- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:35 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >Did you miss the part in the Constitution about "provide for the common >defence" That's a meaningless part of the Preamble. And in any case, it's a statement of why "the People of the United States" wrote the Constitution. It's not an oath of the President. >and about the President's associated responsibility to "take care >that the laws be faithfully executed"? There is no law that specifically controls export of crypto, is there? I was under the impression that is an item on a list of regulated items drawn up by bureaucrats and could be changed any time the Executive Branch chose. a reg isn't a law. >And what oath do you suppose binds him because "The President shall be >commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States"? That's a job title. It doesn't command him as to what he should do in the job. In fact, the Commander In Chief is not under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and so can do anything he wants with that particular "office" subject only to impeachment and the willingness of the armed forces to obey him. It certainly doesn't require him to adopt any particular regulatory strategy. President Browne could legalize the export of all crypto by executive order on January 20th 1997 without violating his oath. That's one of the effects of a "strong executive." DCF

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Opiated file systems
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 14 Jul 96 at 12:48, Adam Back wrote while high on Ritalin: > Some more thoughts on encrypted file system design criteria. > A wish list: > > - Choice of secret key encryption algorithms (IDEA, 3DES, MDC, Blowfish) Nice in theory. Awful in practice. Requires code for managing keys, encrypting and decrypting for ea. algorithm be resident in memory. For some systems (MSDOS), free memory is at a premium... (one of the reasons SecureDrive is popular is because it takes only 2.5k). It's not worth wasting memory for handling several algorithms when only one is going to be used in most cases. > - Multiple architectures (MSDOS, Win31, Win95, WinNT, Unix, Mac) Ok... > - High performance (hand optimised assembler for each architecture) So much for maintaining code across platforms. > - Compression Not worthwhile. Use a Stacker or JAM driver over the encrypted partition on a PC, for instance. Keep compression and crypto separate utilities... keeps bugs from one interfering with another and reduces complexity of both drivers; also, if one wants crypto w/out compression or compression w/out crypto, no wasted memory (see above about RAM being at a premium). > - Ability to chain algorithms (IDEA and then 3DES for example) Why? Doesn't necessarily increase security, esp. considering the performance hit (memory... see above, time, key management). > - Possible to have encrypted file systems on separate partitions, or > > - Encrypted file system located in a file in another file system > (much like DOS stacker drives) this is an ease of use criteria -- I > suspect re-partitioning drives would put off many potential users. Nothing new there. > - Ease of use. Graphical user interface for setup and administration > functions, with a very simple set of configurations options > displayed by default, with more advanced configuration options > available in "expert" mode. A common problem with much crypto these days. > - All directory and FAT information should be encrypted, so that > it is not possible to discover even number of files, or percentage > of disk used without the key Do you understand how such systems work?!? Every sector is encrypted in such systems. That's not even an issue for most encrypted file systems (at least on the PC). > - Facility for duress key, with the real data hidden in the unused > space of the first encrypted drive. To increase the plausible Huh?!? > deniability all unused blocks within a file system should be filled > with garbage, so that it is not possible to tell if there is more > data there. If the algorithm is good, this shouldn't matter. The only way a person could tell if a sector is unused is if that person was able to mount the partition already. > - File system steganographically hidden in files on another file > system (encrypted or not). Support for a wide selection of file > formats (Aiff, Wave, Midi, JPEG, GIF, RGB, MPEG). Now this is getting nutty!!! Never mind the size, compleixty and amazing slowness of such a driver... you'd have to have audio or video files of gigabytes in size to be able to store anything of use. > - Ability to use stegoed file system in files on an unencrypted > file system, and boot from a floppy to access stegoed file system, > with no other traces left on hard disk. Why? The authorities would wonder why you have an 8 Gig JPG on your disk and figure you're using it for stego, or you're crazy, or both, and have you committed. Rob.

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ccMail SMTPLINK Undeliverable Message
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Well, with the UCMJ ( Uniform Code of Military Justice ) and the Oath of >Allegiance Military Personnel take on induction being re-written to Support >and defend the United Nations and to accept direct and lawful orders from UN >personnel, this doesn't surprise me.Soon, UN Secretary-General Boutros >Boutros-Ghali, or someone like him will repeal more of the amendments to our >constitution. First our guns, then our code. > >I'll give up my pass phrase when > they pry it from my cold dead fingers ! > >>Date: Sun, 14 Jul 1996 18:22:00 -0700 >>From: Alan Bostick <abostick(a)netcom.com> >>Organization: Arrogant Opinions 'R' Us >>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >>Subject: Organized Crime Home Page - Four Horsemen, No Waiting >>X-URL: http://www.mywebsite.com:1080/cgi-bin/bvolmgr.cgi?BVpage=management >>Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >> >>Cypherpunks interested in establishment scaremongering are invited >>to take a look at the Organized Crime Home Page >>(http://www.alternatives.com/crime/index.html) sponsored by a group >>called The Committee for a Safe Society, about the world-wide threat >>of organized crime. Apparently every evil known to post-Cold-War >>society, even the bad weather in Chicago, is the responsibility of >>organized crime. Now you know why governments need GAK. >> >>Alan-Bob says check it out. >>-- >>Alan Bostick | [Spielberg's] latest is TWISTER, a film that >>mailto:abostick@netcom.com | gives whole new meaning to the phrase "giant >>news:alt.grelb | sucking sound." -- Patrick Taggart >>http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick >> >> > > > >

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Gorelick GAKs away on CSPAN2
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I managed to miss seeing the Deputy Attorney General, whose name I will resist [with great effort] making a very tasteless joke about, but I've decided to briefly delurk to ask a question I have wondered about for some time: Who (an *individual's name*, not a department, please) came up with my unfavorite Orwellian-term, "key escrow"? I think it was likely a Bush administration official, and probably an attorney [ie. should have known better]. I am, as many of you know, trying to redefine the terms of the debate to our favored term, "GAK" -- although I must say the temptation was strong to try for "Federal Usurpation of Crypto Keys [etc.]" but I feel it's important to try to keep the debate polite until they reach the "cold, dead neurons" stage... Anyway, I assume this Bush administration official, like David Kessler, <spit!> is still a government employee -- and I would very much like to write a polite (believe it or not) letter to him or her, concerning the origin of the term. I will, of course, report back to the list if I get a reply. PS Loren Riddel(sp?) - I am back in south Florida, please send me your key and the secret word(s) in a PGPmessage. JMR Regards, Jim Ray -- DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy "The president has kept the promises he meant to keep." -- George Stephanopoulos (tells the truth, for once). ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 <mailto:liberty@gate.net> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray Coming soon, "Pennies For Perot" page! CYA with http://www.anonymizer.com ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMeo56G1lp8bpvW01AQFWcQQAsw/oUk57ljTKzO8lNgXoV7Lmoo2vWzw0 bk6fxGalAkDXtcgsPDdHBZ/ZV6EIpUhoIgAXi1G9ByI3jG36gxvWDD8eh2mr/ize 5HD9SKkgqCp09zwjKyBKwKAfZPGAT8oWlE0QOeBbp4ayGt+KRYk2llxultkYVlIS 4KQ5r+WQg6U= =dymZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: #E-CASH: PRODUCT OR SERVICE?
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- David G.W. Birch <daveb(a)hyperion.co.uk> wrote: > > Johan, > > >Careful there. At least ecash is a registered trademark. And as far as I know > > It is alleged that a trademark has been applied for on the term "ecash" > in some countries: that's why Robert was careful (as we always are) to > use the term "e-cash" instead. "Ecash" is a registered trademark of DigiCash. It is registered with the Benelux trademark office and the United States trademark office. I believe that it is considered unwise to use minor variations on trademarked names, but I'm not an intellectual property rights lawyer. > >Mondex isn't one of the true electronic cash systems. Please correct me if > >I'm wrong, but isn't mondex an electronic debit card system? > > Mondex is _the only_ true electronic cash system in the world that I know > of, precisely because it isn't an electronic debit card system (like > Avant) or digital travellers' cheques (like Digicash). I think it would behoove us all to clarify our terms. I call Ecash(tm) coins "electronic cash" for several reasons. Ecash(tm) has all of the following characteristics in common with conventional cash, in descending order of importance: 1. Unforgeability. Ecash(tm) coins have intrinsic value because they are cryptographically impossible to forge. 2. Finality. Payments are cleared on the spot. No outstanding payment obligations remain after a purchase. 3. Bi-directionality. Payers and recipients use the same software and the same protocol. It is not necessary for recipients to be specially trusted by the bank or by the payers. 4. Privacy. The privacy of Ecash(tm) payers is mathematically unconditional. 5. Composability. You can make large Ecash(tm) payments out of a collection of smaller Ecash(tm) coins. This is in contrast to a check-based system where you typically draw a check for the exact amount and transfer only a single check. 6. Small payments. Ecash(tm) coins are cheap enough to use that they are practical for small payments. (As a note, I do not use the word "micropayments" here, because I am beginning to think that a good technical definition of "micropayments" is "payments whose value is less than the cost of using current electronic coins". This qualifies schemes like Shamir's and disqualifies, well... current electronic coins.) There might be other angles we should talk about here. I think that the first quality is the defining one, technically. So, could a knowledgeable person e.g. Mr. Birch tell us why Mondex should be considered to be "electronic cash"? And similarly I would like to hear an informed opinion about why Ecash(tm) should not be considered "electronic cash". I tend to agree that Ecash(tm) would be even _more_ cashlike if it were cleared off-line, but I don't consider that difference very fundamental. (_Any_ digital money based on our current understandings will have to be cleared at a central clearer eventually, since digital information is perfectly copyable.) Thank you for your correspondance. Regards, Bryce Ecash 2.x Team -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMepI/UjbHy8sKZitAQEiJwL/VnpQEHL1rOQ6Hm9JIEgAfCGjSKOPaIiC Jp7EVjvPoFYEsQAS4iUWybNLpxi/23uaqpXMCSNMrEwqd8WeC5ZSISldIEK/BnYE 2bULeAeMhIqm92bP6o64ok1NBGPfvK5X =ANO4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Seek-and-Destroy
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do NOT visit: http://xxx.lanl.gov/seek-and-destroy The sysadmins for xxx.lanl.gov don't like robots visiting their web site, so they've published a statement on indexing at: http://xxx.lanl.gov/RobotsBeware.html Remember, do NOT click on: http://xxx.lanl.gov/seek-and-destroy -Declan

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Someone can't read
by David Lesher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Clinton Proposes Initiatives On the Scrambling of Data {} > The insistence of the Administration on moving forward on > key-escrow technology appears to ignore the advice of a May > report by the National Research Council, which recommended > going more slowly on key escrow because the technology had > not yet been proved feasible. > > Administration officials said yesterday, however, that they > were better informed than the council's members realized. > > "We're further down the road on key-escrow technology than > the N.R.C. is familiar with," said Greg Simon, Vice > President Al Gore's chief domestic policy adviser. As I recall the NRC members in DC said, in *EXPLICITLY* rejecting the "If only you know what we know..." mantra, that if there was something the [NRC] did not know, it wasn't cuz that had not asked everyone involved. (Or words to that effect) So it appears the Admin was withholding data from the Congress.... I have here in front of me, documented proof that there are crypto-carrying members of the Cypherpunk Party... -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Sun 14 Jul 96 15:43:37 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- replay remailer(a)replay.com ****+++****+ 5:01 99.99% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #-*##*#**##+ 2:26 99.99% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ***********+ 17:16 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org ++-++++++++- 57:40 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -+++++-+++-- 2:50:34 99.98% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com *#######+##+ 2:21 99.98% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++++ 40:00 99.97% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++-+++ 47:35 99.94% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net -+--++++-.-- 7:31:14 99.93% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----+-+----- 3:12:29 99.86% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org **++++*++**+ 39:15 99.76% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net _-...-+_--. 14:56:48 99.69% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #- ##*#+##+ 2:08 99.46% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -+ + +--.- 3:43:44 98.98% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com #*+#*+* * * 1:28:29 98.17% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ...- -----+ 11:48:28 94.51% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net * #+#-+* # 4:49 91.21% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com ********+ 20:19 76.01% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---.---- 6:01:00 51.75% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ### ## 51:33 47.17% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:58 AM 7/15/96 -0400, Raph Levien wrote: >[much, much elided from Tim's post] >> ... and by opposition to Clipper I, >> Clipper II, and now Clipper III. > >Is this Clipper III or Clipper IV? I seem to have lost count. I think it's Clipper 3.14159. They seem to be going around in circles. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Global Government Access to Keys (GGAK)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:37 AM 7/15/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 2:05 PM 7/13/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote: >>Or what if some terrorist was using keys escrowed in a country that >>sponsered terrorist acts? > >Deranged Mutant is absolutely right. There are about 150 (or so) >governments in the world. When people talk about making keys available to >government (or law enforcement), always ask, "Which governments can access >these keys?" If I were a non-French corporation, I would feel distinctly >nervous if the answer included France. (There are a number of other >countries where the security services have also been suspected of engaging >in industrial espionage.) There are some interesting "public relations" stunts we can use to undermine support for the concept of GAK: * Announce in corporate press releases (for some Cypherpunkish company?) that "As per the laws of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, we have provided Col. Qaddaffi's Office of People's Security with our encryption keys for all communications passing into, out of, or over Libyan soil." (This would likely horrify the U.S. security establishment, were it to be actually true. But it is of course essentially symmetrical with the fear those in Germany, India, Iraq, etc. would have if told to deposit copies of their keys with the U.S. National Security Agency or any other "trusted third party" mandated.) (I can't resist another aside. Sorry. In addition to the abuse of the English language with using "escrow" in this warped sense, we now have "trusted third party" used in a warped sense. "We're not saying _you_ trust them, we're saying the NSA trusts them.") * "The U.S. has designated J. P. Morgan and Company as a Designated Trusted Authority for the deposit of encryption keys for Jewish persons wishing to communicate in primarily Islamic countries." (Making the point that any international key escrow scheme which complies with various nation's laws must collide with American values about such things. In many Arab countries, Jews are restricted in various ways. Do we want the government of the U.S. participating in such restrictions? And what about the Arab boycott? It may be in decline now, but not with all countries.) * "The United States Office of Communications Security has turned over to the government of Singapore a list of all persons suspected of circumventing Singaporan law regarding encryption." (ObNazi Reference: One can imagine how a GAK program would've worked during the Third Reich. Not only would communications have been read, regardless of the supposed legal protections, but GAK would have been used to compile contact lists of people to be rounded up. Sort of the way the U.S. government violated the laws about the U.S. Census to illegally use census records to locate "Japs" for assignment to concentration camps.) And so forth, concentrating on the essentially intractable problem of how to "escrow" keys with foreign governments imimical to Western values. (The crypto literature, esp. the Proceedings of the Crypto Conference, circa the mid-80s, refers to this as the "rogue government" problem, esp. with regard to the issuance of false "is-a-person" credentials. That is, suppose a Global Identification Infrastructure (GII) is implemented, consistent with Global Government Access to Keys (GGAK). What about some countries, whether they be the Free Republic of Libertaria or the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, who either refuse to play along or who subvert the system with false information? What if the United States itself issues false identities to its secret agents, its informants, and its 60,000+ people in the so-called Witness Security program?) There are other aspects of GAK which also collide with basic values. For example, consider several classes of communications we consider "privileged": -- attorney-client discussions, in person or over phone lines. -- doctor-patient discussions -- psychiatrist--patient discussions -- priest--penitent confessions Are the computer communications (likely in the future to increase, even if not common now) of these groups to be GAKked? Even with "safeguards," the priest--penitent relationship will be forever compromised, with neither side knowing whether some secret policemen is listening. These are not new issues; we talked about them several years ago. But now that GAK is being discussed again.... --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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