- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Boycott "Applied Cryptography" and AT&T and RSA
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:40 PM 3/6/96 -0800, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >Bruce Schnier (Author of applied cryptography) and Matt Blaze (Who >is a crypto bigwig at at&t) have made it clear that they support >key escrow. Both have written letters in favor of the new crypto >law, it creates a key escrow system and also other restricts on >crypto. The letters are on the CDT homepage and i think were >posted here. They support a bill which is aimed at easing the restrictions for the uses of cryptography. Judging from what I have read from their positions, they view the bills as having more positive effects than negative effects. (Which may or may not be true...) >WHAT THE FUCK?????????????????????????????????????????? Sudden capslock stickage? >EFF, EPIC, VTW and almost everyone else (except for Bizdos at RSA, hmmmm) >have all come out against this piece of shit. But with these so called >experts baking it it could pass anyway. I think that you are infering evil intent where there is no evidence of same. The bill does have some major flaws, but it also has some major advantages. Being the cynic that I am, I think that the "use of crypto in a crime" provisions are a big negative. Others are not nearly as cynical however. >Maybe the ltrs are a forgery? We should ask them, and if this is true, LETS >SEND THEM A MESSAGE!!!!!!!! SWITCH YOUR PHONE SERVICE AND TELL AT&T WHY!!! >STOP RECOMMENDING APPLIED CRYPTO (THERE ARE EASIER BOOKS ANYWAY). DEMAND >THAT THESE PEOPLE STOP GIVING AWAY YOUR RIGHTS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Posting in all caps will not help you convince people of the correctness of your position. Claiming conspiracys involving people who have better reputations for supporting crypto than yourself will not help either. If I were to charge people with complicity in conspiracy, yours would be one of the first in line. (Though a pretty lame one at that... Trying to smear people who have actual reputations with juvinile assertions and b1ff style postings is not the way to win the hearts and minds of the Cypherpunks(tm).) BTW, good luck in trying to boycott AT&T. They own alot more than you can imagine. "You Will! And the people to make you do it -- AT&T!" | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: rhetorical trickery
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> all my respondents seem to be missing some basic points I have been > trying to make about law enforcement in the US. > > the law runs on proof, and evidence. a file with the name "diary.pgp" > is not incriminating. it is not evidence. no one could be prosecuted > as a criminal for having a diary. there is the presumption of innocence > unless there is evidence and proof to the contrary. A diary isn't illegal... but if you are suspected or even convicted of a crime, and there's reason to believe that a book or computer file is a diary and that you wrote about more crimes in the diary, then it's worth investigating. Just as if one is suspected of money laundering and it is known that that person has Swiss or Cayman Island bank accounts... having them doesn't mean one is guilty, but if there is other evidence that the crime took place then they are well within the realm of investigating. > furthermore, suppose > the "pedophile" is actually prosecuted successfully. does that mean > the diary was incriminating? no, it does not. in the CA case it happened [..] No. It's just another area of potential evidence. > that the pedophile was prosecuted without decrypting the diary. which > in fact argues in favor of the side that says, "cryptography is not > the end of law enforcement, and this case proves it." One can argue that, yes. In fact I remember some LE type who was pro-crypto who insisted the DT Bill was for lazy cops who didn't want to do the footwork necessary for an investigation. Another is when they cited the World Trade Ctr bombing... seems they already had a handle that it was in the works and did nothing anyway. DT or a crypto-ban or GAK would not have prevented that. [..] > now, a person might be successfully prosecuted for obstruction of > justice, or contempt of court, in refusing to hand over the > decrypted diary (but the other post I made about giving the federal > agents a key that decrypts the file to a cookie recipe handles this > quite nicely). And in some ways one has less rights when in contempt of court then when convicted of a felony.... [..] > please, will people stop sending me responses like the above? do you > understand how the American legal system works? a person cannot > be prosecuted without evidence. evidence cannot be illegally obtained. [..] Ideally, that is how the system works. But if they have a good reason to suspect something is evidence (and in the above pedaphile ase a file named "diary.pgp" would probably qualify) a warrant can be obtained. Note that just having PGP-encrypted files would not necessarily be evidence either. They pointed out a specific file with specific reasons why it should be examined. > a person is not required to testify against oneself. these are all > basic long-established cornerstones of our legal system. It's not clear in terms of court rulings whether handing over decryption keys is self-incrimination or not. From what I have heard, the courts do not view safe combinations as self-incriminating... > look, if someone WANTS to be put in jail for having encrypted files, > I'm sure you can probably figure out some way to pull it off. but > if you don't act like an idiot, such a thing is highly unlikely. it > clearly has not happened to date. Doesn't mean it won't... [..] > such deep fear around here about life in the US today? I'd say > that people here are high up on the list of creating the paranoia. > be careful what you fear, you might get it. Good point indeed. "We have nothing to fear but fear itself." (Flames for an FDR quote from raving anti-socialists will be bounced to /dev/null.) Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

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re: PA
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim rote: >(By the way, I also figured out the anonymous markets for assassinations >bit, too, in 1988, and discussed it in detail then with Eric Drexler, Marc >Stiegler, Mark Miller, Robin Hanson, and others. Long enough ago that I have forgotten the citation, I read an even older SF story about explosive necklaces worn by politicians. If their electronic agreement percentage (and think this was in the sixties folks) dropped too low, a vacancy occured. Warmly, Padgett ps if you have strong principles, and stick by them, sooner or later you will manage to offend everyone.

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To: s1018954
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mail to your "from" address bounces with message "insufficient permission." Care to check that?

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How would Leahy bill affect crypto over HAM radio?
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject asks it. I'm not a HAM, but still curious. Wonder if anyone has brought this to Leahy's attention... Comments from the packet folx on the list? --Rob

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Re: Cut the mystical artist crap. (No crypto relevance here)
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:10 AM 3/11/96, Anonymous wrote: >Was it Thoreau who said "Consistency is the hobgoblin of >simpletons"? No, it was Emerson. And that's not what he said. >What the compromises have to do with are that one lives in >a society with rules, mores, laws. One of those touch-shit >facts of life. You can do what you want, but when it involves You seem to be rather fond of consistency. ;) Ted

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono nymrod) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 11 Mar 96 6:48:05 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net **-+ 25:32 100.00% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ####**###-++ 15:00 99.99% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net **+******-++ 14:36 99.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com +****+***-+* 29:01 99.98% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com --##+#-##-** 37:14 99.97% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl **+******-++ 34:21 99.96% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org +.-+__+++++ 1:09:47 99.95% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ----+***-*++ 15:48 99.94% c2 remail(a)c2.org ++ -*__-+*+* 43:39 99.92% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ----------- 3:06:48 99.86% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com ** -**--+-++ 1:12:35 99.81% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org ------..__.* 15:01:03 99.81% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com ###*##*###++ 3:26 99.81% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * -** ***--+ 55:32 99.80% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org ------..__.* 14:43:10 99.76% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com #+##*#+** ++ 8:47 99.72% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com .+-____.-.-+ 35:57:21 99.60% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com +---+- 17:43:46 99.58% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com _______. - * 51:16:44 99.52% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -+--+-- ---+ 3:32:18 99.51% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net #+#-+ 44:54 98.92% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ......._- 30:55:28 98.39% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net * ##*#**#++ 8:06 97.92% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +-+++++ + 43:52 97.56% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu - ## *-** ++ 17:50 90.94% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com 2:59:45 -61.78% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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NYT on Crypto Smoke
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, February 27, 1998, p. D1. Clinton Continues to Stumble Over the 'E' Word (Encryption) By John Markoff San Francisco, Feb. 26 -- President Clinton described the economic impact of the Internet today in glowing terms to an audience of technology investors here, but he failed to touch on the issue that increasingly appears to matter most to Silicon Valley: the fiery debate over the Administration's policy on data scrambling. The Clinton Administration has endeared itself to the nation's high-technology center by cutting capital gains taxes and by calling today for a bill that would bar state and local governments from enacting taxes on the Internet until 2004. But encryption may prove to be the Administration's Achilles' heel in its otherwise friendly ties with Silicon Valley. The debate over encryption -- which has pitted industry and civil liberties groups against law enforcement and intelligence agencies -- has sharpened in recent weeks. New legislation that would restrict the unlimited use of encryption is about to be introduced on Capitol Hill. A series of intense behind-the-scenes negotiations over a compromise solution between the Clinton Administration and a small group of high-technology executives suggests that no simple resolution is in sight. Encryption policy has become a flash point because it is both essential for the growth of Internet commerce and vital for the protection of privacy. Techniques that use mathematical formulas permit computers to scramble data so they cannot be read without access to a special "key," usually a large number that permits a user to unscramble the information. Law enforcement officials want to force users to put such keys in escrow with independent authorities to allow for electronic surveillance in criminal investigations. President Clinton has told Silicon Valley executives in private meetings that he is sympathetic with their viewpoint but that he is under great pressure from law enforcement and national security officials to put even greater controls in place on encryption technology. "To us this is really important, but it's just an irritant to him," said one Silicon Valley executive who met with the President before his speech today and asked not be identified further. "His basic message to us was, 'Can we get this thing done?' " Senators John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Bob Kerrey, Democrat of Nebraska, are circulating a revised version of their encryption bill, which includes several changes in response to industry and privacy concerns but it has so far won few adherents outside of the law-enforcement community. Critics say the legislation is simply a placeholder for future laws that would restrict the use of the technology. "Everyone who is looking at the export issue is looking at it as a prelude to domestic controls," said Mark Rasch, a former Federal prosecutor who is now a specialist in encryption and computer security issues at the Science Applications International Corporation in McLean, Va. Industry opponents of encryption controls, heavily financed by high-technology companies, are preparing to announce on Wednesday a new coalition, Americans for Privacy, aimed at ending restrictions on encryption technology exports. At the same time Hewlett Packard plans to announce on Friday a new set of encryption technologies, with endorsements from the Department of Commerce and companies like I.B.M.. These technologies known as the International Cryptographic Framework, would let individual governments establish potentially conflicting encryption policies -- or even place no restrictions. Silicon Valley executives argue that the law-enforcement demand for the continued ability to wiretap in the information age is wishful thinking at best. The easy availability of powerful encryption software has made it possible for any two people, anywhere in the world to hold a secret conversation beyond the prying of even the most powerful code-breaking computer, they say. The White House is now considering several other industry proposals intent on finding a compromise between industry and law enforcement interests. Another approach that is now being raised in negotiations between industry executives and the White House has been put forth by executives from Cisco Systems, the company that is the dominate provider of Internet routing equipment. The Cisco proposal, known as Clearzone, would place encryption in the network instead of from personal computer to personal computer. Then, if a law-enforcement agency had a warrant to wiretap, it would be possible to go to an Internet provider that could then turn off encryption. But this proposal makes no provision for retrieving stored information also sought by law-enforcement agents. [Photo] President Clinton and Sandy Robertson of BancAmerica Robertson Stephens, at a conference of technology executives and investors in San Francisco yesterday. [End]

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suggestion
by sara.a.james＠usa.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Visit http:www.sface.com for free software Sara James

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re: Request for Web Browser Information
by dmumford＠dmumford.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, you can always download a copy of NFR and watch as the traffic passes. Dodge Original message: Date: Sat, 21 Feb 1998 05:51:41 -0800 From: dstoler <dstoler(a)globalpac.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Request for Web Browser Information I would like to know the information my browser makes available to web sites. I use both Netscape and Internet Explorer. Obviously web sites can determine my IP address for any given session; they can also look at cookies left by themselves and other sites. Can anyone point me to where I can learn exactly what other information is made available (browser version?, OS version?, system name?, user name?, etc.)? Thanks in advance. David

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