) set of random number, maybe using the PRNG of the computer. - Use the LSB of the sampled sound, the sampling being done at intervals fixed by the serie of numbers generated by the PRNG. - when the numbers generated by the prng are exausted, re-use part of the output stream as a random source of numbers for the sampling interval. - keep doing this up until: 1) you are fed up of looking at RND numbers on your screen 2) you have no use for rnd numbers anymore 3) your hard disk is full 4) your computer cpu is so mixed up that it starts outputting all your PGP encrypted files in Serbo-Croatian cleartext 5) any other reasons deemed reasonable by the computer operator 6) none of the above Whaddyathink of it? Regards to almost all Cyphering Punksters JFA Please note, my new key signature is: 2048 bits key Id: C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> fingerprint = 52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91 But I'll still use my old key for signing for a while. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMTi0fwOWptJXIUrtAQE2DgP/S8VRX3PbrKHMKl6JJrFvZgZhdhzOk8Am 8qLJzvwjGZ7ll1gZTYT5iLfAEw+03wpy0eS/ohYdlgQ0Xu9AI418uLP6dReQbsjg ndz9/LIaQeOmrZgL1BlAtk9119QmtCdzx59gwwngz1qNYUZNhJ4l10UGz2EWksXI 51Lve+FjKE0= =zdM0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **** OLD KEY: USE ONLY FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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Satellite Movement?
by Blak Dayz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was out buying groceries and after they scanned the shit through they told me that all the ATMs in the City were out due to connection problems. So i go home and start trying to scan for the shits and i cant find them. If anyone knows what the hell happened i would appreciate the details. I believe it may have been a solar flare that caused the companies to redirect their satellites. It would do me alot of help considering i had to pay CASH (i hate paper) for the stuff and i would like to complain to the fucking JPL and satt. operators about them warning the public.

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RE: Petty Civil Disobedience
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jamesd(a)echeque.com Major problem here is that ten million horny geeks are likely to bring your server to its knees, but if one only has one image, and it is moderately small, say thirty thousand bytes, perhaps the flood would taper off eventually. ................................................................................... Here James has stated the crux of the problem in its basic, elementary form. Why cannot legislators, the courts, and all those socially responsible individuals promoting the CDA and their other complaints against indecency recognize the obvious: that the problem of the presence of (and the success of) alarmingly objectionable material on the internet is all due to the existence of all those "ten million horny geeks", who en masse can actually "bring servers to their knees". I think this is a Male vs Male problem, and personally I think the mature and wise men of the world should take the case in hand and deal with it on a Man-to-Man basis. Or, they could just adopt Assassination Politics and do away with all those "other people's" (horny) internet-addicted male children. (Ha-ha. Really, Jim - any "democratic society" where one group elects a governor and another group votes to to shoot that person down sounds more like a Bosnian/Serv "society". It wouldn't make sense to become a member of such a disfunctional, self-defeating group of misfits in the first place.) .. Blanc

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Re: News on RSA vs. Cylink Injunctions and Patents
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:00 PM 3/9/96 -0500, Perry wrote: >> I'm curious, because in the past, as I understand things, RSA has >> said that the DH patent covers El Gamal. If RSA no longer considers >> DH to be a valid patent, that would mean El Gamal is not patent >> encumbered. >It all matters very little to me, as the patents expire next year. Yeah, but that's still a year and a half till they're gone. Having them gone now (for some relatively small value of "now") would be especially pleasant, because we can start totally ignoring them (except for the RSA and Schnorr patents) rather than mostly ignoring them. Unfortunately, the somebody-at-Siemens-in-Paderborn patent on using Diffie-Hellman with hashed shared secrets for authentication is (minimally) good until something like 1994+17, even though it's so obvious to the skilled practitioner that I thought of it independently myself. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281 # "At year's end, however, new government limits on Internet access threatened # to halt the growth of Internet use. [...] Government control of news media # generally continues to depend on self-censorship to regulate political and # social content, but the authorities also consistently penalize those who # exceed the permissable." - US government statement on China...

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Re: FCC Sets Comment Date for Internet Phone Call Rulemaking (fwd)
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Henry Huang wrote: > ------- Start of forwarded message ------- > From: "Neal J. Friedman" <njf(a)commlaw.com>[..] > > The FCC has acted with astonishing speed in setting a date for comments > the ACTA petition to regulate telephone calls via the Internet. It is > uncommon for rule making petitions to sit for weeks, months, even years > without action. ACTA filed its petition on March 6th and two days [..] Odd that I have yet to see this in any business news. Has it made the WSJ, NYT, Bloomberg or TWP? Also odd that the FCC could try to regulate it. Not much they can do if someone outside the US uses IPhone or the like. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMUDveCoZzwIn1bdtAQHRkQF/U9Ypd5hAkoY86fF8e4pW9HLtVVvrRTVz GqxrRoq12MRtfQZqtD5q0u7VY6gJgR3Y =T64o -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Switchboard
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out www.switchboard.com. From the blurb: find people Find friends, colleagues, and old roommates for free. Any time, nationwide. Look up over 90 million names and get fast response to addresses, phone numbers, and personalized updates. Even send email to registered users. find businesses Find over 10 million businesses across the U.S.A. for free. Whether or not they're on the web. Day or night with immediate results. Is this the same data that was supposed to go on that Lotus CD-ROM? Is this publicly available info? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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TCP/IP Stego (was CU-SeeMe)
by Ben Holiday 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me that it would be possible to squeeze one bit of subliminal data into each tcp packet if you were willing to sacrifice a few cpu cycles in the process: A tcp header contains quite a bit of useful information.. but most of it wouldnt be easily manipulated (by me) to get a bit. You cant very well alternate the port number you are using, or change the packet sequence numbers. However, the tcp protocol forces each tcp header to contain a 'checksum' field.. which is (more or less) the sum of all the octets in the packet. This is used as error correction for the protocol. It shouldn't be too difficult to force TCP to fiddle with the data in the packet a bit to force the checksum to be a particular sort of thing (i.e. even or odd number) .. 0 for even and 1 for odd would get us our one bit of data per packet. I may be wrong, but im pretty certain that you could hack your client (an ftp client would be a good choice since it can easily be made to receive vast numbers of packets without attracting attention) and leave the basic tcp/ip stack untouched. If your client figured out what sort of packet needed to be sent to get the right bit before passing it to the tcp stack then voila you have a subliminal channel. Of course there are alot of other ways to go about it, im sure.. Benji

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Re: Leahy's guillotine
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: > Let's look at the word "willfully". Among other things, it implies > knowledge; under US law, to be guilty you have to know you did something > that you at least reasonably believe is an activity that you're not supposed > to do. Agreed, but it's precisely the sort of thing that is misinterpreted by prosecutors and has to be resolved by a judge after a potentially long stay in prison whilst awaiting trial. (All depending on circumstances of course). Too close for comfort I'm afraid. Jim Bell wrote: > 2804. Unlawful use of encryption to obstruct justice > Whoever willfully endeavors (by means of encryption) to (obstruct, > impede, or prevent) the communication of (information in furtherance > to a felony) (which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States), > to an investigative or law enforcement officer shall... I think the following is a tad better: Whoever willfully endeavors (by means of encryption) to (obstruct, impede, or prevent) the communication of information (in furtherance to a felony (which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States)), to an investigative (or law enforcement) officer shall... Gary -- pub 1024/C001D00D 1996/01/22 Gary Howland <gary(a)kampai.euronet.nl> Key fingerprint = 0C FB 60 61 4D 3B 24 7D 1C 89 1D BE 1F EE 09 06

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Re: Cryptanalysis
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >The usual: Kahn, Denning, and some of the old Dover Press books on crypto. >Also, Herbert Zim wrote a nice little book about 40-50 years ago on codes. >Some of the standard crypto textbooks will of course have more pointers to >cryptanalysis. (Not to sound harsh to Allen, but why would anyone ask here >on the list for recommendations to such a standard subject when Schneier, >Garfinkel, Denning, etc. all have books listed?) Thanks, I'll check. I don't happen to _have_ a copy of Applied Cryptography, etcetera, immediately available, and I had gotten the impression that those concentrated on cyphers as opposed to codes. >And there are so many interesting areas to pursue with using and furthering >modern crypto, that I just can't understand how people can think that >classical cryptanalysis is useful. It might be fun, as a hobby, but it has >no bearing on modern systems. (Well, I'm exaggerating a bit. I suspect that >classical cryptanalysts at the NSA or GCHQ might have some insights into >some problems with modern systems, such as traffic analysis. So I shouldn't >say there is "no use" for it. But I hope you all understand my point in >general. It is unlikely in the extreme that anyone who fools around a >little with classical cryptanalysis will have anything important to >contribute as a result of this.) I never said I was interested in putting stuff about codes into practical usage. Actually, I'm a roleplaying gamer, and I wanted the info for historical settings. True codes appear to be the historical equivalent of OTPs. -Allen

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