- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

No Subject
by Luckey Promotions 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<HTML><PRE><BODY BGCOLOR="#000000"><FONT COLOR="#00FFFF" SIZE=3> Mothers day, Mothers day. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOW IS YOUR CHANCE TO WIN THE PRIZE BELOW --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prize, A 9ct Gold diamond set heart shaped pendant with 18inch chain. Also a luxury bouquet of flowers along with a box of Belgium chocolates. Make your mums day special. To enter answer the question below. On which day of the week is Mothers Day? Now Simply Call The Number Below 0991 118801 The winner will be the first correct entry drawn at random by 11am on Friday 20th March 1998. This competition is promoted by Luckey Promotions. 333a Licoln Road Peterborough Cambs PE1 2PF. The closing date for the competition will be Friday 20th March 1998 at 10am. There will be one winner who will be the first correct entry drawn from the sack. The winner will be notified by phone on the 20th March 1998 between 11am-5pm. Please ask permission from the person who pays the telephone bill before calling. Calls cost £1.00 per minute Maximum cost of call £3:00 Minimum age to enter competition 18 years of age . Open to U.K residents only. The winners information can be obtained by calling 0181 2364221 To delete your e mail address from our database please inform via mail to the address above. </FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=3>

1 0

The DES Analytic Crack Project
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As some of you may have noticed, a new attempt to crack the Data Encryption Standard has been started, with a descriptive FAQ located at the following URL http://www.cyberspace.org/~enoch/crakfaq.html A while back, after the first DES challenge was announced, a number of us made the observation that a known plaintext attack on DES, expressed as a system of a few thousand boolean variables with constraints in 3-conjunctive normal form, was not too far from the size and complexity of problems that could be directly solved by bleeding edge combinatorial algorithms, albeit with signficant CPU and memory consumption. We thought this would be an interesting result, and generated a number of problems of various numbers of DES rounds based on the DES Challenge data, and some not particularly optimized S-Box representations, and set about the task of solving them, smaller problems first. We wrote a lot of code, learned a lot about arbitrary systems of boolean variables, and after breaking 2-round and 4-round problems, the first almost instantly, and the second with very reasonable amounts of resources, set about the task of seeing if we could break the higher round problems, and immortalize ourselves by beating DESCHALL to the key. To our very great regret, we did not manage to do this, and once the $10k prize was claimed, we figured the game was over and returned to working on other things. We still thought DES was a problem of approximately the right size to demonstrate the existence of an analytical solution which would beat a well-tuned exhaustive search on a problem of practical interest. Since that time, DES has been broken twice more by exhaustive search, once by distributed.net, and again by a hardware DES cracking machine designed by Net legend John Gilmore and the EFF for a non-trivial amount of money. Remarkably, although most agree DES is dead for new applications, with Moore's Law and additional hardware crackers being possible today for much less than the cost of the prototype, it still seems to enjoy a reputation amongst the public as a cipher that takes 20,000 pentiums running for half a month or a hardware box with $100k of chips running for several days to break, neither of which seems to have thrown the Fear of God into its current users, most notably the Banking Industry. With other analytic attacks like differential and linear cryptanalysis being really practical only for reduced round DES, and all current high-profile cracks on production ciphers employing key trial, the press has latched onto keysize as a synonym for strength, and has made numerous statements which have reinforced this questionable paradigm in the minds of the public. We have therefore been taking another look at our idea of a combinatorial crack of DES, and decided that even with DES having been cracked three times by key trial, it is definitely a project worth doing. This time, rather than working frantically in an unsuccessful attempt to beat other teams on a public challenge, we wish to finish up our original efforts, and repeat the three cracks previously done, this time using our algorithms, and distribute working code continuously as the project progresses, to sponsors who have donated some money to defray our costs. This will offer people the opportunity to participate vicariously in a fun project which has the potential to be a genuine paradigm shift in the way the world thinks about codebreaking. Sometimes, promising areas of research are not followed because of knowlege of some well-known result which suggests that such exploration will be unfruitful. Years ago, for instance, suggestions that programs could be checked by software for proper behavior, and run without using protected memory regions, were usually met with snide comments about the "computer halting problem" and various adjunct results. Today, there are many variants of "safe execution" technology, from prove and carry schemes, to Java bytecode, with a sound theoretical basis behind them. None of these is a violation of the "computer halting problem" results, of course. Similarly, after a large burst of activity decades ago, which resulted in the notion of NP-Completeness, and various results in computational complexity theory, suggestions that an analytic solution exists for some large combinatorial problem of practical interest conjure up visions of exponential resource utilization, speaker cluenessless, and the lack of progress on NP=P. For this reason, we feel this project is definitely a Schnelling Point. If it works, even badly, people will begin to look at lots of problems in ways they would not have considered before, and much new code which improves upon what we have done will be created. This will be an irreversible change in the Order of Things. In the several days since we put up our FAQ, we have gotten quite a few comments, and some concerns. The comments have mostly been along the lines that it is an interesting, even intriguing project. The concerns are generally that we will experience an unexpected "combinatoric explosion" in the higher round problems, and that no one in their right mind would send money to a nym, because it might just vanish and be used by the nym to live in perpetual ecstasy in some place warm and tropical, without the possiblility of the nym being sued for fraud. While we hope the close coupling between the sponsors and the project members will eliminate this latter concern, with weekly progress reports and working code being distributed to permit the sponsors to reproduce our results as they occur. If three people are willing to sponsor and give us the go-ahead to begin, without wanting their money back if other sponsors do not join, we can probably get through the minimal S-Box representations and their proof-of-correctness as well as some cleaned up code for the 2-round problem. Hopefully we will then have a reputation with these people which will encourage others to join in the effort. Clearly, we're after speculative capital, rather than widow and orphan money, and hope a few of the wealthy older retired (and perhaps even crusty) engineer types might find this a productive thing to support. After all, if you've just blown $220,000 on a DES Cracker, making it $220,500 and getting your very own Schnelling Point in return is probably a reasonable amount of fun for your money. I'll stop ranting now. :) -- Sponsor the DES Analytic Crack Project http://www.cyberspace.org/~enoch/crakfaq.html

1 0

Crypto CD UpDate
by Bholiday 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well given the somewhat enthusiastic response to my last post, I think I'll be safe enough in going ahead with plans for the CryptoCD. Thanks to everyone who responded, and I apologize that I can't address each of you individually. Some points... Copyrights: Obviously care will need to be taken to avoid publishing copyrighted materials, or publishing materials in violation of their distribution agreements. More later. Size/Contents/Etc: The media and cost of writing the disks is the same for 50megs as for 500. If I/We can put together 500 megs of content, I will gladly put 500 megs on a CD, however this will honestly require some assistance by the crypto community. Authors: OK, I had a number of authors suggest inclusion of their package on any forthcoming CD. I intend to have several machines hitting the net for aprox. 8-10hours a day over the next few weeks to gather up files for inclusion; however to speed things along it would be really great if authors could MIME or UUE their package and mail it to me, along with a return email address, and preferably a snail-mail address also. If you do send something for inclusion PLEASE include a breif note stating that you give permision to distribute the package as part of the CryptoCD package. If there is a license included in the package already (GNU, etc) you can just state that the package can be distributed according to the included license. I will include ANY package sent to me by an author, provided that space is available, however if the program(s) seem unfamiliar or questionable, I may put them in a Contrib directory with a strong disclaimer. If you ARE NOT a software author, but you think something should be included, send me email (privately, not to the list). Include a URL for the file, or better yet, include the file in MIME or UUE format. Or be really nice and snail-mail it. The first person to send me any particular file or group of files (not a URL) will be duly thanked in a CREDITS file on the CD. This is your chance to be famous for absolutely no reason at all. If you don't want to be famous just say so and I'll forget I ever got email from you. Errata: I'll be putting up a web page in the next few days which will have daily status updates (oh boy) including an LS-lr of the CD-so-far. Once the page is up, you'll want to check it if you are thinking of sending something for inclusion. I NEED URLS! If you know of a great FTP site, Please, send the address to me. I'd like to be able to offer a really comprehensive archive of as much material as possible, at a break-even price. The amount of assistance the people reading this list are willing to provide will be directly impact the quality and quantity of content on the CD, and also how quickly I am able to have the CD available. Any assistance would be truly appreciated. Ben ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Send Mail To: bholiday(a)trader.tlx.net (prefered) bholiday(a)apollo.tlx.net (prefered) ncognito(a)gate.net (bad idea -- remailer and list mail could cause mail to be deleted without being viewed) Gate net has an absolute quota of around 12 megs, so mail sent there may bounce if I get bombarded. Apollo and Trader allow me unlimited space, and are prefered. If you want to be really nice to me, put it on floppy and mail it to me - My Snailmail address is available on request. If you snail-mail materials for inclusion, I'll pay shipping for any CD's you buy.

1 0

[ADMIN] PGP Announce List Update
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Calling All PGP Fanatics! (of varying degrees) <<<<<<<<<<<<<<< ADMINISTRIVIA: The signed message below is what someone sending mail to <pgp-announce-info(a)lsd.com> would eventually see. Please pass it on to your significant others, so to speak. FYI, I'll be in Boston at CFP96 from 26 Mar - 2 Apr, so no list-admin-business will likely get done during that period. Expect more news soon after my return about PGP 3.0 and other exciting developments. [ cue music: "Jaws" theme ] USUAL SUSPECTS WITH PGP ANECDOTES SOUGHT: Anyone who has an anus-clenching anecdote, an amusing remembrance or just an aprocryphal Jonah+Whale-tale about their experiences with PGP is encouraged to send it to <pgp-stories(a)lsd.com> for inclusion in an upcoming anthology (authors will be credited). Now's your chance to recount for all Posterity the adventurous days gone by when you were dropped behind enemy lines (Vienna, VA?) with only a laptop, your trusty educational PGP freeware and your McGyver-esque ingenuity. Do it soon, though if you want your name up in electrons: disk space is limited. ;) dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "The Official PGP Announce List" Greetings. The PGP Announce List is a special-interest mailing list established to distribute first-line, official news and information about PGP (Pretty Good Privacy [tm]) from the development team led by Philip Zimmermann to interested parties worldwide (no cryptographic code is included in any of the posts). Please read the instructions below to join the list. The list is hand-maintained to help ensure that the list is received _only_ by those persons who specifically ask for it and that it contains official information only. All posting is moderated, and includes items about new PGP releases, legal developments, policy and legislative news, related software add-ons and scripts, co-development projects, software updates, domestic (USA/Canada) distribution notes, worldwide developments, etc. If you have an item to submit, do not send it to Phil: send it to <mailto:pgp-announce-owner@lsd.com> Forwarding of pgp-announce is encouraged and appreciated, but you *must* copy the entire message (including any PGP signature blocks) or we'll send lawyers to your door with rubber hoses and bad attitudes. ;) To obtain PGP for your platform (and from your geographic location worldwide) and see what all this darn excitement's about, point your web broswer at this page: <http://www.csn.net/~mpj/getpgp.htm>. When obtaining your copy of PGP, please respect all applicable export restrictions for your safety and the safety of others. For generic PGP questions or help using the software, mail the smiling PGP Help Team volunteers at: <mailto:pgp-help-humans@hks.net> with a well-documented question in something approximating the English language AFTER consulting the documentation that _always_ accompanies a valid PGP release archive. The Help Team will answer any level of PGP question, ranging from crypto-beginners on up to super-paranoid-cypherpunk-developer types. dave PS: Feel free to redirect the instructions below (including the PGP signature) to anyone you know who is interested in news about PGP. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Verbum sapienti satis est. iQCVAwUBMVXBmaHBOF9KrwDlAQERlQQAuob5u5pTYPD/X786hivrZSIzhiYlGLZw Z7hkzXAnRJkvYTcGskq6CFBGVPFjVpM4TvYY0Lkk5nCAHWVosbZH/yfx9qeSfSn7 WscppurpHHPd3CFRGGyROjqttDPl8zTZL4xMZtLCx04yMl5D8bfuHbHvG0tneaju y6xPAddXFv8= =j80g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- INSTRUCTIONS ................................... cut here .................................. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- .................... "How to get ON the PGP Announce List" .................... [1] <mailto:pgp-announce-request@lsd.com> [2] SUBJECT: Your Name <your(a)email.address> / \ UNquoted (") Full name \ Address in <angle-brackets> please, NOT parentheses. The Body should be left EMPTY (as in nothing, zero, null, void). Please don't put the word "subscribe" anywhere in your msg (killfile fodder). People who can't manage to follow these instructions probably shouldn't be trusted with crypto stuff anyway, right? Once a *correctly-formatted* request makes it past the evolutionary-check-filters, the actual subscription process is higher-primate-managed and list membership is updated when announcements are mailed. This list aspires to be the lowest-volume mailing list on the entire Internet, so you will NOT receive instant verification of your subscription (except for the exquisitely rare admin/test msgs and the announcements themselves). If you follow the instructions above EXACTLY, you're subscribed (and if you don't, you're not). Variations (eg. leaving out the <brackets> on the address or letting your auto-signature mechanism get out of control) will cause the bozo-filters to bit-bucket a request automagically. Sending multiple requests accomplishes nothing other than irritating the cage-cleaners. Send banana peels and/or complaints to <mailto:pgp-announce-owner@lsd.com>. SUMMARY: (GOOD/YES/CAN-FOLLOW-DIRECTIONS) TO: pgp-announce-request(a)lsd.com SUBJ: Your Name <your_address> BODY: (BAD/NO/CLUELESS) TO: pgp-announce-request(a)lsd.com SUBJ: Joe Billy Bob Bozo [jbbb(a)cant.read.directions.com} BODY: Howdy! Kin yew SUBSCRIBE me to yer list? I also has a question... .................... "How to get OFF the PGP Announce List" ................... If you wish to REMOVE yourself from the distribution list, or to CHANGE your listed address (which netiquette is greatly appreciated by the minions who shovel the bits and watch the mail-bounce errors collect, BTW), please format your request as follows: (ADDRESS REMOVAL) TO: pgp-announce-request(a)lsd.com SUBJ: REMOVE Your Name <your_address> BODY: (ADDRESS CHANGE) TO: pgp-announce-request(a)lsd.com SUBJ: CHANGE Your_Name <OLD_address> = <NEW_address> BODY: ............................................................................... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Verbum sapienti satis est. iQCVAwUBMVXBZqHBOF9KrwDlAQGvXgP+ISnuRfAvTIrev2EC5ro+8TNIwDMKg2rh 5U+NyHBx8JWESco15phTDm/f7Cm6rVjuzalWrKogfdV/UZCXuMDaYzoYz0IXcm0F Ax4PS6+Yt9cMojV87PP0Y0IVlMn7/s1cQx6em7WqjWeXdII0uZ8Sn3dZL+X4/cAH ECH31ZJ+ceA= =8Y9c -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

NYT on Crypto Issue
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, March 25, 1996, p. D5. The key issue for the Net is not smut, it is the use of encryption Growing fears that Big Brother might decide to read your E-mail. By Denise Caruso The current uproar over the Internet is about smut and what can be made public on the global computer network. But the next public-policy tangle will be about what we're allowed to keep secret. Earlier this month, a bipartisan group from both houses of Congress introduced versions of legislation called the Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996. This bill, which outlines the proper use of encryption technologies for privacy and security, is by far the most critical piece of Internet legislation yet introduced. Encryption uses a mathematical key to scramble and unscramble digital messages so they can be read only by their intended recipients and not by human or electronic snoopers. Legislation about this powerful technology is especially important when viewed in light of two laws already on the books. One of these, the Digital Telephony Act, signed into law in 1994, allows Federal law-enforcement agencies to update the telephone network with the most pervasive surveillance equipment in history. The other, the freshly signed Communications Decency Act, bans "indecent" material from the Internet. It is a law that many legislators seemed to feel was on shaky ground even as Congress was passing it. A constitutional challenge to the law is currently being heard in Federal District Court in Philadelphia. Though the encryption bill as written is receiving qualified support from industry and civil libertarians, some worry that changes made in committee could make the bill too restrictive, completing a triumvirate of Big Brother legislation that would give law enforcement the ability and rationale to monitor all the electronic messages of citizens, leaving little or no recourse for private or secure communication. Such restrictions threaten to suffocate the Internet. As new users and businesses flock daily to the Internet, their need to protect confidential business data and messages becomes a key issue in making the Net safe enough to be useful. Computer security experts say that many of today's problems on the Net -- minors getting access to pornography, security breaches of corporate data, the need to prove one's identity -- could be solved by using encryption. Today, using encryption of any kind is still perfectly legal inside the United States. Historically, it was mostly used to protect secret military communications, so the technology is still classified as munitions -- the same threat to national security as a boatload of artillery shells. Thus any products containing encryption are subject to strict export controls. Law-enforcement and national security officials say that widespread use of strong encryption would enable terrorists and organized-crime syndicates to communicate with impunity. They say export control is the only way to keep this genie in its bottle, at least when it comes to foreign, not domestic crime. In addition, security experts have persuaded the Clinton Administration to propose an encryption method called "key escrow" that would give the Government access to information even after it had been encrypted. Key-escrow systems generate a decrypting key that is held by a trusted third party. When law-enforcement agents show up with a court warrant, the trustee hands over the key to unlock the message. So far, the Clinton Administration's proposals, which include a key-escrow system called Clipper have been universally reviled by both civil libertarians and the computer industry, which claims it stands to be deprived of up to $60 billion annually by the year 2000 because of export controls. They argue that any country today can make and sell encryption products stronger than what can be legally exported from the United States and that people won't use a system like key escrow because it has a built-in security compromise. One defender of key-escrow policy is Dorothy Denning, a professor of computer science at Georgetown University and a consultant to the military industry. She argued in a letter to Senator Patrick J. Leahy Democrat of Vermont -- one of the sponsors of the new legislation -- that such a system was vital to public safety and security. James Barksdale, president of the Netscape Communications Corporation, whose popular Web-browser software has built-in encryption capabilities, called Ms. Denning's solution a "stopgap measure." "Key escrow is an unworkable idea, and we do not support it," Mr. Barksdale said. "Key escrow will be defeated just like Prohibition was defeated by bathtub gin -- all it took was a big bag of sugar and a long weekend." Policy watchdogs like the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, both outspoken advocates for privacy rights and due process, agree that the bill is headed in the right direction. It does not dictate the use of a key escrow system, eases export controls for "mass market" products (like Netscape's), prohibits any restriction on the domestic use or sale of encryption, and provides a "personal use" policy for American travelers who use encryption while outside the country. But the bill is sure to face a fight as it moves through the House and the Senate, and the key-escrow and export-control proponents marshal their experts. David Farber, a professor of computer science at the University of Pennsylvania and a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, says encryption policy always turns into "a religious discussion" between those who fear terrorism and those who want to live without fear of constant surveillance. But, he adds, if you take privacy discussions to the people, their attitudes are pretty clear. " If you ask the American public what they think of national I.D. cards, for example, a huge percentage are opposed to them," he said. "Why? They're not hiding anything. They just don't want the Government to have that type of power." [End]

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> mix cpunk latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono nymrod) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 25 Mar 96 6:46:51 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- replay remailer(a)replay.com *+***-*++*** 8:38 100.00% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org #####*#-*#*# 2:14 100.00% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ************ 9:26 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #-**###*#-## 5:13 99.99% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ---+++++++++ 2:25:16 99.99% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ##***+**-### 5:03 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ++**+++--*** 29:20 99.98% c2 remail(a)c2.org -++++******* 22:36 99.97% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +********++* 24:47 99.97% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net -+#++*-#*### 3:46 99.88% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +*++++**++++ 34:01 99.86% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com ####*###* *# 1:08 99.73% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ----------- 6:14:43 99.64% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org +++++ +++++ 51:14 99.64% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net ***++*++++- 31:12 99.56% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org --.-_____.- 45:37:44 99.50% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org --.._____.- 45:54:23 99.49% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net -------.--- 5:31:19 99.38% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi _.._._.._ 45:39:57 99.03% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *-+##* * ## 24:59 98.83% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net *--++++++- - 3:51:29 98.62% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -++-- ---+++ 4:35:40 98.58% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net *- ++++**** 29:38 98.48% ncognito ncognito(a)gate.net ##* +*#*# # 1:37 98.08% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com * **___.-* 19:25:45 97.30% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com --- ----- - 2:17:13 96.25% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ...+-+--+- 8:02:48 94.13% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Noise Sphere Plotter in C++ (was Re: Noise sphere graphical tests of randomness)
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 23 Mar 1996 22:29:52 GMT, I wrote: >I've got a short program for the PC (w/TPascal source) that plots a >noise sphere from a file of (pseudo) random data, if anyone is >interested. Requires a VGA card that handles mode 5Fh (640 x 480, [..] >The source has a brief explanation of what noise spheres are and a >reference to the Pickover article the program was based on. >The source code is not copyrighted, and it would be nice to see it ported to >other systems, or maybe a portable C version that writes the output to a >PCX file in RBG(?). [I'm not that fluent in C to write one...] [..] BTW, check the ftp.funet.fi site... Somebody sent me a C++ conversion of it. It compiles fine with BCC 4.02. Enclosed here (thanks to "James Pate Williams, Jr." <pate(a)mindspring.com>) /* NOISESPH.PAS, A Noise Sphere plotter written in Turbo Pascal (23-Mar-96) Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> No copyright is claimed. No guarantees made. Usage: noisesph file This program reads a file of random or pseudo-random data and plots a noise sphere of the data. Poor RNGs or sampling methods will show clear patterns (definite splotches or spirals). The theory behind this is to get a set of 3D polar coordinates from the RNG and plot them. An array is kept of the values, which is rotated each time a new byte is read (see the code in the main procedure). Rather than plot one sphere which can be rotated around any axis, it was easier to plot the sphere from three different angles. This program is based on a description from the article below. It was proposed as a means of testing pseudo-RNGs: Pickover, Clifford A. 1995. "Random number generators: pretty good ones are easy to find." The Visual Computer (1005) 11:369-377. */ #include <conio.h> #include <fstream.h> #include <graphics.h> #include <iostream.h> #include <math.h> #include <process.h> struct Cartesian { double x, y, z; unsigned Color; }; struct Polar { double r, theta, phi; }; int MidA, MidB, MidC, MidY, Scale; double ByteToReal(unsigned char b) { /*note that there will be some gaps since we're only using the equivalent of an 8-bit decimal here*/ return b / 256.0; } //Initialize the graphics screen int InitScreen(void) { int GraphMode, GraphDriver; GraphDriver = VGA; GraphMode = VGAHI; detectgraph(&GraphDriver, &GraphMode); initgraph(&GraphDriver, &GraphMode, ""); Scale = getmaxx() / 6; MidA = Scale, MidB = 3 * Scale, MidC = 5 * Scale; MidY = getmaxy() / 2; if (MidY < Scale) Scale = MidY; return graphresult(); } unsigned int ScaleColor(double) { return LIGHTGRAY; } int Round(double x) { return (int) (x + 0.5); } void Plot(struct Cartesian& C) { putpixel(MidA + Round(Scale * C.y), MidY - Round(Scale * C.z), C.Color); putpixel(MidB + Round(Scale * C.x), MidY - Round(Scale * C.y), C.Color); putpixel(MidC + Round(Scale * C.z), MidY - Round(Scale * C.x), C.Color); } void PolarToCartesian(struct Polar P, struct Cartesian& C) { //No rotation was added. Instead we plot from three angles... C.x = P.r * sin(P.phi) * cos(P.theta); C.y = P.r * sin(P.phi) * sin(P.theta); C.z = P.r * cos(P.phi); //We can assign colors based on x, y, z, r, theta / pi or phi / (2 * pi) C.Color = ScaleColor(C.y); } void main(int argc, char* argv[]) { double X[3]; int error, i, n = 0; unsigned char byte; fstream inp; Cartesian C; Polar P; if (argc != 2) { cout << "usage: noisesph filename" << endl; exit(1); } inp.open(argv[1], ios::binary | ios::in); if (!inp) { cout << "*error*\could not open input file" << endl; exit(1); } error = InitScreen(); if (error != grOk) { cout << grapherrormsg(error) << endl; exit(1); } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { inp.get(byte); X[i] = ByteToReal(byte); } do { P.r = sqrt(X[(n + 2) % 3]); P.theta = M_PI * X[(n + 1) % 3]; P.phi = 2 * M_PI * X[n]; PolarToCartesian(P, C); Plot(C); inp.get(byte); X[n] = ByteToReal(byte); n = (n + 1) % 3; } while (!kbhit() && inp); getch(); closegraph(); }

2 1

Re: Zipped Starr Report
by Terry Leininger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>You are all writing about Clinton and Monica et al. Dunno what this does here >but anyway, let me add to the noise: >Is it possible to download the Starr report somewhere, zipped and prepared for >offline reading? Try http://www.angelfire.com/wa/starreport/home.html Couldn't help it...

3 2

signature appl tested by IRS / PR today
by CA20007＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today, on Monday, March 25th, in New York, a British company, Peripheral Vision Ltd., is demonstrating their technology for recording signatures electronically. The company is also launching a subsidiary called PenOp Inc. today. Their product is a plug-in for Netscape. users use a wacom board or its equivalent for writing actual signatures. IRS is testing the system for verifying signatures at a number of test sites.

4 3

IP: INS Offers Biometric System for Frequent Flyers
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com X-Sender: believer(a)telepath.com Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1998 09:18:32 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: INS Offers Biometric System for Frequent Flyers Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Wired http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/15014.html US Takes Immigration in Hand by Theta Pavis 4:00am15.Sep.98.PDT It's been 44 years since Ellis Island closed shop, but immigration can still be a long, tiresome process. In an effort to speed the process for international travelers, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service is offering a biometric system for willing frequent flyers. So far, 71,000 people in six airports have signed up for the system, called INSPASS. It employs a biometric kiosk to scan and match the geometric dimensions of travelers' hands, verify their identities, and perform standard background checks. The INS plans to expand the program to four additional airports by the end of the year. "It creates a fast lane for people," said James Wayman, head of the federally funded National Biometric Test Center at San Jose State University. The kiosks were integrated by EDS, which has had a US$300 million contract with the INS for automation support and software development since 1994. This summer, the INS awarded a new, five-year information-technology contract worth $750 million to EDS and four other companies. Ann Cohen, an EDS vice president in the government services group, said the fact that so many people have signed up for the INSPASS system shows that biometrics are becoming more popular and could be commonplace in the future. "Were getting over that 'Big Brother' hurdle," Cohen said. As e-commerce develops and terrorism grows, biometrics increasingly are the "only sure way to get security." US and Canadian citizens flying overseas on business at least three times a year are eligible for the free INSPASS program. People from Bermuda and 26 other countries that have visa-waiver agreements with the United States are also eligible. The INSPASS kiosks, which look like ATM machines, were recently installed at the Los Angeles International Airport, where more than 1,000 people have enrolled in the program. Rico Cabrera, a spokesman with the INS Los Angeles regional office, said travelers like the fact that INSPASS can check their identity in 16 to 60 seconds, a process that can take up to three hours at some airports. The largest group of INSPASS users at LAX are US citizens, followed by Australians and New Zealanders. After filling out a one-page form and passing a background check, travelers can be issued a Port Pass card with their picture and a 12-number ID on it. A traveler inserts the card in the kiosk, which reads the ID number and links to a centralized database run by US Customs. A geometric hand template is called up from the database and transferred to the kiosk. After a green light flashes, the right hand is placed on a reflective surface -- the ID-3D Handkey, made by Recognition Systems. The HandKey uses a video camera to take a geometric image of the traveler's hand and fingers, and the data is converted using compression algorithms. If it matches the template of the hand stored in the database, the traveler is in. INSPASS kiosks are also in use at airports in Newark, Miami, Kennedy (New York), Pearson (Toronto), and Vancouver, British Columbia. The INS eventually plans to install them at most busy international airports around the country, including Washington, San Francisco, Seattle, and Honolulu. The department has geared the program toward business travelers, diplomats, airline personnel, and other "low-risk" visitors. Some argue that the INS hasn't done enough to market the program. Jeffrey Betts, WorldWide Solution Manager for IBM -- which has developed FastGate, a kiosk similar to INSPASS -- said people aren't enrolling fast enough in the INS system. International arrivals at airports across the globe are growing every year by 7 to 10 percent, Betts said, but border control resources are flat or declining. In 1996, some 65,000 people were enrolled in the INSPASS program, but the program has added just 6,000 new users since then. IBM, which has been running a small pilot program of FastGate in Bermuda for the past year, is building a system where people can swipe a credit card through a kiosk at the airport and connect with a database where the biometrics are stored. "Governments will have to find ways to do more with less or force travelers to queue like cattle," Betts said. While the government plans on marketing INSPASS more aggressively in the future, Schmidt said, INS is counting on word of mouth to get new people enrolled. "We don't really have the budget for a huge marketing campaign," she said. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0