- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

[SF Bay Area] A talk on Pari by Carl Hansen
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Seen on the net: Pari talk by Carl Hansen Monday, June 10 from 7:30 pm to 9 pm BMUG, 2055 Center Street, Berkeley Carl will give an introductory talk on Pari, software that supports arbitrary precision arithmetic and includes many function for doing number theory. He will compare it to other math software and show the special features of this program, including how Pari can be used as a cryptographers workbench. This presentation will be at the BMUG office at 2055 Center Street in Berkeley. The office is near the north west corner of Center Street and Shattuck Ave. which is half a block from the Berkeley BART station. Driving directions: Take the University exit off 80. Head east on University toward the UC Berkeley campus. Turn right at Shattuck (McDonalds will be at the corner.) Go 2 blocks. Turn right on Center and look for parking. I recommend the parking garage on the left, as the one on the right may close at 8 pm. For more information on the Berkeley Macintosh Users Group (BMUG) Mathematics Special Interest Group (SIG), contact: Nancy Blachman Variable Symbols, Inc. 6537 Chabot Road Oakland, CA 94618-1618 Email: nb(a)cs.stanford.edu nb(a)eeyore.stanford.edu Fax: 510 652 8461 Telephone: 510 652 8462 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | Technology (n): | | A substitute for adulthood. stevenw(a)best.com | Popular with middle-aged men.

1 0

Where does your data want to go today?
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From <http://www.pcweek.com/news/0527/27stor.html>: >Helping pave the way toward cost-effective disaster recovery >systems, MCI Communications Corp. this week will join a growing >number of providers offering file backup and storage over the >Internet. [snip] >MCI and Connected house data on servers at two mirrored sites. >Both companies are adding an extra dimension of security over the >Internet by encrypting data. > >MCI's networkMCI Backup software, for Windows 95 or 3.x, will >scan a file for viruses, encrypt it using an RSA Data Security Inc. >public key and compress it before it is uploaded onto MCI's Internet >backbone network to a secure storage facility, said MCI officials in >Atlanta. [snip] Some comments (off the top of my head): * What kind of encryption? [The article says RSA. ] How big is the key? * Why encrypt before compression? If the encryption is any good, then the encrypted data won't compress much at all. However, compression before encryption has its own problems. * Who does the key management (if any)? * Does MCI store copies of the keys used? * How does MCI authenticate users who request copies of files, and do they then return them encrypted or as plaintext? If encrypted, how does the recepient decryt the files? (He/she just had a disk crash, and this is their backup medium, remember?) I looked on MCI's web site <http://www.mci.com>, but couldn't find anything. Besides, it's slower than sludge. [ 90 secs/page over my 128K link. :-( ] -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> "We don't have to take it; never have, never will. Gonna shake it, gonna break it; let's forget it: better still" --The Who, "Tommy"

1 0

Scientology subpoenas operator of "freezone" anon remailer
by modemac＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: netcom.com!ixnews1.ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!swrinde!newsfeed.internetmci.com!cdc2.cdc.net!news.texas.net!nntp.primenet.com!news.cais.net!bofh.dot!news.his.com!news.lightlink.com!light.lightlink.com!homer From: "Homer W. Smith" <homer(a)light.lightlink.com> Newsgroups: alt.religion.scientology,alt.religion.scientology.xenu,comp.org.eff.talk,misc.legal Subject: Body of Subpoena (fwd) Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 15:12:09 -0400 Organization: ART MATRIX - LIGHTLINK Lines: 28 Distribution: inet Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.960529151032.12441B-100000(a)light.lightlink.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: light.lightlink.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII To: Multiple recipients of list IAP <IAP(a)VMA.CC.ND.EDU>, Remailer Operators List <Remailer-Operators(a)c2.org> Xref: netcom.com alt.religion.scientology:185032 comp.org.eff.talk:85083 misc.legal:174678 DOCUMENTS AND THINGS TO BE PRODUCED 1.) All documents relating to the posting, the header of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, which was made through the anonymous remailer, freezone.remailer, including, without limitation, the identity of the person or persons who made the posting. 2.) All documents relating to logs or other records kept by the computer of any individuals who sent messages through freezone.remailer at the time the Exhibit A posting was made. 3.) All documents relating to how records are kept by the freezone.remailer computer of the source of postings made or messages send through the computer. Exhibit A is the header as received by netcom.com of Scamizdat #3, posted on April 1st 1995. Homer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Homer Wilson Smith News, Web, Telnet Art Matrix - Lightlink (607) 277-0959 SunOS 4.1.4 Sparc 20 Internet Access, Ithaca NY homer(a)lightlink.com info(a)lightlink.com http://www.lightlink.com -- Reverend Modemac (modemac(a)netcom.com) First Online Church of "Bob" "There is no black and white." PGP Key Fingerprint: 47 90 41 70 B4 5B 06 90 7B 38 4E 11 8A ED 80 DF URL: http://www.tiac.net/users/modemac/ (FINGER modemac(a)netcom.com for a FREE SubGenius Pamphlet!)

1 0

Re: [crypto] crypto-protocols for trading card games
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:15 AM 5/29/96 -0400, you wrote: >Design a set of crypto protocols to support the issuing, trading, and >playing of such card games in real time (100ms compute time per move) Well, not quite the same thing, but the cool stored-value cards in Japan (for things like phones and the like) are very collectible. Everyone wants a Armitage (anime) card! _______________________ Regards, If it weren't for the last minute, nothing would ever get done. Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

1 0

Re: Internet traffic is monitored.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:37 AM 5/29/96 +0200, Anonymous wrote: >Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 10:03:11 -0700 >X-Sender: bstout(a)osc.hidata.com >To: Firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM, Return requested <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM> >From: Bill Stout <bill.stout(a)hidata.com> >Subject: Re: Encryption Technology >Sender: firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM > >Extrapolations of fact: > 1. Internet traffic is monitored. > 2. The ability to snoop for encrypted traffic is present > 3. The ability to identify encryption levels is present > (How else can they differentiate DES-1 from DES-3?) > 4. The ability to crack DES-1 in near real-time mode is present. > (See above). > 5. If above=true, then Feds dropping the Zimmerman PGP case probably > also points to it also being crackable in a similar manner. >Bill I think the Feds non-prosecution of Zimmermann had absolutely nothing to do with the crackability/non-crackability of PGP. They just had an extremely weak case: They probably had no way to demonstrate that any particular person exported PGP, which means that prosecuting Zimmermann would have looked like sour grapes. (or, in the alternative, if they had records to show that PGP was exported, they might not have wanted to reveal the extent of their Internet monitoring.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

TIC_hip
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-29-96. FiTi: Chips Galore [Editorial] Texas Instruments' claim to have developed a technology capable of inscribing 125m transistors, or computing elements, on a thumbnail-sized slice of silicon is remarkable chiefly because the technique is commonplace. ... The consequences for society of this continued rise in complexity are perhaps not fully grasped even in an age in which computers are taken for granted. The latest technology promises ubiquitous, tiny packages of electronic intelligence. Today's model is the smart card and the tiny videocamera. Tomorrow, tiny processors will be embedded in jewellery, spectacles, buildings and furniture. ... Widely distributed computer power will confer substantial advantages on society; but it will create new ethical problems for society, such as the individual's right to privacy, which may be at least as difficult to master as the technology. ----- FiTi reported yesterday and today on TI's new chip: TIC_hip

1 0

Re: Re: RSA breaking
by [0m [5m Toth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> System of Russian dolls? What would you suggest? My idea(it is not me that found that) is that tou could have many public keys, when someone want to send you something, he just mail you his(or her) keys, and then you encrypt with the first key, then with the second, etc... This system is used by some anonymous remailers: Each one has a key, you encript your text with the key of the last remailer, then you put your text, the adress of the people tou want the letter to be sent, then encrypt it with the key of the before the last remailer, and put the adress to be sent of the last remailer, etc So your letter is decripted by the first remailer, then sent to the adress found, then the second remailer decrypts it, etc, like an onion. The fact is that you can obtain a very good privacy if you have some keymaker programm. Let suppose you want to send me a crypted text(don't, it's forbidden to crypt in france), you mail to my remailer, that choose 1000(arbitrary number) keys, that send it to you, crypted with your key, you crypt your text the necessary number of times. This way, the message will be maybe uncrypted by someone, but if the key change for each message, someone can't find your key, i insist on this danger, having one key is useless as soon as someone found it. >What kind of system do you think would be needed to crack RSA coded messages? As i said, it is impossible to break an RSA code with softwares, the best attempt was 25 days with ten Crays linked for a key of only 50 numbers. But this can be done as i said before with a simple eratosten crible "translated" into hardware. Sorry electronic is not my way, but for the exemples i saw in class, it is really to the ability of a basic electronician, and they were more complicated than what i am talking about. The best components you have, the faster you'll go, so a governement or a bog private lab can afford this kind of prices.

1 0

Re: Remailer chain length?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"hfinney(a)shell.portal.com" "Hal" 28-MAY-1996 21:35:03.17 >Or better still, run one remailer on the machine, and use it multiple >times in the chain. It seems to me that one remailer on a machine is >better than several because it will allow more mixing of messages. If >two messages enter a machine and later leave, it may be possible to >distinguish them if they went to different remailers and left with >different From: addresses (or other header fields) as a result. If they >had both gone to the same remailer it would be harder to tell them >apart. But you could get a massive amount of mixing of messages, by this logic, simply by having 1 gigantic remailer. It'd have a vast traffic flow and could do a lot of latency, etcetera. But this also means that whoever runs it can trace everything - and whoever breaks into it can trace everything. While multiple remailers on the same machine isn't ideal for this purpose (if root is cracked, they all are cracked), it's better for this aspect than 1 remailer; root can be assumed to be harder to crack than a non-root-account remailer. Moreover, this is assuming one machine, or an interlinked group of machines set up such that there is one root account for all of them; separating the remailers into machines with different roots would help. The rubber-hose attack on the sysadmin is still a problem, though. -Allen

1 0

Re: Remailers - What exists?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com" "Bill Stewart" 28-MAY-1996 05:27:38.19 >It helps a lot to have an account that isn't your main email >account, because it's going to get lots of junk in it >that you want to discard most of, so you'd be better >off without your real mail going there, unless you're >a procmail wizard. A related question is about the cover traffic generators. With those, I've gathered you've got the two choices of loops and nowhere-ending chains (e.g., directing it to "nobody" on most systems). If it's done using a loop, is there any way for a procmail script to determine that and toss them into /dev/null? >Mixmaster-style remailers are more secure than vanilla ones, >but of course you need to use the Mixmaster client software >to use them, which could be a problem if you're a DOS or Mac user. Or a VAX/VMS user; there are, I have been informed, enough UNIX-specific system calls in Mixmaster that porting it isn't a trivial task. >- ability to mess with the sendmail logs >- ability to tell the backup software not to back up your > spool directory (which would be Really Bad, especially > if your computer provider keeps backups forever.) > The alternative is to put it under /tmp somewhere, > and just make sure it recovers if too much stuff gets > deleted by regular daemons. What mechanisms are available to make sure it will recover if /tmp gets deleted? I suspect also that many ISPs might be quite willing not to bother backing up some directory or another - it saves them time and space. Thanks, -Allen

1 0

Re: none [mail2news broke]
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich sez: : Usura just answered this on alt.privacy.anon-server. The basement : mail2news gateway is temporarily blocking posts from c2.org until the : alt.syntax.tactical forgers go away or can be filtered with new code. : While I publicly whined that SOMETHING needed to be done about the problem : (for PR reasons if nothing else), I'm disappointed that there was no : public announcement of the downtime first. Heck, when Scientology came : knocking, there was an 11-day window before utopia shut down... My fault, I didn't imagine shutting down access for c2.org would have a big impact. (other then that the forgeries would stop) Besides the block was in effect for about 12 hours and I was mearly testing if the code did work. (apperantly it does) My sincere apologies if mail has been lost due to this situation. bEST Regards, -- -AJ-

1 0