- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: POISON PILL :-)
by mgream＠acacia.itd.uts.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Earlier, Dwayne wrote: > In <9310011727.AA01395(a)netcom.netcom.com> msattler(a)netcom.com (Michael Sattler) writes: > >> > >>I have Australian Defence Security Clearance stickers on my computer, > >>they are so cool, these little yellow and red stickers that authorise > >>the computer for secure use (and something else I can't remember). > > >Any chance of getting a few sent to me in San Francisco? > > And perhaps me in Melbourne? :-) As I replied directly to the previous poster, they were one off things that came via a friend who was contracted to do work for the Defence Dept. The few I did manage to obtain all went into use. The computer they are stuck on is in the hands of a 'higher' entity, so I don't even remember the exact details of them <sigh>. Matthew. -- Matthew Gream, M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043. protection against an Orwellian state."

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Re: PGP in FIDO
by Matthew B. Landry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"Technically correct" versus pragmatics is often just a matter of whether [...] >P.S. Let me guess, despite the length of time that this issue has been >kicked around here, I'll get nailed for posting something that's not >apropos to cypherpunks. So let me point out how it is apropos: privacy. I think it's entirely appropriate as a discussion re:pragmatics versus law. That's exactly what the PGP in FIDO thread has been about lately. But you're right. We can think of more appropriate examples. -- Matthew B. Landry ml7694a(a)american.edu (Finally!) mbl(a)ml7694a.leonard.american.edu

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Offline Digicash ?
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to the Chaum-protocol description on chaos.bsu.edu, this is an online system - both parties must talk to the bank before a transaction is concluded. Are there any true offline systems? i.e. I can send you an email which is worth money, with no third parties involved, and there is no audit trail or means of tracing. The main problem is that there is no digital "coin" or object which can be passed around but not duplicated. Other than the bank method, I've read about an "observer" chip which keeps you honest, but the design of the chip would have to be secret, or at least the chip would have to know a secret (i.e. a key) which it would never tell you. If you could extract the key, you could write a "cheater". Shades of Clipper. Is there a system which allows anonymity and at the same time prevents people from double-spending their cash? How does it work? --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com

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Re: PGP in FIDO
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger(a)lehman.com> said: > This is why, for instance, the maker of a knife can't >be arrested because the knife is used to kill someone instead of >cutting bread. The law is actually reasonable. Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't. I recall some years ago when bartenders were getting convicted for their patron's drunk driving accidents. One can't always count on laws being reasonable, and if they are, you still can't always count on courts interpreting them reasonably. Doug

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The right to remain silent
by lex＠mindvox.phantom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quoting a previous message: >Date: 03 Oct 93 14:42:57 EDT >From: Sandy <72114.1712(a)CompuServe.COM> >To: <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Subject: POISON PILL WIMPS > >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . > >Punksters, > >I've just about had it with posts like Matthew Gream's: > > . . . attempting to play 'smart-ass' to your > investigators is only going to result in more problems > for you. Its a non-ideal world, and they definitely have > the ability to cause you substantial problems. > > . . . I feel it is essential to show them everything > that they think is there, and convince them (as they > will not be as competent in cryptographic analysis as > yourself [at least you hope]) that there is nothing > hidden. > >Didn't any of you appeasers and apologists read and *understand* >HACKER CRACKDOWN? Once you are the focus of an investigation, >they are already causing you substantial problems. Cooperation >only gives your tormentors more ammunition. You are not going >to convince them of anything. You cannot talk your way out of >anything. What you can--and will--do is dig yourself in deeper. >After that, you will probably try to get off the hook by rolling >over--like a bitch in heat--on your friends and associates. > >The ONLY thing that works is (a) stonewall, stonewall, stonewall >until you get competent legal representation, then (b) do what >your lawyer's says. Period. > >Consider this your wimp wakeup call. > > S a n d y >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A wise mindvox user said recently on the round-table forum: "If you have nothing to hide and did nothing wrong then you have absolutely nothing to lose by keeping quiet" Having seen many a hacker (and non-hacker) get into trouble over the years, I'd have to say that Sandy's assesment is correct in the majority of cases. as for "rolling over--like a bitch in heat-- on your friends and associates" this too I have seen all too often and many times to little benefit to the rat who is talking. Dragging other people down with you serves little purpose IMHO and is a particularly dispicable and all too common trend among hackers of recent years. oh and sandy, I did read the Hacker Crackdown :-) Let me quote a second recent post: >Date: Sun, 03 Oct 1993 15:51:55 -0400 (EDT) >From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE(a)delphi.com> >Subject: Excessive Crap & Flamage >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >This list is becoming completely unreadable! First the POISON PILL and now >PGP IN FIDO just seem to go on and on. And how many before that? >(Troglodyte mind-rapists, etc) I've got about a meg of utter crap in my >email file, most of it unread or skimmed. If people want to fight, why not >do it in private mail, back up your positions, and then post your >conclusions if you manage to come up with any. Please don't CC all your >flames to the list. And please don't echo a three-page post to add one >line of comments to it. > >What happened to all the idealism? Total privacy, cryptophones, digital >cash, zero-knowledge cooperation, bringing down governments and setting the >world free? That's what the list is for, not mindless flaming. > >Aargggh! MikeIngle(a)delphi.com > although no one is asking me, I'll admit that perhaps this message itself is guilty of the above. And I am on the verge of unsubscribing after a couple of months being on the list because the daily time requirement to keep on top of the messages is exceeding an hour. Perhaps splintering the list into the following 2 main areas is an option: 1) A fairly lean-bandwidth list containing technical facts, news articles, bibliographic info, short source code, etc. 2) A more fluffy-content list containing general comments, opinions, flames, etc. Subscription to list 2 would probably necessitate subscription to list 1. But for those who want the meat without the potatoes, subscription to list 1 is all that would be required. I recall this coming up about a month and a half ago, more calls for keeping the messages "pertinent" to the cypherpunk agenda. The problem has only grown worse. Lex

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Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
by Jim.Cannell＠f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In a msg on <Sep 30 12:15>, mnemonic(a)eff.org of 1:216/21 writes: m> From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com m> From: mnemonic(a)eff.org (Mike Godwin) m> To: mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl) m> Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 11:45:09 -0400 (EDT) m> Cc: yerazunis(a)aidev.enet.dec.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com m> Well, there's no doubt that users of his system can agree to m> allow the sysop to read their mail. But what about people m> whose mail passes *through* his system on the way to somewhere m> else? m> He has no agreement with them. FidoNet policy has a statement allowing monitoring of all intransit mail. I guess I'm going to have to dig my copy of Policy out of the archives to post the relevant paragraphs. This is a very shortsighted policy. Although financial restraints have curtailed my operations here making a lot of this moot, my own policy allows all users and passthru mail to be encrypted. I neither monitor nor censor. Jim PGP key 1024/72C6A7 fingerprint = F5 74 29 3D 9C F8 A7 32 C7 98 F1 FE C4 85 FA 70 Protect your right to privacy. Say no to Clipper/Skipjack and key escrow -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLK8tCZuaN9X1csanAQFh6QP/bcfC21gOOnBMAAKoGTVON7u7NEda9Nqr JtH1voGXQKArnRveoVffSTTlESjBC+yaBzi3t4Z1E37uELkd31r70M6OLIWDmw8o QLvZXtoQJgCTzyzHUlY+K94XW3QznHllMVx2oYVJ53tKPn/HmrjwIN5Ml0orBU70 vhek/pyCXnk= =f+Pj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= (Gated via FidoNet Node 1:1/31) Jim Cannell Internet: Jim.Cannell(a)f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org

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Revisionist Reinterpretation
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by Jim choate, quoting another: >> We might also add Shay's Rebellion, Bacon's >Rebellion, the Hudson >> River Renters' Uprising, the Pullman Strike, the >Homestead Strike, the >> Ludlow Massacre, the Lawrence Textile Strikes, etc., >etc. Many of >> these were full-scale insurrections. This country's >"progress" is >> really just a series of grudging concessions made by >authoritarian >> power structures to various nearly catastrophic >crises. I have a hard time comparing any of these histricaly important but comparatively minor events to the half a million dead of the Civil War or the 50,000+ dead of Vietnam. Perhaps you have extended the analogy a little too far?... .......................................................... I think he was talking about the Principle of the deal, Jim - about what this means regarding the relationship of the citizenry to the big G. Put all of those insurrections together and what do they spell? F _ _ _ _ _ F Blanc

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ECPA and Remailers?
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not being a lawyer (despite my recent spate of "legal" posts, which were based on several hours browsing through the library), I wonder whether any provisions of the ECPA would apply to anonymous remailers. Several operators keep logs of messages and read them, occasionally rebuking or perhaps even blocking users who send inappropriate messages. (As far as I know, no cypherpunks have done blocking, but other remailer operators have. Several cypherpunks have said they read messages.) My feeling is that it is better for me as a remailer operator to have as little to do with the content of the messages as possible. I just don't want to know. If someone complains I will have, to the best of my ability, NO POSSIBILITY of breaking the anonymity of the message they were upset about. Paradoxically, this very blindness to the content of messages will, I hope, protect me if and when abusive or illegal messages are sent. Frankly, I find it paradoxical for remailer operators to try to keep secret information which will allow them to break the very service they are providing, anonymity. I think it represents confusion about just what they are trying to accomplish. And I think it could even get them into trouble if illegal messages go through their systems. Like the Fido sysops, in trying to protect themselves they may be exposing themselves to even more liability. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: NPR?
by Christian Void 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 3 Oct 1993, L. Detweiler wrote: > >Has anyone considered forwarding and/or send NPR an information packet to > >help bring the encryption/clipper issues to the general public, or is that > >looked upon as a bad idea? > > I think I may have called them once. didn't get a call back. ^^^^^^ They do have a mail address via AOL, and IMHO are not biased towards anything except the left wing. Getting them to discuss the Clipper/Crypto issue on the science program could help get it out in the open in a positive manner, rather than waiting for someone to have his equipment/life seized, or some other such thing making it's way into the mainstream, and thus causing the general public to be biased towards the government (which is what we don't want). Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc. cvoid(a)netcom.COM | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213 Tel. 1+415-807-5491 | -Erwin Schrodinger (1887-1961) | SF, CA 94117 * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *

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Re: POISON PILL
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Something else you can do is use a cipher which takes two input streams >> and merges them into the one file, with one key extracting the 'harmless' >> information and another extracting the 'harmfull' information. >> >> Matthew. >> -- >> Matthew Gream, M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of >> Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043. protection against an Orwellian state." > >Has anybody writen one? Can we try for this as a feature in the next pgp? >Should I write it myself? Of course I should... silly question... Ok does >anybody have any suggestions or wishlists? Lemme know. > AFAIK, the only way to do this is with a Vernam OTP. You have a key file (A) the same length as your real data (B) -- encrypt the data by XOR to get (C). Then you take an innocent text (D) and XOR with (C) to get an alleged key file (E). You hide (A) someplace, destroy (B) and (D). Leave (C) around and put up just enough resistence in letting folks have (E). Does anyone know a simpler way? I'm willing to bet that it can be proved that the key would have to be at least 1/8 the length of the message in order for this to work but I don't know of any schemes using less than the message length to do it. - Carl

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