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MACWORLD article
by mulivor＠orion.crc.monroecc.edu 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

In case this hasn't been mentioned here: There's a sizeable story in the July issue of MACWORLD magazine called "Privacy in Peril." It's a general roundup on electronic privacy. I didn't notice any reference to Clipper or digital currency. See pp. 118-130. Carry on, patriots. Phil <mulivor(a)orion.crc.monroecc.edu>

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Re: REMAIL: X-TTL and X-Discard
by jthomas＠kolanut.mitre.org 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

Hal wrote: > > What is needed to make X-TTL useful is for the remailer to choose another > remailer as its destination, and ideally to encrypt the message before > sending it. This way X-TTL can be used to insert a random remailer path of > n hops in the middle of a sender-constructed remailing path. This leads to > a system where the remailer decrypts an incoming message, reads the X-TTL > value, decrements it, re-encrypts the message for the next remailer in the > chain, and sends it. The X-TTL value is never exposed to outsiders. > > At one point I wrote a modification to my remailer to cause it to > encrypt any message which it sent to another remailer which supported > PGP. But I decided that this didn't really help security enough to > be worthwhile. It would be much better to encourage users to encrypt > their messages themselves in a nested fashion so that no remailer sees > any more information than the bare minimum necessary. Rolling your own encryption wrapper for the remailer chain you're sending through is a Good Thing, but your modification would be useful if you think of the cypherpunk remailer network as a "back end" for an anonymous/pseudonymous server like Julf's. Ideally, a pseudonym server will only keep an encrypted remailer chain for a user's return address (along with the unencrypted adress of the first remailer on the chain). The nymserver _doesn't_know_ what remailers are in the chain, so it can't encrypt the message with each of their public keys. But if the server can include a header line inside the encryption envelope that tells the remailer to encrypt with the next remailer's key, we can be sure that an adversary is still unable to match up incoming and outgoing messages. Setting up a pseudonym server with this kind of encrypted return address is good, of course, if you're worried about its database being seized. Without the cooperation of each remailer in the chain, the database doesn't give an adversary anything useful. And since now we've got TTL as another use for a next-step-encryption feature in the remailers... I'd better go get those remailer scripts and a UUCP feed for my new Linux box. Joe

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REMAIL: X-TTL and X-Discard
by nobody＠eli-remailer 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I don't see that X-TTL is very useful as currently proposed. As I see it, I would have to create something like this: ======================================= :: X-TTL: 5 Request-Remailing-To: remailer1 :: Request-Remailing-To: remailer2 :: Request-Remailing-To: remailer3 :: Request-Remailing-To: remailer4 :: Request-Remailing-To: remailer5 Dummy message to be sent. ======================================= (Or an equivalent structure could be set up with nested PGP encryptions.) This would go through remailers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, decrementing the X-TTL field each time, and after the last one when it was 0 the message would be deleted. The X-TTL is not very convenient in this case since you still have to come up with a path for sending your message which is at least as long as the X-TTL value. It seems to me that the X-Discard idea is simpler; you can just put the X-Discard in the command block for the last remailer, and you don't have to count them. What is needed to make X-TTL useful is for the remailer to choose another remailer as its destination, and ideally to encrypt the message before sending it. This way X-TTL can be used to insert a random remailer path of n hops in the middle of a sender-constructed remailing path. This leads to a system where the remailer decrypts an incoming message, reads the X-TTL value, decrements it, re-encrypts the message for the next remailer in the chain, and sends it. The X-TTL value is never exposed to outsiders. At one point I wrote a modification to my remailer to cause it to encrypt any message which it sent to another remailer which supported PGP. But I decided that this didn't really help security enough to be worthwhile. It would be much better to encourage users to encrypt their messages themselves in a nested fashion so that no remailer sees any more information than the bare minimum necessary. Hal Finney 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLB5mUKgTA69YIUw3AQHlRwQAmQ4t6ZcSNbieK4Y8ywj2t1vT1WR9amsY RB1H/cBGfIsVZOcpFb7K5OLrwhTh+aIO6b7sUzXVBsbsgNKLtv0yPjracDpPH5y1 EJ6U9k+74mXDpxl7vo4tqFUiEFd3s3I6by/TjmVAtKy8eX1+o83yo0BJgt9YgNSr psi8xbAFGUI= =4DtE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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digital cash
by Duncan Frissell 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>>The legal issues involved in setting up a real world money system are enormous.<<< No need. This is the advantage of piggy backing a digital cash application onto an existing offshore financial institution. It is true that if I sat in the US and started to offer digital cash accounts I would be subject to a lot of regulation. DC would probably be held to be a 'security' and there are all sorts of financial regulations involved. It might be possible to get a regulatory waiver for an experimental system if we got an academic partner like the Iowa Political Stock Market which also traded 'securities' with account sizes up to $1,000. On the other hand, other jurisdictions are not as regulated as the US is. Generally, solicitations for unregistered securities cannot be directed to Americans except in international publications. I would advocate that all physical mail involved in such an application be sent and received overseas (The City of London would be convenient) and that all email be sent via Julf's remailer. We could also start an internet DC email group (as a feedback and semi-advertising medium) sent from Finland. (Julf willing of course.) It would be interesting to see the litigation about whether or not such a publication is a "domestic" publication. It should be easy to find non-US residents to be the nominal "publishers." Now all we need is a banking haven jurisdiction with good internet connections... I *have* been looking. Duncan Frissell -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLB36L4VO4r4sgSPhAQFGswQA3JTCDiFHPfazuWYo8+4BALg4cvGFWVXq mBJYhx7avEWUYIqZOK5b/XinmmJvoPNxAIKhjk/bNDOxq21kAKE/29PPygQgSXt8 uQPcG45MB5tBwS6fBNuSG/4uljiPveAYvD5xU0JuOGev03Zd8FOV9tvRsBiYGudn eGeH96j0Oxc= =wVQT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Digital Cash$$$$
by Duncan Frissell 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- L;>INTERNET:cypherpunks@toad.com;Digital Cash$$$$ (J. Michael Diehl) >>>1. How does one start a digital cash economy?<<< A digital cash economy doesn't have to be separate from the regular economy. 1.) You mail cash/MO to First Digital Bank of Cyberspace (at an offshore maildrop) together with a public (unique if you like) key and anonymous email address (on Julf's remailer perhaps). 2.) The Bank opens an account denominated in the (traded) currency of your choice or a commodity (gold). There is no reason not to use existing monies to back digital cash. 3.) You request digital banknotes and the bank emails them to you as detailed in David Chaum's Scientific American article. 4.) You find someone to accept the digital cash. Initially it can be used for gambling and telecoms/storage fees, eventually buying digital goods (software, print, audio, video, VR) will be easy. Remember, within a few years 100 million homes in OECD countries will have 1.5 megabit lines into them. This is a huge market for digital entertainment. 5.) After a bit of development when the First Digital Bank of Cyberspace cuts a deal with a physical offshore bank, it can issue VISA debit cards and ATM cards in a Nome de Guerre. This is already done for large depositors, the nets make it possible to do it for all. You can then access your account from any streetcorner in the OECD. Remember money market funds are pseudo banks these days with VISA cards and check writing and all. 6.) If you want to close your account, and you can't find any way to spend your money as digital cash, you can have funds wired to a regular bank account you maintain in a Nome de Guerre, have it wired via Western Union with a code phrase because you've 'lost' your ID (for small amounts), have it wired to an out-of- country bank in your truename and go pick it up in person, arrange a gold purchase from a dealer somewhere and have the funds sent to him by wire or draft and take physical delivery of the gold. (There are many other techniques known to privacy experts). Eventually there will be plenty of moneychangers on the nets happy to take your digital cash. Most money is already digital. The digital cash technology just gives us a way to make easy financial transfers over public networks. If there is a demand for economic transactions over the nets, the money will be supplied. ****************************************************************************** * DUNCAN FRISSELL Attorney at Law, Writer, and Privacy * * CIS 76630,3577 Consultant since the Nixon * * Internet 76630.3577(a)compuserve.com Administration * * or frissell(a)panix.com * * Easylink 62853962 * * Attmail !dfrissell * * TLX: 402231 FRISSELL NYK * * * * * Privacy Checkup still only $29.95. Buy today before price * * * * controls force me to raise my prices. * * * * * "If Mohammed A. Salameh had seen me in January, he'd be * * vacationing in Tunisia today." * * * ******************************************************************************

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YAA (yet another article)
by fergp＠sytex.com 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

ComputerWorld June 14, 1993 Volume 27, Number 24 pages 73,74 Enterprise Networking Commentary All Eyes On Clipper by Gary H. Anthes If any conclusion can be drawn from the cacophony of conflicting views put forth at a recent public hearing on government-sponsored encryption technology, it is that the Clinton administration should slow down and take a closer look at Clipper. Clipper is the government's attempt to give law enforcers the ability to unscramble coded messages from suspected criminals while guaranteeing constitutional safeguards to legitimate users. To do that, a secret algorithm embedded in a chip will use encryption/decryption keys maintained "in escrow" by two government-approved agencies and subject to use in wiretaps only via court order. The first image brought to mind when presented with the key-escrow concept is that of a digital Big Brother, able to siphon off electronic secrets from anyone not in favor with the establishment. Stanford University Professor Martin E. Hellman says former Attorney General John Mitchell was in the habit of handing down blank but signed wiretap authorizations, 40 to 50 at a pop, rather than personally reviewing each request as required by law. "Two escrow authorities do little good if only one court order is required," Hellmman contends. The government has done little so far to put those fears to rest or to

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Re: Rude CryptoStacker Suggestion
by mlshew＠dixie.com 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

On Mon, 14 Jun 1993, RYAN Alan Porter wrote: >On Mon, 14 Jun 1993, Mark Shewmaker wrote: > >I don't consider us without options, I just have yet to see a program that >I would trust my data with. > >Besides, I wouldn't consider it a waste of effort even if there were such >a system out there (which I doubt) Well then I have doubts about your doubts: Even I've got a few ways of getting transparent compression or encryption on my own system (amiga), most of them simply device drivers or some other standalone sets of code one would then to use to mount a (virtual) partition, and there's also a more standardized compression/encryption modular system to do the same thing (sort of), just like you talk about later. That's why I keep thinking that for PC's and freely distributable source code for encrypting file systems, that by now someone *must* have already invented the wheel. (Although you could still invent the radial tire, so to speak, and make the original idea more usable.) >Anyway, thanks for the suggestion; I would be interested in any parallel >systems which anyone might happen to stumble upon. Seeing as you had previously said: >The sources for bare network redirectors and block device drivers are, >indeed, in wide supply. I guess I really should upload some of the amiga code then, even though a great deal of it will absolutely useless to you, (but I must admit it would be kinda cool if pc's and amigas could both access the same compressed/encrypted xpk files.) If it's really just the encryption part per se that you are missing, then they might be helpful to your project. I'll write up a description, plagiarizing the readme files somewhat, and upload a few of the archives to Eric's site. >The more people who know how to implement good encryption, the more >widespread other cypher code will become. Very true. (I'm always annoyed when I download a new "security" type program, only to find it lets you encrypt/decrypt with any of ten proprietary methods, numbered one through ten. Absolutely useless. And of course the scums never include the source. Grrr.) >(Oh also, have I come off lately as being incredibly overflamesensitive, >or are you just a very cautionary guy? I can understand it if I have >projected a flameshield attitude, but I'm really not that bruisable...) "Jane, you ignorant slut." (Implied smileys for the SNL-impaired.) Partly I'm cautionary, trying to be polite, tit for tat and all that, but also I don't like being the 100th person whining about your project, (especially knowing next to nothing about DOS systems), while people who think it's a neat idea keep quiet. Plus I overdid the cautiousness a bit. (And I've got this pet peeve about people re-introducing obvious ideas in sci.crypt, and similar places.) -Mark Shewmaker

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alt.whistleblowing
by J. Michael Diehl 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

I just started reading the alt.whistleblowing newsgroup. It would seem that it has already digressed into a flamefest. Could the person who created it please post a set of guidelines for the group! Also, people are using their REAL names! Appearantly, they don't know anything about the anon remailers....Could someone post a notice about that, too? Same thing goes WRT pgp. We helped create this group, we ought to help keep it worth reading. ;^) +-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+ | J. Michael Diehl ;-) | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY | | mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu | But, I was mistaken. |available| | mike.diehl(a)fido.org | | Ask Me! | | (505) 299-2282 +-----------------------------+---------+ | | +------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+ | Politically Incorrect!" <Me> | +-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+ +----Is Big Brother in your phone? If you don't know, ask me---+

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Re: Timothy C. May:superhacker
by bear＠eagle.fsl.noaa.gov 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

Ben Byers writes: In-Reply-To: <01GZ6EDS7DHK003YG5(a)vax1.tcd.ie> >> Of course, requesting your own government file is likely to draw attention >> to yourself, so it's probably best not to do so unless you're sure that >> they already know that you know-that-they-know-something. > >Yes, acoording to a 2600 article (admittedly not the best source), >requesting a file on yourself causes one to be created if one does >not exist. Naturally they'll open a file on you to document the fact that you requested information under the FOIA and to file a copy of the information returned to you. Will they start an investigation on the basis of the fact that you requested information under the FOIA? How many people with rather, shall we say, unusual ideas do you think have pestered the CIA or NSA with FOIA requests? Of course, if you admit you learned about this on a cryptoanarchist e-mail list... :-) Bear Giles

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Re: Timothy C. May:superhacker
by bbyer＠BIX.com 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

In-Reply-To: <01GZ6EDS7DHK003YG5(a)vax1.tcd.ie> > Why doesn't Tim and anyone else who suspects that they have reached > the much-sought status of "superhacker on gov't files not just write > to their local friendly federal government office and ask for a copy > of their own records? > > Of course any interesting information they've got is likely to be classified, > but at least you'll find out whether any such information is stored on the > files. > > Of course, requesting your own government file is likely to draw attention > to yourself, so it's probably best not to do so unless you're sure that > they already know that you know-that-they-know-something. Yes, acoording to a 2600 article (admittedly not the best source), requesting a file on yoursself causes one to be created if one does not exist. Ben Byer <bbyer(a)bix.com>

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