- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

q.N
by nadeshda＠mexred.net.mx 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To whom it may concern: My name is Nadeshda Vargas Stepanenko, I`m a Law Student from Mexico City and I`m writing this letter because in one of my classes I was asigned to do a discertation on what can be done to control the Internet in relation to it`s content and use, to protect the public at large using the methods to protect your privacy. I have found a lot of information of these servidors, but the reason to write this e-mail is for asking some questions about the subject: 1) It would be convenient to legislate this methods? 2) You can use them, for example, in Mexico? 3) Do you think it would be necessary to create an International Association for solving the problems in the Internet? 4) What do you think about legislation of the Internet, and how the lawyers may resolve these situations? I would be very thankful if you send me only a briefly opinion about this questions, it is very important for me because it is not an easy job.

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Geodesic Warfare: The Mesh and the Net
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anthony Templar took the text file I had of THE MESH AND THE NET Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon MARTIN C. LIBICKI McNair Paper 29 March 1994 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. bashed it quite nicely into HTML, and parked it at <http://www.shipwright.com/meshnet.html>. Somebody put a pointer to the original site -- which I have since lost -- on cypherpunks a couple of years ago, and I downloaded the text version, then, thinking that I would have a copy of my own if it was ever taken off the net. Altavista was just getting started at the time, and, like a turn-of-the-century British dancehall character named Archie (the namesake for World War I antiaircraft fire), Altavista was busy looking up the dress of every website it could find, and telling everyone what it saw. :-). No telling when stuff would go away, especially after the webmasters' bosses found out about it. It dawns on me that both comic book and internet protocol Archies were aptly named, in hindsight... Anyway, thanks to Anthony for doing such a nice job on what looks like a 65-page paper. It's about 250k+ in size. Its e$ relevance, of course, is, what happens if there's a cash settled market for force, and these increasingly smaller, autonomous, networked weapons auction their services in that market? Also, the paper talks about how these weapons could be used to effectively defend very small pieces of ground, certainly at the level of your average suburban house. Personal warfare? The Swiss, the original Icelanders, and the pre-British Irish must be smiling somewhere. Lions and Tigers and Bears. Oh, my. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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FC 97 and www.offshore.com.ai offline
by Jim Burnes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone been able to reach www.offshore.com.ai for the last several weeks. I've been trying to follow up with some email to Vince about getting my fellow FC '97 attendees' email addresses, but to no avail. If anyone on the list was at the conference, or has such a list I would appreciate it. BTW: hi to lucky green, eric blossom, vince and everyone that made FC 97 a wild adventure. jim burnes jim.burnes(a)ssds.com Jim Burnes Engineer, Western Security, SSDS Inc jim.burnes(a)ssds.com ---- Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him? Let history answer this question. -Thomas Jefferson, 1st Inaugural Addr

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Re: Sabotaging Big Brother Inside Corporate Complicity
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: > There are two somewhat related technologies being discussed here, as Kent > lists: key escrow and multiple encryption. > > However, as Tim points out, really both approaches can be adapted to > a Big Brother situation. If the government can force you to escrow > your keys, it could equally well force you to encrypt to the FBI as an > additional recipient. Key escrow amounts to both and more. In escrowing your keys, you are doing so to the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Agriculture, Social Services, the janitor at the Key Escrow holding facility, etc. Should we put our faith in the 'good intentions' claimed by those promoting key escrow? Talk to the grandmothers whose cars were confiscated because their dear grandson left a roach in the ashtray, under authority of the laws that were supposed to thwart drug kingpins. Key escrow is needed so that grandmothers of the future, plugging the parking meters of strangers with eCa$h, cannot escape prosecution by using encryption. > I see > supporting multiple recipients in the way outlined above as being an > effort to *avoid* building "big brother inside". Otherwise key escrow > is what many employees are going to get. If other people don't see it > that way, I'd like to know. In lean econonomical times, employees tend to get whatever they are given...end of story. If the employees are to get something other than Big Brother type of control over their work-lives, then it is up to those such as the CypherPunks and others who value privacy to promote viable options for corporations to choose from in the security area. If the only security options that a corporate manager has is no control or total control, then there will be those who will be forced by circumstances to opt for the latter, regardless of whether they find it personally distasteful. Indeed, members of the Tim C. May Corporate Sabatoge Revolutionary Committee may well find that they can sabatoge the government's evil intentions without harming their employer's position, merely by making an effort to ensure that their company's product gives the undercover Human Rights agents that have infiltrated corporate management an option to choose a product that they can customize with a view toward maintaining both company security and employee privacy. Let's face it, the government will roll over anyone who is unarmed, and have Kent issue a press release suggesting that the citizens were crying out for tank-tread marks on their backs. The solution is to provide as many workable products/solutions as possible for those who feel a need for encryption, so that they may customize their use of it according to their own inclinations and level of conscience. The government always seems to have extra munitions on hand to give to would-be dictators, it is up to disorganizations such as the CypherPunks to make certain that the citizens have the opportunity to arm themselves, as well. -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: LJL into key-escrow? (was Re: The Balloon is Going Up....criminalization of noncompliant crypto)
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, Apr 02, 1997 at 12:26:55PM -0600, Toto wrote: [...] > > Kent, > You should try to refrain from embarassing yourself by referring > to the above as "reasoning". Obviously, I embarass easily. > I'm of a like mind with Bill Stewart and Dr. Robert's, or whoever, > who appear to think that compromises on privacy and freedom lead to > yellow stars and barbed-wire fences. Do you work for a living? > Now, if you could just give us similar examples to illustrate > how the burdgeoning market for Zyklon-B showed that corporations > *really wanted* the Holocaust... Hitler again. You lose. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent(a)songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55 http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html

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Re: LJL into key-escrow? (was Re: The Balloon is Going Up....criminalization of noncompliant crypto)
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kent Crispin, lacking valid arguments, asked: > > Do you work for a living? I'm an undercover liquor store owner. I use PGP ski-masks to retain my anonymity when picking up the night's receipts. (It's kind of a freelance 'cash escrow' type of concept.) -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Junger vs. U.S. crypto-suit
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to JYA for putting these documents online; I wasn't able to convert 'em myself. -Declan ************ http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,792,00.html The Netly News Network / Afterword Junger vs. U.S. By Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) April 2, 1997 Peter Junger decided to do it differently when he filed a lawsuit against the Federal government seeking to lift export controls on encryption software. He could have mimicked the other two crypto-suits and asked the government to let him ship data-scrambling software overseas -- and sue when the request was denied. But Junger never sent that query to the Feds. "In my case I've never applied for permission. >From the beginning I'm raising the constitutional issues. So it's a cleaner case," says Junger, a 63-year old law professor at Case Western Reserve University. Junger hopes to win by stressing that any regulation requiring government approval of a publication -- a "prior restraint" -- is unconstitutional, even when applied to computer programs. "My position is that I don't have to apply for a license. It's unconstitutional for you to require me to apply for a license," he says. (The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that the First Amendment's "chief purpose" is "to prevent previous restraints upon publication.") Junger filed his lawsuit last spring. Now the documents are online at http://jya.com/pdj.htm; read on for some excerpts... ---------- Excerpted from Statement of issues, points, and authorities ISSUES Prof. Junger challenges those provisions of the ITAR, as written and as would be applied to his conduct, that require a license or some other government approval before disclosing cryptographic software or technical data. The following are principal standing and First Amendment issues that plaintiff respectfully suggests ought to be addressed at oral argument: Standing Issues I. Prof. Junger has alleged that he cannot disclose at least some cryptographic information (either cryptographic software or technical data) to foreign persons or place some of the information on the internet without a license. Does Prof. Junger have standing to challenge the regulations? Or must he first apply for a license? First Amendment Issues II. As a threshold matter, is source code and object code expression or so closely related to expression that is protected by the First Amendment? III. There is no dispute that certain cryptographic software and technical data is subject to licensing under ITAR. Do the licensing requirements amount to a system of unconstitutional prior restraints? IV. The government has asserted that export controls on cryptographic software and technical data are necessary to protect its ability to gather foreign intelligence. Do the regulations control a substantial amount of protected expression that is unrelated to the government's stated purpose? V. Notwithstanding that all statutes and regulations are imbued with some ambiguity, are these regulations sufficiently clear to persons of ordinary intelligence? ---------- Code that actually encrypts deserves First Amendment protection apart from its own expressive content. Code that actually encrypts can be used to keep other communication secret and confidential. To the extent that source code and object code have a function, that function is to protect the secrecy and confidentiality of other communication. For this reason alone, cryptographic computer code deserves First Amendment protection. As a means of protecting confidentiality and furthering other communication. cryptographic code is no different than the newsracks at issue in Lakewood or the ink and paper at issue in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Comm. of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 ( 1983). Any requirement that a person must first seek a license or other government approval before publishing or disclosing protected expression is a classic prior restraint. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). ###

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q.N2
by nadeshda＠mexred.net.mx 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To whom it may concern: Thank you for answering my mail, it was very useful for me, but at the end you asked me why do I think legislation would be needed? I have several opinions: In one part I think that it is not necessary to legislate, because as you said you have to protect your privacy from the gobernent, IŽm agree of that, but I have other situations: IŽm going to give you some examples: 1) I heard about several cases about individuals who use the Internet to attract children who are then raped and murdered, kidnapped and sold on the black market, many of these pediophiles work out in open in complete anonimaty, due to the structure of the Internet and many service providers. 2) And what about the terroists who use the Internet to comunicate with each other, gather information and funding establish methods, investigate methods of terrorism (how to make a bomb in your house using abono and household chemicals. This is an area that should be strongly controlled, but the question is how do you do it without restricting the rights of the average citizen?

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Re: hi-tech ROT-13
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: > At 05:37 PM 4/1/97 -0500, Andy Dustman wrote: > >consider this a compromise between normal blocking (deliver unless told > >otherwise) and middleman (get someone else to deliver it), which I would > >sum up as: Ask permission before delivering the first time, and once > >granted, deliver until told otherwise. > > An alternative approach is > - ask before delivering _every_ time, unless > - accept deliver-without-asking-again responses to cookies. > This leaves the recipient the middle ground of > granting permission for one message without granting it for all future > messages, which is probably good for people unfamiliar with remailers. > (Also, the permission-once == permission-always model doesn't stop > spamming - a spammer can send a whole bunch of messages to the recipient, > and if the recipient's response to the first "You have anon-mail" cookie is > "That's interesting, let's see what it is", they get all the spam.) I got a 60MB mailbomb the other day which didn't bother me a least bit. That wasn't done via the remailers; it came via worldnet.att.net's open smtp server. The initial form letter asking for permission should warn about the possibility of their getting a large amount of crap. However it's just as easy to get a throwaway account and mailbomb someone via that. I say: discard (don't keep) e-mail for folks who haven't explicitly unblocked themselves; treat "unblock" as "unblock everything and face the consequences". Letting the user impose some sort of constraint on the size of the e-mail being remailed is actually a dumb idea: * any half-decent mail handler should do it on the user's side * they can be mailbomed by a 1000 little messages --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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PGP-Domo...
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On another mailing-list, there has been a lengthy discussion going on about encrypting the list-traffic or not. Although I personally agree, that encrypting a public mailing list is kind of useless I would like to know from a technical perspective if PGPdomo supports _both_ PGP and plain-text simultaneously on the same mailing list (if no public key available, send plain-text, otherwise encrypt). Also, considering the time it takes to encrypt/sign a message for each individual user (assuming they use pgp), isn't that too much overhead for the list-server, when we deal with a few hundred people and maybe traffic like on cypherpunks? Any experiences from PGP-Domo users/admins would be greatly appreciated. Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ... Microsoft - "Where do you want to crash today?" ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBM0NCbTltEBIEF0MBAQFasAf+ODKv3pX/bCZy66coA9SCGaB2BUgWEPfv n42WokKZY9HY/WrRLJ4vTtbiJs+p7i9vJA37VUy7I/vAZJ5fFQOHYCWS9g8Mpxtn kOmDoIj7grfNXDEgYa91+Shv5xEJXo62bGnW+YlX7TNeb3buQj2H91ova4Jk3oci sBKFSRLf5EDtOjBOBXcxy1V232k2wLoefSvVORWmjHtEyzCdstenCv4jjEf5LF+E uIzBr7+MmzJPK49lM17izHTpBv/LALBvyD2lq1IfJl0psnfbFtL2SMJeOAVdkQe/ Hqn8qeNHpLwuvPTO/QZP85aMRnHCNVVJaeHJpLJnX3pMVrLjCOGC3g== =7xD4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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