- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

PGP encryption for HTML forms
by Dorab Patel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've developed a simple protocol for encrypting the submission of HTML forms using PGP. I've written up the protocol in an "Internet Draft". We are distributing two reference implementations (with sources --- copyrighted, but freely redistributable). One is a modification to lynx sources to handle this protocol natively. The other is a "helper application" (by Jun Hamano) to do the encryption written in python. You can get the package via anon ftp. ftp://ftp.cs.ucla.edu/pub/sitp.tar.gz Comments welcome. Snarf it before it becomes illegal! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.2, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBMDTTYGnoQvE1ROndAQE5dQP/SWII7eR/eFYWsdU6mOilLZautmtS1rb9 kRcifS02p7WS3N3sY+MRu20uuPmuL+f+5rriYWJWVgd//s3jgegs8HGqmRuxVQdL qMFRmtMB5oUfYkLmTiDebHsksr2YLF+AB8vrBCgXIbgKAcSRF4OStRyXBUeXfZ/3 gp9MiACvXV4= =PxCp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: SSL challenge -- broken !
by goedel＠tezcat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Neal wrote: >On 18 Aug 1995, Panzer Boy wrote: >> John Pettitt (jpp(a)software.net) wrote: >> : Huh? So you run on 120 workstations worth how much? to steal a credit >> : card number worth how much? Get real - there are hundreds of ways >> : to get credit card numbers that cost less. >> >> Has anyone thought about starting up a distributed rc4 cracking web. >> Send in your message to a web server form, it will then spawn of requests >> to a pool of machines willing to try cracking rc4 for you. Allow anyone >> to offer up spare cycles towards the effort. >> > >I suggested that very thing just yesterday in the list, but my message >seems to have gone awry. In short, I suggested we use E-Cash payments >for cracking efforts. This would establish a reward for participating >and an 'exchange rate' for e-cash at the same time. I'd we willing to set up a "crackweb" mailing list, or perhaps a site to register your machine(s) with % available and MIPS ratings. DJK

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Re: Netscape security
by adam＠bwh.harvard.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

| > > There is no word as to how to become a KSA. Netscpe has | > >ignored the question on several occaisons. | > | > I'm fairly sure that I remember Taher saying at the W3C security | > meeting that they intend to do this, and that hardcoding the CA's | > into the library was as quick hack. I also have the impression | > that they don't know how to do it, but my recollection is fuzzier there. | | It has been stated publicly several times that we do plan to allow | user configurable certificate authority and server trust. A user | will be able to configure their browser to talk to servers that have | certificates signed by any CA they choose to trust. But I think I can work cheaper than Verisign. What do I have to do to get set up as a KCA today? Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: WhiSSLing in the Dark
by ab411＠detroit.freenet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Netscape Encrypted Data Cracked > >Tokyo, Japan, Aug. 18 (NB) -- ... > >Many companies working on secure transaction systems hope >the much more secure 128-bit code version of the system >will be available for export eventually. This is said to >be almost unbreakable, requiring a trillion times more >processing power to crack than the 40-bit version. ... Notice how the "over a trillion times more" has devolved into simply "a trillion times more" -- and we all know that the former statement was a gross underestimate, reminiscent of the claim of "over 3 billion combinations" on Ideal's packaging for Rubik's cube. Of course the real reason the media have standardized on trillian for this is that they know it is the biggest number the bulk of their audience is familiar with, and that if they said 3e26 or even "three times ten to the twenty-sixth power" they would snow most of their readers/viewers. (To be fair, I think the WSJ did say 10^26, with a brief explanation of what that meant. I congratulate them for not "talking down" to their readers.) -- David R. Conrad, ab411(a)detroit.freenet.org, http://www.grfn.org/~conrad Finger conrad(a)grfn.org for PGP 2.6 public key; it's also on my home page Key fingerprint = 33 12 BC 77 48 81 99 A5 D8 9C 43 16 3C 37 0B 50 Jerry Garcia, August 1, 1942 - August 9, 1995. Requiescat in pace.

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Re: WhiSSLing in the Dark
by goedel＠tezcat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David R. Conrad wrote: >>Netscape Encrypted Data Cracked >> >>Tokyo, Japan, Aug. 18 (NB) -- ... >> >>Many companies working on secure transaction systems hope >>the much more secure 128-bit code version of the system >>will be available for export eventually. This is said to >>be almost unbreakable, requiring a trillion times more >>processing power to crack than the 40-bit version. ... > >Notice how the "over a trillion times more" has devolved into simply "a >trillion times more" -- and we all know that the former statement was a >gross underestimate, reminiscent of the claim of "over 3 billion >combinations" on Ideal's packaging for Rubik's cube. > >Of course the real reason the media have standardized on trillian for >this is that they know it is the biggest number the bulk of their >audience is familiar with, and that if they said 3e26 or even "three >times ten to the twenty-sixth power" they would snow most of their >readers/viewers. (To be fair, I think the WSJ did say 10^26, with a >brief explanation of what that meant. I congratulate them for not >"talking down" to their readers.) I talked the guy out of using an analogy with physical key length (the kind you stick in a door) and he settled on "10^26" rather than a power of 2. Also, I gave hime the relevant names, e-mail addresses, and URL's, but didn't have any phone numbers. BTW, in the "cryptography experts and hackers and mathematicians" as well as the whole "hacker" slant, smells like an editor. Dietrich J. Kappe | Red Planet http://www.redweb.com/ Red Planet, L.L.C.| "Chess Space" /chess 1-800-RED 0 WEB | "MS Access Products" /cobre Web Publishing | E-mail: RedPlanet(a)redweb.com

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Re: PGP Certification Service for Pseudonyms
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In my announcement about Pseudonym Signing Service, I forgot to type Rule 4) 4) Any messages requesting signatures for keys must be signed by the key requesting the signature (both the key and the email message need to be signed...) Thanks; Bill #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- "The fat man rocks out Hinges fall off Heaven's door "Come on in," says Bill" Wavy Gravy's haiku for Jerry

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Sun's buggy MD5?
by michael shiplett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's something fun to do on Solaris 2.3 or 2.4. Notice the similarity among the Solaris md5 output. Anyone know why this is? The Sun service folk weren't able to point me to a Solaris bug-report email address. I had a similar experience looking through www.sun.com. Pointers are welcomed. PROBLEM: A program which uses md5 from a dynamically linked (or loaded) library and the nsl library is loaded before a ``standard'' md5 library will get md5 results different from the rest of the non-Solaris world. NOTES: the non-Solaris md5 files are from RFC 1321. some test output has been deleted as it does not fit nicely on a standard message line. solmd5 seems to give slightly different output on different machines and greatly different output with different compilers the nsl library is required on Solaris 2.4 when using sockets. /usr/include/sys/ppp_chap.h includes a slightly modified---mainly names---version of md5.h. % gcc -o md5 mddriver.c md5c.c % gcc -o solmd5 mddriver.c -lnsl % ./md5 -x MD5 test suite: MD5 ("") = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e MD5 ("a") = 0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661 MD5 ("abc") = 900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72 MD5 ("message digest") = f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0 MD5 ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz") = c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b MD5 ("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789") = d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f % ./solmd5 -x MD5 test suite: MD5 ("") = f00001c0effffba8429b59d50529097c MD5 ("a") = f00003c0effffba8aec5fcf4284a8dbe MD5 ("abc") = f00005c0effffba896fc8af8ca60a911 MD5 ("message digest") = f00007c0effffba8f373218f317a9558 MD5 ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz") = f00009c0effffba896b4f24acb3f4738 MD5 ("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789") = f0000bc0effffba8cef237a614aa457d michael

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Economic Model for Key Cracking
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So far, list members have mostly presented two points of view on the economics of key cracking: o It's free, since it uses spare CPU cycles o It should be priced at the cost of the dedicated computer hardware needed to do it. Both of these approaches are wrong. The first approach fails because it doesn't scale -- there probably aren't enough people willing to crack lots of keys purely for the research interest, hack value, or the goodness of their heart. At the same time, many people and companies have lots of unused CPU time on their hands. Economically, this CPU time is scrap material -- and there are companies out there that do nothing but buy up scrap equipment for pennies on the dollar. Therefore it should be possible to create a market in spare CPU cycles for tasks like this that require massive parallel computing. An earlier suggestion for bounties on keys (basically the Chinese lottery approach) is a step in this direction. I'd also like to point out that a hacker who can sniff out SSL-encrypted packets on a hacked network is going to be vastly harder to catch than someone who trolls through his or her physical community dumpster diving and bribing clerks. The ability to anonymously gather and decrypt credit card numbers has a vastly lower "cost" in terms of likelyhood of prosecution. If it drops down to under $100 per key, it's probably at a good break-even point to do it wholesale. Certainly the out-of-pocket cost of cracking a 40-bit SSL key is less than that right now for a great many people, even without creating a market.

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Time-memory tradeoff in SSL's RC4 code?
by JMKELSEY＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Thu, 17 Aug 1995 08:32:56 -0400 >From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> >Subject: Re: SSL challenge -- broken ! >It has occured to me that, because the RC4 key crackers spend most of >their time in key setup, you can crack N SSL sessions that you >captured in not substantially more time than it took to crack 1. This >is analagous to the way brute force Unix password file hacking operates. This would work with straight 40-bit keys, but I believe SSL uses 128-bit keys, and then intentionally leaks 88 bits to comply with export requirements, to prevent this kind of attack from working. >Perry --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)delphi.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMDVGXUHx57Ag8goBAQFyUQP7B7fhKc8AqpcHnQ09ip5gOfy5QMCtGImB f1Y9lZtAmLFwOIkrfdaL2vCWJKIKc7yg8+FwtmX6Q8yYWH4TdE5eWOGIKSfl5Q8f etVgF2B49T5Lxxb02ah5cHfO8baOqQOTMkvzQ9bj0XVqAItPoPjDTCOAAegwKZ3V 6L+kZQn89lY= =KkAX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Export policy change
by JMKELSEY＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Thu, 17 Aug 1995 23:48:01 -0400 >From: Rich Salz <rsalz(a)osf.org> >Subject: Export policy change >Just heard on the 11:30pm NPR news update. The Clinton Administration >has changed the crypto export policy. You will now be allowed to >export strong crypto, provided it is a key escrow system. The >reporter (Dan Charles?) said something like anyone can hold the keys, >as long as they will be made avail when presented with a court order. >He also said, US citizens will still be able to use strong crypto >without key escrow internally. Terrorists and drug pushers were given >as "reasons." I think this is an important and somewhat subtle political move on the part of the administration. If they can get at least a few large businesses (the ones who buy into the key-escrow scheme) on their side, by making it in their economic interests for everyone to use escrowed crypto, they will have manufactured some potentially powerful allies in the computer industry. Certainly, once any major company has spent a lot of money to set up a key escrow facility, they will help lobby *against* any easing of the requirement to use escrowed crypto, based simply on self-interest. --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)delphi.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMDVGZUHx57Ag8goBAQEutQQAmM/qEIAlLklDRW/FVvLah7vgY6lYcCK/ XToA79tVZNmy+8U/XjS2g6+Ffsc/gQflOdg/ZmewDOQRJ4YI+BzHUjKL5NVDWAUA /4+ySWxcAAEOD23GhS9p/iFN/Gbe0oV9JIQ2HCpPN929VaRl7J+1fWA/ETZkB914 ClJPlXqa1xo= =XefF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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