- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: "----- Message body suppressed -----"
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: alano(a)teleport.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Aug 23 22:43:00 1996 I just got 17 more in the last 30 minutes. They appear to match messages delivered already as per sender, subject and time. The only common issue I see it toad. I have copied a set below. - ------------ FULL Message Return-Path: cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by infinity.c2.org (8.7.4/8.6.9) with ESMTP Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id GAA15937 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 06:57:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from big.aa.net (root(a)big.aa.net [204.157.220.2]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id GAA15932 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 06:57:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fozzy.aa.net (moon-c24.aa.net [204.157.220.124]) by big.aa.net (8.7/8.7.5) with SMTP id GAA06741 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 06:57:16 -0700 X-UIDL: 840751255.041 X-Intended-For: <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> From: blane(a)aa.net (Brian C. Lane) To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: SpamBot Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 13:56:22 GMT Organization: Nexus Computing Reply-To: blane(a)aa.net Message-ID: <321c65db.721494(a)mail.aa.net> X-Mailer: Forte Agent .99e/16.227 Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Well, with all the other noise in the list lately, I'll add a little of my own. I woke up today to find my mailbox filled with 20 messages from a 'careernetonline.com' offering to spread my resume across the net for $60. It was one of those terrorist spams where they apologize for wasting your time and tell you that you can stop getting spammed by replying to the message. Well, I really hate giving in to terrorists, no matter what form they take. And I'm sick and tired of spam. So, I'm starting a project called SpamBot. You feed it a message and a list of addresses and the bot send the message to those addresses until they reply with an appropriate message indicating that they are at least looking into the problem. Some people may say that this is sinking to their level. So it is, but I think its time that system administrators realized that there are people who don't appreciate being the target for shotgun marketing schemes (none of which have been of any use to me). Watch my webpage for more info on this helpful little bot. Brian - ------- <blane(a)aa.net> -------------------- <http://www.aa.net/~blane> - ------- "Extremism in the defense of Liberty is no vice" - B. Goldwater ============== 11 99 3D DB 63 4D 0B 22 15 DC 5A 12 71 DE EE 36 ============ - --------- SUPPRESED Message Return-Path: cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by infinity.c2.org (8.7.4/8.6.9) with ESMTP Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id TAA20706 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 19:20:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from littlewing.mcom.com (h-205-217-255-33.netscape.com [205.217.255.33]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id TAA20700 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 19:20:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from root@localhost) by littlewing.mcom.com (8.7.3/8.7.3) id TAA08776; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 19:23:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from maleman.mcom.com (maleman.mcom.com [198.93.92.3]) by tera.mcom.com (8.6.12/8.6.9) with ESMTP id GAA13912 for <mcom.list.cypherpunks(a)tera.mcom.com>; Fri, 23 Aug 1996 06:51:48 -0700 Received: from ns.netscape.com (ns.netscape.com.mcom.com [198.95.251.10]) by maleman.mcom.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id HAA11324; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 07:24:22 -0700 Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by ns.netscape.com (8.7.3/8.7.3) with ESMTP id HAA08688; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 07:23:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id GAA15937 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 06:57:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from big.aa.net (root(a)big.aa.net [204.157.220.2]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id GAA15932 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 06:57:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fozzy.aa.net (moon-c24.aa.net [204.157.220.124]) by big.aa.net (8.7/8.7.5) with SMTP id GAA06741 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Thu, 22 Aug 1996 06:57:16 -0700 X-UIDL: 840854011.002 X-Intended-For: <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> From: blane(a)aa.net (Brian C. Lane) To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: SpamBot Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 13:56:22 GMT Organization: Nexus Computing Reply-To: blane(a)aa.net Message-ID: <321c65db.721494(a)mail.aa.net> X-Mailer: Forte Agent .99e/16.227 Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk ----- Message body suppressed ----- - --GAA13919.840808533/tera.mcom.com-- > At 06:25 PM 8/23/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > >At 1:10 AM 8/21/96, Skip wrote: > >> ----- Message body suppressed ----- > >> > > > > > >Sounds good to me. Keep it up. > > It looks like an internal mailing list version of Cypherpunks at > Netscape is > feeding back into the regular list with weird results. > > --- > | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD. - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com > "| > |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: > | > | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man > | > |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the > keyboard.| > | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com > | > > > Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMh56UctPRTNbb5z9AQFi4Qf9HKkx+OBM4CdgkIsZvWRsiJ8PDR/TCzai 5vjLUFuDG2462VRHV5onGQ4KZo7XwnyGsjdAgUrx3XzXcXAbKyA3luDOkM5C/8Vk YRBO3pLnCCBUB+54QVt65QgjMZ6JtuCuUZO3ntwwUL9Wde/Y1v0nmHXmuZZE++v3 tyrWrfDRh1aEuwGNjNcEEFQ9ZUEsM/y5RCvVlD/4VyvWSUvDejGItMnIbMWICs2j jt48NNiMK3uU4A5bLDbonzgn4f6n21wF62AJwkAf3UB0DMwJ9DLz2isfOUe50B3h FPw1FZqPvdOz5BV61bKcx2ABU5GZDEe+ZBZ5zdFZ7Xl7JaQbg46CYg== =uBW8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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EVIL GUVMINT suppresses our mailing list. message bodies are truncated. we can circumvent the looming censorship if we compose our messages such that all the text goes into the Subject: lines. Please use only subjects to transmit your views. Thank you.
by maintains 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

- - - MESAGE BODY SUPPRESED _ _ _ - - -

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Re: Spamming
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The advertizers in printed & broadcast media exercise a great deal of control > over the content. E.g., a magazine that gets revenues from tobacco ads isn't > likely to run a story about tobacco companies trying to addict kids. That's > why you see more anti-tobacco content in broadcast media (who can't run > tobacco ads) than in printed media. (And there are cross-ownership > restrictions.) This can be true to certain extent. But if the mag doesn't maintain objectivity, it will kill itself slowly. Same is true of broadcast media. Vipul

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BioInfoWarFare? / Re: sorry
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark Hedges wrote: > > *sigh* actually, that wasn't bad english, it was just accidental > >html email....i didn't realize netscape would do that and i apologize. > >ooooooooooooooooo > >colin the feeling that its > > cjm1(a)execpc.com all a lot of oysters > >maroney and no pearls. > >ooooooooooooooooo > > It's 'it's', not 'its'. > > Good English does not coherence generate. Sounds like a biological agraphia warfare attack, followed by a logic bomb... Hhmmm...I smell a Platypus?

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Hackworth
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AN AMBUSHED MARINE Have a look at the following. A loyal, heroic Marine is being fed to the sharks. A letter to your congress person and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with an info copy to your local newspaper, would help. For those who might want to help a good Marine financially he would be forever grateful. Tim Witham Legal Defense Fund c/o Robert Ferris Box 538 Jacksonville, NC 28541 SEMPER FI and perhaps the top brass in the Corps should refresh themselves as to what this wonderful expression means. Hack 14, March 16, 1998 NATION: "Criminal Injustice?" To judge from his military paper trail, Marine Sergeant Timothy Witham, a 33-year-old Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialist, is the embodiment of the Corps. A veteran of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Witham has also served with distinction in Somalia. Superlatives suffuse his service record: "Sergeant Withams professional achievement, initiative and loyal dedication to duty reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service," declared Lt. Colonel G.C. Cutchall in a citation issued when Witham received the Navy Achievement Medal. In a letter endorsing Withams application to become a Warrant Officer Candidate, Lieutenant Colonel E.M. Smith, his former commanding officer at North Carolinas Cherry Point Marine facility, praised Withams "seasoned leadership high degree of maturity poise, understanding and tact." In addition to his military service, Witham has also excelled in joint projects with civilian agencies, according to Smith: "He has established a tremendous rapport with outside agencies such as the FBI, various ATF state bureaus, Secret Service, DEA and other police agencies." Withams dossier includes a certificate of appreciation from the Secret Service for his work as part of a presidential security detail at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. He was also entrusted with similar security responsibilities during the 1994 Middle East peace talks and the UNs 50th anniversary in 1995. Abrupt Change of Heart Noting that Witham is "loyal, displays sound judgment, and is exceptionally reliable and trustworthy," Lt. Col. Smith recommended his application "with utmost enthusiasm." Withams current commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Ayala of Marine Wing Support Squadron 271, offered a similarly glowing endorsement last September. "[Witham] leads from the front. Superior knowledge of the EOD field. Can handle any mission and looks forward to challenging assignments," declared Ayala. "[Witham is a] true asset to his section and to this Squadron. His knowledge and expertise would make [him] an outstanding candidate for the warrant officer program." However, Ayalas opinion of Witham underwent an abrupt change just a few weeks later. "SSgt. [Staff Sergeant] Witham has proven that he is a threat to the good order and discipline of the Squadron and the U.S. Marine Corps," insisted Ayala in an October 17th memo. Ayalas radical reevaluation of Witham followed the October 16th arrest of Witham and five other Marines as a result of "Operation Longfuse," a 16-month joint sting operation conducted by the FBI, the ATF, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Witham found himself accused of "transporting a loaded weapon on base; conspiracy to commit larceny; larceny of military explosives, equipment, and firearms; wrongful disposition of military property; receiving stolen property; [and] federal firearms and explosives violations under the Federal Assimilated Crimes Act." Upon his arrest, Witham was designated "a flight risk," which led Ayala to support "continued confinement" until his pre-trial hearing which turned out to be a 79-day jail term. "Lesser forms of restraint would be inadequate to insure that he would appear at his hearing and court-martial," insisted Ayala. "This is not the first time that SSgt Witham has been involved in this type of incident." Curiously, in the same memo, Ayala noted that there had never been any previous disciplinary action taken against Witham which would suggest a serious delinquency on the part of his superiors if Witham had indeed been "involved in this type of incident" on earlier occasions. Just as curious is the fact that Form 1070 in Sergeant Withams personal file, which lists "offenses and punishments," is entirely blank. Literally in a single day, a model Marine with an unblemished record was transmuted into a felonious arms smuggler whose motivations were equal parts greed and radical "anti-government" views. Federal and military investigators have yet to find a particle of material evidence to prove that Sergeant Witham is the criminal they describe; their case depends entirely upon the testimony of three eminently impeachable witnesses a twice-convicted perjurer, a civilian ex-convict, and an ex-Marine of dubious integrity who served as a "confidential informant" for the feds during the undercover operation. Two of the witnesses peddled their testimony against Witham in exchange for lighter sentences. The "confidential informant" made an even better deal: He arranged for complete immunity before beginning his undercover work, and since October 17th he has been taken into the witness protection program. Last September, Staff Sergeant Timothy Witham was chosen from 20 very qualified candidates to become a Warrant Officer; now, after spending 79 days in jail, he faces the prospect of an April court-martial. Robert Ferris, a retired Marine officer and former commanding officer to Witham, told The New American: "I spent 24 years in the military, in the Army and Marines, and Ive never seen an abuse of power to compare with the treatment of this young man. He should be at Quantico going to school to become a Warrant Officer, and yet hes exhausting his life savings and seeing his career destroyed because the feds need to convict somebody to make a political point." The "political point" being made in the case of Tim Witham appears to be that mere suspicion of "anti-government" views is enough to destroy the career of a model military man. Extremist Spin The "Longfuse" investigation cast a net across several states, pursuing leads as far south as North Carolina and as far north as Massachusetts. Fourteen suspects were arrested on October 17th eight civilians and six Marines, including four stationed at Camp Lejune. Over the course of a year and a half, undercover investigators, focusing their efforts on gun shows, military bases, and gun dealers throughout the southeast, had purchased an estimated 150 pounds of plastic explosives, grenades, grenade launchers, shoulder-launched rockets, a handful of anti-personnel mines, and more than 50 machine guns. In the post-Oklahoma City bombing environment, the preferred spin of federal investigators was entirely predictable. Robert Ferris, who is now Withams next-door neighbor, was a witness on Withams behalf at two preliminary hearings: the "Magistrates hearing," which is held to determine if pre-trial confinement is necessary; and an "Article 32" hearing, which is the military equivalent of a grand jury. "The first thing out of the mouth of [military prosecutor] Captain [Michael] Richardson was Ruby Ridge," Ferris recalls. "They insisted that Tim was part of a ring of anti-government radicals who were stealing weapons and had sworn not to let the feds take them alive." Thus was Witham identified as part of the ubiquitous menace of "right-wing extremism." Initial press coverage of the "Operation Longfuse" arrests played up the alleged "anti-government" angle, and the feds did their best to abet such speculation at least in the beginning. "Federal agents seized truckloads of stolen military and civilian weapons yesterday in an expanding investigation into the theft and sale of machine guns, grenades and plastic explosives," screamed the October 18th Baltimore Sun. The paper reported that an anonymous investigator portentously warned that some of the civilian suspects arrested "have ties potentially to militia groups." The Raleigh, North Carolina News and Observer carried a similar warning: "A top official said he could not rule out the possibility that anti-government extremists were connected to the theft of military ordnance from Camp Lejune." "These are weapons that are of military use, very lethal weapons, and they were weapons that were in the wrong hands," fretted Treasury Department spokesman Jim Johnson at an October 17th press conference. "Thats the sort of thing all citizens should be concerned about." Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon added the disturbing observation that "C-4 was taken, which is highly dangerous and used by terrorists." For those who missed the message, the Dallas Morning News offered a useful summary: "Concern over the theft of high explosives has increased in military circles along with a broader anxiety about domestic terrorism, especially in the aftermath of incidents such as the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building." The "right-wing menace" is the medias favorite enemy, and ATF officials were careful to drop tantalizing hints that "Operation Longfuse" had uncovered something big. "You could outfit a small army with what weve recovered," claimed ATF special agent Mark Logan. ATF spokesman Earl Woodham primed the press for further dramatic developments: "The investigation has really just begun. Its like we just hit the base of an oak tree, and if we follow it up, we may find that it branches out very wide." Dubious Informant The man who planted the acorn that grew into the ATFs "oak tree" is a former Marine sergeant who had served as an EOD specialist with several of the arrested suspects. In early 1996, this sergeant reportedly instigated "Operation Longfuse" when he approached authorities at Camp Lejune to warn them that weapons and explosives were being stolen and sold at gun shows and gun dealerships. That his motives werent purely idealistic is suggested by the fact that he was careful to get complete immunity before taking an assignment as a paid confidential informant (CI). For the next year and a half, the CI worked numerous stings against Marines and civilian gun enthusiasts. The feds deployed other undercover assets as part of "Longfuse" and tried to tailor stings to the psychology of the suspects. In the case of Thomas Crawford, a Marine captain stationed in Massachusetts who was among those arrested on October 17th, the undercover agents reportedly posed as intelligence specialists who sought arms and explosives for deniable missions in Latin America "an Oliver North-type black ops project," according to one source. In the case of a second Marine sergeant who was caught in the sting and who became the second witness against Witham undercover feds reportedly posed as organized crime figures. "[The second Marine sergeant] wasnt going anywhere in the Corps," Sergeant Witham asserted to The New American. "He was consistently denied promotions; you might say he has more pass-overs than a satellite. I suspect that he had a real need to feel important, and the undercover agents were happy to feed his ego." From information made available during legal discovery, Witham relates, the second Marine "got involved in long drunken discussions with the undercover people in which he claimed to have been involved in all kinds of crimes, including at least one murder. He supposedly helped kill a guy and then disposed of the body with a woodchipper. Strangely, though, the prosecution didnt follow up on that particular story." The feds were willing to give credence to the second Marines alcohol-aided claims about Witham, which were covertly recorded. "They initially used those drunken boasts to make three charges against me," Witham recalls. "The first was that I had been involved in the theft of washing machines, dryers, and other appliances, as well as drywall and other things of that nature. The second was that I had been involved in forgery, and the third was that I had been involved in the theft of explosives. The prosecution dropped the first two charges but has stuck with the third." How credible is the second Marine as a witness? According to local press reports in North Carolina, he has twice pled guilty to perjury. Furthermore, he faced accumulated prison terms of up to 380 years on charges arising from "Longfuse" and reportedly made a deal with the prosecution in which he could peddle his testimony against others for a total of 12 years in prison with the possibility of parole after four. The third witness against Witham has served a prison term on firearms-related charges. He also reportedly made a deal for his testimony in a previous weapons theft case involving Army personnel. Casting a Large Net Given his own solid military background, and the dubious background of the witnesses against him, how did Sergeant Witham get entangled in this mess? Attorney Vaughn Taylor, who has acted as Withams legal counsel, believes that the sergeant was "caught in a very large casting net" thrown out by federal investigators. "There were two things that the government found very significant," Taylor related to The New American. "First, they were looking for people who had worked with Captain Crawford in EOD; secondly, they were looking at gun shows and people who did business at them. Of course, these two facts dont add up to a case, particularly when the suspect is someone like Tim Witham. As far as his military career is concerned, Witham all but walks on water; its impossible to imagine someone farther from the person described in these charges." Nor were the feds able to develop a material case against Witham. On October 17th, agents from the ATF and NCIS conducted a search of Withams home in Jacksonville, North Carolina; this included an examination of an adjoining building from which Witham, a federally licensed firearms dealer, sold guns and related merchandise. The October 20th "Report of Investigation" filed by special agent John S. Corpening of the ATFs Wilmington, North Carolina field office noted that "no machine guns or prohibited weapons were found" during the search of Withams home and business. The report did note that Witham was in possession of a stolen Ruger pistol. The gun had been brought to Witham for repairs; when he ran a check on its serial number, he learned that it was a stolen weapon, and informed the ATF. As instructed, Witham logged the stolen weapon in his Acquisition and Disposition record, and held it on behalf of the ATF. "Strangely, the ATFs search of my home was conducted, in part, by students of mine," Witham informed The New American. "For about three years Ive been involved with some of them in a drug interdiction program, so they knew me well before all of this." (Witham has also helped train ATF and FBI personnel in explosives disposal.) Despite the effort on the part of NCIS investigators and Marine officials to depict Witham as a danger to public order, the ATF did not seek revocation of his federal firearms license. "Even though I was in jail for 79 days and face court-martial, my firearms license is still active, and my inventory is still intact," observes Witham. "If I had done all of the things Ive been accused of, or any of them, would the ATF have left me with my weapons?" On December 19th, Major Robert Brubaker, the Judge Advocate General investigator who presided over Withams "Article 32" investigation, filed his report, which once again noted Withams sterling record and the poverty of the case against him. "Evidence was presented demonstrating that SSgt. Withams military character up to this point has been excellent," Brubaker pointed out. "He has a clean, in fact quite distinguished, service record." For a man identified as a "flight risk," Witham displayed little inclination to escape when presented with the opportunity. Brubaker noted that the "chasers" the MPs assigned to watch Witham were quite inept. "To say that their supervision of their charge was loose would be an understatement," reported the investigator. "I observed a couple of occasions when SSgt. Witham was alone without the chasers in sight. There was one occasion when SSgt. Witham himself tracked down his chasers to tell them he was going somewhere and they needed to be with him. To me, this rather strongly cuts against any argument that he is a serious flight risk." While Brubaker stated that "there probably is sufficient evidence to send the case to a court-martial," he also took note of the fact that "the government seems to be relying quite heavily on the statements of two witnesses of questionable integrity" to make its case against Witham. (Since that time a third witness has also offered to testify against Witham.) Abuse of Power It is possible that Withams impeccable service record belies his involvement in the felonious theft of military weapons and explosives. However, it is at least as likely that he is merely an exemplary serviceman who has been traduced by perjured statements offered in exchange for special prosecutorial considerations. His case serves as a precautionary tale about the federal governments increasing reliance upon paid undercover informants, especially in firearms-related investigations and other forms of covert operations against the "radical right." In his book Deadly Force, law enforcement analyst Carsen Stroud points out that in 1994 the Justice Department budgeted $100 million to spend on confidential informants, many of them involved in "quasi-criminal or actively criminal" enterprises. Also significant is the potential impact on military morale should Sergeant Witham prove to be the innocent victim of a politically motivated abuse of prosecutorial power. "I love the Marine Corps and have great respect for our federal law enforcement agencies," declares Robert Ferris, who was himself a respected field-grade commander. "But what is being done to Tim is simply wrong; its an abuse of power by corrupt and ambitious people who are, by God, going to get a conviction, whatever it takes to do so. In nearly a quarter-century of military service Ive never seen a comparable abuse of power." William Norman Grigg *************************************** Visit our home page at: http://www.hackworth.com Sign up for the free weekly Defending America newsletter on our website Snail mail to: P.O. Box 430 Whitefish, MT. 59937

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blah PGP/Remailers in the News!
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's an EXCELLENT column on PGP and remailers: Roadside Attractions Along the Information Highway by Dave Farrell [roadside(a)branch.com] Your e-mail doesn't have to be for everyone's eyes Sending e-mail over the Internet can be a very convenient and efficient way to communicate. If things are working right, you can dash off a memo to a friend or colleague halfway across the world and they'll receive it within minutes. (On the other hand, I've sent off important e-mail messages into cyberspace never to hear from them again, but that's another column.) A big drawback of the e-mail, however, is that it is not private. In fact, it's a lot like mailing a postcard to a friend. Just as a lot of people handle your postcard before it gets to its final destination, your e-email mesages pass through a lot of computers before they land in the recipient's in-box. In both cases, there are plenty of opportunites for people to read your messages before they get where they're going. You may not care if someone reads the bean dip recipe you're sending to your Aunt Clara, but sensitive monthly sales reports you're emailing to your boss might be another story. While there's no way to absolutely guarantee e-mail privacy on the Net, there is a fairly simple way to make it extremely hard for prying eyes to read your messages. It's called encryption, and there's a couple of good programs available that can teach you how to encode your messages. Encryption basically involves scrambling your outgoing messages to make them unintelligible. The recipient then unscrambles them on the receiving end, converting them back into plain English. There are several encryption programs available on the Internet. I recommend you try PGP, which stands for Pretty Good Privacy. You can download a free copy of PGP from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Web site: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html. Of course, PGP works only if you take the time to use it. To make that process easier, you should download a copy of Private Idaho, a free program that will make using PGP a point-and-click process. Private Idaho also will enable you to post anonymously to Usenet Newsgroups and do other neat tricks, such as anonymously access Web sites with your browser (you did know that you leave electronic "mouse tracks" when you visit Web sites, didn't you?) You can download a copy of Private Idaho from http://www.eskimo.com/(tilde)joelm. [retypist's note: yes, the article had "(tilde)" in place of "~"] Unfortunately for Mac users, Private Idaho is available only for Windows. If you really want to increase your Internet privacy, you might want to consider using anonymous remailers to send and receive your messages. These remailers strip your messages of your reutrn address and allow you to send e-mail that can't be easily traced back to you. There are many reamilers on the Net. Some are free, some charge. For a nice list to choose from, surf over to: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/(tilde)raph/remailer-list.html. If you're REALLY paranoid about hiding your electronic tracks, you can send your message through several anonymous remailers, which will obscure your identity over and over again. To learn more about this process, check out http://www.replay.com/staff/usura/chain.html. To save some time typing in the addresses of all the remailers you want to use, try the Community ConneXion at: http://www.c2.org/remail/by-www.html. This site will allow you to point-and-click your way through the process of selecting remailers and sending your messages. Finally, for more information about on-line privacy, visit the Electronic Privacy Information Center: http://www.epic.org.

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[NOISE]Mangled messages
by Derek Bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I did a quick count and found 35 messages that have been mangled today. Fortunately, the last message I got wasn't mangled. Hopefully this is the end of the problem. Derek

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Re:
by Sean Sutherland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat Aug 24 19:00:18 1996 > Does anybody know what I can get for generating the credit card > numbers? > And they say there's hope for the youth of America. - --- Sean Sutherland | GCS/C d- s+:+ a--- C+++ V--- P L E- W++ N++ K w o PGP Key ID: E43E6489 | O-(++) M-- V PS+ PE++ Y PGP++ t--- 5+++ X++ R b++ Vote Harry Browne '96 | DI+ D+ G e- h! !r y -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Key: finger or email w/ 'send key' in subj. http://www2.interconnect.net/maverick iQEVAwUBMh+Xk1ZoKRrkPmSJAQGj+Af8C2P7D+3ZZ4f8h76+6UfdgqEubOO0mkWj 2DazxBMuY1b1sx1G6gaIGR9Tc11vIcoCY3pmBzhBW7Nc6do8gfOK8Bkkon6Pck1g 61tCFH6qPb2bSH0HnbzjrXJhRD6dFv9ondTtyZgiFIeMuVDDIx4+ZKvelL6BHk8x o6sLdY4Y/Nmnvz9HXrBj0DaYR8pcY96+dexwj5luvcgVkdsDjghWXZy/mHkeDXMI bvOuUOMLQyExS0Ts4D5K4/XfIhP0HUiPfdeL9oxONcLUYznywxAUevBMfHceqvsS qFnxcDcyHa8ynHLRH9Qg0t5QuKVUvTpZh3YjPXCF9QKwvIFbZukHKw== =e03n -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Apple crypto engineer position available
by Anonymous Sender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PGP cut the gordian knot and demonstrated that it was _possible_ >to have a successful PKI application without a CA. But that is not >to say that a trusted third party cannot add value to an >application. PGP validated PKI generally but it did not invalidate >the CA concept - in the PGP system everyone is a trust provider, >everyone is in that sense a CA. PGP did in fact invalidate CA concept, very successfully. There is a world of difference between "everyone is a trust provider" and several centralized CAs. Authentication is an essential part of security. If one assumes wrong who she is talking to then all "strong crypto" used is irrelevant, since the middleman is browsing the plaintext. If there is a need, CA customers will be given middleman's keys and all traffic will be systematically captured, re-encrypted and forwarded to the intended recipient for as long as required. Maybe even keys with the same hash (id) can be generated to pass the verification. What percentage of users would do the non-automated, manual check anyway ? If trusting a secret key to escrowing entity (GAK) is a bad deal, how is trusting someone's identity to CA any different ? In both cases security is deposited with an organization that can be influenced in any number of ways. The CA concept does not work because security and privacy are inherently individual, and any forced insertion of third parties in the process is bound to miserably fail. The Fool

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The Great Internet Bandwidth Crisis
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me that the chief impediment standing in the way of the Internet becoming a propaganda and marketing tool suitable for use and control by a few rich and powerful business entities is the comparatively inexpensive and easy access of millions of users to the same technologies available to megacorporations. History itself leads me to suspect that the money and power moguls will use a variety of real and imaginary issues to place greater monetary burdens and access restrictions on many aspects of the Internet and Web, particularly those that have commercial potential. A current example is the attempt by various Telecos to raise the cost of access for other businesses, citing alleged burdens placed on their resources by ISPs at the same time that they are scrambling to enter the same market by undercutting their competitors. The Great Teleco Resource Crisis will undoubtedly be mirrored at some point in the future by the Great Internet Bandwidth Crisis. I suspect that although it will be as bogus as the Telecos' current imaginary crisis, it will come at a time when the major players have divided up enough of the infrastructure pie among themselves to be unanimous in their nod-and-wink agreement as to the severity of the crisis. Undoubtedly, this will be just one of a variety of crisis in which will require restrictive legislation and cost-increasing regulations that will save bandwidth for future children and protect adult citizens from the extreme danger of engaging in commerce with other average adult citizens such as themselves. It seems to me that the *only* way that the Internet can be kept from being used as just another tool for herding the masses into larger and more efficient feeding pens is to enable and empower the citizens to freely and safely control their own financial and commercial destiny in their Internet transactions. The more accessible and widespread the control over one-to-one monetary transactions, the more difficult it will be for a few entities to lead the citizens around by financial rings run through their noses. The government currently has a variety of budgetary axes held over the heads of the citizens, such as federal funding and grants in which money taken away from the citizens is returned to them on a statewide, local or individual basis only upon conditions that involve giving up rights and liberties that are due them. In order to resist being herded by a myriad of legal, licensing and regulatory 'axes' into increasingly global feeding pens, the citizens will need access to tools which allow secure financial transactions with differing levels of identity versus anonymity available to them. The reason that major business has not yet been able to divide up the financial pie available through the Internet is the excessive amount of resources that they need in order to compete for the attention of Internet users, given that average citizens are providing equal or better information and services for free or for a low cost. The sooner that the masses are able to engage in free commerce with one another via the Internet--whether it be giving Grandma Jones a dollar for her cookie recipies, or engaging a student across the continent in private research in return for money, for goods or for services--then the sooner the masses will scream loud and long when government or corporate entities threaten to take this ability to be self-sufficient away from them. Those who wish to circumvent the loss of privacy, liberty and freedom that they forsee as being possible on the Internet need to realize that most of those who are not currently empowered to manifest those possibilities in their individual life will little recognize or protest the 'present' loss of those 'future' possibilities. Unless there is a widespread dissemination of working tools accessible to the average citizen, then the future will be controlled by those with the funds and resources to limit financial transactions on the Internet to a self-defined 'way things are.' "Teach a man to buy his fish from you, and you'll feed yourself for a lifetime."

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