- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

RE: NSA response to key length report
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What I don't get is why the "report" is so semi-literate? The grammar errors are curious given the supposed source; it even makes me a little skeptical as to the source. My take on the bit about "high processing speeds -> I/O bound" isn't that they're talking IPC, but bus timing (??) I don't have the original paper handy and I don't recall what the proposed processor speeds are. "Total exhaust time" --- is this truly as meaningless as it sounds? ---------- From: Matt Blaze[SMTP:mab@crypto.com] Sent: Friday, July 19, 1996 2:10 PM To: Ernest Hua Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: NSA response to key length report Ernest Hua <hua(a)xenon.chromatic.com> writes: > > It sounds like most of their "counter-arguments" are just stalling tactics. > > If you are a lawyer for someone you know is guilty, you still would choose > to find every reason in the book to attack the prosecution's case. Here we > have precisely the same effect with the NSA. Any tactical manuveur to keep > stalling the impending collapse of ITAR. > > (It is human .. er .. rather .. bureaucrat-esque to claim innocence in the > face of overwhelming evidence of guilt.) Particularly impressive is that our key length report was hardly above criticism from several angles, but their rebuttal managed somehow to avoid them. What I find most disturbing about this is that their report was provided secretly to policymakers in the administration and in Congress, without independent technical review that would have quickly exposed the fallacy of the arguments. I never would have seen it had several of the recipients not faxed it to me. This is the first hard evidence I've seen of NSA providing anything less than the highest quality technical analysis to other parts of the government. A non-specialist reader would be easily misled by the technically dense, but completely irrelevant, "rebuttal". It smacks of either ill-informed sloppiness, or, perhaps worse, self-serving disingenuous cynicism. Either conclusion is scary, and, to me in fact, quite surprising. -matt

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Re: MSNBC and cookies
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-=> Quoting In:tcmay@got.net to Harka <=- In> patrons, the Web Awareness Program tracks user interests at Web sites. In> The WAP has already allowed the FBI and other intelligence agencies to In> check up on several people who appeared to have an unusual interest in In> the TWA 800 case. In> (Don't spend too much time in certain sites, friends.) Or be there 'anonymized'... (http://www.anonymizer.com) Harka ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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take the pledge
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Look, folks, we all know that 99% of what David Sternlight posts is garbage. Why don't we all pledge not to answer any of his posts, and then he'll go away. If necessary, someone can be appointed to post a weekly "the views expressed by David are junk and we are deliberately not replying to them directly" message. David has plenty of places to argue with the wind. We don't need to add this one. I'd like to ask people to publically pledge that they will not reply to David's messages. This is such a pledge. Perry

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Government = Obscenity?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:00 PM 7/19/96, Declan McCullagh wrote: >This move by Singapore to censor a newsgroup posting is a good example of >the overbreadth of government censorship. It's a bait-and-switch maneuver: >say you're going after porn but censor "offensive" speech. I'm surprised Duncan has not come forth with one of his patented "My Dad says..." comments, so I will emulate his style. Imagine a child refusing in school to do an assignment that involves connecting to various government Web sites... "My Dad says government is obscene, and that I'm not old enough yet to look at obscenity." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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High Voltage Management
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:34 AM 7/20/96, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >jim bell wrote: ... >> I've had a substantially better idea. Hang carbon-fiber bundles from the >> ceiling, which are charged to about 10,000 volts when an intrusion is >> detected. They'll glom onto anything conductive within their range, and >> anyone with the bad fortune to be breaking into the house at that moment >> _might_ live to regret it. (resistors could be added to limit the current >> to non-fatal but exceedingly painful levels. > >It the voltage is 10000 volts, it is always fatal, right? And if you set >good enough resistors, then the voltage for the human body itself would >be much less than 10000V -- most of the voltage will be taken by resistors >themselves. > >Right? Right! 10,000 volts is always fatal. In fact, I died many times during my high school days, playing with 20,000 volt neon sign transformers, 100,000 volt Tesla coils, and (gasp) 250,000 volt Van de Graaf generators. (By the way, the neon sign transformer was actually pretty dangerous, and my handling of it was careless, I now see. Be careful when you convert one of these into a Jacob's Ladder, or use it for plasma studies.) However, maybe the a.c. nature of some of these voltage sources revived me on the "reverse" cycle. (The V.D.G. is not a.c....so this blows this theory.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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BIG_dif (fwd)
by gimonca＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 19 Jul 1996 12:59:14 GMT > From: jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young) > > 7-19-96. NYP: > > "AT&T and Wells Fargo Investing in an Electronic Cash > Card." > [etc.] > Because of these concerns, Mondex has been modified in > the United States so that banks will be able to track > card use. That will allow them to audit for fraud, if > not recreate every transaction. Data from Mondex cards > will be used for various product marketing. > In other words, they took a bad product and made it worse.

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The PGP keyserver at jpunix.com
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The PGP keyserver at jpunix.com is temporarily shut down due to technical difficulties. For some reason, it won't process keys without failing. I suspect a corrupted keyring. I'm expecting to FTP a new master keyring shortly. Please be patient and I apologize for any inconvenience. John Perry - perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com - PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMfBasVOTpEThrthvAQGffwP/f1PuovMRixg58kFedhDQ8+ioX4MMgYo+ AKi0wK2TW10iswaqLm6Q2CV0rh+D2p2Ao8SgYaxoCV8qNgF+qssx8B84zKeq8xWI gGtX3qPhW1VCcyv6czCP+F2QOtmxPquHDhis62XMeI4RoFMj20fdcmTycHEQAZZp CflWX30YH5Q= =ZX9n -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Crim Law Message Board
by AFDA2＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Criminal defense attorneys are welcome to use the new message board located at the web site maintained by the Association of Federal Defense Attorneys (AFDA), located at http://www.afda.org The message board was installed on Friday, July 19, and it's there to serve the interests of the defense community. The board should be used strictly for professional purposes, to exchange ideas on the law, ask colleagues for input on strategies, share views or inquire about government agents and witnesses, and so forth. No personal or social conversation, please. You are also welcome to join AFDA online by clicking the "Join AFDA" bar on the home page of the web site. System Operator email to: Operator(a)afda.org

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Re: Opiated file systems
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 19 Jul 96 22:31:16 -0800, dfloyd(a)IO.COM wrote: >> A) Only accept files with valid PGP signatures from accepted keys - this >> is one area where PGP's commandline interface is a plus - just write a >> batch script. Demand that a separate file be sent first, signed by a >> certain key. This file would contain valid filenames for the rest of the >> session. If a non-listed file is sent, kill the session. This could all >> be automated with a simple program. You could probably even use SSLs and >> similar to do it on a website if you could swill the PGP bit - maybe a >> plugin? > >This defeats the purpose of the data haven. If I did stuff like that, >then why not use McAffee's WebStor, where you FTP files over to your >personal "vault"? What I was trying to propose was that you provide a key for usage when they first initiate usage of your site. They could then use that key to send stuff to you. Neither party needs to know who the other person is, merely that he is using the agreed upon key. This would let you revoke the keys of offenders. >> B) bounce trash back. > >If someone is shipping through a remailer, how would that help? I'm assuming most remailers allow 2 way traffic. Alternately, just send email to the remailer operator. Rather than get spammed by the bounceback, he would probably block that site from sending to you... (Or revoke their account entirely) >I plan to make this as anonymous as possible. Reason? Everything else is >just posing. I was intending this to be a place that one could be assured >of anonymity -- the data haven doesn't even know if the user can use PGP. I was using PGP as an example. If you really want portable, use that Java PK library and write a custom frontend for it. You just need to use an agreed upon key for verification. Now, if they wanted, a secure method might be using PK-aware remailers - pk channel from you to remailer, using your keys, pk channel from remailer to them, using their keys. This would let you exchange a key securely... Of course, it would involve trusting the remailer operator, but you'd have to do that anyway. // Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> - Webpages for sale! Se habla JavaScript! // Automatically receive my resume or PGPKEY by sending email with a subject // of 'send PGPKEY' or 'send resume'. Capitalization counts so be careful!

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Re: American People the relation to the Police
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:38 AM 7/20/96, Jim Choate wrote: >I disagree. This country fought two wars of liberation (you forgot about >1812) and a civil war to discredit this thesis in relation to a Democracy >founded upon individual liberty. It is no coincidence that the Tree of Liberty Well, to many of us, the wrong side won the War of the Rebellion (aka the Civil War, aka the War Between the States, etc.). A bunch of southern states wanted to seceed, which my reading of the founding documents said was clearly an option if sentiment was strong enough in that direction. Constitutional scholars of course debate this, and I've seen arguments that the documents eventually agreed to in 1789-90 in some ways undercut this "right" to seceed. I think this to be untrue, and that the signers of the Declaration and of the Constitution would be surprised to learn that they were signing a one-way, unreversible, no way out document, binding their communities to be part of the United States of America forever, even if their populace clearly wants out. So, the wrong side won. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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