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A Fire Upon the Deep
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199501052231.OAA11745(a)netcom5.netcom.com>, tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) says: >Finally, his Hugo-winning novel, "A Fire Upon the Deep," has some >casual mentions of crypto, including the odd speculation that those in >the know in the distant future don't really trust public key crypto. This is quite sensible given that in the Zone universe, you may have no idea how much computing power your enemies have, so no cryptography that is only computationally secure can really be trusted. _A Fire Upon the Deep_ also describes how anarchy might work on a galactic scale. For example, Vinge seems to think that arbitration organizations would be very important in such an anarchy and would acquire military characteristics. Issues of trust and reputation are also treated implicitly. There was some recent talk about network agent technology on this list. Vinge mentions almost in passing how an entire planet (or maybe planets) was taken over by an "intelligent net packet". Makes me rather nervous about things like Magic Cap... One more thing that's marginally related to cypherpunks (hey I really like this book so I'll take any chance I can to talk about it ;-) is the idea that the efficiency of distributed computation (and distributed intelligence) depends on high bandwidth and low latency of the communication medium. Since anonymity seems to have rather high costs in terms of bandwidth and latency (compare anonymous e-mail with internet video conferencing or even with normal e-mail), this implies that an organization of anonymous agents will not work as efficiently as a similar orginzation whose members are not concerned about anonymity. Wei Dai PGP encrypted mail welcome.

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Re: Remailer Abuse
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What lists did you post to?

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More signal than YOU can handle.
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For the moment, all of the archives that Eric just dropped me are on ftp://ftp.hks.net/cypherpunks/All I'll be making some primitive engines to access individual articles by various means but I thought I'd put 'em up in case anybody else with more disk space than brains would like to snarf 'em (following the Shulgin model). (By the way, Glimpse looks like it'll be ideal, since everything is already in its own file, the "since June" archive currently being our /usr/spool/news/... dir.) Look for more info in this space (that sucking sound is my copious free time). - - -- Todd. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBLxD1GBNhgovrPB7dAQEOQAQAuTRIVTQOzIbjqrUAFsPu3xHTJAH+3YnX ickYtw627leo3vs7wD2rxGfHNx6As7JbzSI1JwD26zsb2CMqMGgvQHNQ5eD7rW/N 3ICSWACwESWlnL/rAFvVh69mZDM/IUv5C+eSTVHKdlh3KWYbetRvCgkRNQvGVl58 S06pthGBpJ8= =f4fe - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxD1nyoZzwIn1bdtAQEv7wGAhSVywzGivjeo9fZwVrYDRaJx596TPVeJ pjutyvubg3yyKmqFD+Ele62LhiPvhxtX =pooh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Data Haven problems
by dfloyd＠io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- While programming my data haven code, I am wondering how to guard against spamming the data haven parser. It is trivial to mount a denial of service attack by repeatedly mailing large files. which will fill up the quota or filesystem of the data haven host, and if you have mail on a root partition, will cause hangs or crashes. Any ideas on how to guard against mailbombs, and to confirm to the sender that their files are stored successfully? Perhaps do a mailing with a test command that validates the existance of the file, and sends a reply back wether the file is okay or not, or would this result in a possible security hole? As to the code, this will have to be my second rewrite as I am going to do it in perl code, rather than C... last rewrite was from a daemon to a program activated by a .forward file. Lastly, instead of postage (like a remailer would get), how hard would it be to implement "rent" where if the "rent" is not paid, and a grace period has elapsed the file would be trashed. All this while preserving the anonymity of the sender and the data haven site. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBLw7KpFLUeLjqSiixAQHs4wf+Mf4CVx77nXjUXug/3q1hINhCyWgWmal7 vY1WeCDXM+qrrdxUgqzIhYRYpCPKChMjeozFltn9T0CcH/YdaD5hx3dB5A0YUPWZ SpF5oCL3iZzf2veA8BBJEIrFdmts/nFUzWaqMx4+2IcufYb+0kVw/AKi2M5B0ZiT UoOFFIsySR9hIMMIfHlkGqrnoO8LhlViRBx4u1O0bb0GYAyc+Nv6HvDJOSWuVe9C g5B4GMLuW1t9e5Qw3W0Qy1VRIC4QbOrd0zbjDrQ38GUemOjALuZ2h4+tr3bR93KU ZthueqsIzGKlr90PU6AVVZd128mDHLofJO4I4IoOgSPV7XIK4tufyA== =KZk0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: revoked transactions/guerrilla fee remailers
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:15 PM 01/09/95, L. McCarthy wrote: >- - From what I've seen so far, accepting payment would seem to make anonymous >_operation_ of a remailer well nigh impossible. Anonymous operation with >revenue would require a corresponding level of anonymity in the transfer of >money. Until such time as conversion of funds from a net-liquid form to a >conventional form becomes unnecessary (or just commonplace ?), financial >traffic analysis can't adequately be thwarted. >All this bodes ill, IMHO, for the prospect of guerrilla or quasi-guerrilla >remailers charging for service any time soon. There's just too much >infrastructure to which they'd need to be tied at the moment. Well, that's certainly true, for the reasons you gave. Right now, it's enough of a chore just to get non-anonymously run remailers charging for operation. And it's not easy to set up an effective guerilla remailer either. I think the set of tools and environments that make it possible to run a remailer anonymously and charge for it certainly aren't going to exist until the component problems of charging for a remailer at all and running a guerilla remailer at all are made easy. I think once both of those problems are dealt with, it won't be too dificult to deal with the combined problem of guerilla for-pay remailers. Or at least, exactly what things are neccesary to solve that combined problem will be obvious.

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positive publicity for anonymity
by nissim＠acs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just posted a proposal to alt.config for a new group alt.temping I'm hoping that temporary workers will use this as a forum to compare and contrast temp agencies, wage differences, 'permanent hire penalties' etc. There are about 4.4 million business service temps in the US. Wage differentials are noticeable - one egency will pay $2.00 more than another; this means $320/month to a temp worker. I expect temps to use anonymous posting capabilities to compare wage rates and company patterns *anonymously* because they may fear discrimination from their agencies. (I know I would) This seems like a very positive use of anonymity. Not only will millions of people on the bottom rung of office life be able to gain advantage by information, there are clear parallels to areas in the past of the left where unions and workers rights were seen as causes of first importance. In fact, the troubles involved in being temporary have been championed several times on television. This might make a good counterargument to 'teenagers and pipe bombs' If we say anonymity is a tool that helps up to 3-4% of the work force make intelligent choices and get paid more we may key into the left wing slant of the media. Treon Verdery (not posting from Adam's account this time!)

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AT&T produces video encryptor -- is it clipper based?
by perry＠imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just saw a story go by on the dow jones wire saying that AT&T had developed a "comprehensive security system for commercial information services". It is said to be an encryption system developed jointly by Bell Labs and VLSI, and its intedned for set-top boxes and "the internet". VLSI was one of the contractors on Clipper. Anyone know if this is an "escrowed" system? Anyone know any other details? Perry

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(fwd) Re: Racism on the Internet
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Xref: netcom.com alt.internet.services:40076 alt.internet.media-coverage:2932 Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!uunet!nwnexus!news.halcyon.com!usenet From: mpdillon(a)halcyon.com (Michael Dillon) Newsgroups: alt.internet.services,alt.internet.media-coverage Subject: Re: Racism on the Internet Date: Wed, 28 Dec 1994 18:11:51 +0000 Organization: Memra Software Inc., Armstrong, B.C., Canada Lines: 36 Message-ID: <dfQ0lapDlT1B073yn(a)halcyon.com> References: <18570UODGFHLRSDHOUP(a)curvet.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: halcyon.com This is forwarded from can.infohighway. Note the quote from Rutkowski at the bottom. This info should be more generally know on the net. In article <18570UODGFHLRSDHOUP(a)curvet.com>, dshaw(a)curvet.com wrote: > > IN>ae763(a)FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Harvey Goldberg) writes: > > >I work for the Canadian Human Rights Commission. > >I am currently doing research on the use of the > >Internet for the propagation of hate material. > >The purpose of the research is to determine what > >measures could be considered to control the use > >of the Net for this type of purpose. > > >I would appreciate hearing from anyone who has > >any views, information or comments on this > >subject or who know of anywhere on the Internet > >where this matter is discussed. > > According to Tony Rutkowski, Executive Director of the Internet > Society, "The Internet from a regulatory standpoint falls into the > category of private value-added networks, and in most countries under > the treaty provisions of the ITU, as well as the GATT, these are > networks that are outside the purview of government. To the extent > that there is any kind of obligation by governments, it is to allow > such networks to exist on a competitive basis". <Internet World, > January 1995>. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Cool cats, brick bats, bad boys wearin' big hats Surf's up, my cup, floating, flying, rising up. Michael Dillon mpdillon(a)halcyon.com C-4 Powerhouse, RR #2 michael(a)junction.net

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Re: for-pay remailers and FV
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:53 PM 1/9/95, Doug Barnes wrote: > ... Also, there is no reason on earth to take FV for payment under >such a scheme, if one wishes to preserve anonymity, and not have >to deal with the fraud/reversal factors. (The stamp issuer >would not know which blind-signed stamps were issued to the >turkey who reversed all his credit card transactions two months >after buying them -- see various threads on this vis-a-vis >using FV to buy blinded digital cash and why it won't work too >well.) > ... I don't see any reason to get FV involved, unless one were so lame >as to be unable to get signed up directly with the credit card >companies as a merchant -- a process of appropriate complexity >to indicate the posession of at least one (1) clue, which is prob. >desirable in someone who's going to be handling remailer finances MC/Visa require the reversibility of transactions as a condition of their merchant agreements. It's not something peculiar to FV. In fact, under certain conditions it is mandated by federal law. Escort services have a similar problem as far as non-returnability goes, but I don't know how they finesse their way around it. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Re: Pornography, What is it?
by Raul Deluth Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pornography is in the eyes of the beholder. [Especially if the beholder happens to be a postmaster in Memphis...] -- Raul D. Miller N=:((*/pq)&|)@ NB. public e, y, n=:*/pq <rockwell(a)nova.umd.edu> P=:*N/@:# NB. */-.,e e.&factors t=:*/<:pq 1=t|e*d NB. prim=:1&=@| 2&^@<: [. large=:>&(2^1024) x-:d P,:y=:e P,:x NB. (d P,:y)-:D P*:N^:(i.#D)y [. D=:|.@#.d

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