- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Reasonable validation of a software package
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I expect this problem can usually be handled without formal CAs. If you publish your PGP key fingerprint in your advertising and make the key available on your web page, then your users have a way of independently verifying your key. As the finger print appears in more and more places (letterhead, product packaging, etc.), it is less and less likely that your attacker can reach them all to modify them. The important thing is diverse paths. If you include your key in the package with the product and print the fingerprint on the outside, it becomes relatively easier for your attacker to replace the whole thing as part of an attack. At 11:33 AM 7/13/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin wrote: >This illustrates the need for and role of certification authorities. > >See http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/trusted.htm for some >info. > >On Sat, 13 Jul 1996, Lyal Collins wrote: > >> This touches upon a favourite rant of mine. >[...] >> So, now you need to ensure that you can get your public key >> (to verify the digital signature with) in the hands of all >> your possible, or intended, recipients. >> >> Now the race is on for as many people as possible to generate >> PGP public keys/certificates bearing your name, or variations >> of it. Once that occurs, there is a fair chance that one of >> these keys will verfiy the digital signature on a piece of >> software purportedly from you. Still, not many people will have >> your true PGP public key/certificate, but, them's the breaks. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:05 PM 7/13/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote: >On 12 Jul 96 at 18:23, Bob Palacios posted: > >[Banner Snipped!]] >> CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 27 July 12, 1996 >[..] > >> Today's statement is essentially a re-statement of the Clipper III proposal >> released in May. Among other things, the Vice President: >> >> * Called for the liberalization of export controls provided computer >> users participate in a "global key management infrastructure" >> designed to make personal encryption keys accessible to law >> enforcement. > >This is particularly problematic... if the mainland Chinese gov't >requested a key from a N.Amercian or European (or even UN controlled) >escrow agency, who is to say it isn't really for political reasons >(even though they may claim the persons are drug smugglers)? > >Or what if the 'crime' was, say, discussing Mormon beliefs, which is >illegal in Singapore (and I think Russia as well)? > >Or what if some terrorist was using keys escrowed in a country that >sponsered terrorist acts? Deranged Mutant is absolutely right. There are about 150 (or so) governments in the world. When people talk about making keys available to government (or law enforcement), always ask, "Which governments can access these keys?" If I were a non-French corporation, I would feel distinctly nervous if the answer included France. (There are a number of other countries where the security services have also been suspected of engaging in industrial espionage.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Lack of PGP signatures
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:38 PM 7/5/96 -0400, "Mark M." <markm(a)voicenet.com> wrote: >OK, now the point of this message: somebody pointed out that if a binary was >clear-signed using an option that would strip it down to 7 bits, the binary >would be corrupted and therefore, such an option on PGP would be a Bad Thing. >Then, I pointed out that not only would there be no point in a clear signature, >since that would make the binary useless to someone without PGP anyway. It >is best to sign a binary and extract the certificate to a separate file, which >you noted above. So an option that would strip data down to 7 bits would not >affect the ability to sign a binary. Such an option would probably be a Good >Thing. Not everybody limits their language to the 96 characters supported by ASCII; many people use languages that have umlauts and cedillas and accent marks and haceks and other inkblots above/under/around their letters, or symbols like section markers and Yen and British Pound currency symbols. A signature form that trashes files down to 7 bits would not only annoy these people, but also their readers :-) One readily obvious alternative - hashing only the lower 7 bits of each letter, but not damaging the letter itself - is probably worse, because the message can be altered by changing high bits without changing the signature, while the shred-them-all method at least leaves you sure what you're signing. But they're both pretty bad.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Re-delegate Authority!

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Re: Word lists for passphrases
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:43 PM 7/8/96 -0700, you wrote: >If the purpose is for use with "Crack" or some similar program, it might be >better than you would think. You won't get the "unusual" words, but you >will also get the words in common usage that do not appear in dictionaries. >(Such as fnord, jedi, killfile, and the like...) "fnord" is in _my_ dictionary - can't you find it in yours? :-) >Another thing to look for when choosing dictionaries/wordlists for crack is >not sticking to english. If you have a userbase that is known to have a >certain percentage of people of a non-english background, you will want to >find lists of words from that background. (I had a sysadmin asking me about >Yiddish and Hebrew wordlists for just that reason.) These can be a bit >harder. (Especially for unusual languages.) Grady Ward has his Moby Words databases with some of this kind of information. In addition to the usual sets of languages, it's useful to include any available lexicons of Elvish, Klingon, Unix, and other popular hacker-languages, plus any names you can scam off MUDs, etc. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Re-delegate Authority!

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Defend Mail Bomb
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is it possible to defend mail bomb? If not, detect who they are?

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Organized Crime Home Page - Four Horsemen, No Waiting
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, with the UCMJ ( Uniform Code of Military Justice ) and the Oath of Allegiance Military Personnel take on induction being re-written to Support and defend the United Nations and to accept direct and lawful orders from UN personnel, this doesn't surprise me.Soon, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, or someone like him will repeal more of the amendments to our constitution. First our guns, then our code. I'll give up my pass phrase when they pry it from my cold dead fingers ! >Date: Sun, 14 Jul 1996 18:22:00 -0700 >From: Alan Bostick <abostick(a)netcom.com> >Organization: Arrogant Opinions 'R' Us >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Organized Crime Home Page - Four Horsemen, No Waiting >X-URL: http://www.mywebsite.com:1080/cgi-bin/bvolmgr.cgi?BVpage=management >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >Cypherpunks interested in establishment scaremongering are invited >to take a look at the Organized Crime Home Page >(http://www.alternatives.com/crime/index.html) sponsored by a group >called The Committee for a Safe Society, about the world-wide threat >of organized crime. Apparently every evil known to post-Cold-War >society, even the bad weather in Chicago, is the responsibility of >organized crime. Now you know why governments need GAK. > >Alan-Bob says check it out. >-- >Alan Bostick | [Spielberg's] latest is TWISTER, a film that >mailto:abostick@netcom.com | gives whole new meaning to the phrase "giant >news:alt.grelb | sucking sound." -- Patrick Taggart >http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick > >

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Questions from a Wannabe
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I have been reading all of the posts for a few days now and I have a couple of questions, if someone has time. In the event of GAk, how can we be forced to register our keys ? We could always scrounge some old outdated but functional TEMPEST equipment .... and could someone please explain ITAR in a simple way for me ? One last thing.. If I have the US PGP and a friend uses the export version, I assume we are compatible, yes ? Thanks all, Charles E. Sparks<sparks(a)bah.com> In God we trust, all others we encrypt ! http:/www.clark.net/pub/charley/index.htm Public Key At http://www.clark.net/pub/charley/cp_1.htm

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Re: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> > That is interesting as I don't recall ever being offered a choice of >> > toll free or being billed when I dial an 800 number (sometimes the only >> > number offered for a company). >> I haven't noticed too many business telephones that don't appear in >> Directory Assistance. >That is assuming that you know which area they are located in. There are businesses that _only_ list their 800 numbers, and you can't find out the real phone number associated with them through directory assistance. It's especially annoying when they've got an in-state or other non-nation-wide 800 number, or when you're calling from outside the US, especially when they're a business you'd like to be able to reach from anywhere, any time, like the travel agent your office uses :-) But it does make it hard to call them directly for ANI-avoidance as well. And they may _only_ have the bank of phones that's got ANI service on it, and not have other phones. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Re-delegate Authority!

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:17 14/07/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 7:05 AM -0700 7/13/96, Deranged Mutant wrote: >>On 12 Jul 96 at 18:23, Bob Palacios posted: >>> * Called for the liberalization of export controls provided computer >>> users participate in a "global key management infrastructure" >>> designed to make personal encryption keys accessible to law >>> enforcement. >> >>This is particularly problematic... >Your best shot would be to make sure the part about the system being >voluntary was hard-wired into any legislation or rule-making. Unless and >until ITAR is modified by Congress, the USG has what Mark Twain called "the >calm confidence of a Christian with four aces" on this matter. International agreement on this issue won't happen this century. People don't understand the problem (or why it needs regulation), are suspicious of the US and its motives -- in any case international negotiations take forever. As for the "concession" regarding liberalisation of export controls of crypto -- big deal. The stuff is available anyway outside the US, so the only people helped are US industry -- why should the rest of the world care? Without international agreement, the whole key escrow idea doesn't have a leg to stand on, and I doubt US industry will be willing to wait that long before they can use strong crypto in their international products. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org check out my new page at http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ The protestors of Tiananmen Square will be back. Next time, the battle will be fought in cyberspace, where the students have the more powerful tanks...

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Re: Metered Phone
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:19 PM 7/7/96 +0800, you wrote: >Does anyone have any ideas about this metered phone? >I am from Philippines and heard some news that it will be >existing in 1997. Quite a big problem! Every dial will be counted, >every seconds will be measured... That sounds like you're getting newer telephone technology. In the US, most areas with newer telephone switches offer you the choice of flat rate service (you pay a constant price per month for calls in your city or other local area) or measured service (you pay a lower price per month plus a few cents per minute for local calls.) In many places with measured service, the phone company measures how much time you use for local calls, but doesn't record who you call, only how many minutes. For long-distance calls, which always charge for time, they do record what number you call. For computer users, there are two issues - - recording who you call is, of course, bad - if you have flat rate telephone service, you can stay connected to your Internet provider full time, instead of calling up every N minutes or when you have mail. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Re-delegate Authority!

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