- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Gingrich, "crypto coalition" & dysfunctional philosophy
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The detweiler tentacle is afraid to debate me... >To: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri(a)netcom.com> >From: jimbell(a)pacifier.com (jim bell) >Subject: Re: Gingrich, "crypto coalition" & dysfunctional philosophy > >>well, I don't really care about convincing anarchists that you're >>a bozo. it's reasonable people who it would scare me if they began >>to take you seriously. > >Then start being "scared." I guess you have lots of practice. > >> frankly I'm not convinced that anyone with >>half a brain is taking you seriously. > >I don't have to convince you of anything! You wimped out! You claimed that you would be happy to debate me IN PUBLIC! Well, I did and you ran away with you tail between your legs! > >Stop being a wuss! If you're as correct as you claim you are, you have no reason to fear. Debate, dammit! >

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AI and Author-ID Security
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The AI and author-ID security programs covered in the Nov 17 Science article are described in detail at: <http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/coast.html> Active Defense of a Computer System Using Autonomous Agents Mark Crosbie and E. H. Spafford; Department of Computer Sciences, Purdue University; CSD-TR-95-008; 1995. Defending a Computer System Using Autonomous Agents Mark Crosbie and E. H. Spafford; Department of Computer Sciences, Purdue University; CSD-TR-95-022; 1995. Authorship Analysis: Identifying the Author of a Program Ivan Krsul; Department of Computer Sciences, Purdue University; MS Thesis; CSD-TR-94-030; 1994.

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Re: MED_vac
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 16 Nov 1995, Adam Shostack wrote: > If you have some personal data that includes your patient > number, why not have a card that instead lists your important data? > "This patient is diabetic, alergic to amoxicillin, and has Gold Cross > insurance." I'm confused. Are you saying that the answer is hardware?? Why I think someone already thought of that. It's called a MEDIC-ALERT bracelet. As someone who's blood type is rare, I can appreciate this. > At Defcon, Bruce Schneier was talking about the value stored > in casino chips. Its sttaggering. Its an alternate cash system, with > a huge float, astounding velocity, and very little fraud. Transaction > costs are low, clearing is instantaneous. The comparison is fairly > clear. I don't see the comparison. High value "chips" have additional security precautions engineered into them, over and above low-value chips, hopefully Schneier realizes this. There are also regular "counts", in fact perpetual "counts" in all casinos. I mean pit bosses and managers have to do something to earn their keep. (other than handing out comps, I mean.) There's also an "eye in the sky" lording over you in a casino, and the "chips" aren't actually "cleared" until you cashout. I'm not sure how Schneier got the idea that it was instantaneous clearing, but it isn't by any stretch of the imagination. But then what do I know ... I don't even sign my posts with PGP. > | So, what if my records were available on the net, but encrypted with a > | an key known to my physician and an escrow agency? (Equivalently, they > | could be on that smartcard, but encrypted.) If an emergency occurs, the > | hospital fetches my encrypted records from my physician's server, then > | sends a message (signed with the hospital's key) to Keys R Us, the escrow > | agent, saying "This is Dr. McCoy at Frobnitz Memorial Hospital, we need the > | key for FooBar Medix, Inc., patient number 147258369." (My FooBar Medix, > | Inc., insurance card lists my physician's server, the escrow agency, and my Why bother with having records on the "Net". What if the net goes down, then what?? Where are you left then? Relying on technology, simply because something CAN be done is very bad practice, when its not needed. When I travelled in the States, I simply kept a copy of my travel documents in my wallet. I never had any problem. And I had a copy of my pertinent medical data, attached via a MEDIC-ALERT bracelet to my body. Then again, the amount of information that you want a doctor reading over when you do have an emergency is minimal. You really want the doctor to act, not to get to know all of the details which aren't relevant to your treatment. There's no need to overload someone, you simply have to give someone the resources they need in order to get the job done. And that is the critical point, isn't it?? Getting the job done, and giving someone what's needed to do so. > -- > "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." > -Hume Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Learning about Elliptic Curves
by norm＠mediacity.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have found an easy introduction to elliptic curves. It is "Rational Points on Elliptic Curves" by Joseph H. Silverman & John Tate. (Springer-Verlag ISBN: 0-387-97825-9 or 3-540-97825-9) It is a breezy undergraduate introduction. It emphasizes the mathematical elegance. It mentions crypto applications but does not delve deeply. Schneier recommends "Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems" by Alfred J. Menezes. (Kluwer Academic Publishers ISBN: 0-7923-9368-6) That book has only a very compressed theory section which already requires knowledge of field theory. I think that the first book is a good intro to the second, which does cover crypto applications. What I learned is that elliptic curves are an alternative to finite fields for crpto purposes. Here is what they have in common: There are many (2^70 -- 2^2000) values any one of which can be represented in the machine in constant space. a_i is the ith one of these values. If someone sends you a_i it is real hard to figure out what i is. There is an operation that isn't too expensive for computing a_(i+j) given a_i and a_j. For some big integer i you can compute a_i in about (log i)^3 steps. For RSA, knowing how to do these two computations does not reveal what the period of the sequence is, i.e. what is the first i after 0 such that a_0 = a_i. Knowing the period is tantamount to knowing the private key.

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Re: crypto for porno users
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"moroni(a)scranton.com" "Moroni" 25-NOV-1995 16:21:44.10 I'm soory but I don't care if the images come from mars . Jerking off to the images of kids is sick. ---------------------------- That's your opinion, and thus your problem to be dealt with by you. Yes, I'm calling that a _problem_. If it makes you want to harm others who aren't harming anyone else, then it's a problem. I also have my doubts as to whether you can honestly deny ever being attracted by a young teenager, even as an adult. But your sexual preferences are not my business, any more than anyone else's are of yours. I will refrain from posting further on cypherpunks about this, since it's getting far from the purpose of the list. Feel free to reply in private email. -Allen

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REPOST: Amnesia Remailer
by Scott Kenney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Excuse the repost but I was asked to do this again !MIME :) The amnesia remailer is now available for public use: amnesia is a combination mixmaster/type 1 remailer supporting the following capabilities: <amnesia.chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub Encrypted: PGP - header ## - pasting Latency: - header Cutmarks: - header Encrypt-Key: - header Due to the nature of my mail connection there is an automatic variable latency of 0-180 minutes. The reordering pool is set to 5 presently. amnesia is currently running the following software: Lance Cottrell's Mixmaster v.2.0.3beta6 Lance Cottrell's Reordering package. John Fleming's Freedom Remailer v.1.00 (upgrading to 1.6beta soon) Hopefully USENET posting capability will be added soon. The remailer keys are attached. Scott Kenney =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com e320fd79c4c229decabe4d486bd84394 2.0.2 - -----Begin Mix Key----- e320fd79c4c229decabe4d486bd84394 258 AASlry72N9LH8PxZ2oyfETBsL/BTgi9XAVnRJ/61 poZOwA+JJ7hmok+3PCjRJyyT+e8zbzxKIcYoJneP 8alFIy/YHhFbzBHwqfRnakULVGdAKhonR4M2lqNc VWO+uiFdCxafVe0ZONjFQIrcr1EUS5bIQEBpf+fz 3wVkzzQ+ifOITwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB - -----End Mix Key----- - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzB86y8AAAEEAKEWFiS8DqxtyTacR9DOIcRqpRTkxdlq6UY4FxBzy16C0N3S dspQkwAQR5dDQqZ2JSRJ6m+iE0l+3OohZn44xMj/cbKUDFQon3Vh6vCBVvABPc1N aY1X9x9H7FzPOWsc4pivVbzJB3luw6+gzZ2zYAN/nX0oi9LoCrM8PpA8rdoFAAUR tDhBbW5lc2lhIFJlbWFpbGVyIFR5cGUgSSBLZXkgPGFtbmVzaWFAY2hhcmRvcy5j b25uaXguY29tPokAlQMFEDCB9D2zPD6QPK3aBQEB+6sEAIL/OtuErDiVpOqRARQQ I0yWWTU1tyT11Bl+Kmx1Sf5p1JyE2Z6bt3tPLflDyek2NY42tNV0k8cbig4Q9kvP 5GwCUcKRexiWVJFUpF6FABL2wZZMltt7nMmtxRwxw+LsMra7dYhPSaYewNNHKQ7C xcYKPxTg5HkCg7leqtEp2H9p =6+JZ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLgNDZQgY7wl3Gh1AQGUVQQA05aN+xx4sVVohysVN8xrvsvc5KxP/82y sLUHCerLEsKH2EHnb1mcoT8Ayu+nrp+0YU+/di2QNF+AMMONhP/J0OQJt7odqbFM ZgxUmyX9ya1UnRmZDiTEubGsUWeOMt9IZoeLryzMgYcB9502GpvMZWp8r6YFW5vN nEphpRRncWY= =Abso -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: So. FL Cypherpunks Keysigning/Party
by jpb＠miamisci.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jim Ray (liberty(a)gate.net) announced a South Florida Cypherpunks meeting for the night of Wednesday, November 29th at the Abbey Brewing Company on South beach. >Location: >The Abbey Brewing Company (305) 538-8110 >1115 16th Street, Miami Beach > >Directions: >[From North: Take I-95 South to 195 exit, over to the beach, and go South >on Alton Road. Look for a green sign that says "BAR" atop the building.] >[From South: Take I-95 North to 395 exit, over to the beach, and go North >on Alton Road. Look for a green sign that says "BAR" atop the building.] I am proposing that all cypherpunks planning on attending the meeting email me their PGP key fingerprint between now and noon on the 29th. I'll collate them and print enough copies of the fingerprint checklist for all who've announced that they're planning to attend. At the meeting, you can verify (or not, not my business, really) the fingerprints with the other attendees. Afterwards, we'll exchange keys via email and sign them at home and mail them back to their owners. I'll set up an email list so that each person can email out their key once they've merged all the signatures. Suggestions as to how to streamline this process are welcome. For more information on the meeting, contact Jim at liberty(a)gate.net Joe Block <jpb(a)miamisci.org> "We can't be so fixated on our desire to preserve the rights of ordinary Americans ..." -- Bill Clinton (USA TODAY, 11 March 1993, page 2A) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMLgL5WGnwFiC3O2NAQHxwAgAu6kSVBfEwBYGwNaYbw5OOjNxP6j49T5F h2z7WIKhehq94yiT+WhyijMscCqlGUTsBp3aDVFYY9n2/ONXr+MyGIMoTst0dvsv dXhuguIcBTuvImTddGA4MNZG7eUibO/r98BPJlF9iRfHTwpCOXOsNJGit+ONSB++ Cy8xgAFUiAUaOvNbi63pTnELoyCmBvFqhROqspeUmRGYYHZj4w3DF3nEH+XED31K vVx7FFpejIeBBfhk72T7vL0L+cu17R4uIhOgmqUmHIw7k7rmLxf+z7f7fNAwQpPi yjEsyXPtKwENXV2kRSc12O8XjwNoKiQBfuGBDpSfqbev4fkwoMuoyA== =z9sP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- signoff 2048bit-Fingerprint: 74 64 C7 6F 51 72 36 3D 87 75 F9 F5 2A F6 8F 74 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Help Phil! email zldf(a)clark.net or see http://www.netresponse.com/zldf

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Cypherpunk archives
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Is this list archived so that I can try to look stuff up before asking >stupid questions? see http://www.hks.net/cpunks/index.html -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: BOS_nya
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What Comes Next: > The End of Big Government And the New Paradigm Ahead > By James P. Pinkerton > Hyperion. 404 pp. $24.95 I read a review of this book in the Standard <ducking rotten tomatoes> with in the last week or so. If you think *I'm* hyperjargonate, you should see how this guy does it. Hear tell he practically invents his own language... May be worth a read if the local library has it, though. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://www.webstuff.apple.com/~vinnie/Rah >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 25 Nov 1995, Adam Shostack wrote: > Does X.509 version 3 fix the problem that Ross Anderson points > out in his 'Robustness Principles' paper? (Crypto '95 proceedings, or > ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/robustness.ps.Z) > > Its an excellent paper, well worth reading, but the basic > problem is that X.509 encrypts before signing. You'd rather sign before encryption?? Doesn't that give you "known plain-text" to attack? i.e. the signature. I'm not sure whether it would or wouldn't, but I'm sure some cryptographers here might clear that up mighty quick -- before any more harm is allowed, I mean. > Adam > > -- > "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." > -Hume Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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