- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Been good to know ya ...
by Rabid Wombat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Later, all. And thanks to John for all the work he has put in to maintaining the list. Last one to leave, turn out the lights. -r.w.

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Re: anonymity and e-cash
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: alt.cypherpunks, talk.politics.crypto,sci.crypt) At 1:19 PM -0800 2/12/97, Lee Tien wrote (on the Cypherpunks(a)toad.com list): >The NSA's research report on e-cash says: > > "The ideal situation (from the point of view of privacy advocates) >is that neither payer nor payee should know the identity of the other. This >makes remote transactions using electronic cash totally anonymous: no one >knows where Alice spends her money and who pays her. > > "It turns out that this is too much to ask: there is no way in such >a scenario for the consumer to obtain a signed receipt. Thus we are forced >to settle for payer anonymity." > >Keeping in mind I am only a lawyer, my skim of Schneier (2d ed.) didn't >illuminate. The discussion of digital cash seemed to assume no payee >anonymity. But the immediate previous section of dining cryptographers >involved (it seemed) recipient untraceability. > >Is payee anonymity technically possible? Under what conditions? > >If so, is the issue social, e.g., as NSA notes, the lack of a signed receipt? You missed a very good talk by Ian Goldberg of UC Berkeley at the Saturday Cypherpunks meeting at Stanford, where Ian talked for more than an hour on just this issue. (He also talked for an hour on his crack of the RSA challenge using 250 workstations...this was also a good talk.) It was explicitly stated in Chaum's 1985 paper that methods existed to ensure full untraceability. Chaum has in recent years emphasized a more "surveillance friendly" system in which some of the anonymity is lost. It was the intuition of some of us that "coin changers" could solve this problem, e.g, by having intermediaries to "mix" the coins and thus break the traceability chain. Lucky Green wrote some articles along these lines, and maybe Hal Finney, too. This was a couple of years ago. The notion is similar to what Ian showed, but our arguments were not formal and robust. In August of '95, Doug Barnes released a long article on "Identity Agnostic" systems. (His article is no longer at the www.communities.com Web site, so I can't refer you to it. Maybe he'll post it again.) About a year ago Ian Goldberg considered this issue and came up with a solution which has seemingly reproduced what Chaum was thinking about (but, apparently, did not make completely clear in his papers, for whatever reasons). Ian deals with the issue of "making change" and comes up with a system in which intermediaries, which we may call "e-cashiers" and "moneychangers," can take on the role of the mint/bank. By making "negative deposits" (submitting signed withdrawal slips, effectively), these intermediaries function as moneychangers. And so the one-way anonymous features become two-way (effectively, each of the transactions contributes a "one-way anonymous" component: one-way + one-way = two-way). It is much easier to understand digital cash with the usual diagram showing the usual triangle of CUSTOMER-MERCHANT-MINT and then analyzing the flow of information, who knows what, etc. Drawing such diagrams in e-mail is beyond my patience. This system used online clearing, of course. This "disintermediates" the process, and makes for an "everyone a mint" situation, which has some of the same nice properties that an "everyone a remailer" ecology of remailers and users has. And the principle can be extended further back, to where the usual distinctions between CUSTOMER and MERCHANT vanish (as it sort of does in the real world, where the two parties are merely exchanging one item for another item), and where the role of the MINT is minimal. In fact, Ian showed, the Chaum patents on blinding are NOT USED by the Mint/Bank; only the CUSTOMER uses the blinding patents (and the MERCHANT in some cases, not in other cases). This means that "anyone a mint" does not violate any of the Chaum/Digicash patents, and "mint clients" are likely to be written by third parties. (The _customer_ is presumably on the honor system to abide by the Chaum patents...except the patents are only being licensed to banks...go figure.) (This is where, as I recall, Doug's "agnostic" system came in...it is possible his thinking was similar to Ian's...I don't have Doug's paper handy.) Ian demonstrated this on an actual system, with real live connections to mints in various countries, but with the blinding not used (as I recall). Draw your own conclusions about what this means. It was heady stuff, seeing the result many of us believed to be implicit in Chaum's 1985 paper made real. Everyone a mint. This makes the spread of fully anonymous digital cash harder to stop. Issues of the mint denying one has an account are always real ones, but not important--I think--in the real world. The untraceability of the digital coins means that a mint never knows who is testing it for reliability and "honesty," and the mint cannot set out to "screw" a particular customer by declaring his account not to exist (as the mint almost certainly does not have to know who own which accounts, as deposits can be made anonymously). I hope this helps. I plan to use this result centrally in my talk at the panel discussion on "Governmental and Social Implications of Digital Cash" at the upcoming CFP. --Tim May -- Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Spam posts from my acct.
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cpunks, A number of spam mails (I counted about 100 in my incoming mail) were sent to the list from my account last night. I do not take particular precautions with my password for this account as there is no sensitive mail sent through it, I recall in particular giving the password to someone to test out a machine recently and I believe they may be the culprit. Again, my appologies for the inconvenience and you have to admit that while his method may have been less than subtle his message was certainly something we can all relate to ;-) Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: John Gilmore the fascist cocksucker
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Why you are doing this, Paul? > > - Igor. It would appear that someone I gave my password to the other day (I recieve no sensitive mail through this account) so they could use it to test a machine has a rather infantile sense of humour and have taken my critical posts to the list to mean that I want to spam a mailing list with dreck like this. I shall ensure the offending fool is castrated forthwith... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Excerpt on SPAM from Edupage, 11 February 1997
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:21 PM +0000 2/12/97, Attila T. Hun wrote: > maybe relief is in sight; can we spell excedrin? > >on or about 970211:1433 educom(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu said: > >+COURT GRANTS COMPUSERVE INJUNCTION AGAINST JUNK E-MAIL > >+A U.S. district court in Ohio has granted CompuServe's request for a >+preliminary injunction barring Cyber Promotions Inc. from sending >+unsolicited e-mail to its subscribers while the commercial provider ... Were I a customer of CompuServe, I'd ask on what basis CompuServe was intercepting e-mail to me. In fact, a CompuServe account holder has made just this point: "I'll decide what's junk mail and what's not." Having the court system involved in deciding what mail is valid and what is not valid is not my idea of a free society. Having said this, the flaw remains that "junk mail" is "free" to the sender. This is a flaw in the ontology of e-mail, and needs to be fixed. Digital postage is one approach. I'm not holding my breath, but I sure don't want a "District Court" deciding. --Tim May Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Extensis CyberViewer Registration
by webmaster＠extensis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Gringo, Thank you for registering your copy of CyberViewer with Extensis! Your CyberViewer serial number is: JME-100-001-936-690721 Please save this message for your records. Visit <http://www.extensis.com/products/CyberViewer/> for more information about CyberViewer news & updates! Thanks for using Extensis CyberViewer! Jeff Cheney Product Marketing Manager jcheney(a)extensis.com

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Re: Recommendation: Creation of "alt.cypherpunks"
by Firebeard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>>> Timothy C May writes: TCM> Since posting my comments I've just seen the proposal that tivoli TCM> may host a list. Whoa, Nellie! Who made that proposal? It certainly wasn't me! I said that I was taking steps to set up a majordomo to host a cypherpunks list. Topmost on those steps is creation of the sten.net or sten.org domain, and getting a personal, paid-for-out-of-my-own-pocket, ISDN connection. The majordomo will run off of my personal computer sitting in my apartment, not on Tivoli hardware sitting in the support lab. As I said, John forced my hand in his announcement, causing me to 'put up' before everything was in place, including the domain registration. Yes, my mail comes from sten.tivoli.com. That doesn't mean that everything I do in life is connected to Tivoli, IBM, etc. -- #include <disclaimer.h> /* Sten Drescher */ Unsolicited bulk email will be stored and handled for a US$500/KB fee. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion, it is by the beans of Java that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking becomes a warning, it is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. -- Carlos Nunes-Ueno, 3/29/95

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Re: Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer (fwd)
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com" "Jim Choate" 12-FEB-1997 18:43:56.23 > From: "E. Allen Smith" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.rutgers.edu> >> Umm... because you'll eventually accumulate _lots_ of addresses >> that don't work, which will slow things down tremendously in sending >> mail out? >The current subscription is between 1,000 and 2,000 I don't think that is >_lots_. All we need to do is count the number of bounces per address in >a given period, the SSZ end is trying to decide between weekly or >monthly cleanings, and then clear that address. At no point would I need >to archive the original bounce. Someone with more experience correct me if I'm wrong (I'm just starting to learn about mailing list management), but isn't saving at least the first bounce from a given address good in order to check what address is the one that's actually bouncing? Admittedly, this only applies to badly-formed bounces. The rest can just have the address noted. >> Well, loki(a)cyberpass.net has made the offer to host the entire >> list... and Lance is certainly making money at it. While this would have >> some problems in comparison with the distributed list idea (namely more of >> a choke point), it would decidedly help. >I certainly hope they get a cpunks address made available. I will certainly >subscribe cpunks@ssz so that the distributed remailer will benefit from >that input. However, one of the major realizations is that as long as one >anything is involved in the list it is capable of being shutdown at any >time with no warning. It also makes it much easier to compromise. I would >like to see servers in several countries myself. Agreed. >> >Is anyone interested in acting as a mail-to-news gateway? >Want to volunteer? Give me some idea of how much programming knowledge, time, etcetera is required, please, before I can answer. I'd be renting space on some other computer (e.g., an account on cyberpass.net) to do it in; the only higher-level programming language (i.e., beyond Applesoft Basic) that I know anything of is Perl (and I don't know that all that well); and I am somewhat busy with other stuff. In other words, it depends. -Allen

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security
by zac speidel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

does any 1 here a hacker??? --=====================_855792302==_ Content-Type: TEXT/HTML; CHARSET=us-ascii Content-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.970212160438.11558F(a)crl.crl.com> <BASE HREF="www.well.com/user/fritoy/sample.html"> <html> <title>Skinhead Oi Oi</title> <script>  </script> </head> <body bgcolor=#000000 text=#FFFFFF link="FF0000" vlink="8888FF" alink="FF00FF"> <script>   </script> </head> <body> <BODY BGCOLOR=000000 text="#000000" link="#0000ff" vlink="#c00c0" onload="scroller()"> <CENTER><FORM> <BR><BR><BR> <input type="button" Value="Close" onClick="if (confirm('Are you sure you want to close this window?'))window.close();else (alert('OK, this window will not close yet.'))"> </FORM></CENTER> <BR> <CENTER><P><FORM name="forma"><INPUT NAME="david" VALUE=" Speidel(a)lightspeed.net The End Is HERE!!! The world is falling apart" type="hidden" ><INPUT NAME="scroller" VALUE="" size="35"></FORM></P> </CENTER> </BODY> </html> --=====================_855792302==_--

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Re: Network of majordomos
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What was your chater? Could you Cc a copy to the list? I didn`t save it but it was something along the lines of this: Charter: alt.cypherpunks will serve as a discussion forum for the members of the cypherpunks community. The discussion group previously resided on a mailing list run at toad.com but due to a difference of opinion between the majority of active members of the list and the owner of toad.com, John Gilmore, the list must now relocate onto usenet as a temporary measure while further measures are put in place to re-establish a mailing list format. The group has approximately 1500 members and has been active online for some 5 years. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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