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Gary L. Burnore's Paranoid Hatred of Privacy and Anonymity
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :Most control freaks like Gary Burnore and the rest of the DataBasix Gang are > :hypocritical about privacy. They want to invade that of others at will while > :protecting their own. Gary Burnore and Belinda Bryan > :were worried that their UNLISTED PHONE NUMBERS might be given out, but anyone > :who dares criticize their actions with an "unlisted" e-mail address is an > :"anon asshole". > > So you'll post your address and phone number right away, right? You go first, since you claim you "have nothing to hide". Why would anyone with "nothing to hide" choose to "hide behind the skirts of" an unlisted phone number and street address? (Recognize the rhetoric? It's yours, not mine.) > :I'm still wondering what wondrous plans Gary and Belinda had for all > :those e-mail addresses of the users of the Huge Cajones Remailer if Jeff > :Burchell had turned them over to DataBasux as they had demanded. (Not just the > :senders but the RECIPIENTS as well!) > > > More lies from the anonymous asshole. I posted the URL. What part of it was a "lie"? Are you now denying that you demanded that Jeff Burchell turn over the sendmail logs from his Huge Cajones Remailer to you and Belinda Bryan? > : Fortunately, Jeff was smarter than your > :average Burnore and didn't keep such things around to tempt DataBasix, > :Scientology, etc., so we'll never find out. > > Supposidly, they weren't available. Now you're claiming he had them but kept > them private. What else will you accuse Jeff of? Jeff didn't do anything > wrong yet you constantly berate him. What do you have to gain by demeaning > Jeff? Haha! Nice try at IKYABWAI. I guess that's the best you at DataBasix can do to try to divert attention from your activities and tactics? You and Belinda were the anti-privacy control freaks who supposed that Jeff had created and maintained logs for abusive organizations like DataBasix and the Church of Scientology to demand. Jeff knew better all along and didn't keep such info to tempt people like you. Had you done your homework rather than blindly attacking Jeff and his remailer, you'd have known that such data didn't exist and could have saved yourselves the embarrassment of being caught trying to demand it. You still haven't stated your reason for demanding these logs which, had they existed, would have identified everyone who either sent or received anonymous messages through the Huge Cajones Remailer. What wonderful surprises lay in store for remailer users after their identities had fallen into your hands? > Why are you trying to get remailers shut down. Jeff Burchell NAMED his attackers. Would you care to point out my name in his post? (Yours is named rather often.): http://calvo.teleco.ulpgc.es/listas/cypherpunks-unedited@toad.com/HTML-1997… Your paranoid conspiracy theories remind me of the kid who blamed the mess in his bedroom on an invisible herd of stampeding elephants. ("Well of course you didn't see them, dad. They're INVISIBLE.") In your case, you speculate that there's a single "anonymous asshole" who's responsible for everything that you CLAIM has occurred. The problem is, you haven't proven that 90% of the stuff you *CLAIM* occurred even happened, let alone was the work of your imaginary lone "spam-baiting/forging/child-molesting/cyber-stalking/libeling" (did I miss anything?) so-called "anon asshole". How about some proof of your wild charges, Gary? Only one of us even USES remailers (or at least admits to it). You, OTOH, have never had a civil word to say about ANY anonymous poster. If remailers were shut down, I'd lose my ability to post. What would you lose, Gary? Is being able to identify your critics and single them out for harassment really that important to you?

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Re: Whoever thinks the "word" is censored, post the 'word' fool
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore+NOspam(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :My only guess is that the posting person thinks that Replay censors more > :than one word, and that giveing the word away would tell Replay which > :filter to lift. If I had found something like that, I'd pass the info > :around privately to a bunch of friends first, and make sure that I was not > :the only one expereienceing the prob. > > Some have asked him to email it privately as well, seems he's not done that > either. I'm curious -- how would you know whether he's done so or not? I don't recall you making that invitation to him. Do you even accept incoming e-mail from remailers? > :Or, he could just be trolling. :) > > Doubt it. It really sounds like he believes the word is being censored. Maybe it's time for Alex to join this thread and either say "no, we don't filter on any words at the Replay remailer", or else "yes, here's a list of the words we consider to be objectionable, so please omit them from your posts through the Replay remailer". I'm half expecting that his posts aren't showing up either because he's screwed something up in the message to the remailer (like misspelling the word "Newsgroups" in the header, for example), because the posting gateway is flaky, or because some Net Nazi has taken it upon himself to indiscriminately forge cancels to posts he doesn't like. But some definitive word, one way or the other, would go a long way towards clarifying this situation. I see no rational reason for covertly blocking posts based on content. *IF* he didn't want something posted, then an announcement that the Replay remailer rejects posts containing certain words or phrases would make life simpler for all concerned. And to whoever created the subject line for this message, I'm tempted to either post the word "fool", or say that it's a lousy "Mr. T" impression. :)

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Ross Anderson's Eternity service
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sherry Mayo posted here a while back a reference to Ross Anderson's Eternity service paper, <URL: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk:80/users/rja14/#Lib >. He is also giving an invited talk on the subject this fall at a crypto conference in Prague. The goal of the Eternity service is to make published information permanently and ineradicably available, despite efforts on the part of powerful attackers to destroy it. The attack model explicitly includes governments. This has obvious relevance to current controversies involving copyright, trade secrets, etc. It's difficult to evaluate the proposal because many of the issues seem more legal than technical. Can a service like this, which would seemingly exist largely to circumvent legal restrictions on publishing, possibly be legal? Anderson's basic concept is of a network of storage servers in widely scattered jurisdictions. He uses cryptography so that although the servers store data, no single computer knows exactly what is stored in the encrypted files it holds. Keys to the data are spread across the network using secret sharing techniques, with mutual cooperation among the servers being necessary to decrypt files. (I believe the files themselves are redundantly stored on individual servers, but they are encrypted with keys which are split.) Anonymous communications are used among the network of computers to reply to requests, so that attackers can't tell which computer produced a requested document. The overall goal is apparently to arrange things so that each individual server has a level of deniability if they are accused of having provided information which is illegal in some jurisdictions. It can deny having produced any particular document in question, and if everything is designed properly it is not possible to prove otherwise (other than by subverting a bunch of the other servers). I won't try to go into much detail here (actually I found some of the crypto details kind of hard to follow in the paper, but I will write up my understanding if there is interest) but some of the other ideas are that the service would charge money enough to cover its costs and add new equipment as storage requirements increase (to prevent flooding attacks), and that requests would be submitted by broadcast to the network of servers, and information returned via a remailer network. The documents would be identified by some global names, and one of the documents would be an index file which identifies the others, with descriptions. A few questions for discussion: - Would it be possible in practice to run a network like this? - Would there be much interest in it among users? - Would it be a net benefit to society for such a service to exist? Hal

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Re: Burnore & Databasix
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :> >We'd expect no less. I do wonder how long it will take before those who > :> >believe remailers are a good thing start to realise this asshole has > :> >it in for them. Everything it posts could be used by the anti-remailer > :> >front as a reason to shut them all down. > : > :Much of this "anti-remailer front" works for DataBasix. > > Another lie from the anonymous asshole. Prove it. Of course, you can't. You're denying that you, Belinda Bryan, and William McClatchie are staff members of DataBasix? Are you denying that McClatchie used unproven allegations of "forgery" as his excuse to campaign to get the upstream providers of Jeff Burchell's "Mailmasher" server to disconnect him? Do you remember McClatchie's post which said: -> > I encourage anyone who is being forged due to the deliberate negligence -> > on toxic's part to write hotwired and MCI asking that mailmasher be shut -> > down until it can longer be used to commit forgeries. Did you catch that -- "asking that mailmasher be shut down"? Have your forgotten the time McClatchie was asked this question: -> >>If that was done, then a complaint to the operator would have gotten -> >>that particular pseudonym making the postings locked out. But your -> >>agenda seemed to be to get the entire server shut down. Why? To which he replied: -> > Becuase the shithead running it pissed me off with his responce that "He -> > had better things to do" and "Maybe i should learn mmail filtering" to -> > avoid the abuse. And then there's Jeff's account of what followed. Do you remember when you asked him: -> > : So are you suggesting that McClatchie did that all by himself? Just -> > : curious, I don't know the details. And his response: -> > Nope. McClatchie posted a spammed message that was offering Pirated -> > CD-ROMS for sale. He just happened to send it to a number of companies -> > that had software products included on the CD-ROM. They in turn handed -> > the matter over to the Software Publisher's Association, which then -> > took their usual witchhunting activities to a new art form (including -> > using a personal contact at Wired for professional "gain") You said that it was the "anti-remailer front" that was using this alleged "abuse" to get remailers shut down, but McClatchie was the one named by Jeff of playing that very role. I'd like to hear more about this "anti-remailer front" you speak of. Thus far, you've claimed that all the anonymous posts that have criticized you have all come from the same person. That doesn't sound like much of a "front". How about some more NAMES? Who else is involved in this "front"? > : Notice the classic > :disinformation tactics that Gary Burnore is engaging in here. > > Engaging in? You post disinformation after disinformation and post no proof > of your aligations. Posting REPORTS of disinformation is not disinformation. You have posted no proof for any of your disinformation. For example, your unsubstantiated claim that someone (you actually accused someone by name) of sending abusive e-mail, via a remailer, to an unnamed "teenage girl" who supposedly had a web page at DataBasix. Where is your proof of that accusation? Saying that an anonymous person "abused" an unnamed victim is pretty flimsy, don't you think? Then Belinda Bryan came along and claimed that this same person had supposedly forged posts through an anonymous remailer in the names of "every known email address of DataBasix staff and customers". Again, no evidence that it even occurred, nor even an explanation of how someone OUTSIDE of your company would get ahold of that kind of confidential information! > : But notice > :that Gary was part of this "anti-remailer front" that used ALLEGED forgeries > :and "spam baiting" to get two remailers shut down. > > Again. PROVE IT. Now it's TWO remailers? Before you said it was one. Again, > Burchell said he shut down the remailer after hundreds of complaints. You're > suggesting that those hundreds came from DataBasix? PROVE IT. You're forgetting Mailmasher and McClatchie's hissy fit to get it shut down? > : It is interesting that > :he now attributes the activities of himself and his associates at > :DataBasix with this unnamed "anti-remailer front". > > No, it's closer to the facts than your posts. You consistantly post harass > from a remailer your tactics are obvious. You won't win though. Too many > people WANT remailers. Your lies are not working. Free speech is now "harassment"? (Only in the world of DataBasix!) If you didn't want people talking about the things you've done, you shouldn't have done them in the first place. Exactly what "harassment" are you alleging? You mean posting replies to you and answering the questions you asked? You whine for "proof" then scream "harassment" when it is posted. Cute. > So what are YOU doing it for? It's obviously not a privacy thing. You were > attacking me long before I complained to Burchell to get my name blocked. You > obvously have other reasons for your attacks. You obviously have a short memory. Your letter to Jeff Burchell demanded that he turn over his logs to you identifying everyone who had sent and received anonymous e-mail through his remailer. This was MONTHS after you whined about alleged "forgeries" and were told about having your name blocked upon request. Unless you deliberately avoided taking the advice you had been given then blocking your address would have been a non-issue by June, since you were whining about "forgeries" in February. Or are you talking about your attempt to get posts that even MENTIONED your name in the body blocked? > :Which makes one wonder why Gary and Belinda wanted to get ahold of the logs > :from the Huge Cajones Remailer which would have identified anyone who ever > :sent or even received anonymous mail through that remailer. Gary and Belinda > :have consistently stonewalled that question. My guess is that they were > :counting on Jeff keeping that dirty little secret of theirs hidden. > > Which makes one wonder what else your demented little mind will think up next. > Your claims are false, NO PROOF, none. Claims? I asked a QUESTION. What use did you have in mind for Jeff's remailer logs which you demanded? Since you refuse to answer, let me repeat Jeff's theory. If it's incorrect, please feel free to correct it: -> Subject: Re: DataBasix vs. the Remailers -- Gary Burnore's Dirty Tricks Exposed (was: Jeff's Side of the Story.) -> From: toxic(a)hotwired.com (Jeff Burchell) -> Date: 1997/07/02 -> Message-ID: <5pc9mb$omg$1(a)re.hotwired.com> -> -> [...] -> -> : > Mr. Burnore requested a copy of my (non-existant) logs. -> : > I told him to get me something in writing, signed by his lawyer that -> : > stipulated that the logs were confidential, and not to be revealed to -> : > anyone outside of the lawyer's office. -> : -> : He requested the logs of the messages of *EVERYONE* using Huge -> : Cajones? What was his rationale for such a fishing expedition? -> : (Cases like this are a good reason for remailers to NOT keep logs.) -> -> I have no idea of his rationale. And I don't know of any remailer -> operator who keeps logs that would identify a user. I had my machine -> configured to log in a fairly standard way, but I used a different -> sendmail configuration for the remailer, that had all logging (except -> for certain error conditions) turned off. -> -> Part of me thinks he wanted the logs so he could tell if I was going -> to be able to identify him when he started his attacks. [...] > Yet, according to you I got his remailer shut down. Which is it? You claim I > got his remailer shut down but then you claim I didn't have the power to do > it. Go back and reread the post. It was the power to demand that Jeff turn over (non- existent) logs to you and Belinda that you didn't have. The rest makes no sense, because it's quite obvious that the remailer is SHUT DOWN.

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CITI conference:The Impact of Cybercommunications on the Law:Criminal,
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone on the list planning to attend? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Impact of Cybercommunications on the Law: Criminal, Tax, Securities, & Antitrust 20 December 12, 1997 - Dag Hammarskjold Lounge, Columbia University To register: email: citi(a)research.gsb.columbia.edu web: www.citi.columbia.edu Law in the Electronic Age - It's a Whole New World The questions of how to prevent and how to detect computer crime are just the start. Equally nettlesome are the legal questions which are just beginning to be confronted. For example: -How does one define a computer crime or tort? How does one prove it in court? How does one handle conflicts of laws issues when the locus of the "crime" is the internet? What remedies are available or useful - as a practical matter? How effective is criminal prosecution in this area? What happens when the "criminals" are foreign and their activites are lawful in the host country? -Who can tax electronic commerce? How do they do it? What is the territorial source of income generated in cyberspace? -How does one prove (or avoid) price collusion under the anti-trust laws when everyone's prices are instantly available to competitors online? What are the antitrust implications of network economic effects? -What does the SEC do regarding investor protection when foreign unregistered securities can be purchased from your desktop PC? What are the implications of cyberspace for the future of traditional distribution channels for IPO's. What is the future of traditional exchanges? This conference is the beginning of what may prove to be a series of events which will begin the exploration of these and related questions with experts active in this arena. 8:30 - 9:00 Continental Breakfast 9:00 - 9:15 Introductory Remarks 9:15 - 10:30 Computer Crime and Fraud, I Presentations: Electronic Evidence Recovery and its Use in the Courtroom" Jason Paroff, Kroll Associates, Inc. "Computer Crime: The Threat to the Net" David E. Green, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Dept of Justice "International Schemes and Corruption" Don Sussis, Interested Inc. 10:30 - 10:45 Coffee Break 10:45 - 12:00 Computer Crime and Fraud, II Panel Discussion: Moderator:=20 Thomas J. Fox, Fordham Law School Discussants: James Doyle, NYPD Richard Field, Esq. Chris Hansen, Senior Counsel, ACLU David Sobel, Electronic Privacy Information Center Fred Trickey, Academic Computing, Columbia University 12:00 - 1:00 Lunch 1:00 - 2:20 Impact of the Internet on Tax Law "Electronic Commerce: Are The Current Tax Rules Adequate, Or Even Relevant" Howard Levine, Roberts & Holland Moderator:David L. Robbins, Columbia Business School Discussants: Jeffery Colon, Fordham Law School Elvin Hedgepeth, Director, Office of International Programs, IRS Robert Wood, Coopers & Lybrand 2:20 - 2:30 Coffee Break 2:30 - 3:50 Impact of the Internet on Securities Law "Securities Regulation and the Internet: Can Gatekeepers and Intermediaries Survive in Cyberspace" Robert B. Thompson, Washington University School of Law Moderator: Dr. James Armstrong, Director, Fundamental Family of Funds Discussants: Dr. Andreas J. Junius, Resident Partner, Puender, Volhard, Weber & Axster Elizabeth King, Senior Special Counsel, SEC Andrew Klein, President, Wit Capital Group 3:50 - 4:00 Coffee Break 4:00 - 5:20 Impact of the Internet on Antitrust Law "That the issue be decided: Cooperation and Competition on the Internet" David McGowan, Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk, & Rabkin Discussants:=20 John Kasdan, Lecturer, Columbia Law School Laurel Price, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey Lowell Williams, Vice President, Bull HN Information Systems 5:20 - 6:30 Reception Directions to Dag Hammarskjold Lounge The Dag Hammarskjold Lounge is located in the School of International Affairs. Enter at 118th Street between Amsterdam Avenue and Morningside Drive. Take the elevator to the 6th Floor. The local subway (#1/9) stops at Broadway and 116th street. Parking is available at Riverside Church on 120th Street, between Broadway and Riverside Drive, or on 114th Street betweenBroadway and Amsterdam. A full map of the campus and more detailed directions can be found at the website. Registration Fee (lunch and breaks included): Industry: $195; Gov't/Academic/Non-profit: $50 tel: 212-854-4222 fax: 212-932-7816 email: citi(a)research.gsb.columbia.edu web: www.citi.columbia.edu mail: C.I.T.I 3022 Broadway, 809 Uris Hall Columbia Business School New York, NY 10027-7004

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Cybercrime Summit, from Netly/Afternoon Line
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************* http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/afternoon/0,1012,1626,00.html The Netly News / Afternoon Line (http://netlynews.com/) December 10, 1997 Big Eight Ball At a briefing at FBI headquarters today, top police officials from eight countries outlined a 10-point action plan calling for greater cooperation, joint training and a revision of national laws to combat malicious hackers and "cybercrime." Anne McLellan, Canada's attorney general, said her country wanted to crack down on "old crimes using new technology -- for example, child pornography or hate." Left unsaid was how, for instance, the U.S. could follow Canada's lead and ban racist web sites, which are permissible under the First Amendment. Among the virtual crimes listed were the "cyber-offenses" of money laundering and... H-bomb smuggling? (In response to a reporter's question, the Russians denied they had misplaced 84 of their nuclear weapons.) Heinz Lanfermann, Germany's state secretary, added to the list of Internet undesirables "all those who are organizing slave trading and drug trafficking and car theft." U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno pointedly declined to address encryption, saying "it was generally not a topic" discussed. She did, however, applaud the Internet industry for offering to "work together in a collaborative manner" to track "computer criminals." But she clearly intends to do more than collaborate: The joint principles call for the government "to continue providing the public and private sectors with standards for reliable and secure telecommunications and data processing technologies." Like the Clipper Chip, maybe? --By Declan McCullagh/Washington [More Afternoon Line stories are at http://netlynews.com/ ]

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Re: Remailer Trivia / Re: Singapore & Freedom (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 12:54:26 -0800 > From: Steve Schear <schear(a)lvdi.net> > Subject: Re: Remailer Trivia / Re: Singapore & Freedom (fwd) > > At 3:43 PM +0000 12/9/1997, jonathon wrote: > >On Mon, 8 Dec 1997, Jim Choate wrote: > > > >> analogous situation you would need to use a *listed* phone number registered > >> to anonymous in such a way that ANI displayed the number but any directory > >> search resulted in anonymous w/ no address or other tracing info even for > >> the phone company. To the best of my knowledge no phone company anywhere > > Third party, anonymous, telephone services are available. One in Las Vegas (at least it used to be) is Private Lines, which is an anonyous re-dialer using 900 number billing for payment. Yeah, and the way it works is that some 3rd party buys a trunk from the local RBOC and then sets up their PBX and then re-sells the lines. Here's your test for them. Buy a line and have them list it in the RBOC directory under 'anonymous'. Not the same thing as going directly to the RBOC and having them list your number under 'anonymous'. THAT is the litmus test for true anonymous phone service *and* to make it equivalent to an anonymous remailer with address persistance. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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free ACM publications
by VaX#n8 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks readers may be interested in the ACM digital library, which is open free to the public until the end of this year, at which it becomes a rather expensive members-only luxury. Many complete articles are available online in PDF format. Reviews and abstracts will remain free. A search for "encryption", "cryptanalysis" or "cryptography" in the title and abstract reveals some interesting papers. As usual, use but don't abuse; I don't want to regret telling everyone about this, particularly since I haven't started reading yet myself. Information wants to be free: http://www.acm.org/dl -- VaX#n8, Junglist

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Announcing SecureDrive 1.4b
by edgar＠garg.campbell.ca.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is to announce the availability of Version 1.4b of SecureDrive. SecureDrive Version 1.4b replaces version 1.4a, 1.4, 1.3d, and previous versions. Release 1.4b is a maintenance release of 1.4/a. No new function is added. Only modules SDCOMMON.C, SETENV.ASM and CRYPTDSK.C have non-cosmetic changes, which affect executables LOGIN.EXE and CRYPTDSK.EXE. For that reason, all other executables still self-identify as release 1.4. They are in fact the exact same EXE & COM files as release 1.4. 1.4b fixes problems setting PGPPASS from Windows 95, either inside Win95 from a DOS window, or from the DOS 7.0 environment outside Windows. Unfortunately, LOGIN still cannot activate SecureDrive decryption from inside a Win95 DOS window. This same fix also, for the first time, enables LOGIN to set PGPPASS (as well as activate SecureDrive) from inside a Windows 3.x DOS window. CRYPTDSK also contains added warning msgs for 1) attempting to encrypt drive C: and 2) interrupting en/decryption with Ctrl-Break. There are also some minor changes in SECDRV.DOC. In the USA, SecureDrive 1.4b is now available at Colorado Catacombs BBS - 303-772-1062 (up to 28,800 bps, 8n1) - log in with your own name or alias. Download SECDR14B.ZIP from the [F]ile menu. ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/USA/?????/disk/secdr14b.zip where the ????? is given in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README These are all controlled-access sites available to USA citizens and residents only. Thanks to the cooperation of Steve Crompton of the U.K., who worked with me closely, I am able to also announce availability on an offshore site, ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/disk/secdr14b.zip In case anyone in the U.S. Justice Dept. is reading this, Steve and I were very careful to do this release without violating US export restrictions. The only things I "exported" to Steve were "diffs" for source changes from 1.4a to 1.4b, which themselves don't contain any code capable of encryption or decryption. Steve combined those with source for 1.4a, already available overseas. Steve compiled the new source code, and sent the new EXE files to me. I compared the new executables to ones I compiled myself and verified they match, bit for bit. I then sent back to Steve detached signature files for the executables. Steve then put together secdr14b.zip and sent that to me for final inspection. I then compared all files against my "master" files here and verified that they matched. I then shipped the secdr14b.zip that Steve sent me to the USA sites. So the USA release matches bit for bit the offshore release. Here are the contents of secdr14b.zip Length Method Size Ratio Date Time CRC-32 Attr Name ------ ------ ----- ----- ---- ---- -------- ---- ---- 54081 DeflatX 19452 65% 07-20-96 19:45 8f807f09 --w- SECDRV.DOC 43718 DeflatX 20532 54% 07-20-96 20:12 21b5a5cb --w- LOGIN.EXE 42564 DeflatX 20333 53% 07-20-96 20:12 bdda692b --w- CRYPTDSK.EXE 32595 DeflatX 8786 74% 08-06-95 00:00 1c7d2225 --w- SECTSR.ASM 20623 DeflatX 4896 77% 07-20-96 19:34 f4c9ffda --w- CRYPTDSK.C 19664 DeflatX 4184 79% 11-19-93 21:42 22c2502c --w- CRYPT2.ASM 18598 DeflatX 4560 76% 07-20-96 19:41 7b2def07 --w- LOGIN.C 18321 DeflatX 6917 63% 06-14-93 22:27 0767480b --w- COPYING 15466 DeflatX 9750 37% 07-20-96 20:12 a90b90ff --w- FPART.EXE 14998 DeflatX 4111 73% 06-12-96 18:06 858fc2cb --w- SDCOMMON.C 13011 DeflatX 3073 77% 07-20-96 19:48 4fbda9fb --w- SETENV.ASM 12606 DeflatX 7634 40% 07-20-96 20:12 5b3023ad --w- COPYSECT.EXE 11557 DeflatX 3274 72% 05-09-93 19:38 e71f3eea --w- MD5.C 5278 DeflatX 3467 35% 11-14-95 20:52 af2f141c --w- KEY.ASC 4353 DeflatX 1721 61% 08-06-95 00:00 b4e99e6a --w- FPART.C 3656 DeflatX 1101 70% 08-06-95 00:00 6ed75bcc --w- SECDRV.H 3407 DeflatX 1105 68% 05-11-93 12:49 f1f58517 --w- MD5.H 2022 DeflatX 789 61% 08-06-95 00:00 dd3e9e64 --w- COPYSECT.C 2000 DeflatX 1324 34% 07-20-96 20:12 ba1568d1 --w- SECTSR.COM 1554 DeflatX 569 64% 08-06-95 00:00 3589f489 --w- MAKEFILE 1355 DeflatX 629 54% 01-21-94 08:44 db63ade4 --w- RLDBIOS.ASM 1254 DeflatX 543 57% 05-09-93 19:39 182978aa --w- USUALS.H 278 DeflatX 213 24% 12-06-95 20:33 6c13428c --w- FILE_ID.DIZ 152 Stored 152 0% 08-06-95 00:00 17b02bc2 --w- COPYSECT.SIG 152 Stored 152 0% 06-01-96 01:10 c195c865 --w- CRYPTDSK.SIG 152 Stored 152 0% 08-06-95 00:00 0b345a16 --w- FPART.SIG 152 Stored 152 0% 06-01-96 01:09 4cebe45a --w- LOGIN.SIG 152 Stored 152 0% 08-06-95 00:00 3817512c --w- SECTSR.SIG ------ ------ --- ------- 343719 129723 63% 28 Also note that the ZIP file contains PGP detached signatures (*.SIG) for the executable files. Finally here is my public key, also available on many public keyservers and on my home page (below); note who has signed it. Also please note my present Email addresses. Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US> Edgar W. Swank <Edgar_W._Swank(a)ilanet.org> Home Page: http://members.tripod.com/~EdgarS/index.html (Note: only Garg and ilanet addresses are currently valid. Garg is preferred.) Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/DA87C0C7 1992/10/17 Edgar Swank <edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US> sig E8E044BD Peter Herngaard <pethern(a)datashopper.dk> sig DA87C0C7 Edgar Swank <edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US> sig 4AAF00E5 Dave Del Torto <ddt(a)lsd.com> sig 32DD98D9 Vesselin V. Bontchev <bontchev(a)complex.is> sig 0F59323D Albert Yee <sa3189049(a)ntuvax.ntu.ac.sg> Edgar W. Swank <Edgar_W._Swank(a)ilanet.org> sig DA87C0C7 Edgar Swank <edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US> Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org> sig 91E71221 Cruz <cruz(a)ccxbbs.uunet.ve> sig DA87C0C7 Edgar Swank <edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US> sig C0595F91 Ian H. Chan <ianchan(a)iti.gov.sg> sig 61130A1B Arnold L. Cornez, J.D. <arniec(a)dnai.com> sig 18239E91 Robert C.Casas <73763.20(a)compuserve.com> sig 4AAF00E5 Dave Del Torto <ddt(a)lsd.com> sig 08B707C5 Anton Sherwood <dasher(a)netcom.com> sig 32DD98D9 Vesselin V. Bontchev <bontchev(a)complex.is> sig 34D74DC1 Peter Simons <simons(a)petium.rhein.de> Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com> sig 877AA661 Peter Simons *OLD KEY* <simons(a)peti.GUN.de> sig 4AAF00E5 Dave Del Torto <ddt(a)lsd.com> sig 3245BF5D Jeremy S. Anderson <jeremy(a)cctwin.ee.ntu.edu.tw> sig 08B707C5 Anton Sherwood <dasher(a)netcom.com> sig 32DD98D9 Vesselin V. Bontchev <bontchev(a)complex.is> sig FF67F70B Philip R. 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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMfT1Bt4nNf3ah8DHAQEFdwP/QYiBhqlP0K5YMqY6LIb4EQWy/ddZd4ji R5dwYRBxfErnb7h+3K4mtH/gFf/rznSDt5TONLIfaw2nGXx0nSpa9ANFbRhYaZTX GSaesh1wDQ0Z3/OZaKYpaKXbiZuprbBm0OEzTqb4IoTP4VpyYRrRly01lAtOClT/ IUX3I+irPoY= =24Ih -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US> Edgar W. Swank <Edgar_W._Swank(a)ilanet.org> Home Page: http://members.tripod.com/~EdgarS/index.html

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update.350 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From physnews(a)aip.org Wed Dec 10 16:59:59 1997 > Date: Wed, 10 Dec 97 14:35:44 EST > Subject: update.350 > > PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE > The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News > Number 350 December 10, 1997 by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben > Stein > > QUANTUM TELEPORTATION has been experimentally > demonstrated by physicists at the University of Innsbruck (Anton > Zeilinger, 011-43-676-305-8608, anton.zeilinger@ uibk.ac.at; Dik > Bouwmeester, Dik.Bouwmeester(a)uibk.ac.at) First proposed in > 1993 by Charles Bennett of IBM (914-945-3118), quantum > teleportation allow physicists to take a photon (or any other > quantum-scale particle, such as an atom), and transfer its properties > (such as its polarization) to another photon--even if the two photons > are on opposite sides of the galaxy. Note that this scheme > transports the particle's properties to the remote location and not the > particle itself. And as with Star Trek's Captain Kirk, whose body > is destroyed at the teleporter and reconstructed at his destination, > the state of the original photon must be destroyed to create an exact > reconstruction at the other end. In the Innsbruck experiment, the > researchers create a pair of photons A and B that are quantum > mechanically "entangled": the polarization of each photon is in a > fuzzy, undetermined state, yet the two photons have a precisely > defined interrelationship. If one photon is later measured to have, > say, a horizontal polarization, then the other photon must "collapse" > into the complementary state of vertical polarization. In the > experiment, one of the entangled photons A arrives at an optical > device at the exact time as a "message" photon M whose > polarization state is to be teleported. These two photons enter a > device where they become indistinguishable, thus effacing our > knowledge of M's polarization (the equivalent of destroying > Kirk).What the researchers have verified is that by ensuring that > M's polarization is complementary to A's, then B's polarization > would now have to assume the same value as M's. In other words, > although M and B have never been in contact, B has been imprinted > with M's polarization value, across the whole galaxy, > instantaneously. This does not mean that faster-than-light > information transfer has occurred. The people at the sending station > must still convey the fact that teleportation had been successful by > making a phone call or using some other light-speed or > sub-light-speed means of communication. While physicists don't > foresee the possibility of teleporting large-scale objects like humans, > this scheme will have uses in quantum computing and cryptography. > (D. Bouwmeester et al., Nature, 11 Dec 1997; see also > www.aip.org/physnews/graphics) > > DO EARTHQUAKES HAVE ELECTRICAL PRECURSORS? The [material deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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