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A cypherpunk in Baghdad (was re: giantlaser: Ali Baba returns)
by R. A. Hettinga 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

It looks like Ryan's going to Baghdad... Same as it ever was. Click the link to see details, like a pic or two. :-). Tyler's been running a sattelite ISP there for about a year. I've been reading his LJ for about 6 months now, or so. Great story. Anarchocapitalism at its finest, ladies and germs... Cheers, RAH -------- <http://www.livejournal.com/users/giantlaser/48523.html> Tyler (??) (?giantlaser) wrote, @ 2004-07-18 13:24:00 ? ? Ali Baba returnsslownewsday and I woke last night to a battle outside our house. Two thieves (Ali Babas) dressed in black were sneaking around the back garden of our neighbor. It isn't clear who fired first, or how it started at all. What is clear is that the guards on my roof (over our bedroom) opened up with multiple rifles in short automatic bursts. The thieves may have responded with pistols, but clearly decided they were outgunned and beat feet. Jayme and I didn't know any of this when it happened. We bolted from bed and silently dressed in the first thing at hand, our pajamas. Note to self - emergency pants. Jayme put on her armor and I took my med kit, and we went to check what happened. My heart was beating and my mind raced. The firing had ceased after 15 seconds of exchange or so, but it was very close with no distant return fire. Is it Ali Baba? Insurgents? Something really serious? Can we defend the house or do we make a running retreat? Protective, aggressive caveman hovered beneath my consciousness. I could feel everything around me, including my own hands shaking as they grabbed spare magazines. Then I was holding my pistol, and I was still and ready. Strange. I advanced down the hall cop-style with my gun made ready with my arms in lowered shooting stance. It seemed like a good idea at the time - it's what cops do, right? Outside, I found Kak Jalal (the former Brig. General) talking to the guards. He looked me up and down, and laughed. He must have seen thousands of young men like that, armed and scared. I dropped the cop stance. It was all over by the time we were outside. We went back to bed. The post-panic sex was fantastic. So we're reviewing security. The approach the thieves might have taken is covered by a guard post (over my bedroom), a 3-meter wall, and razor wire. However, it's dark on the far side of the wall. Noor al Dien (my personal guard and faithful manservant *) spoke to the neighbor. The neighbor thanked him for guarding the neighborhood and asked us to install a light that shines into his yard. He doesn't have a generator, so he can't power a light reliably. This is good news for us, because we wanted to do this anyway but we didn't want to irritate the neighbors. Well, irritate them more than the razor wire and periodic gun battles already do. * I love saying "faithful manservant". We're adding the lights and working on better coordination between the guards. Some were more careful and gave measure warning shots. Some decided that overwhelming fright was the best tactic, in order to discourage repeat visits. I can't really argue with that, except for the part where it scares the shit out of me. (Post a new comment) octal 2004-07-18 04:39 (link) Amusing that this happens the day before I show up :) Webcams on the perimeter would be fun, too. I think I'll try to get a III + IV vest for the car; is it worth bothering with a coolmax and a IIA concealable? Also, battle dressings seem like a REALLY good idea. Pistol? Why not the AK? I've never really had a problem with confronting people with a gun while naked; if it shocks them for even a second, it's a plus for me. Heh. What are "warning shots"? As in center-of-mass hits on the targets, which the others find out about before attacking again? (Reply to this) (Thread) giantlaser 2004-07-18 06:48 (link) Vest is your call - the hard part is finding one. I don't wear one, but Jayme was issued one by her company. We carry battle dressings and tampons (stick them in wounds) at all times. 1/3 of my normal man-bag (read: European Carry-All, or purse) is devoted to bulletwound care. I went shooting with the AK a few days ago. It performed poorly - aim is fine, but after 30 rounds it heats up and jams frequently. I won't carry a weapon that's going to get me killed at a random time in the future. Killing is a very serious thing here. Even if they are thieves, we pay fassel if we kill them. So you give them a chance to flee before taking serious aim. A real attack is one thing. Simple thieves are another. (Reply to this) (Parent) (Thread) travisd 2004-07-18 15:27 (link) If you capture them though, can you demand ransom for their return? (Reply to this) (Parent) (Thread) giantlaser 2004-07-18 22:46 (link) Uh, yes. :) But it's not a wise business to get into. Our engineers are far too vulnerable as they travel around to make a profit on ransom possible. (Reply to this) (Parent) habibi 2004-07-18 08:18 (link) wow! (Reply to this) valiss 2004-07-18 08:41 (link) Another note-to-self: emergency shoes. Nothing like trying to flee from a building when glass is all over the floor. (Reply to this) gori11a 2004-07-18 09:21 (link) In Nairobi, our Askari ("night guard"? There's no real translation) carried Rungas, which are short narrow clubs with knotted gnarls at the end. Bandits usually were armed with Machettes. A siren and spinning light alarm on the top of a house would summon all the Askaris on the block to beat the bandits to within an inch of their lives. It was not uncommon for an Askari to be found asleep on his watch. I'm glad guns weren't as prevalent there as they seem to be in Baghdad. (Reply to this) cambler 2004-07-18 10:14 (link) I've said it before, and I'll say it again - I look forward to your book more than you can know. (Reply to this) re: turns of phrase (Anonymous) 2004-07-18 12:30 (link) "faithful manservant", eh? "aide-de-camp" is also very good. (Reply to this) pinkish 2004-07-18 23:55 (link) What about good ole motion sensor lights? Scare the shit out of me walking by someone's garage at 4am. (Reply to this) (Post a new comment) -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re:
by Dave 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

>fotogalary and Music [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/octet-stream which had a name of Doll.scr]

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Re:
by Dave 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

>Predators [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/octet-stream which had a name of Cat.cpl]

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Re:
by Jya 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

>Animals [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/octet-stream which had a name of Dog.com]

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1984 Comes To Boston (fwd from brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
by Eugen Leitl 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews(a)hyperreal.org -----

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Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies
by Tyler Durden 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

>As suggested, tapping oversea fibres in shallow waters is probably the Way >To >Do It. Apparently NSA has it's own splicing sub for this purpose. As for US fibers, I've spoken to folks who have actually seen the splice in cable landings that went over to W. VA or wherever. -TD _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/

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Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies
by Tyler Durden 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

"Gimme an intel IXA network processor and no problem. ATM is fixed size data, not as tricky as IP decoding. Predicatable bandwidth. Stream all into megadisks, analyze later." I'm gonna have to challenge this bit here, Variola. Let's back up. You've got an OC-48 or OC-192 fiber and you want to grab ALL of the data in this fiber. Now I'll grant that in real life there's going to be a lot telephony circuit in there, but let's take a worst-case and assume you need ALL the data. What's in this OC-192? Right now it definitely ain't 10Gb/s of packets. It's going to have LOTS of DS1s, DS3s and, if you're lucky, and STS-3c or two. So you'll need to first of all demux ALL of the tributaries. Next, you've got to un-map any ATM in each of the DS1s, etc, and then pull out the IP data from the ATM cells, remembering to reassemble fragmented packets (and there will be plenty with ATM). And remember, you may have to do this for 5000 simultaneous DS1s. Oh, and let's not forget pointer adjustments. You can't just blindly grab stuff...remember that all those tribs come from different STRATUM 1/3 clocks, so they'll be moving at different speeds and as a result have periodic slips w.r.t the STS-192 container. And that's just one fiber. How will you actually get all of this traffic back to HQ? Remember, it keeps coming and won't stop. No, I think I'm becomming convinced that they can't yet get ALL of it. But they DO probably grab complete wavelengths and backhual them, storing them for later study. (They must do some grooming too. For instance, they probably CALEA everything into and out of Brooklyn, and then that will get switched over to the Beltway where it will be packed into a GIG-BE OC-768 back to storage and processing.) -TD >From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv(a)cdc.gov> >To: "cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net> >Subject: Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto >proxies >Date: Sun, 18 Jul 2004 22:35:19 -0700 > >At 01:07 PM 7/18/04 -0500, J.A. Terranson wrote: > >Let me fill in what he left out. Yes, the industry is moving towards > >MPLS over POS. That's not where it is now though. At least not for >most > >interfaces. Right now the industry is chock full of lagacy gear, >mostly > >old fashioned ATM. You think you can just casually reassemble this >crap > >in transit? Let's see it! > >Gimme an intel IXA network processor and no problem. ATM is fixed >size data, not as tricky as IP decoding. Predicatable bandwidth. >Stream all into megadisks, analyze later. >You need to tap the MPLS label assignment service (or watch all the >egress ports and correlate to endpoints) too to know which ATM chunks >went where. > > >Besides that old fashioned transport diversity, we have the original > >problem: even if you could do it (maybe in three to five years), what >are > >you going to do with the data you've snarfed? Backhaul it? Shove it >into > >TB cassettes? Better keep a guy on staff to change the tray!! > >You don't know about tape robots, or offline indexing, eh? > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/

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RE: Cheap TDR for fibers?
by Tyler Durden 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

Telecom-grade laser packages (and the lasers inside them) not only do not have a monitoring diode, they are designed very carefully to prevent the kind of feedback you're talking about (it destabilizes the laser and causes a power penalty). However, there's no real reason not to be able just to splice into the fiber. Hell, you don't even need a splice if you have access to the FDF (Fiber Distributing Frame, or fiber patch panel). -TD >From: Thomas Shaddack <shaddack(a)ns.arachne.cz> >To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net> >Subject: Cheap TDR for fibers? >Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2004 05:25:35 +0200 (CEST) > > >The laser diodes used in eg. CD players have a feedback photodiode, >sensing the laser's optical output. > >If the lasers used for optical fibers have similar mechanism too, and if >the diode is sensitive to the light coming to it not only from the chip >but also from the fiber itself, and can react quickly enough with high >enough sensitivity, maybe it could be exploited. > >In chosen moments, we could then send a short pulse of laser light into >the fiber, then watch the signal from the feedback diode, what gets >reflected back from nonhomogenities on the fiber. This would give us the >distances of all the splices and connectors, and let us know immediately >(if the test is performed eg. once per 5 seconds or with similar short >period) that there is an attempt to compromise the line underway. >Comparison of snapshots from longer periods apart could also serve to find >deterioration of the signal path before it results in failure. > >The advantage of this approach, if possible, is the ability to add the >functionality without having to modify the optical transceivers >themselves. > > >It sounds too good to be true, so it probably won't work, but I may be >wrong... > _________________________________________________________________ FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar get it now! http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/

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Secure telephones
by Thomas Shaddack 19 Jul '04

19 Jul '04

Pondering construction of a secure telephone. (Or at least a cellphone in general. The user interfaces and features available on virtually all the mass-market phones suck, to put it very very mildly, not even mentioning that there's no access to their firmware (so no chance of audit), poor or no support for SSL (while running HTTP through the operator's proxy), and typically no possibility to run more than one Java applet (or other program) at the same time. A combination of a GSM/GPRS module with a suitable embedded Linux-running computer could be the right solution.) The easiest way is probably a hybrid of telephone/modem, doing normal calls in "analog" voice mode and secure calls in digital modem-to-modem connection. The digital layer may be done best over IP protocol, assigning IP addresses to the phones and making them talk over TCP and UDP over the direct dialup. (We cannot reliably use GPRS, as the quality of service is not assured, so we have to use direct dialup. But we can implement "real" IP later, when the available technology reaches that stage.) Once we have the phones talking over IP with each other, we can proceed with the handshake. I'd suggest using OpenSSL for this purpose, as it offers all we need for certificates and secure transfer of the key. Then use UDP for the voice itself, using eg. stripped-down SpeakFreely as the engine. So during the call, two connections will be open over the IP channel: the command one (SSL-wrapped TCP, for key and protocol handshake, ensuring the identity of the caller, etc.), and the data one (a bidirectional UDP stream). As the command connection should be silent for most of the time, a 14k4 modem should offer us enough bandwidth for 9k6 GSM codec, even with the UDP/IP overhead. The problem is with the calls themselves, determining if they have to be connected as secure or as insecure. For landlines, it's easy; we can hold the line open while switching the modem between voice and data modes, even if we'd have to do it the "hardcore" way with a relay and a 600-ohm resistor connected to the phone line during modem hangup. We then can freely alternate between voice and data, starting in voice and getting the telephones negotiate over "analog sound" using some sequences of beeps, like during the time of acoustically coupled modems. We need just few 100s bps to tell each other that we both support secure call, and that we want to switch to it. However, the cellphones pose a much worse problem. The voice/data call type is determined at the connection time, and as far as I know, can't be changed on-fly. So we would have to have the desired call mode specified in the phone's addressbook (with eventual secure mode advertising through the mentioned beep sequence when in insecure mode, and eventual automatic or manual redial in secure mode). Does anybody here know if there is a workaround available for this? How does the Siemens crypto-phone <http://www.vnunet.com/news/1125124> solve this? It is possible to place data calls from a GSM phone. But it is possible to RECEIVE the data calls on it? Can I connect a cellphone to a laptop and have a dial-in server? A workaround here could be exploiting the always-on properties of GPRS (if the Enfora modules offer GPRS simultaneously with GSM calls, it could provide a lot fo advantages), and use eg. Jabber as a messaging platform (overcoming the difficulties with secure SMS messaging), and optionally also for secure call negotiation, serving here as a control connection. A nice feature could be a phone-located voicemail (won't cover the situations when the phone is outside of the network reach, but could be handy for the situations where the phone is just told to not ring). The advantages would be the possibility of the voice being transported in secure mode, and the possibility of encrypting the messages in storage. Another feature, that could make the device rather attractive in some demographics, is the possibility of having the phonebook stored encrypted on the handset, inaccessible without a PIN, or not located there at all, stored remotely. Yet another advantage, useful for closed groups, is the possibility of using Jabber UIDs dynamically mapped to phone numbers, allowing the users to swap the handsets, bringing a bit of deniability into the location tracking. The modularity of the design should allow low degree of lock-in to the vendors and networks; other modules than Enfora can be used for different standards, Enfora produces tri-band (and even quad-band, adding 850 MHz to the mix) ones for both US and EU/AU/NZ markets, the control computer should be exchangeable for any other kind, with just minor tweaks in the software itself. Openness of the design should allow the implementation of other emerging secure comm standards, including but not limited to Skype. Various message-anonymizing tricks could be also done, using mixmaster-style forwarding within the network, and/or using secure messaging clients instead, like eg. Silc <http://www.silcnet.org/>. Any comments from the Collective? -- ....Enfora Enabler tri-band GSM module, <http://www.enfora.com/shop/detail.aspx?ID=32>, $120. Full-featured embedded Gumstix computer, <http://www.gumstix.com/>, $185. Big fat lithium battery, $50. Display, keypad, other circuits, case: $100-200. Writing the firmware, 2-3 weeks. Warm fyzzu feeling from pissing into the wiretap operators' beer - priceless!

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Cheap TDR for fibers?
by Thomas Shaddack 18 Jul '04

18 Jul '04

The laser diodes used in eg. CD players have a feedback photodiode, sensing the laser's optical output. If the lasers used for optical fibers have similar mechanism too, and if the diode is sensitive to the light coming to it not only from the chip but also from the fiber itself, and can react quickly enough with high enough sensitivity, maybe it could be exploited. In chosen moments, we could then send a short pulse of laser light into the fiber, then watch the signal from the feedback diode, what gets reflected back from nonhomogenities on the fiber. This would give us the distances of all the splices and connectors, and let us know immediately (if the test is performed eg. once per 5 seconds or with similar short period) that there is an attempt to compromise the line underway. Comparison of snapshots from longer periods apart could also serve to find deterioration of the signal path before it results in failure. The advantage of this approach, if possible, is the ability to add the functionality without having to modify the optical transceivers themselves. It sounds too good to be true, so it probably won't work, but I may be wrong...

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