- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

POLI: Politics vs Technol
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

H>Have people forgotten the Clipper proposal, with the possible H>follow-on to make non-Clipper encryption illegal? To the extent this H>proposal has been or will be defeated, it will happen through political H>maneuvering, not technology. If it got that far, a ban on unapproved crypto would be defeated by litigation not politicking. There is no chance that a crypto ban would be upheld by the Supremes these days. The courts have explicitly ruled that one can speak other languages (than English) if one wishes. Crypto is just another language. H>Have people forgotten the PGP export investigation? Phil Zimmermann H>hasn't. He and others may be facing the prospect of ten years in prison H>if they were found guilty of illegal export. I'd like to see some indictments first. The trial would be fun. Long sentences are unlikely in any case. H>If anyone has any suggestions for how to escape from jail into H>cyberspace I'd like to hear about them. The same way one survives and atomic bomb (for those who asked) by *not* being there when it goes off. Those indicted have two years prior to trial to leave the country. Anyone who can't figure out how to flee the jurisdiction in two years deserves prison. H>Mike's SecureDrive is a terrific program for protecting privacy. But H>if we want to keep keys secret from politically-motivated H>investigations, we have to rely on the very political and H>non-technological Fifth Amendment (an amendment which Mike Godwin of EFF H>and others contend does not actually protect disclosure of cryptographic H>keys). Again, we need to win political, not technological, victories in H>order to protect our privacy. Encryption alone will absolutely protect the 99.99% of communications that are never the subject of any government disclosure orders. Investigations take *serious* money. The government can only investigate (let alone prosecute) a very small number of individuals. Since much of their attention will necessarily be on others, the members of this list -- much less the general public -- have little to worry about. What's the big deal. Dan White emptied his revolver into the Mayor of the City of San Francisco, reloaded, and then emptied it again into the body of a member of the Board of Supervisors. For this crime, he served 5 years and 2 months. Since nothing we are doing is worse, we can't serve more than that amount of time. (I know, I know. Just kidding.) The criminal justice system is a pretty dull tool, however. The Feds have lost most of the big political cases that went to trial over the last few years. They lost all but one of the insider trading cases. They lost the BCCI case. They lost the Ollie North prosecution. They lost the Steve Jackson games case. In confrontations with the Feds, behave like the guy who was acquitted of insider trading in the Princeton Partners case -- wear a Cat hat reading "Shit Happens" to all the negotiating sessions. Remember too that in the absence of war, 99.99% of the damage "the government" does to you is actually self inflicted. Don't obey. Don't line up. Don't fill out the proper forms, properly. Don't give them your right name and address. Keep fixed in your mind the words of the first rebel, a fallen angel, who said, "Non Servatum" (I will not serve). DCF Who will request that the jury at *his* trial be required to watch Schindler's List. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

Re: Question for article
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Say someone fucks you over (real or imagined) or flames you severely. What >sort of nasty things can you do to them or their data? You know, like >e-mail bombings etc. I don't need particulars, since this is pointed at a >mainstream audience. (It also might not get published if the technophobic >editor(s) think its too risque, if you know what I mean.) You can: - 1 - If the damage done you was real, not just an annoyance, then you might litigate. - 2 - Otherwise, or if there is reason to believe that it was without intent, then you could be a grown-up: live and learn. Purile retaliation is the demesne of bullies and children. >I have some ideas already, but I'd like to hear from the pros. :-> This sounds like people who study martial arts so they can `really kick some ass'. Serious students of many disciplines consider it for defense only. This is the case with the technology of privacy. You have seriously mistaken this list. This is not a list of `expert electronic vigalantes' who deal out home brew justice. This is a group of people with concerns about technological encroachment on personal privacy, and ensuring that the information age doesn't swallow law abiding citizens into a new world of glass houses. I am sorry to say I can easily imagine what you must have been reading to give you this impression. Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

1 0

Technology vs. Politics
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>But could the government ban a book today? Of course not, at least not >>after one person typed it or scanned it into a computer. Technological >>gains are permanent. The political approach is only useful as a >>tactical weapon, to hold them off until technological solutions are >>in place. If you want to change the world, don't protest. Write code! >This position seems to be fast becoming cypherpunks dogma, but I don't >agree. The notion that we can just fade into cypherspace and ignore >the unpleasant political realities is unrealistic, in my view. >Have people forgotten the Clipper proposal, with the possible follow-on to >make non-Clipper encryption illegal? To the extent this proposal has been >or will be defeated, it will happen through political maneuvering, not >technology. Yes, when something fascistic like Digital Telephony or Clipper comes along, we have to fight it. But if we win, it will just return the next time something scares the government. There can be no permanent victory through politics. The only way to win permanently is to hold them off through politics and public opinion long enough so that everyone has encryption and is using it. If it's widespread enough, it will be impossible both technically and politically to stop it. Stalin refused to build a phone system in the Soviet Union, because he considered it subversive. Could the government take away all our phones today? >Have people forgotten the PGP export investigation? Phil Zimmermann >hasn't. He and others may be facing the prospect of ten years in prison >if they were found guilty of illegal export. If anyone has any >suggestions for how to escape from jail into cyberspace I'd like to hear >about them. Yes, we have to mobilize around the Zimmermann case, and if he actually goes to trial, I'm going to send in my contribution and try to get others to do so. Perhaps the next version of Secure Drive should have a request of the form: if you like this product, please send a contribution to the Phil Zimmermann Defense Fund. They may be able to single out individuals who have put themselves on the spot, but they can't stop the technology. >Mike's SecureDrive is a terrific program for protecting privacy. But >if we want to keep keys secret from politically-motivated investigations, >we have to rely on the very political and non-technological Fifth Amendment >(an amendment which Mike Godwin of EFF and others contend does not actually >protect disclosure of cryptographic keys). Again, we need to win >political, not technological, victories in order to protect our privacy. And the next time there's a Red scare, or a Yellow scare, or any kind of scare, they will say "national security" or "public safety" and start putting people in camps, like the Japanese. Political victories are temporary. Whatever the Constitution says, the fact is it has been blatantly ignored every time the government imagined a threat, starting with the Sedition Act only a few years after the Bill of Rights was passed. The Supreme Court has never stopped one of those actions until after the scare was over. >I even question Mike's point about the government's inability to ban books. >Look at the difficulty in keeping PGP available in this country even though >it is legal. Not only have FTP sites been steadily closed down, even the >key servers have as well. And this is legal software. Yet almost everyone I talk to has a copy. It's on BBSes all over the country, and hundreds of thousands of people have it. Maybe millions, worldwide. I've sent it to many people by modem and on disks. It's even on CD-ROMs. Are they going to confiscate them all? What are they going to do, shoot everyone caught with a copy? That is bad for public relations. >Sure, this software is currently available overseas, but that is because >PGP's only legal limitations are the U.S. patent issues. Imagine how much >worse it would be if non-escrowed encryption were made illegal in a broad >range of countries, with stringent limits on net access to countries which >promote illegal software? Here again, these kinds of decisions will be >made in the political realm. >Fundamentally, I believe we will have the kind of society that most people >want. If we want freedom and privacy, we must persuade others that these >are worth having. There are no shortcuts. Withdrawing into technology >is like pulling the blankets over your head. It feels good for a while, >until reality catches up. The next Clipper or Digital Telephony proposal >will provide a rude awakening. Ultimately the people have to want it. Very true. And the best way to get them to want it is to provide it. Let them see how much more freely they talk when their mail is encrypted. How they can write and store what they want, when their hard drives are encrypted. If the public experiences real privacy, they will want it, and it will be harder to take away. They will even be willing to buy it. In the long run, PGP may well be the best thing that ever happened to James Bidzos, just like the pirating of Altair Basic was the best thing that ever happened to Bill Gates. Politics, the process of politics and the political mindset, is our enemy. Governments cannot create freedom; they can either leave it alone or take it away. We must prevent them from taking it away, until it is so widespread and universal that it can't be taken away. --- Mike

1 0

Current Operational Status
by an12070＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We (operation Cyberanarchist Repression and Poison) thought you might like an update of our current status and future plans. We have been extremely busy! So much has happened lately! Remember when we said, > You have 24 hours before we >launch our next cyberspatial strike. That was a reference to Operation Tick-Tick-Tick. We were really delighted with the outcome of this attack, we made very significant gains in our campaign, and there were some stellar fireworks. The sequence of Usenet posts equating cyberanarchists with drug users and Sodomites found great response. The Cyberanarchist glossary was unchallenged! We nailed the szabo(a)netcom.com tentacle mercilessly, and he is afraid to show his sickly green face any more. The Pit Bull (His Royal Eminence) showed up to make a fatal mistake in exposing the Szabo tentacle, and we nailed him some too (his brilliant smear tactics give us more ideas ourselves!). As usual, Emminent Eric has been rather quiet. We did spoof him spectacularly with that Apology feint. `I never wanted a brainwashed follower.' `Democracy stinks.' `I am the anti Christ.' Ha, ha. Tantalizing Timmy showed up a bit `out there' to further whine, evade, and threaten, and tell us that he doesn't know anything about drugs! He says he has a gun, and isn't afraid to use it! Fantastic! `The rumors about high level conspiracies and drug use are false' he says. Ooops, have you talked to Ingenuous John? (hee, hee). You guys really have to work on getting your stories straight. It's pretty pathetic. As for the BS, we don't know who it is you saw at your last Cypherpunk party and their California IDs. Must have been some cardboard cutouts! Oh, what fun. This is all in addition to the shrapnel wounds on the public lists (we have no comment on the private ones!). We appreciate your feedback in all areas. What did you think of the delightful poetry? How about the Nazi Espionage story? That brought tears to our eyes when we thought how much your own Big Macs have surpassed the Fuhrer in their own present glories and future ambitions. Perhaps the people `out there' on Usenet will be similarly impressed ... ? === Nevertheless, the Big Macs don't seem to understand that we have long since lost interest in the tentacle exorcisms, although we like to continue to play to keep our practice. We have graduated to the Big Leagues and they are still scratching their crotches in the minors. Full fledged exposure! The Cypherpunk Credit union for money laundering! the black markeeting! the tax evasion! The lies in the media! The secret mailing lists! Thank you so much for finally coming clean (or at least opening a few windows to diminish the stench) in some key areas. Our next projects should help encourage you to continue this wonderful Glasnost, where before we had the KGB. Once again, we remind you that you can relent and surrender at any time. Some of the things we are interested in at the moment: 1. Further information on the media deceptions in Wired and NYT. These are very difficult to unravel. 2. A complete status report of the TX bank and CA credit union. Maybe some more info on the `real' Chaum link. 3. A complete comment by the Big Macs on their knowledge and involvement in pseudospoofing and all the `quasi-legal' activities. 4. A complete list of all the secret mailing lists. Your subscribers to this list would probably be interested in this too, why not post it publicly? After all, they don't know that all the *real* development is being done under the table. Kind of ironic, too, how long people were asking for a `list split', not knowing that it had already been done in secret. Ah, a pity, but that is your modus operandi. But, since in the true spirit of warfare we must be prepared for any eventuality, including the continued persistence and tenacity of the enemy. So you know, here are some of the operations we are planning over the coming weeks and months, listed in scale of seriousness and potency. Operation SQUISH - a very sophisticated and comprehensive simultaneous attack on many fronts that will involve a `grass roots' approach vs. the last `top down' attack in the newsgroups. Medusa keeps asking for our complete knowledge. This will lay it all out on the table for everyone to examine -- a complete list of tentacles, Small Fries, Big Macs, Poison Needles, Medusa Sisters, and Medusa. It will also be a bit disorienting for you in the spirit of our favorite tactics of `polymorphic paragraphs'. You really seem to get a buzz from that. If you think that the last Usenet strike was bad, wait 'til you see what happens with this one! Operation Octopus - this is the multiple pseudonym and agent project. We plan to have at least a dozen (hence the name) posting simultaneously to many different lists and the newsgroups. But the overhead on this is very significant, and it will take us awhile to gear up and build the infrastructure to the point we can `engage'. You have seen more of these agents lately `out there', but our coordinated attack will take some more planning. Hopefully, these operations will crack the nut. It is already wobbling, splintering, chipping, and shaking. But this is a tough nut to crack. The following operations are far more insidious and devastating. We have been hinting about them in various places. They are our `secret weapons' -- the will require some further developments, but will be immensely effective in destabilizing your technology and `movement'. Operation Duplicity - extremely top secret. Let's just say, you will be seeing double, and triple, and quadruple, and ... Operation Apocalypse - extremely top secret. Let's just say, Robert Morris and Richard Depew would be proud ... Of course, in the meantime your list will be subject to the same drizzle of froth that has you so excited lately. And we'll probably recycle some of our better artillery to strategic positions `out there' on Usenet some more. We wish to thank T.C.May personally for all the stellar ideas in Reputation Assault and Cyberspatial Sabotage. What's good for the criminal is good for the police, so to speak! Finally, just to let you know, we are going to take a momentary breather here and scale back all the current operations somewhat to reorganize and retrench before the next onslaught, so enjoy the respite. Happy New Year! p.s. you might want to see this below. This software and attack report was part of our last strike, Operation Tick-Tick-Tick. The software for the new operations is far more complex (you know how difficult it is e.g. to track multiple identities well), partly the reason for the delay. === #!/bin/csh -f sleep 518400 echo insider echo `date` nick "Cryptoanarchist Assassination Squad" send ./insider& sleep 86400 #1 day echo glossary echo `date` nick "T.C.Hughes" send ./gloss1& send ./gloss2& sleep 86400 echo szabo echo `date` nick "GCHQ" send ./szabo& sleep 86400 echo druggies echo `date` nick "Pablo Escobar" send ./druggies& sleep 86400 echo homo echo `date` nick "A.Pervert" send ./homo& sleep 86400 echo tcmay echo `date` nick "The Allied Forces" send ./tcmay& sleep 86400 echo conspiracy echo `date` nick "S.Boxx" send ./conspiracy& === insider Mon Dec 13 15:58:36 UTC 1993 [1] 8930 [1] + Done send ./insider glossary Tue Dec 14 15:58:57 UTC 1993 [1] 10919 [2] 10920 [2] + Done send ./gloss2 [1] + Done send ./gloss1 szabo Wed Dec 15 15:59:26 UTC 1993 [1] 13139 [1] + Done send ./szabo druggies Thu Dec 16 15:59:52 UTC 1993 [1] 15347 [1] + Done send ./druggies homo Fri Dec 17 16:00:31 UTC 1993 [1] 17894 [1] + Done send ./homo tcmay Sat Dec 18 16:03:15 UTC 1993 [1] 20016 [1] + Done send ./tcmay conspiracy Sun Dec 19 16:03:52 UTC 1993 [1] 21253 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

3 2

cyberanarchy RULEZ!!!
by an12070＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When my son appeared home from work last Tuesday evening just as the 10 p.m. news was beginning, I was pleasantly surprised to see him. Earlier in the day he told me he'd be home around 11 since he was scheduled to be one of the `closers' at Chuck E. Cheese that evening. I hated it when he was scheduled to close on school nights, and I told him so that afternoon. But since his fellow employees and manager had been so kind to him during a recent illness, and since he hadn't been able to earn much Christmas money, I didn't say much more. So when he came in and said, ``Hey, someone else wanted to close tonight, so I didn't have to stay,'' I knew I could lock up and go to bed a little earlier than I'd planned. Then the news bulletin came on: ``There has been a shooting at Chuck E. Cheese pizza parlor in Aurora.'' I yelled and my son came out of the bathroom with his toothbrush still in his mouth. He sat on the edge of the rocking chair watching and waiting for more information. Then he said, pointing his finger at me and shaking, ``I bet I know who it was...'' I questioned him about what he had seen and dialed the police department. The police spoke with him and said they'd send out a detective. Then my son told me about the people who were still at the restaurant when he left. Bobby -- the nicest guy in the world, he said. Sylvia -- a lot of fun. Ben, oh yeah, he was in the game room. Colleen -- she was working the show room. And Marge -- did you know she liked weird pizza -- like spinach and stuff? He spoke about each one as we waited for more information. In the meantime, we heard helicopters and sirens waited for more word. The early reports were sketchy ... Several people had been shot ... Some were still in the restaurant, some were being wheeled out on stretchers .... More on the morning news, they said. We looked at each other in disbelief. I knew that my son had missed being one of the victims by minutes, maybe just a couple of minutes. No one in our family slept well that night. At about 4:30 a.m., I got up. I had been having nightmares anyway, and I wanted to make sure that whatever the news was, I knew it before my son did. I'll help him through it, I thought. He was sleeping on the floor in his brother's room. He didn't want to be alone. As I looked at the front page of the newspaper, I felt some relief that at least some of the people had survived. But then I turned on the early news and learned that all the victims had been shot in the head and that two were dead: Marge and Colleen. I held my sides and wept. My son heard me and came out to watch the news. He urged on those still living: ``Come on, Sylv, come on ...'' I prayed hardest for Bobby. He had offered to close for my son. I didn't know if I could handle it, or how my son would feel, if he didn't make it. But as that day wore on -- that horrible day -- two more would die. There but for the grace of God, I thought. I kept picturing my son's face as he talked to the TV reporters. My child is in shock, I thought. And here I am at work, trying to act as though my world has not been blown apart as well. After a few short hours, I decided I should go home -- I wanted to be there when he came home. I wanted to hold him and tell him I love him. After my son arrived home, the phone rang and rang. People from all over the country were calling to make sure that he was OK. He told his story over and over again. He needs help, I can see, but I don't know how to give it to him. It's so hard to imagine the pain felt by the families of Colleen, Sylvia, Ben, and Marge. I've thought often about how horrible that night was for them and about how hard it will be in the future. It's hard for me to even imagine the depth of my own son's pain. No one taught me how to help my child through a mass murder. I can't explain to him why the police say they are going to call and then don't. I don't know why the alleged murderer was allowed to threaten people for months without anyone challenging him. I'm not sure that it would happen again tonight. Most of all, I'm scared to admit that most people won't attach any responsibility for the situation to anyone but the killer. No parent, no school official, no juvenile or adult law enforcement agency, no former employer recognized and took responsibility for the potential danger of this situation. Maybe that is today's truth. We have become very adept at avoiding responsibility for much of anything. I'm angry at s many people -- and I'm angry with myself. Our young people need our help. They are living through these horrors because we are allowing them too, mostly because we are just too busy to care. They did not, in their short lives, create this violent, irresponsible society. We pretend not to see that we sell them the means of their destruction. I realize that my nerves are raw right now. I just hope that as the days and months go by that we do something meaningful to show our kids that we really mean to help them end the violence that threatens their generation. I am sorry, too, son. I haven't done enough so far. But that doesn't mean that I can't do more now. Please help me. We all need to speak up when we see something going very wrong. If we are going to effect an real change, I'll need your energy and commitment to push me. And I will take responsibility for my part. It isn't too late, son. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

1 0

Re: Anonymous video on demand
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, with tamper-proof chips this problem can be solved easily. You don't need oblivious transfer. Rather, you get digital tokens from the video provider which you pass on to the tamper-proof decryption chip, where each token is worth a certain amount of decryption. Then you choose which movies you want to decrypt. The only question would be whether the tamper-proof chip would keep a record of your viewing habits. But you should be able to monitor anything it transmits (if it has to transmit anything) and it should not have to send any encrypted messages. So your secrets should be safe. One problem with this approach (and the other ones we have discussed) is that the vendor loses any information about which movies are most watched, which hurts his ability to set prices and choose which movies to carry. Perhaps he could resort to a separate anonymous public-opinion poll to determine this info (protected with is-a-person (is-a-customer?) credentials so that our friend Detweiler can't pseudo-spoof with his multiple tentacles ;-). Or, perhaps another approach is to have a different decryption key for each movie, and to simply sell those keys to anonymous buyers. They would then load them into their decryption boxes. This does seem vulnerable to pirating the keys, though. Piracy could be avoided if the decryption keys were stamped with the serial number of the particular tamper-proof decryption box they were for (so that they would only work with that one box). But then you lose the anonymity. I'm thinking that some form of blinding could be used to produce a key which would only be accepted by one box, but for which the movie seller would not be able to determine which box it was for. This is very similar to the requirement for electronic cash, and I think a similar idea would work. This solution also is a nice example of the uses of anonymous networks. I wonder whether the NII could support DC-nets? :) Hal

1 0

Re: Anonymous Video on Demand
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It just occured to me that when this protocol is implemented with > RSA, it is subject to a minor (and unlikely) failure that can > allow Alice to determine which video Bob has selected (or at > least eliminate some of them). If each video keypair has a > different modulus and the one Bob selects has a larger modulus > than some of the "dummy" videos, then if the encryption of Bob's > session key with his selected video public key results in a > message that is close to the modulus itself, the keypairs with > moduli that are smaller than Bob's message can be trivially > eliminated as candidates. This protocol also assumes that all of the movies (or pieces of information) cost the same amount. Presumably in the video-on-demand business, a most movies would have the same cost or there would be a few 'levels' of costs with many movies in each 'level.' In that case you would only pick random 'padding' videos that have the same price. However, a video store could easily give all of the horror movies one price, all of the comedy ones another, all the pornos another, etc.... and at least be able to determine the general type of video the customer is purchasing. In a general information market type setup, I would expect that the value of different pieces of information would vary greatly. How would payment of the information be made? In a general information market setup, where the bits of information have varrying values you could do something like the following. in the oblivious transfer protocol, if the hardware used is implemented in tamper-proof chips, the price of each piece of information could be encoded with the information. The chip would store a running total of the prices of information successfully decrypted by the customer. At the end of the month, the box would send the total price to the vendor, which will bill the customer. Depending on the number of pieces of information purchased, the vendor would be able to infer more or less information on the types of info bought by the customer... Also, you could randomly purchase very cheap (or free and worthless) bits of information to make it more difficult for the vendor to figure out what you are interested in... andrew

1 0

CFS source code available January 12
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Source code for version 1.0 of CFS, the Cryptographic File System, will be distributed upon request in the United States starting on January 12, 1994. CFS pushes encryption services into the Unix(tm) file system. CFS supports secure storage at the system level through a standard Unix file system interface to encrypted files. Users associate a cryptographic key with the directories they wish to protect. Files in these directories (as well as their pathname components) are transparently encrypted and decrypted with the specified key without further user intervention; cleartext is never stored on a disk or sent to a remote file server. CFS employs a novel combination of DES stream and codebook cipher modes to provide high security with good performance on a modern workstation. CFS can use any available file system for its underlying storage without modification, including remote file servers such as NFS. System management functions, such as file backup, work in a normal manner and without knowledge of the key. CFS runs under SunOS and several other BSD-derived systems with NFS. It is implemented entirely at user level, as a local NFS server running on the client machine's "loopback" interface. It consists of about 5000 lines of code and supporting documentation. CFS was first mentioned at the work-in-progress session at the Winter '93 USENIX Conference and was more fully detailed in: Matt Blaze, "A Cryptographic File System for Unix", Proc. 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Fairfax, VA, November 1993. (PostScript available by anonymous ftp from research.att.com in the file dist/mab/cfs.ps. The version being released differs from the version described in the paper in a few ways: * The encryption scheme has been strengthened, and now provides approximately the security of 3-DES with the online latency of only single-DES. * Support for the smartcard-based key management system is not included. * A few of the tools are not included (in particular, cname and ccat). * The performance has been improved. * The security of the system against certain non-cryptanalytic attacks has been improved somewhat. CFS is being distributed as COMPLETELY UNSUPPORTED software. No warranty of any kind is provided. We will not be responsible if it deletes all your files and emails the cleartext directly to the NSA or your mother. Also, we do not have the resources to port the software to other platforms, although you are welcome to do this yourself. (Note in particular that CFS has not been tested on either Solaris or Linux, and we have no plans ourselves to support either of these systems.) We really can't promise to provide any technical support at all, beyond the source code itself. Because of export restrictions on cryptographic software, we are only able to make the software available within the US to US citizens and permanent residents. Unfortunately, we cannot make it available for general anonymous ftp or other uncontrolled access, nor can we allow others to do so. Sorry. Legal stuff from the README file: * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993, 1994 by AT&T. * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software and in all copies of the supporting * documentation for such software. * * This software is subject to United States export controls. You may * not export it, in whole or in part, or cause or allow such export, * through act or omission, without prior authorization from the United * States government and written permission from AT&T. In particular, * you may not make any part of this software available for general or * unrestricted distribution to others, nor may you disclose this software * to persons other than citizens and permanent residents of the United * States. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NEITHER THE AUTHORS NOR AT&T MAKE ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE MERCHANTABILITY * OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. If you would like a copy of the CFS source code, please send email to: cfs(a)research.att.com DO NOT REPLY TO DIRECTLY TO THIS MESSAGE. Be sure to include a statement that you are in the United States, are a citizen or permanent resident of the US, and have read and understand the license conditions stated above. Also include an email address in a US-registered domain, and say whether you'd also like to be included on a developer/user mailing list that is being set up. For a number of reasons, I am unable actually send out code until January 12, 1994. Unless you specify some other format, you'll get a uuencoded compressed tarfile. I'll be at the January USENIX conference in San Francisco, and will announce CFS at the WIP session there. -matt

1 0

Re: Radiation experiments & not trusting gov
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE(a)delphi.com> said: >I was disgusted but not particularly surprised to read about these >experiments. It's been known for many years that they deliberately >exposed troops to atomic fallout and chemical weapons to determine >their effects. They also tested LSD, mind control, and truth drugs >on unsuspecting human lab rats. I agree with Perry, and even more with what Mike there. Considering that such *has* been well known for so many years, I was a little bit startled at the current media reaction to the radiation experiments. Did they only just wake up or something? Or more likely, it's just been a few years since the media has had the opportunity to make a fuss over such things, so now it's "fresh news" again, as if that category of things had never happened before. BTW on the subject of how much was known about the long term effects of low level radiation exposure 4 or 5 decades ago: *LOTS*! Let us not forget that the nuclear age was not ushered in during WWII; decades prior to that it was well known that prolonged exposure to low level radiation could cause hideous cases of cancer. Remember the radium elixer cases? The luminous watchdial painters? (I think the latter came up twice; once early on with radium-based pigments, and again later with tritium.) What did Madame Curie die of? Even Roentgen got cancer from x-raying his hand so much. That's a bit of a digression, but people seem to forget, so there it is for the record. >Unfortunately, these people are exactly the type who seek power, and >the culture of militarism and secrecy helps them to ignore any small >amount of humanity they might otherwise have. True enough, but that doesn't really explain why the participating *physicians* did it. Probably 50% callousness and 50% willful ignorance, I would guess. >If you want to change the world, don't protest. Write code! I've been quiet here the last few months because that's what I mainly do. :-) Doug Merritt

1 0

Radiation experiments & not trusting gov
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I find the recent disclosures concerning U.S. Government testing of >the effects of radiation on unknowing human subjects to be yet more >evidence that you simply cannot trust the government with your own >personal safety. I was disgusted but not particularly surprised to read about these experiments. It's been known for many years that they deliberately exposed troops to atomic fallout and chemical weapons to determine their effects. They also tested LSD, mind control, and truth drugs on unsuspecting human lab rats. >Some people, given positions of power, will naturally >abuse those positions, often even if such abuse could cause severe >injury or death. Unfortunately, these people are exactly the type who seek power, and the culture of militarism and secrecy helps them to ignore any small amount of humanity they might otherwise have. >I see little reason, therefore, to simply "trust" the >U.S. government -- and given that the U.S. government is about as good >as they get, its obvious that NO government deserves the blind trust >of its citizens. What country has ever fallen because of too little oppression, too few prisoners, too little espionage on the people, or too much freedom? >"Trust us, we will protect you" rings quite hollow in >the face of historical evidence. Citizens must protect and preserve >their own privacy -- the government and its centralized cryptographic >schemes emphatically cannot be trusted. Most people know that; they just don't know what to do about it. I have the Time magazine from 1985 announcing Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union. They interviewed several Russians. Their attitudes were very much like Americans' today: yes, we know it is screwed up, but what can anyone do about it? Public anger grows quietly and explodes suddenly. T.C. May's "phase change" may be closer than we think. Nobody in Russia in 1985 really thought the country would fall apart in 6 years. Politics has never given anyone lasting freedom, and it never will. Anything gained through politics will be lost again as soon as the society feels threatened. If most Americans have never been oppressed by the government (aside from an annual mugging) it is because most of them have never done anything to threaten the government's interests. For example, much of the progress that's been made against media censorship is in danger of being lost in the hysteria over violence. But could the government ban a book today? Of course not, at least not after one person typed it or scanned it into a computer. Technological gains are permanent. The political approach is only useful as a tactical weapon, to hold them off until technological solutions are in place. If you want to change the world, don't protest. Write code! --- Mike

1 0