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Re: the cost of untracability?
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:42 PM 4/12/96 -0400, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"weidai(a)eskimo.com" "Wei Dai" 7-APR-1996 10:52:52.30 > >>I think you're right. There is no need for the issuer to pay explicit >>interest. The easiest way to eliminate signorage would be to steadily >>increase the value of each denomination of ecash. ... > > Another method would be for ecash to have a label on it as to when the >issuer would redeem it. Until then, if you want cash from it, find someone else >to trade to. ... And if you are using a "first to clear gets the money" system like Digicash, the holders can race to see who gets the money. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:37 PM 4/12/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"jimbell(a)pacifier.com" "jim bell" 7-APR-1996 03:10:38.36 >>I think that most crimes that subpoenas would normally be used for are >>probably not crimes at all, and are probably "malum prohibitum," not "malum >>in se" crimes. And in the future, they would likely be used to harass >>political enemies, as harassment was done in the 1950's and 60's. This >>means, for anybody of a libertarian bent, that it would actually be better >>if the government could be rendered incapable of enforcing them. Naturally, >>governments and courts will resist, but that will be irrelevant. > > I would guess that most instances of violations of banking secrecy, >wiretaps, et al fall into this category also. True, I think. For example, 10-20 years from now there will probably be no need anymore for laws against wiretaps, because crypto telephones will become so cheap and ubiquitous that it will be assumed that anybody saying anything "valuable" on the phone will be using good crypto. If that's the case, nobody will even bother doing wiretaps, and nobody will ever lose anything as a consequence of being tapped. There's no point in having a law against a crime that never occurs. Likewise, "banking secrecy" will become a contractural obligation: Nobody who isn't privy to this information will be able to retrieve it. Looked at in this light, laws against victimless crimes can be seen as a last, desperate attempt by government to replace the real crimes which are "lost" to technological developments with placeholders; things the cops can do when nobody needs them. I think it would be reasonable to present so-called "law enforcement" with an ultimatum: "Make yourself obsolete within 10 years or we do it for you." In other words, choose only those crimes which have real victims, and figure out technological ways to either prevent them entirely, or solve then once committed. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: A little Paranoid, PUNKS?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

StanSquncr wrote: > Subject: A little Paranoid, PUNKS? Dimitri? Is that you, Dimitri?

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What can the judge do to me?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An unnamed cypherpunk asked: > I was just wondering how/if [International Union] fit[s] in with frequent >claim 'the judge can throw away the key' if he wants...... c'punks - I've been involved in a private discussion with a list reader about the extent to which courts can impose contempt fines and sanctions. I thought I would post the results to the list as many have expressed interest in the ways that courts might try to compel production of crypto keys or compel offshore e-cash institutions. The bulk of my answer follows. The key to limiting the ability of a court to summarily enter contempt sanctions has always been the classification of the sanctions. "Criminal" sanctions, may entitle the witness to a trial by jury. "For 'serious' criminal contempts involving imprisonment of more than six months, these [procedural] protections include the right to jury trial. " International Union, United Mine Workers of America, et al. v. Bagwell et al., 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1993)(hereinafter, International Union)(citing Bloom, 391 U.S., at 199; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 41 L. Ed. 2d 897, 94 S. Ct. 2697 (1974)). "Civil" sanctions do not require such protections and can be imposed on the spot and without review. "...civil contempt sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are considered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard. Neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required." International Union, supra. The court in International Union also makes a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" contempts. "Direct contempts that occur in the court's presence may be immediately adjudged and sanctioned summarily." International Union, supra. These would certainly include refusing to reveal non-privileged information on the stand, and may include the refusal to reveal the passphrase to a crypto key while on the stand. The court also recognizes that the indefinite confinement option is available to judges. Specifically, "[t]he paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction, as set forth in Gompers, involves confining a contemnor _indefinitely_ until he complies with an affirmative command such as an order "to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance." International Union, supra (emphasis added)(citing Gompers, 221 U.S., at 442). See also, McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64, 83 L. Ed. 1108, 59 S. Ct. 685 (1939) (failure to testify). Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, n. 6, 16 L. Ed. 2d 622, 86 S. Ct. 1531 (1966) (upholding as civil "a determinate 24 month sentence which includes a purge clause"). My favorite language from the court defining such sanctions is this: "In these circumstances, the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act, and thus "carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket." International Union, supra (citing Gompers, 221 U.S., at 442, quoting In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 451 (1902)). The court goes on: "A contempt fine accordingly is considered civil and remedial if it either 'coerces the defendant into compliance with the court's order, [or] . . . compensates the complainant for losses sustained.'" International Union, supra (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-304). And, "Where a fine is not compensatory, it is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge." International Union, supra, (citing Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 91 L. Ed. 1117, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947)). And on per diem fines, "Like civil imprisonment, such fines exert a constant coercive pressure, and once the jural command is obeyed, the future, indefinite, daily fines are purged." International Union, supra. The court makes a point to justify severe sanctions where testimony is sought, or the proceedings are threatened. "The necessity justification for the contempt authority is at its pinnacle, of course, where contumacious conduct threatens a court's immediate ability to conduct its proceedings, such as where a witness refuses to testify, or a party disrupts the court... [t]hus, petty, direct contempts in the presence of the court traditionally have been subject to summary adjudication, 'to maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process in the face of an 'actual obstruction of justice.'" International Union, supra (quoting Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S., at 513 and citing numerous other sources). Most interesting to the crypto crowd: "Contempts such as failure to comply with document discovery, for example, while occurring outside the court's presence, impede the court's ability to adjudicate the proceedings before it and thus touch upon the core justification for the contempt power.... Similarly, indirect contempts involving discrete, readily ascertainable acts, _such as turning over a key_ or payment of a judgment, properly may be adjudicated through civil proceedings since the need for extensive, impartial fact-finding is less pressing." International Union, supra (emphasis added). Hence, International Union preserves very broad contempt sanctions which can be imposed without much review provided they fall into a rather wide "civil" categorization, rather than a "criminal" one. I think it's clear, the court literally spells this out, that holding a witness indefinitely until he complies with court orders is within the discretion of a judge. Compelling through sanctions the production of a "key" (though I'm not sure a crypto key is directly contemplated) is likewise clearly permitted. --- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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Re: why compression doesn't perfectly even out entropy
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:36 AM 4/11/96, jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >At 10:36 PM 4/9/96 -0400, JonWienke(a)aol.com wrote: >> Would anyone like to propose a means of measuring entropy that we can all >> agree on? I haven't seen anything yet that everyone likes. > >Nor will you: To measure entropy is a deep unsolved philosophical >and physical problem. Indeed. That there can be no simple definition of entropy, or randomness, for an arbitrary set of things, is essentially equivalent to Godel's Theorem. (To forestall charges that I am relying on an all-too-common form of bullshitting, by referring to Godel, what I mean is that "randomness" is best defined in terms of algorithmic information theory, a la Kolmogorov and Chaitin, and explored in Li and Vitanyi's excellent textbook, "Algorithmic Information Theory and its Applications.") Think of it this way: when can a set of things, a string, etc., be _compressed_. Answer: whenever a compression is found. Most things have no real compressions, that is, they have no shorter description than themselves. But they _might_ have a shorter description, a compression, and we can never say for sure that they do not. Thus, even a set which we think is of "high entropy" (roughly, "high randomness" or "no order" or "not compressible") may actually have some hidden order, or compressibility, not apparent at first glance. That we can never know when we have achieved maximum compression is a profound result of modern mathematics and information theory. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ Dorothy - there's been substantial discussion on cypherpunks about your position escrow proposal; the paper that's on your web page was posted here.] At 03:01 PM 4/11/96 -0400, perry(a)piermont.com wrote: >Paul_Koning/US/3Com%3COM(a)smtp1.isd.3com.com writes: >> Suppose I want to pretend that I am 1000 feet closer to satellite 4 than >> I really am. Simple, I take the signals from all the other satellites >> and delay them by 1 microsecond. That looks like a 1 microsecond >> local timebase error together with a 1 microsecond delay reduction >> to satellite 4. >Aren't things even worse? Since the satelite signals are not >authenticated with anything like public key methods, couldn't I just >synthesize a signal appropriate to any spot on the planet, knowing the >positions of the satelites relative to that spot? No, you can't. One problem is that the Selective Availability coding isn't predictable, since it uses some kind of secret military code - so you don't know what its values are until you hear them. So as long as you share any satellites with the recipient, you need to be sure to output the correct codes for that satellite, which means you need to either be in range or have access to some internet "position remailer" site that's making them available. As far as predicting relative timing between satellites to fake your position, if that's sufficiently unpredictable that you can't fake it, as Denning and MacDoran say, then it should also be equally unpredictable to the verifier who wants to know if you're telling the truth or faking it. And if you require systems to respond to requests for "Where are you now?" or especially "Where were you on the night of April 13th at 8:37pm?", the spoofer can request that information just as easily as the verifier. One method that could be used to prevent faking is GPS receivers with "tamperproof" digital signature capability, which would not only receive the location information but sign it; that's not much more secure than just having a "tamperproof" token in the first place. As far as the multipath issues that some people have brought up, I searched for "MacDoran" on altavista, and found several papers on GPS multipath, so they're aware of the issue, though I don't know how they're planning to address it. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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[NOISE] Why there are so many cluless people
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today, I heard a commercial on the radio. Some company wants to help you make $1k+ per day as an Internet expert. Simply listen to their one week audio tape course and you know everything you need to work as an Internet consultant. Sigh, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Spinners and compression functions
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have had a somewhat related idea to this on compression regarding steaography and which bits are the best ones to use. How about those that a lossy compression method that's reasonable loses first? These are the ones that aren't going to be noticed by the viewer, and (if the compression method is good) will have at least somewhat higher entropy than the rest. -Allen

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Re: Entropy Estimator
by rick hoselton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:19 AM 4/12/96 -0400, JonWienke(a)aol.com wrote: >I just added a feature to my entropy graphing program that >estimates the number of bits of entropy in the file, Hey, that's just what I need. I have these two 8-million byte files. One is a recording made by a geiger counter, every bit is uncorrelated with anything else in the universe and each bit is equally likely to be a one or a zero. The second file is an IDEA encryption of all the four-byte numbers from one to two-million. Here's my problem. I can't remember which file is which, and I've forgotten sixty-four bits of the key I used to produce the encrypted file. That's where your technique come in. The first file has sixty-four million bits of entropy. The second file has only sixty-four bits of entropy, total (the missing key bits). Surely, your technique can tell me which file is which. Estimating entropy can be difficult, and I don't expect perfection. But any measuring technique that is not a complete HOAX must be able to clearly find a difference of six orders of magnitude. If you tried to give me a ruler that couldn't detect the difference between a millimeter and a kilometer, I might think you misunderstood something about the concept of distance. If encouraged me to use a clock that could not measure the difference between a minute and a year, many would conclude that you were not an expert in chronology. So, if your technique is worth anything at all, it should be able to accomplish this easy task. PS. I think it is your patriotic duty to report this technique to the Federal government. They frequently need to distinguish between ciphertext and just plain random digits. A breakthrough like this would have a major impact on national security. They might be willing to remove ITAR restrictions from cryptography, out of gratitude to the cypherpunks.

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PICS
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had a chance for a brief look at the PICS protocol, and it seems to have a lot of cypherpunks relevance. It includes features such as: Multiple third party rating systems Digital signatures I will have to find time to look at it in more detail. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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