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Karl Hess Club
by j.hastings6＠genie.geis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fellow c-punks: Since the topic of regional lists and meetings has been recently discussed, I thought I could announce a libertarian supper club without getting flamed for being off-topic. The first meeting of the club, named after Karl "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice..." Hess, featured J. Neil Schulman, author of Stopping Power: Why 70 Million Americans Own Guns. Next meeting Victor Koman talks about private space. Like any supper club I attend, I'll have the latest versions of PGP available for $1 per disk. Last time I announced news about Clipper, digital cash, and the MIT release, using information from this here list. Hope to meet some of you at this cypherpunk-friendly event. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- N A S A v s T h e K i n g s o f t h e H i g h F r o n t i e r =========================================================================== Victor Koman with his new novel, Kings of the High Frontier, goes where no libertarian went before... First he killed God -- the hardest-boiled private dick of the future did it (in The Jehovah Contract). Then he solved the Abortion Controversy -- saved the fetuses and kept a woman's Right to Choose (in Solomon's Knife). God and abortion were warm-ups; now Vic takes on Darth Vader's cadet academy: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. How many ways are there for free men and women to get to the High Frontier in spite of the best efforts of the Space Nazgl to keep them from it? Read Kings of the High Frontier and count them, baby! And come hear Victor himself blow the State out of our way into space at: the second meeting of the Karl Hess Club Monday, July 18, 1994 -- 7 PM Dinner at the Alpine Village Emerald Room, take the Torrance Blvd exit off the 110 fwy, just South of where the 405 meets the 91, between Vermont and Hamilton. PROGRAM == Presentation of the first ever Chauntecleer Medallion for Libertarian Activism by Samuel Edward Konkin III, for the movement, to Chauntecleer Michael for more than a decade of hard-core activism! == Announcements == Featured speaker (above) == Questions and Answers (moderated by the speaker) == Survey of Attendees: should this club move? == After-meeting until midnight. NOTES =* Full bar. Pitchers of good, foreign dark beer available! =* NEW: dinner (if you want to eat) now prix fixe $17 and includes a choice of four entres (schnitzel, sauerbrauten, Tyrolian chicken, plus one), coffee or tea, tax and tip. Only dessert extra. =* Still no reservations needed and no charge for program. =* Plenty of convenient parking available. =* Photography and tape recording encouraged. =* Smoking encouraged but not required. Kids welcome. Kent - j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLhHLUzQYUX1dU7vxAQFQZwQAtjPmbRVfgql/u97CZ/h2qchlzUHqBkr2 OIai3eCnel/sgOrFQNjZBiIixUNIU9Phg5Rv43QybLlGjeajUWJHm7xPV1VP67Pf gL6a+yXMj3l7TWtPpV8IZr5uPBnXQ5gjY0PTAvt45lD7MxI7PRStMBiDgCyZl6h5 fY+58UVxtGI= =l9Jp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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MAIL: chained remailing strategy
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Can some of the major remailer operators make available some > "sanitized" traffic stats of average traffic by hour and day of the > week? Well, I don't run a remailer at the moment, but I can about ones I used to run. One I ran (elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu) batched all incoming messages and remailed them randomly at midnight. So in some sense it didn't matter when during the day mail arrived. During its operation, the remailer averaged about 15-20 messages a week, or about 2-3 a day (I don't remember which days of the week if any were more popular). Sometimes there were severe usage "spikes", when the remailer would handle several times its average (once nearly 100 messages in a week, and 20 in one day). However, I feel that this was due to users repeatedly submitting messages - perhaps testing the remailer - without realizing the remailer only resent at midnight. I don't know what loads remailers operated with, but more messages circulating via anonymous remailer would definitely help. > Can someone familiar with remailer software answer something? When > a message is encrypted, using the "Encrypted: PGP" header, will > everything after the end of the encrypted message itself be ignored? > I ask, because this seems like a good place to introduce "padding" > into the message length to thwart detection of identical messages, > assuming that such extraneous material wouldn't screw something up. Yes, the extra text is ignored. In fact, the remailer implemented this form of padding (however, it only padded messages shorter than 2K out to 2K). This isn't the best way to do padding since it is quite obvious that it is in fact padding. Hal Finney wrote some perl scripts which pad inside the pgp message (add random text without likewise updating the message length field; upon decryption the extra text is throw away) and this is a better approach. I think one thing that screws things up (Bill O'Hanlon pointed this out months ago) is if somebody encrypts a message with the -m option (for eyes only) - this causes the remailer to hang, waiting for keyboard input. I'm not sure if this problem is easily fixable on the remailer side. > What's the best strategy for utilizing a given group of remailers > in a chain? Which ones would be most advantageous as the FIRST Run your own and use that one as the first link ;) > How would "someone", hypothetically, follow the chain backwards? Hm... I guess exactly the way you describe, by going to each machine and trying to piece together the remailing path, possibly with help from the syslog file. > What, if anything, would prevent that? By disabling sendmail logging, if the remailer operator is able to. (I wasn't able to on any of the remailers I ran). Of course, other forms of logging would need to be disabled as well. > For the sake of argument, let's assume a worst-case scenario: a > chained message to "president(a)whitehouse.gov" containing a Well, I'm not sure. A few months ago, there was only one remailer outside of the U.S. (in Canada, @extropia.wimsey.com). However, now there are several, in the Netherlands, and one in Italy (?). I guess it would depend on whether the chain includes out of the country remailers, if each remailer keeps logs (including syslog which may or may not be in control of the remailer operator). All the same, I would recommend remailers block @whitehouse.gov. :) Karl Barrus klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLhJHbcSF/V8IjI8hAQEGswP+LmW+DqIOr7UZS82/EVINGn57e+LtBzlJ 0HOonCMuId7DmC7OiqbRyHD2TSHNZB5KrPOVGg7N4QXtuzioJ55e/S9mdMxsSy0G 9oan4UGzMZEyw9rD09KIu5MqG4vt/KVQqpNhy7F8XMZwt9wwlbupeQv1v/92VdRU rDOlw9pCnZE= =A4af -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NSA
by root%pig.jjm.com%jjmhome.jjm.com＠jjmhome 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just two small points. First NSA's two missions are protecting classifed US communications and penetrating those of everyone else. Neither is aided at all by publication of NSA developed cipher technology. Seems particularly silly to assume that no matter how much NSA mathematicians and engineers might like to publish that the agency would let them if by so doing they made their job harder in either the short or long term. And certainly it is not in the agencies interest to publish much of anything ex-officio either. So it is really kind of stupid to complain that they must not be any good because they have not contributed to the published body of work that constitutes the infant modern science of mathematical cryptography when the existance of and quality of that body of knowlage is their greatest long term challenge. NSA's mission depends critically on others underestimating NSAs capability and overestimating their own skills at making and breaking codes. If those whose codes NSA has cracked thought they could be cracked they would not have used them (would have used one time pads or some other technology that is truly secure instead). It is thus obviously not in NSAs interest to allow the world to know just what they have developed and when, especially if by so doing they frighten the codemakers in the rest of the world into using more secure technology, and certainly so if by thus admitting they can be seen to be endorsing a particular technology that they have in fact been using in US codes because they think it secure. This brings up the second point. IS NSA really presuring RSA because they fear the security of the RSA exponentiation algorithms or because they can break them and hope to induce people to use use them by seeming afraid of them ? What would be a better endorsement of a security product than that the NSA wanted it banned because it was too good ? Or would it ? I personally find it extremely hard to believe that Clipper/Skipjack is not riddled with holes and backdoors since it seems inconceivable that NSA would allow a NSA technology that could be used effectively against them to be circulated world wide. They can't really believe that the anti-reverse engineering stuff will protect them against foreign goverments and other well funded research organizations for long, and they admit to having known of Blaze's checksum hack so it seems likely that anything one could extract from reverse engineering the chip and algorithm is flawed in some more subtle way. Weak Keys ? Or do they have a general method of solving DES like ciphers ? Dave Emery N1PRE die(a)pig.jjm.com

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Re: ANI 800 number
by Matthew Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

shamrock(a)netcom.com (Lucky Green) wrote: | About 1.5 years ago, Sandy posted an 800 number that would give you the | | number of the phone you are calling from. Does anyone still have that? | No, but you can use AT&T's test number - 1073214049889664 (you won't be charged for the call) If you're interested in that type of thing, you might want to read alt.2600

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Re: PC Expo summary!!
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rarachel(a)photon.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian): > FEB 17 CYPHERPUNKS TRANSCRIPT > Copyright (C) 1994, cypherpunks(a)toad.com All Rights Reserved. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I wonder how the courts will interpret that ;) Pats on the back to you for going ahead with the distribution of disks. It would be a good idea to put up the contents of the disk at some FTP site, maybe soda. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Detweiler clone at WSJ
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The drumbeat against all those anonymous pedophiles continues.... _Wall Street Journal_, 6/30/94 PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY by Walter S. Mossberg "Keeping Your Kids Away From Creeps As They Play Online" (...Talk about striking up electronic friendships online ...) But there's a dark side to this exciting phenomenon, one that's too rarely understood by computer novices. Because they offer instant access to others, and considerable anonymity to participants, the services make it possible for people - especially computer-literate kids - to find themselves in unpleasant, sexually explicit social situations (Sex-ed sessions led by Joycelyn Elders?) The online services all have rules banning bad conduct and, fearing possible government-imposed restrictions, have stepped up the policing of online abuse. But parents could do more to protect kids from these disturbing situations. And I've gradually come to adopt the view, which will be controversial among many online users (!), that the use of nicknames and other forms of anonymity must be eliminated or severly curbed to force people online into at least as much accountability for their words and actions as exists in real social encounters. (.. More talk about how your kid might [gasp!] download a "hardcore pornographic photo" [This guy should see the stuff on the newstands in Amsterdam!]...) Beyond that, I think it's time now for the services to jettison the long tradition of allowing members to hide behind "handles" or nicknames. In general people should conduct themselves online under their real names, or not at all. IN THE SAME VEIN, I THINK THE SERVICES SHOULD DELAY GRANTING NEW MEMBERS ACCESS FOR 24 OR 48 HOURS ...WHILE THEY VERIFY THAT THE APPLICANTS ARE REALLY WHO THEY SAY THEY ARE ... (emphasis mine). (And some folks thought that Brady-style fascism would only be applied to "gun-nuts"! Won't be long before you have to have a license to drive on the information superhighway.) (Article continues with more of same. Lambasts AOL. Talks about "the most dangerous forms of communication," etc.) ------------------------------------------------------------------- I didn't comment on NSA threatening Bidzos because dog bites man is not news. If you annoy the Nazis in power and they can get away with it they will kill you. BTW: The current _New Republic_ contains a story about an Oxford student being threatened by the Secret Service over a much more trivial matter.

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Re: Question: Key Distr. in realtimeo applications?
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

adam(a)bwh.harvard.edu writes: >Sending your otp by RSA reduces the security of your OTP to that of RSA Who said anything about sending a one time pad under RSA? I was talking about a session key. Sorry not to use the buzz word "session key", but neither did I use the buzz word "otp", I just said "random"... -kb -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 31:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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(FWD) WHAT MOTIVATES CRYP
by bmorris＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com JJ> anathema to the libertarian and I'm curious to know if there JJ> are other crypto users (I would NEVER call myself a cypherpunk JJ> :-) who's interest stems from a left-wing rather than JJ> right-wing viewpoint. I'm a leftie and was also a bit bemused by the idea of using crypto to avoid paying taxes. Hopefully we can find a bit more exalted use of crypto than that. However, I assume all here are agreed that strong private crypto is a good thing. "Politics makes strange bedfellows", indeed. This wouldn't be the first time that those on the fringes of the left and the right saw a common enemy - encroaching government with control in their hearts. * RM 1.4 B0037 *

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Re: Detweiler clone at WS
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

R.>The down side was that licensing was mentioned as the first recourse R.>from the state. When we complained of the financial hit, the talk R.>turned to registration. But the sense was clearly toward proactive R.>state control. Are these people mentally retarded or what. A BBS is a publication. The 1st Amendment was specifically written to outlaw the British licensing of publications. No risk. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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The 800 number requested
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The outfit was called "Full Disclosure" and was at 800 235 1414. I haven't tried it for a long time so, no guarantee its still active.

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