- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Crypto CD
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:52 AM 3/24/96 -0500, Ben Holiday wrote: >I would plan to put unix/dos/mac all on one CD. I'm thinking that >realistically I can expect 50 megs or so. Possibly as much as 100 if I >find a TON of wonderful text. If you include the archives of this list, the main forign archives, and the various sources in the US, you will EASILY exceed 100 megs. (More like 200.) If you seperate out all the duplications, you might squeeze under the 100 megs mark. >Could be useful to individuals, as well as for groups wishing to create >FTP sites etc. It would be a nice thing to have if it is reletivly complete. Hopefully it can be created with a minimum of government interfearence. (But then, I have been xpecting alt.binaries.crypto to be created as well...) >Pricing with shipping would wind up around US$20.00, give or take 5 dollars.. Sounds about right. You will probibly need to run about 1000 or so. Actually, the prices for CDs in bulk are pretty cheap. (Just expensive up front.) Depends how much premastering you are able to do up front. (If you need information and/or contacts to get mastering done, send me private e-mail. I used to work for a CD-ROM company.) >I'd like to know first off whether such a thing already exists. Not that I know of... I have seen a few of the "Hacker" discs with crypto code on it, but nothing complex (other than ancient versions of PGP) and you have to wade though alot of crap to get to it. >Secondly >whether anyone would be interested in possesing such a thing. And lastly >any suggestions for/about content that I may have missed.. Archives of the PGP key database, the archive at hacktic.nl, ftp.dsi.unimi.it, ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de, and probibly a few other archives would be useful. An index/search engine would also be helpful. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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Choices
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Well there you have it. Many of the poor clearly are not buying new sets >that have closed-captioning. Meanwhile, we all pay for it when we buy new >sets and VCRs. High added cost does not follow. We (actually my wife as a Christmas present) bought the cc box because none of our sets were new enough. I suspect that the cc decode capability could be integrated into the existing video decoder chips at no additional cost (other than what is needed to turn it on and off & that is done electronically) - suspect that if you look at trade (e.g. hotel/motel) set prices before cc was added and after that you will will see little difference (any body here know ? I have not followed this. V-chip could be similarly integrated just by having the signal cause the video to lose sync. >A hidden tax, that does not benefit those in need. Depends on the quanta. I suspect that like cc, in the long run it will have little or no effect on set prices. BTW, anyone know under what juristiction the regulation requiring cc devices was issued ? ADA ? - if so would not work for V-chip. >ObCypherpunks: A truly surprising number of people on this list are on the >one hand lambasting the government for thievery, incompetence, corruption, >and violation of their rights, while on the other hand explaining why they >think some particular intrusion is justified. Think I have been consistant - am FOR things which add to my choices and AGAINST those which reduce the choices available. In general I do not mind paying a delta for increased choice so long as it is small >People need to think about the powerful implications of strong crypto, and >decide if they are _for_ access to strong crypto by citizens, or _against_ >it. All things follow from this decision. Am FOR choices. Citizens *have* access to strong crypto. Do not believe use of crypto in this country can be regulated between two citizens or on public networks. (Note, I say *public*. On *private* networks, the owner can enforce any rules he/she/it/other likes.) Gov has right to define communications with and between itself. Gov does have the right (in fact the duty) to regulate communications between citizens and non-citizens/sites in other lands (and if you do not think communications with sites such as anon.penet.fi are inside the charter of the NSA, I have this prime Florida land - we're in the dry season now 8*). Warmly, Padgett

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signing && emacs?
by nelson＠crynwr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone considered adding a PGP signature to emacs local ``eval'' or hook variables? It'd sure be nice to have Emacs just load up a file without asking me if I trust the author. -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/~nelson Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | PGP ok 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | If you would seek peace, Potsdam, NY 13676 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | first seek freedom

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Building in Big Brother
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Building in Big Brother: The Cryptographic Policy Debate Edited by Lance J. Hoffman Springer Verlag Publishers Copyright: March 1995 Price:$29.95 ISBN 0-387-94441-9 _________________________________________________________________ "If you ever wondered how a particular computer technology could attract the interest of the directors of three intelligence agencies, the heavyweights in the computer industry, a gang of programmers turned freedom fighters, and the President of the United States, you need look no farther than Building in Big Brother. This book outlines the next civil liberties battle in the United States." - Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information Center "One-stop-shopping for even the most sophisticated analyst of the policy wars over cryptography." - A. Michael Froomkin, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School "Lance Hoffman has compiled an extraordinarily useful and well balanced collection of materials on cryptography and its applications. This book will instantly become a definitive compendium." - Peter G. Neumann "Though Lance Hoffman is a dedicated opponent of current government policy, he has assembled a volume that should be -- and will be -- on the desk of every cryptographic policymaker in Washington. He has accurately recorded the many voices in a debate that will profoundly affect our future, for good or ill, well into the twenty-first century. This book is an important contribution to the history of encryption. It is an even more important contribution to those who are struggling to shape that history." - Stewart Baker, Steptoe & Johnson (formerly General Counsel to the National Security Agency) "An authoritative source of political writings by the major players in the crypto revolution." - Philip Zimmermann, Creator of PGP _________________________________________________________________ Includes Steven Levy's peerless "Cypherpunks vs Uncle Sam" and other Shortstop-proof cpunx ammunitions.

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Re: American Reporter on CDA 2/8/96 (fwd)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:28 AM 2/10/96 +0000, Sean Gabb. wrote: >What a splendid article! I will keep it on disk forever. Congratulations! You're now an Unindicted Co-Conspirator! #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com / billstewart(a)attmail.com +1-415-442-2215 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs Pager +1-408-787-1281

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Springfield Medical Center
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alia, Thanks for the update on CJ. Please keep us informed. More on CJ's music and how to get it, and help promote it, would be welcomed. It sounds wonderfully rude and vulgar, all right! Below is a 1994 thumbnail description of the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, taken from a long, critical report on prisoner health care with more on the Springfield facility available at: http://jya.com/hehs-94-36.txt (81K) Bureau of Prisons Health Care: Inmates' Access to Health Care Is Limited by Lack of Clinical Staff (Letter Report, 02/10/94, GAO/HEHS-94-36). [Excerpt] SPRINGFIELD MEDICAL REFERRAL CENTER MISSION OF REFERRAL CENTER The U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, is one of the Bureau of Prisons' six referral centers that treat male medical, surgical, and mental health patients. LOCATION AND CONDITION OF FACILITY The Springfield Medical Referral Center is an administrative facility, meaning it is equipped to house inmates of all security levels. It was built about 1933. Inmates live in six connected buildings, each of two or three stories. The medical facilities are concentrated in four of the six buildings. The acute and chronic care medical and surgical patients are housed in units that resemble typical hospital rooms, except that several rooms in each unit have locked doors. These locked cells are used for patients who are (1) dangerous to staff or other inmates, (2) participating in the federal witness protection program, or (3) waiting for their custody status to be determined. The mental health patients are housed in units that resemble typical prison cell blocks with one-man cells. Springfield also has a unit that can contain up to 37 inmates in individual locked cells for disciplinary or protective reasons. NUMBER OF INMATES AND PATIENTS SERVED Springfield serves approximately 1,120 inmates, including 439 patients who require medical or surgical care and 294 who need psychiatric care. The medical and surgical care is provided to about 46 acute care patients, 54 patients receiving renal dialysis, and 393 other chronic or recovering patients. The mental health population includes 177 treatment patients and 117 forensic inmates who are being evaluated for their mental ability to stand trial. NUMBER AND TYPE OF MEDICAL BEDS The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations rates Springfield as a 46-bed acute care and 177-bed mental health hospital. NUMBER AND TYPE OF STAFF POSITIONS AUTHORIZED AND FILLED In July 1993, Springfield had 279 authorized health care positions, including 5 psychiatrists, 15 medical/surgical physicians, an optometrist, 12 physician assistants, 127 nurses, 9 pharmacists, 12 psychologists, 6 quality assurance staff, 10 medical records staff, and 82 other health care staff. At that time, 18 positions were vacant, including 3 medical physicians, a surgeon, a psychiatrist, a physician assistant, 10 nurses, 1 medical records staff, and 1 other health care staff. The following specialists were working at Springfield: 3 general practitioners, 4 psychiatrists, 2 internists, 2 neurologists, 1 physiatrist, 1 anesthesiologist, 1 orthopedic surgeon, and 1 chief of health programs. Physicians and physician assistants are available 24 hours a day. However, physicians generally work from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. During the evening and night shifts and on weekends, one physician, one psychiatrist, and one psychologist are on call. Physician assistants are available in the facility 16 hours a day. Nurses are responsible for medical care between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Nursing service is provided 24 hours a day. STAFF ORGANIZATION The Associate Warden for Medical Services supervises most of Springfield's health care staff, including nurses and technicians. The Clinical Director is responsible for the internal medicine physicians, psychiatrists, surgeons, dentists, physician assistants, the quality assurance coordinator, utilization manager, and infection-control practitioners. The Associate Warden for Mental Health Services is responsible for the psychologists and social workers who work with the mental health patients.

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No Subject
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From proff Sat Feb 10 18:09:57 1996 Subject: new zip cracking code To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat, 10 Feb 1996 18:09:57 +1100 (EST) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 3806 Does anyone have any pointers to cryptanalysis papers on the Zip encryption scheme (presented below)? I've seen a few MSDOS executeables which used some sort of brute force attack, which didn't seem particularly intelligent or effective for long passwords. If anyone has some pointers, or source I'd be glad to hear of it. From what I can see of Schlafly's algorithm a bute force attack could be speed up a great deal by pre-compution and expansaion of elements of the first 3 or so rounds at the very least. Ideas anyone? Decryption ---------- The encryption used in PKZIP was generously supplied by Roger Schlafly. PKWARE is grateful to Mr. Schlafly for his expert help and advice in the field of data encryption. PKZIP encrypts the compressed data stream. Encrypted files must be decrypted before they can be extracted. Each encrypted file has an extra 12 bytes stored at the start of the data area defining the encryption header for that file. The encryption header is originally set to random values, and then itself encrypted, using 3, 32-bit keys. The key values are initialized using the supplied encryption password. After each byte is encrypted, the keys are then updated using psuedo-random number generation techniques in combination with the same CRC-32 algorithm used in PKZIP and described elsewhere in this document. The following is the basic steps required to decrypt a file: 1) Initialize the three 32-bit keys with the password. 2) Read and decrypt the 12-byte encryption header, further initializing the encryption keys. 3) Read and decrypt the compressed data stream using the encryption keys. Step 1 - Initializing the encryption keys ----------------------------------------- Key(0) <- 305419896 Key(1) <- 591751049 Key(2) <- 878082192 loop for i <- 0 to length(password)-1 update_keys(password(i)) end loop Where update_keys() is defined as: update_keys(char): Key(0) <- crc32(key(0),char) Key(1) <- Key(1) + (Key(0) & 000000ffH) Key(1) <- Key(1) * 134775813 + 1 Key(2) <- crc32(key(2),key(1) >> 24) end update_keys Where crc32(old_crc,char) is a routine that given a CRC value and a character, returns an updated CRC value after applying the CRC-32 algorithm described elsewhere in this document. Step 2 - Decrypting the encryption header ----------------------------------------- The purpose of this step is to further initialize the encryption keys, based on random data, to render a plaintext attack on the data ineffective. Read the 12-byte encryption header into Buffer, in locations Buffer(0) thru Buffer(11). loop for i <- 0 to 11 C <- buffer(i) ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(C) buffer(i) <- C end loop Where decrypt_byte() is defined as: unsigned char decrypt_byte() local unsigned short temp temp <- Key(2) | 2 decrypt_byte <- (temp * (temp ^ 1)) >> 8 end decrypt_byte After the header is decrypted, the last two bytes in Buffer should be the high-order word of the CRC for the file being decrypted, stored in Intel low-byte/high-byte order. This can be used to test if the password supplied is correct or not. Step 3 - Decrypting the compressed data stream ---------------------------------------------- The compressed data stream can be decrypted as follows: loop until done read a charcter into C Temp <- C ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(temp) output Temp end loop -- +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ |Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has | |FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest | |EMAIL: proff(a)suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon | +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+

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WIT_nes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The NYT Web site does not seem to offer today's Sunday magazine article on the federal Witness Security Program, as revealed through one family's trauma of official death and rebirth: WIT_nes (38k in 2 parts)

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Re: China
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: > At 01:54 PM 2/10/96 EST, you wrote: > >It's not difficult to imagine that governments will seek to regulate the > >possession of modems again. Some may recall that in the U.S. it used to be > >technically illegal to connect a modem to the phone jack without a permissio > >from AT&T. > > Actually, permission from the local phone companies, who owned the system, > I assume? (Though I don't actually remember which parts of The Phone Company > were involved in the Carterphone decision.) Nope. I used modems back when the local phone company _was AT&T. :-) --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Impossible Analysis Paper at Crypto98
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's talk of a paper given at Crypto98 on "Impossible Differential Analysis" which got the NSA people scribbling like mad taking notes as though this was something that had never come up at the agency and they'd better get right on it. Roughly, as I heard it (and I may be way off), the premise is that instead of using differential analysis for finding weaknesses in a cipher, to flip that to determine what could not possibly be a weakness in a cipher and build one with just those attributes. Is this report correct, and is there a source for that paper?

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