- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

LMAO
by Major Variola (ret) 23 Jul '04

23 Jul '04

Working for a major Kiretsu, I learn that a certain keypress sequence during boot enables SSH. Security by obscurity, baby. Never heard of Mr. Kirchoff? Undocumented backdoor feature, baby. LMAO, yours, MV

2 1

Got Osama?
by Major Variola (ret) 23 Jul '04

23 Jul '04

At 12:40 PM 7/23/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: >On Thu, 22 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >> My point is only that they will be killed should they leak their >> actual capabilities. > >Well... I am reading a book about intelligence now. Specifically, "Ernst >Volkman: Spies - the secret agents who changed the course of history". >Amusing book; describes many ways of intelligence fieldwork, most of them >pretty lowtech. You would enjoy the tradecraft described in the Brit book, which JYA has stopped propogating, but is available on the P2P net. As exercise, they broke into brits' houses. But then, no BoR, all your serfs belong to us. >Eg, using business representatives as business/technology >spies (as eg. a skilled steelworker can assess the capacity and capability >and current processing of a factory quite at a glance, and he's often let >in during contract negotiations), using pretty women to lure officers into >honeytraps... or, recruiting young pretty men to seduce the not exactly >pretty old maids who so often work as secretaries in important places. Yes a friend of mine's wife was a Russkie with a Biz degree, he posted her CIA recruitment letter on his cube door.... >You don't need a *LOT* of money to pull smaller-scale tricks of this kind. >Also, using "amateurs", private enterpreneurs in the arts of burglaries, >safecracking and other relevant areas, instead of "governmental" >employees, poses a counterintelligence advantage that these recruits are >unknown to the adversary (and to most of your side too, so there's less >chance somebody will be caught or changes sides and squeaks on them). And as the Operatives have found, you get caught, you are Halal meat, at best. >There are many ways to get access to even pretty sensitive info. Patience >and persistence and plethora of approaches are important here. H. saps. be the weak link. >> >Undersea taps are hard. No matter how you figure it. That's why you pay taxes, bub. >Depends on whom. Often the money are the main motivation. Of course, your >own country won't pay you as well as the other one, and will try to appeal >to your "patriotism" like a bunch of cheapskates - it's better to be a >contractor. Until your head is separated from your body... >> What I meant was, Ames and that FBI dude Hansen (sp?), at least the KGB >> got Ames' wife as part of the package, whereas the FBI CI dude let his >> wife off as part of the deal he cut. Nice xian that he was, he was into >> strippers. >> >> All under $2e6, all capable of reading their own records. Go figure, >> eh? > >And many of them disclosed their colleagues when politely asked. Well duh, that's part of the deal.. >But a big truth remains here - SIGINT and COMINT aren't everything, often >a drop of HUMINT is the missing secret sauce. Yes, but HUMINT tends to lose its head when questioned.... on video, no less... Madrid == October, 2004, dig?

1 0

Cryptographers and U.S. Immigration
by R. A. Hettinga 23 Jul '04

23 Jul '04

--- begin forwarded text

2 1

Cryptographers and U.S. Immigration
by Atom 'Smasher' 23 Jul '04

23 Jul '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 ...atom _________________________________________ PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "When the government fears the people, you have liberty. When the people fear the government, you have tyranny." --Thomas Jefferson <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0407.html#3 Cryptographers and U.S. Immigration Seems like cryptographers are being questioned when they enter the U.S. these days. Recently I received this (anonymous) comment: "It seems that the U.S. State Department has a keen interest in foreign cryptographers: Yesterday I tried to renew my visa to the States, and after standing in line and getting fingerprinted, my interviewer, upon hearing that my company sells [a cryptography product], informed me that "due to new regulations," Washington needs to approve my visa application, and that to do so, they need to know exactly which companies I plan to visit in the States, points of contact, etc. etc. Quite a change from my last visa application, for which I didn't even have to show up." I'm curious if any of my foreign readers have similar stories. There are international cryptography conferences held in the United States all the time. It would be a shame if they lost much of their value because of visa regulations. #### -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.3.6 (FreeBSD) Comment: What is this gibberish? Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJBAI9EAAoJEAx/d+cTpVcibb0IAIPYNzglmGiNyBLP4ogd5bI8 bSUCTLLIHkp4+dOKuxcuoNTagsNBfDC1Ny1BCL60grW5yoY0hiS1SzY+aw2/VrHg 6DEJVtXTSae/oEZv/czlVJsvI+U+OBD2JqlXIyFiayfR1R6yMVoMrX3RVyB7UklG 3a10ehfuY+pKkZa6JwYlM+TGxrNNCR5UOoNV1TdL40oLBTb0uFs+WG2tY+KYuypO ChdyAsTlBQw7b6rGRoOti93Wi4XxkFH39cFxDfRIG8Ah+J2QkRjwFrO+aUwCG7ds SjBfjV1kBWsXChS+vfzZBmwvGwZx3EDKfpBecybokyvV1jpdugyiRnV/UPERnro= =ytcR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-devel mailing list Gnupg-devel(a)gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

Cryptographers and U.S. Immigration
by Atom 'Smasher' 23 Jul '04

23 Jul '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 ...atom _________________________________________ PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "When the government fears the people, you have liberty. When the people fear the government, you have tyranny." --Thomas Jefferson <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0407.html#3 Cryptographers and U.S. Immigration Seems like cryptographers are being questioned when they enter the U.S. these days. Recently I received this (anonymous) comment: "It seems that the U.S. State Department has a keen interest in foreign cryptographers: Yesterday I tried to renew my visa to the States, and after standing in line and getting fingerprinted, my interviewer, upon hearing that my company sells [a cryptography product], informed me that "due to new regulations," Washington needs to approve my visa application, and that to do so, they need to know exactly which companies I plan to visit in the States, points of contact, etc. etc. Quite a change from my last visa application, for which I didn't even have to show up." I'm curious if any of my foreign readers have similar stories. There are international cryptography conferences held in the United States all the time. It would be a shame if they lost much of their value because of visa regulations. #### -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.3.6 (FreeBSD) Comment: What is this gibberish? Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJBAI9EAAoJEAx/d+cTpVcibb0IAIPYNzglmGiNyBLP4ogd5bI8 bSUCTLLIHkp4+dOKuxcuoNTagsNBfDC1Ny1BCL60grW5yoY0hiS1SzY+aw2/VrHg 6DEJVtXTSae/oEZv/czlVJsvI+U+OBD2JqlXIyFiayfR1R6yMVoMrX3RVyB7UklG 3a10ehfuY+pKkZa6JwYlM+TGxrNNCR5UOoNV1TdL40oLBTb0uFs+WG2tY+KYuypO ChdyAsTlBQw7b6rGRoOti93Wi4XxkFH39cFxDfRIG8Ah+J2QkRjwFrO+aUwCG7ds SjBfjV1kBWsXChS+vfzZBmwvGwZx3EDKfpBecybokyvV1jpdugyiRnV/UPERnro= =ytcR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-devel mailing list Gnupg-devel(a)gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies
by Major Variola (ret) 22 Jul '04

22 Jul '04

At 10:27 AM 7/22/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >>Gilmore et al used a bunch of old Sun Chassis for his & Kocher's >>DEScracker. You think this is somehow more than 100 watts, in a >>diplo suitcase, nowadays? My point was, Gilmore et al were way behind what's capable. Proof of concept needn't be compact. A suitcase can handle his DesCrack, with all due respect, nowadays. >OK, so you're saying that this suitcase takes in say 10 OC-192s, demuxes all >of them down to the DS1 level (we're at 50,000 DS1s), demaps and unpacks the >ATM cells, and then reassembles all of the packets therein? Questions: Just for yucks, look up the specs on an Intel IXA processor. >1) How does this majic box store all that data? No store, just bridge. >2) I've been in dozens of COs myself, and have worked extensively with >people who have spent (collectively speaking) centuries in them. They never >saw such a magic box a you describe, and indeed would certainly know about >someone trying to install one. Or perhaps the NSA has developed a cloaking >device making the box invisible? Do you think they so naif they'd expose themselves to a poster who dares post *here* ? >2) What silicon does t use? Are you saying that the government can do a LOT >better than 0.13 microns these days? I'm saying that tech xfer on metal coated diamond is not just for fun. And years behind reality, for those with $400 toilet seat budgets. >3) If the majic box doesn't store the data, how does it get it back to HQ? >Telepathy? One more time: dark fiber and compact drivers. Or even your more subtle unused-bandwith usage, "back atcha". >As for trolling, well when I do it I do it with friggin' style m'friend. True 'nuff. I mean no harm, only to provoke some to think, is all. Clearly you are the uber-Sonet-troll. :-)

1 0

Anonymity, ... - A Proposal for Terminology v 0.18
by R. A. Hettinga 22 Jul '04

22 Jul '04

I've been sent the pdf and .doc versions of this. If you can't get this through the site or the author, ping me and I can send you what they sent me. Cheers, RAH --- begin forwarded text

1 0

Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies
by Tyler Durden 22 Jul '04

22 Jul '04

Variola: You say a lotta good shit here, but you're really out of your area in this case. You seem to miss the basic points, and then fill in your blindspot with pure theoretical conjecture. Let me point out some of the lil' flaws in your thinking.... > >With all due respect, you think Ft. Meade uses the same COTS crap >as you are forced to deal with? Bwah hah hah. For some things, sure. Actually I know from first hand experience. (I've actually been in an NSA, DISA, and a few other experimental network nodes.) Lots of the equipment I saw was from the big vendors, most notably Lucent and Nortel. Somewhere deeper than I had access to, however, they almost certainly use special silicon. >Gilmore et al used a bunch of old Sun Chassis for his & Kocher's >DEScracker. You think this is somehow more than 100 watts, in a >diplo suitcase, nowadays? OK, so you're saying that this suitcase takes in say 10 OC-192s, demuxes all of them down to the DS1 level (we're at 50,000 DS1s), demaps and unpacks the ATM cells, and then reassembles all of the packets therein? Questions: 1) How does this majic box store all that data? 2) I've been in dozens of COs myself, and have worked extensively with people who have spent (collectively speaking) centuries in them. They never saw such a magic box a you describe, and indeed would certainly know about someone trying to install one. Or perhaps the NSA has developed a cloaking device making the box invisible? 2) What silicon does it use? Are you saying that the government can do a LOT better than 0.13 microns these days? Somehow I doubt it. Look at the off-the-shelf SONET chip architectures. Sure, there's lots of stuff onboard that you wouldn't need for what you're talking about, but getting rid of that stuff would still put the most advanced chip lightyears behyind what you're talking about. 3) If the majic box doesn't store the data, how does it get it back to HQ? Telepathy? Or, does it use a bank of lasers that somehow are several orders of magnitude more efficient that off-the-shelf lasers? (And let us remember that there's a fundamental constraint with bulk optics..an optical multiplexer or ciculator can't be an order of magnitude smaller than the wavelength it will support.) JA's comments about fiber exhaust are dead-on, and were not known to most of the Telecom Bubble participants. (Indicates the dude knows what he's talking about with respect to telecom.) But dark fibers aren't a real concern. It would be easy to develop a DWDM system that operated over the L or M bands, "under" the C-band wavelengths used by a carrier. So the problem isn't the fiber, it's lighting it. As for my comments about cable landings, I explicity stated that the splices back to VA were seen and known. And yes, I was in a position to know. (There's not a lot you can hide in a CO...it's not like they staff them with NSA agents or something.) As for trolling, well when I do it I do it with friggin' style m'friend. But sometimes, the truth is so mundane it looks fairly boring. Sorry to dissappoint you. I'm going to have to confiscate your copy of "Deepness in the Sky"... -TD _________________________________________________________________ MSN Toolbar provides one-click access to Hotmail from any Web page FREE download! http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200413ave/direct/01/

1 0

Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies
by Major Variola (ret) 22 Jul '04

22 Jul '04

At 10:12 PM 7/21/04 -0500, J.A. Terranson wrote: >On Wed, 21 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: >> >> With all due respect, you think Ft. Meade uses the same COTS crap >> as you are forced to deal with? Bwah hah hah. > >Sorry Major, I'm gonna have to call you on that one. Yes, they are >lighting that fiber on COTS. Likely on Nortel gear, which I can tell you >from personal experience requires an incredible amount of power, cooling, >and rackspace. >> Just curious as to the depth of navite in the field.... > >As we are curious of yours. Fair 'nuff. I'm following the Principle of not underestimating the adversary, who does plenty of R&D, just look at their tech-transfer program, multiply by a few decades in capacity.. Perhaps that grants the Maryland trogdyltes too much, but again, conservatism rules in this game. Remember, "Nortel" is cost-bound. TLAs are not. They also get radioisotope power supplies, etc. And unpublished tech made in unknown fabs. Albeit, "Nortel" (even if Canadian, eh?) etc are 0wn3d by the USG, so taps through COTS are not so hard, and my "dark fiber" only means the physical capacity is there. And of course people are cheaper than tech. Hell, the counter-intel folks seem to be real bargains, whether FBI or CIA. But if you prefer to believe they play on the same field as us, go ahead, I'll still read your posts, and appreciate the questioning. MV

2 1

Re: Email tapping by ISPs, forwarder addresses, and crypto proxies
by Major Variola (ret) 21 Jul '04

21 Jul '04

At 10:09 AM 7/21/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >Variola wrote... > >Dark fiber. > >"Dark Fiber" ain't a talisman you merely wave at data to get it to magically >move to where you want it to.You've got to LIGHT that fiber, and to light >that fiber you need LOTS and LOTS of power-hungry, space-occupying >equipment. In other words, you'd need to duplicate a significant fraction of >the current public transport network. With all due respect, you think Ft. Meade uses the same COTS crap as you are forced to deal with? Bwah hah hah. Gilmore et al used a bunch of old Sun Chassis for his & Kocher's DEScracker. You think this is somehow more than 100 watts, in a diplo suitcase, nowadays? Just curious as to the depth of navite in the field....

2 1