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Re: Scienter and all that stuff
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by jamesd(a)netcom.com (James A. Donald) on Tue, 20 Sep 3:22 PM > >Of course Noam Chomsky is optimistic - he favors >limitless and absolute state power and the forcible >and violent silencing of all those who deviate from >political correctness. > >If I was campaigning to make a the US a totalitarian >terrorist state, I would be full of optimism. I respectfully suggest that that's not what Chomsky advocates. He makes superior detailed analysis and criticism of authoritarian government by brilliantly attacking weak-willed ideologues of all political persuasions which hide under skirts of tyrants. On the contrary, his optimism, it seems to me, derives from his own hard work and original thinking not from parroting any party line. With this he is in the company of original thinkers like Karl Hess, Murrary Bookchin and others who have garnered the courage to grow beyond the simple faith of left-right comforts and conceits. Their writings have a generosity of scope and purpose that exemplify how to assess specific problems and to prescribe remedies, and thereby perhaps help us break free of the mesmerizing, melodramatic defecations of partisan politics. Or so I optimistically muse. John

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Re: Virtual assasins and lethal rema
by doug＠OpenMind.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TJHARDIN(a)delphi.com writes: >Adam is absolutely right.... Even if a killer is so anonymous that she can't >be linked to a given crime by the employer who will talk 99.9% of the time >any pressure is applied, she must still continue to accept various >contracts. >The police would then set up one of their stings & "hire" her anonymously >for another job & snatch the killer up when she attempts to fullfill this >contract. Likewise, the very first offer of employment may well be of this >sort. Once again (and hopefully for the last time!), I reiterate that it is the person *placing* the contract who is at zero risk (except for the risk of losing their digital cash). Stings can be set up to catch the killer, but providing the person doing the hiring trusts no one but himself, there is no risk to him. To the extent that there is *any* risk to this person, the goals of crypto anarchy have not been met. This pertains to every conceivable security leak that might affect the person placing the contract. Doug ___________________________________________________________________ Doug Cutrell General Partner doug(a)OpenMind.com Open Mind, Santa Cruz ===================================================================

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Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: greg(a)ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) > In general, scienter/mens rea requirements mean that you must have intended > a particular action (or failure to act) - the question is about your > understanding of the facts of a particular situation, not the legal status > of a particular situation. Given your example, it's illegal to drive > across the border, knowing your pickup contains ammunition - whether or > not you believe your actions are legal. It's not illegal to drive across > the border with a box full of ammunition if you thought you were carrying > a box full of clothes. > > The old saw "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is basically accurate. > Good-faith reliance on legal advice from competent counsel won't even > save you. (but it might get you a malpractice judgement/settlement). I don't know how true this is in general, but my research into the arms export question indicated otherwise. Here is part of a posting I sent to CP some time last year concerning a case in which the defendant did in fact drive to Mexico with a truck load of ammunition: > In U.S. v Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the appellate court wrote (in 541 F2d 826), > > "At trial and on appeal, the defendant admits that he purchased the > ammunition and that he intended to export it to Mexico. His defense is > bsed on the contention that he had no knowledge that his conduct violated > the law. Hence, the appellant claims that to be found guilty under > 22 U.S.C. 1934 [the predecessor to 22 U.S.C. 2778], the government must > prove that he intended to violate the statute.... We agree, and hold > that he was entitled to a specific intent instruction. Accordingly, we > reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial." > > The court discusses several reasons for concluding that "willfully" > implies a need to show specific intent, among them that the articles on > the Munitions List are not obviously illegal to export, finally concluding: > > "Accordingly, we hold that in order for a defendant to be found guilty of > exporting under 22 U.S.C. 1934, the government must prove that the > defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty not > to export the proscribed articles, and the jury should be so instructed." Perhaps the arms export laws are worded differently than some others and so the more stringent rules apply. Hal

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Re: SHAMELESS PLUG
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort writes: > Mark Chen wrote the follow about the scienter thread: > > ... Howard Zinn makes the same point in _Declarations of > Independence_.... he concludes that law is made not by > legislators and judges, but by the policman's club. > > But less and less every day. As Duncan and I--the official > "Pollyannas of Privacy"--have been telling you, technology is > on our side. As it advances, technology continues to shift the > balance of power from the State to the individual. Which is why, even with their exceedingly feeble perception of what these technologies portend, authoritarian structures are thrown into fits of nearly hysterical apoplexy when confronted by Things Crypto. > For my vision of technology in the service of civil liberties, > see my upcoming article, "Support Your Digital Police," in the > "Idees Fortes" section of December's Wired. I'm there. - Mark - -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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Re: THOSE DARNED HIT MEN
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > SANDY SANDFORT > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . >Would you do business with a escrow that was the bag man for >contract murders? But if the system is set up for total anonymity, _who would know_ that an escrow agent was the "bag man"? Just like no one would know who the contractee was, or the contractor: ========================================================= Date: 21 Sep 2003 07:59:53 -0700 (PDT) From: nobody(a)remailer.mafia.org Subject: HIT MAN Needed To: alt.jobs.hitmen Contract killing needed. 5,000 credit bonus if "accidental", additional 5,000 credits is done within 30 days. If interested, post MegaCrypted bid to alt.jobs.hitmen, specifying escrow agency, and using message ID in subject line. MegaCrypt v3.7 key: dijfwoiertqwgsdfjiwqfnwenfgwiegeowqt-384`=3jkig918ur5=`9ur2ihg roih2`-98tu`=0r`\012jri2nf92ur=0`9u3r9goi23`08ru2`=093r2`3ru23 ofn1-90401t9=039t30149t394t13=04t343049u=0349304109fj3=090458g ru2-983r3i3hg143594t=39jfv3jf0`2\203r9349ugpweokwoert213tr9u=0 flkj2-0r9`2=9t130gjf32if2-103r0134ui=109jf30uf=039r=0394jf3409 flk23fr09r092r9jfgiogif30rtu=09ru0jf02ijf029ru20`9u29ti3jfoi3i oiwf-90283r-9283ru2f2ijf20r-28ru89u2h28f2-98ru2-8r298h23ohf298 oifg213-09r12-03r-20rj20jf09rut034toi53ofeg0we9g34wjkego-i309g fi3r230ru2rij39rturt3iof8u1ru30rj3f285u^&*df23rt209342`j232t4j -98tu`=0r`\012jri2nf92ur=0`9u3r9goi23`08ru2`=093r2`3ru23ofn1-9 0401t9=039t30149t394t13=04t343049u=0349304109fj3=090458gru2-98 3r3i3hg143594t=39jfv3jf0`2\203r9349ugpweokwoert213tr9u=0flkj2- 0r9`2=9t130gjf32if2-103r0134ui=1 ================================================== My nickel's worth..... Dave Merriman (hoping I don't hear from the FBI about this :-) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Re: HTTP authentication efforts
by Mark Hittinger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: paul(a)hawksbill.sprintmrn.com (Paul Ferguson) > Does anyone know, on the off-chance, who is currently working on > HTTP authentication processes for web browsing and Mosiac? Cern probably has this already done and under wraps by now. In the USA the recent NCSA/Spyglass, Inc press release implies that Spyglass will develop an "electronic commerce" capability for Mosaic. Tuesday's Wall Street Journal has an interesting article (Sep 20 C1 bottom) about the mysterious DE Shaw company. For those of you who don't follow every vital scrap of information pryed out of DE Shaw - they are a stock market related firm with very heavy investment in computer hardware and brain power. The article quotes Shaw implying the development of yet another electronic market capability - "commercial use of the Internet". Perhaps Shaw is funding some of Spyglass? Its odd to see program trading gurus get side tracked on this. mark.h

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Re: (fwd) "Will You Be a Terrorist?"
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:43 PM 9/20/94 +0200, Alex de Joode wrote: >Please keep in mind that the US jurisdiction doen't cover the whole earth. > >(There is life outside the US) I am well aware of that and, in fact, intend to expat myself. I was merely responding to Tim and others who were writing about the legal risks remailers face in the US under RICO, The Crime Bill, etc. I know foreign laws differ. It would be interesting for those in other jurisdictions to comment about how *their* rulers might view anonymous communications and strong crypto. DCF ************************************************************************* ATMs, Contracting Out, Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex, Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Mail Receiving, Phone Cards, Quants, Securitization, Temping, Voice Mail.

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international escrow and things
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>4:30-5:00 >International Escrowed Encryption >Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown University >John Droge, Mykotronx, Inc. Boy, doesn't this just give you a warm and fuzzy feeling? "Sorry I couldn't attend your conference Dorothy, I was busy doing my cryptography homework." On the subject of remailers, I just had a thought. What about a series of "meta-remailers" known only to the remailer operators? Is this just a case of meta-security through obscurity? Then there's that pesky "web of trust" thing.... Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth

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Re: Laws Outside the U.S.
by Cyber City 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > Indeed. One of the mysteries is why so few French are on our list...I > can't recall any, actually. Their country has some of the most > draconian laws, it is alleged, and, as Phil notes, an active SDECE > industrial espionage unit. I noticed the following in sci.crypt recently. There are some useful crypt- analysis papers in the archive, among other things: > From vaudenay(a)dmi.ens.fr Wed Sep 14 11:52:18 EDT 1994 > Subject: New WWW-Crypto-server > Organization: Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, France > > We are happy to annonce the birth of the html pages of our team : > > http://www.ens.fr/equipes_dmi/grecc > > Most of our papers are available. > > --Serge for the GRECC team. The French company BULL makes a nice encrypting laptop computer, called "Sub Rosa", which is used by Canada's Department of national revenue auditors. -- Alex Brock

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Re: Laws Outside the U.S.
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Germany: There is no restriction of import or use of cryptography ( _yet_ ). There are some restrictions about export and transmission of encrypted data: - Encryption soft/hardware can not be exported to communist countries (COCOM) without problems. I don't know exactly, whether it is forbidden, must be licensed, or must be registered in any way. - There are two kinds of amateur radio, the CB (citizen band) and the licensed amateur radio, which requires a personal license. On this licensed radio it is not allowed to send encrypted messages, but as far as I know nobody cares and nobody checks. The sense was to make you use the telephone and pay. - There was a restriction about the telephone net. You are not allowed to transmit anything but voice. I don't know what happened with that restriction since everyone uses fax and modem legally. At the moment they have a lot of problems with such laws. They have to decide whether they are valid or not, because most european countries have joined the European Community. The EC forces their countries to equalize their laws in the sense of "what you can do in one country, you can do everywhere". Sometimes this is very helpfull (e.g. use of modems. Most of them where illegal in Germany, meanwhile nearly all of them have a license), sometimes they have silly ideas (e.g. laws about ingredients of noodles or beer). If France forbids the import of crypto software, but allows to sell it inside of France, then I can sue France, because the french programmer can sell his programs in France and I can't. I'm sure we will get a special crypto law within the next years. Hadmut

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