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Re: Digital Cash$$$$
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Jun '93

17 Jun '93

J. Michael Diehl asks: > 1. How does one start a digital cash economy? How is the initial distribution > of currency done? This is, of course, assuming the technical stuff is taken > care of. Issuing digital cash is easy - the problem is getting someone to take it :-) Other than anonymity, the problems of starting a digicash exchange economy are pretty similar to those of starting any other private money system - governments avoid the problem by pointing guns at people (i.e. issuing fiat currency and making legal tender laws), and commodity money systems mostly avoid it by using a commodity people care about as a standard (gold, silver, cordwood, tobacco, etc. - doesn't have to be fixed value), but everybody else has to solve it somehow. (The other main issue, which someone brought up, is whether there are applicable laws like banking law or taxable transaction reporting laws that may require you to get permits or let regulators regulate you or whatever, which vary from country to country, and also depend on how you define and manage your digicash accounts.) My current involvement in token-based currencies, aside from government fiat, includes NJ parkway toll tokens, which went up in value when the toll went up, Washington DC Metro tickets, which aren't redeemable for anything, and Joe's Coffee Money at work. Joe prints it on the Macintosh, there's a box of them on the counter, you leave a dollar when you take more, the coffee's ok, profits pay for new hardware and occasional free days, and unlike the bozos who run New Jersey's highways and Arts Center, Joe's a guy you can trust :-) One way to get people to accept your digicash is to use it for convenient anonymous payment for a service, like highway tolls or subway fares, or anonymous remailer payments. Essentially, you're getting a group of vendors together, selling digibucks for cash, and distributing the cash among the vendors according to the digibucks they've received. It's not much different from other systems using tokens. As long as the vendors agree to accept tokens at the current value for an extended period of time, you don't risk much. If you ran a barter club using tokens, you could do it with digicash; the problem then is how to agree on when tokens will be generated, and by whom. One solution that would be readily accepted is to only issue tokens in return for real cash or other valuable commodities. This means everybody knows that a digibuck is worth a buck, and has a reasonable expectation that the currency won't be inflated away. For commodities, some reasonable valuation needs to be done. (ObMovieReference - the poker game in "Benny and Joon" is marvelous :-) For payment for services, it's tougher - the demand side of your market depends on how much money is floating around as well as how many people want your services, and a market that's too small won't be able to generate much. On the other hand, unless there's some way for people to perform services that become part of the bank's assets and available to creditors, it shouldn't issue more digibucks to pay for them; that's inflating the currency merely for the bank's benefit. Another way to start a digicash system is as a credit card analogue, where the bank bills the customers later and only has enough cash backing to cover the float, but that's not much different from a cash-based system except that in a pay-first cash system, it's possible for the digibank to invest the cash in an external investment, with the usual issues of risk, liquidity, etc. that normal banks have, only the account balances exist as digibucks in people's digiwallets instead of ledger entries in the bank's computer. > 2. Is digital cash supposed to be backed by actual cash on deposit at the bank? Or by a promise of future services from vendors hired by the bank (presumably for real cash), if the customers find that acceptable, but that's essentially backed by the bank's negotiable assets, including cash. > 3. How would one "get out" of such an economy if he wanted to? The ideal way is by spending all your digicash, either for the Collect the system service / product if it's a vendor-based system, or for services or products sold by other members. It's somewhat of a system failure to redeem your digicash for paper cash, unless the system is basically intended as a payment system, in which case it's fine. Or abandon your investment, or sue. > 4. If DC is to be backed by actual cash, is this really such a good idea? I once knew someone who had invested in a bank-like system that denominated its accounts in gold rather than fiat currency, and paid its depositors in gold on demand. It also paid interest, which should have been a clue.... It eventually collapsed, and turned out to be a semi-scam; it had invested most of its money in high-yield, high-risk stocks (South African gold mines,mainly, which were actually doing quite well in 1980), and when it folded he had to file SEC complaints and sue them in Federal court to get them to distribute the stocks to their creditors instead of distributing stock in a worthless subsidiary company that it had formed to take over the assets. He was successful, so he lost a lot less than he could have, but being a hard-money paranoid isn't all it's cracked up to be :-( Bill

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Second epistle of Whit apostle to Congress
by whitfield.diffie＠Eng.Sun.COM 17 Jun '93

17 Jun '93

Here is what I told Markey's telecommunications committee last Wednesday about the business impact of key escrot. What follows has been corrected for a major error for which I apologize to CPSR. I had carelessly cited EFF as the extractor of some documents under FOIA. It also makes some minor corrections; the changes are shown at the end. Whit TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE 9 June 1993 The Impact of Regulating Cryptography on the Computer and Communications Industries Whitfield Diffie Distinguished Engineer Sun Microsystems, Inc. I'd like to begin by expressing my thanks to Chairman Markey, the other members of the committee, and the committee staff for giving us the opportunity to appear before the committee and express our views. We stand at a moment in history when an amazing coincidence of developments in technology and world politics is showing us opportunities in both business and personal life that no one could have anticipated. These developments rest on two closely related cornerstones: communication and internationalism. Business today is characterized by an unprecedented freedom and volume of travel by both people and goods. It is an era of rapid inexpensive transportation coupled with declining trade barriers. All this movement is made possible, however, by the reality of instant telecommunication between places thousands of miles apart, conveying voices, images, and data wherever they are needed. Ease of communication, both physical and electronic, has ushered in an era of international markets and multinational corporations. No country is large enough that its industries can concentrate on the domestic market to the exclusion of all others. When foreign sales rival or exceed domestic ones, the structure of the corporation follows suit with new divisions placed in proximity to markets, materials, or labor. The result is a world in which much of the population enjoys a standard of material wealth and freedom of action previously unknown. It is also a world in which no company, community, or country can afford not to compete in the global market. Security of communication and computing is essential to this telecommunication driven environment. The communication system must ensure that orders for goods and services are genuine, guarantee that payments are credited to the proper accounts, and protect the privacy of business plans and personal information. In the past, these diverse assurances have been provided by an ad hoc patchwork that has evolved slowly over the century and a half since the invention of the telegraph, but two factors are now making that patchwork obsolete. The first is the rise in importance of intellectual property. Much of what is now bought and sold is information that varies from computer programs to surveys of customer buying habits. Information security has become an end in itself rather than just a means for insuring the security of people and property. The second is the universal demand for mobility in communications. Traveling corporate computer users sit down at workstations they have never seen before and expect the same environment that is on the desks in their offices. They carry cellular telephones and communicate constantly by radio. They haul out portable PCs and dial their home computers from locations around the globe. With each such action they expose their information to threats of eavesdropping and falsification barely known a decade ago. It is the lack of security for these increasingly common activities that we encounter when we hear that most cellular telephone calls in major metropolitan areas are overheard or even recorded by eavesdroppers with scanners; that a new computer virus is destroying data on the disks of PCs; or that industrial spies have broken into a database half a world away. In this troubling scenario, however, there is a large ray of hope. Most of the technology to provide the needed protection is already available in the form of contemporary cryptography and its allied disciplines. Some of it has existed for nearly fifty years; some dates from the last five. It isn't in widespread use, but it does exist. Why then are proper security measures not incorporated in every cell phone, laptop, and workstation? Part of the answer is economic. Collecting intelligence by spying on information is so hard to detect that most users are unaware that they are suffering from it and unwilling to pay to protect themselves. Another lies in a unique problem of implementing security standards: security mechanisms are designed to block access to everyone who does not conform exactly to their demands. This makes them very unforgiving of that flexibility at the margins that makes much of standardization possible. Compounding these internal difficulties is one that is entirely external: a regulatory structure that goes back to the cold war and does not recognize the realities of the present situation. In the United States, export control has been the major barrier. Companies are deterred from building proper security mechanisms into their products because to do so will limit their exports and subject them to tedious administrative procedures required to comply with the law. The alternatives are to support two versions of each product, one for domestic use and one for export or to dilute the security measures in all products to a level whose export the government permits. At Sun Microsystems, approximately half our customers are outside the United States. Were we to build a workstation and an operating system embodying the best security we know how to provide and the security that we believe is needed, we would not be permitted to export them. This would present us with insuperable problems in maintaining distinct but somehow compatible domestic and foreign product lines. Not least of the consequences is that we are unable to provide security features that elements of the U.S. Government would like in the systems they buy, because that market does not come close to making up for the one we would have to forgo. I believe we are typical of computer companies in these respects. Digital Equipment after having made some outstanding contributions to network security, appears to have abandoned its lead in the field. Export issues were cited when it discontinued development of an operating system designed to achieve an National Computer Security Center A1 rating some five years back and I suspect they may have played a role in its larger retreat from security as well. We have also suffered from the government's failure to take the lead in championing security standards, both domestic and international. The first proposed federal standard in the area of public key cryptography has appeared only after such techniques had been employed for more than a decade and does not conform to the conventional practice that has evolved both in the U.S. and abroad. Some have even suggested that the government has actively worked to block standardization citing the United States failure to vote for its own national cryptographic standard (DES) in the International Standards Organization and material on the working relationship between NIST and NSA recently released to the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility under the Freedom of Information Act. Now we are faced with the greatest challenge to our ability to secure the personal and business communications of the modern world that we have yet encountered. The administration proposes to adopt as a federal standard a system that is not only secret, but incorporates provisions for the government secretly to decode any person's communications when it deems this necessary for law enforcement or national security purposes. The effect is very much like that of the little keyhole in the back of the combination locks used on the lockers of school children. The children open the locks with the combinations, which is supposed to keep the other children out, but the teachers can always look in the lockers by using the key. The stated objective is to require the use of equipment based on these new `key escrow' chips for certain communications within the government and between the government and business. If they are successful in their objective, the latter provision could force the inclusion of these chips in all devices used, for example, to communicate with the government about contracts or taxes. What would be the effect of such broad inclusion? We have been assured by NIST that the finished chips, once their key escrow provisions have been programmed, will be available without restriction for incorporation in any piece of domestic equipment, but it is hard to see how either the security or wiretap objectives could be achieved if this were the case. It appears more likely that key escrow chips will be available only to companies that agree to employ them in approved ways. Probably this will be done by using existing regulatory machinery (called the Type II Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program) that requires the manufacturers to submit their designs to NSA for approval. Were this to happen, the nation's computer manufacturers would be trapped in a regulatory web more confining than any we have seen so far. If we at Sun were required by customers' needs to communicate with the government to put the key escrow chip on the mother board of our machine and by regulations to have the board design approved, the government would have effective control of our development cycle. One of the requirements that would likely be imposed in these circumstances would be that we not offer any other security mechanisms that could be used to defeat the escrow provisions. This would mean we could not even maintain compatibility with our existing product line. It seems especially unlikely that customer acceptance of a chip explicitly designed to provide only partial security could ever be achieved other than by the coercive force of regulations. Nor does it seem likely that a system to which the U.S. held the keys would ever be accepted by more than a handful of other countries. They do not need it to achieve security, because an understanding of cryptography is now global and developing rapidly. Faced with a choice between secret U.S. technology known to embody a compromise and foreign systems of published function that at least claim not to, customer response seems hardly in doubt. The result may give the government a devastating choice: accept the import of foreign technology, losing both market share and the new law enforcement capability or forbid the import of foreign cryptographic systems altogether. In the latter case, the U.S., currently a leader in computers and software, seems likely to become a backwater, cut off from one of the most profitable segments of the global economy. Another problem presented by the key escrow technology is cost. No matter how essential it may be, security is still difficult to sell and extremely price sensitive. To require that cryptography not merely be isolated in hardware (by and large a good security practice) but that that hardware be a tamper resistant chip entirely dedicated to one security function will push the prices of many products and features beyond the reach of their potential markets. Cryptography can perfectly safely be embodied in microcode, implemented in cells incorporated in multi-function chips, or programmed on dedicated, but standard, microcontrollers at a tiny fraction of the tens of dollars per chip that Clipper is predicted to cost. The effect of giving the government and one or a small number of companies a monopoly control over an essential technology is also troubling to contemplate. The present key escrow chips operate in the megabit range. Can companies depend on NSA to have hundred megabit or gigabit chips available just when they are needed or might U.S. companies miss critical market windows while they wait for delivery of parts over which they have no control? Will there come a time, as occurred with DES, when NSA wants the standard changed even though industry still finds it adequate for many applications? If that occurs will industry have any recourse but to do what it is told? And if this happens who will pay for the conversion? Last month, before another committee of Congress, I discussed at some length the impact that the key escrow proposal could have on personal freedom, concluding that if it is adopted, we will take a big step toward a world in which the right of private conversation belongs only to those rich enough to travel to face to face meetings. Rather than repeat those arguments, I have attached my earlier testimony as an appendix and focus here on a few essential points. It is clear that the costs of key escrow will be monumental whether measured in dollars spent for computers, squandered business opportunities, or lost liberties. Even if these costs are accepted, there remain two questions: can the law enforcement function be achieved, and is it even necessary? In a world in which cryptographic expertise is widespread and cryptography is readily implemented on small processors, rules seem no more likely to keep security out of the hands of criminals than export controls guarantee it will not be available to hostile nations. This, however, may not matter. Despite the concern of law enforcement that advancing technology will reduce the effectiveness of wiretaps, that technology has been at least as much a blessing to the police as a curse. Even ignoring the contribution of police communication systems and databases, modern telephone switches make wiretaps more effective by supplying caller ID in real time under many circumstances. In a world in which conspiracies were conducted via conference calls on secure phones, criminals could never be sure that one of the participants was not an informer recording everything in high fidelity without the risk of being caught wearing a body wire. Corrections to First Version Given to Congress line 89 unaware of that ==> unaware that line 137 Electronic Frontiers Foundation ==> Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility line 181 design cycle ==> development cycle line 213 implemented in dedicated ==> programmed on dedicated

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Need consulting work
by Philip Zimmermann 17 Jun '93

17 Jun '93

Hello Cypherpunks. I'm looking for some more consulting work in data security. Anyone have any leads? You can respond by email or phone. Thanks. -Philip Zimmermann 303 541-0140

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Re: yaa (yet another arti
by M..Stirner＠f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 17 Jun '93

17 Jun '93

> Another wiretap enabled authorities to thwart Chicago's "El Rukns > street gang" from a Libyan government-sponsored attempt to shoot > down a U.S. commercial airliner with a military weapons system. Uu> They find these all the time through other mechanisms. This episode was hilarious. An imprisoned El Rukun was conducting gang business via jailhouse payphone. One chuckly FBI agent was "decoding" the simple slang-code by which the goons communicated. After _three months_ he figured out enough of the code to bring an indictment. Some of the more amusing of these sophisticated subterfuges: Peanut = Jimmy Carter Hollywood = Ronald Reagan Roman = Policeman Change = Kill Our Friend = Qadaffi Long Demonstration = Shotgun It's interesting to note the length of time required for this "plaintext" to be decoded in an urgent matter of national security. . ~ . M. ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Questions to the White House from the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group
by gnu 17 Jun '93

17 Jun '93

Cypherpunks will recognize some of the questions from the brainstorming session of a few weeks ago. ------- Forwarded Message From: djw(a)eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner) ... The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, coordinated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, sent the following questions to the White House, the Department of Commerce, and key members of Congress. ================== Digital Privacy and Security Working Group 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE Suite 303 Washington, DC 20003 Jerry Berman or Daniel J. Weitzner 202/544-9237 Leah Gurowitz 202/544-6909 ISSUES AND QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION'S CLIPPER CHIP PROPOSAL A. Process by Which the Proposal Was Developed 1. Why the secrecy in which the encryption code scheme was developed? Were any members of the computer, communications, or security industries consulted? Were any privacy experts consulted? Has the Justice Department or the White House Office of Legal Counsel considered the constitutional implications? 2. The Administration's announcement implies that a policy review on encryption has been commenced; but at the same time, it appears that a decision has already been reached to support the Clipper proposal or some other key-escrow scheme. Is any review of the Clipper chip itself now underway? What progress has been made? When will this expedited review be complete? 3. What role has the National Security Agency played in the development and selection of the Clipper Chip and key escrow system? What will NSA's role be in the deployment and evaluation of the system? Are these roles consistent with the principle of civilian control of computer security, as required by the Computer Security Act of 1987? 4. What efforts are underway to improve the government's ability to decrypt non-Clipper algorithms which are likely to be used by criminals? Can the government decrypt all commercially available hardware sold domestically and abroad? If not, wouldn't it be a better policy to direct U.S. resources in that direction instead of the Clipper approach? 5. What percentage of the 800 to 900 annual Title III interceptions encounter encrypted communications? What percentage of law enforcement encountered encryption is estimated to be Clipper as opposed to the other encryption schemes? Is this a solution in search of a problem? 6. Did the government consider commercially-available encryption schemes and reject them? If so, why were they rejected, and is that analysis available? If not, why not? 7. Capstone is the successor to Clipper with the addition of public key exchange and digital signature capabilities. Is Clipper just an intermediate step before Capstone is released? Why did the White House press release not mention Capstone? 8. How will this relate to the FBI's Digital Telephony Proposal? Has the Administration committed to supporting, discarding or reintroducing the proposal in a new form? 9. What is the history of the proposal? How long has this been under consideration? 10. How long has the Clipper Chip and escrow concept been in development? Which agency originated these concepts? B. Secrecy of the Algorithm 11. Will the Clipper proposal have the same degree of public review that other NIST standards, such as DSS have gone through? 12. How can the public trust the security and reliability of an algorithm that is kept classified? 13. If American firms are not able to have their encryption experts examine the algorithm, how can they be sure that there is no "trap door" that would allow any Clipper Chip security system to be overridden? Dr. Kammer of NIST has said that "respected experts from outside the government will be offered access" to the algorithm. How do interested parties go about obtaining this access to the classified material about the Clipper algorithm and participate in the analysis of the design to search for trap doors and other weaknesses? What specific reports from this process will serve to reassure users regarding the integrity of the Clipper Chip? 14. What will be the consequence if the algorithm is published? Will it become less secure? If publication (i.e., de-classification) would make it less secure, how secure can it be? 15. If the Clipper Chip is too weak to protect classified government communications, why should it be used for sensitive proprietary private sector communications? 16. Executive Order 12356 has procedures on classification and declassification of information. Is the algorithm being classified under the framework of this order? What agency is in charge of classification/ declassification? 17. How much effort has the government put into the design and cryptoanalysis of the Clipper Chip as compared to the public analysis of the Data Encryption Standard during the last 16 years? 18. Is the Skipjack algorithm being used by the Clipper Chip derived from codes used in the management of our nuclear arsenal? Is this why the algorithm is being kept secret? If this is so, why are we using this secret system for a dubious commercial standard? If there is a national security justification to avoid having this encryption technique revealed, why risk compromising it by integrating it into publicly distributed products? 19. If the algorithm is classified, how will it be legal to distribute the chips to users not qualified to handle classified encryption equipment? This seems contrary to Facility Security Clearance procedures and the Personal Security Clearance requirements of DoD 5220.222-M, Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information. 20. Is it illegal to reverse engineer the Clipper Chip? If it were reverse engineered, would it then be illegal to reveal the algorithm? C. Voluntariness of Clipper System 21. Will this system be truly voluntary? If so, won't criminals and terrorists just use some other type of encryption? 22. If the use of the Clipper Chip is "voluntary," why would any party desiring privacy or secrecy of communications use it, knowing that the US. government has a process to allow decryption? If the Administration's ultimate goal is to ban other forms of encryption for use domestically, what is the legal basis for such an approach? 23. Isn't the Administration doing more than "encouraging" use of Clipper? (E.g., discontinuing DES at the end of the current certification cycle, directing NIST to adopt Clipper as a Federal standard, and maintaining export restrictions on hardware/software using different algorithms?) 24. Does the government have any plans to campaign for the implementation of the Clipper Chip as a standard for data cryptography? 25. What impact will the introduction of Clipper have on the market for other encryption technologies? Will the government otherwise try to discourage other cryptographic mechanisms from being marketed domestically and abroad? 26. Isn't the government dictating the design of technology into commercial products rather than allowing market demand to dictate? 27. What prevents a sender of information from encrypting with secure, easy to obtain software using DES or RSA algorithms before sending data through a channel encrypted with the Clipper system? 28. Would the Administration ever consider making the Clipper Chip or other key escrow system mandatory? D. Key Escrow System 29. How can the government assure us that the keys held in escrow are not compromised? What public or private agencies have sufficient integrity and public trust to serve as escrow agents? 30. How can the public be sure that keys will only be revealed upon proper warrant? Will there be clerks who actually operate the equipment who could get anyone's keys? Or will judges have personal keys, which would be directly authenticated to the escrow agents' equipment that protects the users' keys? 31. Once the keys are obtained from the escrow holders, is it envisioned that electronic surveillance can be done "real-time," or will recording and post-processing be required? 32. To hear both sides of a conversation, does law enforcement need the keys of both participants? 33. After law enforcement has properly obtained a pair of unit keys from the escrow agents and conducted a wiretap, will the keys be "returned" to the agents? What safeguards exist to prevent law enforcement from re-using the keys without authorization in the future? 34. Once in possession of the unit keys, can the government pretend to be ("spoof") the original unit owner? 35. What is the smallest number of people who would be in a position to compromise the security of the system? 36. Can an escrow agent exercise discretion in the release of key information? E.g., can they refuse an inappropriate request? (Phone companies ensure that court orders are facially valid.) Can they publicize an inappropriate request? Can they tell the person whose communications were intended to be violated? 37. Who will be responsible for auditing the escrow process and the use of revealed keys? 38. How will the government ensure that unanticipated uses of the escrow database are prevented in the long term? (E.g., the Census database was supposed to stay confidential for 75 years, but was released during World War Two to allow Japanese-Americans to be imprisoned without cause. What protections are in place to make sure that this never happens again? 39. What happens when one discovers that the keys have been captured through theft? How difficult would it be to change keys? What is done in the meanwhile? How difficult is it to reprogram the chip, or do you need a replacement? 40. If the chip can be reprogrammed, how do you prevent covert changes that will not be discovered until authorization to tap is received and execution of the warrant is forestalled? 41. It appears that once a given chip has been compromised due to use of the escrowed keys, the chip and the equipment it is used in are vulnerable forever. Is there any mechanism or program to re-key or replace compromised hardware? Is there any method for a potential acquiring party to verify whether the keys on a given chip have been compromised? Who should bear the cost of replacement or re-keying of compromised hardware? 42. What safeguards will be used when transporting the escrow keys? 43. What are the national security implications of widespread deployment of Clipper? Does it make our communications more susceptible to disruption or jamming? 44. Doesn't the two-escrowee approach make these locations targets of opportunity for any party or foreign government that wants to gain access to sensitive US. information? If an escrow location is compromised, all chip data contained there is compromised. Wouldn't these locations also become targets of opportunity for any criminal or terrorist organization that wanted to disrupt US. law enforcement? What back-up or physical security measures are envisioned? If multiple copies are kept, doesn't this increase the threat of compromise? E. Choice of Agents for the Keys 45. Who will be the agents for the keys? How secure will they be from the outside and from the inside? What is the cost of maintaining the escrow system? Who will pay? Who will profit? 46. When will the escrow agents be announced? Will there be a process to allow input into the selection of these individuals/agencies? 47. Although it has been reported that the escrow holders will not be the FBI, DoD, CIA or NSA, is it envisioned that one or both of the escrow locations will be non-government entities? Can one or both be private parties? What will the process be to determine what private party will be awarded the contract for key holder? 48. Can the set of escrow agents be changed after the initial selection? How can the government be prevented from moving the escrow contract to a more pliable escrow agent, if one of the agents stands up against the government for the rights of the people whose keys they are protecting? 49. Will escrow agents be immune from prosecution during their term of office, like Members of Congress, the President, and Justices of the Supreme Court? If not, what will prevent the government from harassing the agents during a dispute with the Justice Department? 50. Will there be a mechanism for particular people to keep their keys out of the key escrow database, or to obtain Clipper Chips with keys that have not been escrowed? (E.g. Judges, law enforcement officers, NSA officials, the President, etc.) F. Level of Security of Clipper Chip Encryption 51. How will the government assure American businesses that their proprietary information is not compromised? Given the extremely competitive nature of the high-tech industries, and the importance of intellectual property, how can American firms be adequately protected? 52. How will the government assure American citizens that the privacy of their electronic communications and the security of personal information that is transmitted in electronic form will all be secure under the Clipper Chip? 53. f the Administration is so confident about the level of security of the Clipper Chip scheme, why will classified information not be encrypted with it? 54. What warranty is the US. government prepared to make regarding the security of the Clipper Chip compared to other algorithms, and indemnity for failures for breaches of the algorithm, chips that are compromised due to failures in the security of the escrow system, or other failures in the Clipper approach? 55. What effect does Clipper have on other NSA and DOD programs aimed at encryption and authentication of unclassified messages (e.g., MOSAIC)? 56. If Clipper is not approved for classified traffic, what government agencies will be utilizing Clipper, and for what applications? 57. Normal security procedures involve changing cryptography keys periodically, in case one has been compromised. But the family and unit keys cannot be changed by the user. If these keys are compromised, it won't matter how frequently the user changed their session keys. Doesn't the long use of the same family and unit keys increase the likelihood that these keys will be compromised while they are still in use? Doesn't this also eliminate a significant degree of the user's control of the level of security that their his or her system provides? 58. If the government discovered that the algorithm or family key had been discovered by a foreign government or private individuals, would it tell the public that the system had been compromised? Are there plans to restore privacy and authentication if the algorithm is compromised? 59. How secure is the Clipper algorithm if it is attacked by a person with half the key? G. Level of Privacy Protection 60. Given the dramatic growth in transmission and storage of personal information in electronic form, does the Administration recognize that private individuals, as well as large organizations, need access to affordable, robust encryption systems? 61. Is law enforcement permitted to identify the specific piece of communications equipment without obtaining a warrant? If encrypted communications include the serial number ("chip family key"), will law enforcement be able to keep track of communications traffic and track private citizens without even securing the keys from the escrow agents? 62. Does the Administration believe that all household phones are going to be replaced with secure versions over some period of time? At what cost? 63. It has been impossible to keep any large collection of information completely private, including Social Security records, tax information, police files, motor vehicle records, medical records, video rentals, highly classified military information, and information on abuses of power. How will users be able to tell when this happens to the key escrow information? H. Constitutional/Legal Implications 64. Has the Administration fully considered the constitutional implications of the Clipper Chip and other key escrow systems? 65. Does forcing someone to disclose a key for future law enforcement access infringe the fundamental right against self incrimination embodied in the Fifth Amendment? 66. Does requiring key disclosure in conjunction with a particular technology violate users' right to free speech under the First Amendment? Courts frown most severely on any government attempts to compel a particular form of speech. 67. Does the escrow system violate the letter or the spirit of the Fourth Amendment protections which safeguard citizens against intrusive law enforcement practices? 68. When the Administration says "nor is the U.S. saying that 'every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product,'" are they therefore saying the inverse, that every American is not allowed to have an unbreakable commercial encryption product? 69. Does the Administration see the need for any new legislation to implement its Clipper Chip proposal? If so, specifically identify. 70. In the event that one or more escrow keys are obtained through unauthorized means, what liability, if any, might the equipment manufacturer have to bear? 71. What will be the relationship between Federal and state law enforcement? Will the policy pre-empt state law? How will state law enforcement access the "key" system? 72. What is the statutory authority for regulation of domestic encryption? Are any of these statutes cold war relics? Should the efficacy of all statutes that effect civilian encryption be reviewed? 73. What protections do we have against blackmailing by escrow agents, or by others who have gained possession of escrowed keys? Is there civil or criminal liability for escrow agents who reveal keys illegally? 74. What is the impact on society if the right to hold a truly private conversation is withdrawn? 75. Is strong encryption technology important for protecting intellectual property in a digital network environment? I. Logistics of Chip Development and Manufacture 76. Why weren't other Chip manufacturers given the chance to bid on the chip production process? Why was the choice made to have only one manufacturer? 77. Since the Clipper Chip design data will need to be released to manufacturers, how will we be assured that this information, in itself, will not allow the user systems to be compromised? 78. What assurances will there be that the manufacturer is not keeping a record of all keys issued? 79. We have read Dorothy Denning's explanation of how the two 80-bit keys will be created in the SCIF. Is this description accurate? If not, how would this process occur? If so, is the system feasible? What will the cost be for this process and for the increased security of the involved government agents? 80. The chips will be programmed in a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Does this suggest that the chips should at some point be classified Secret or Top Secret? What is the classification of the Clipper and Capstone chips and the Skipjack algorithm? How will these chips be declassified once leaving the SCIF? 81. Some of the press reports imply that AT&T has had access to this information in order to incorporate Clipper into some of its equipment designs. Is that implication accurate? 82. Can this scheme be implemented in software? If so, why haven't we seen information on that software? If not, were issues of how this hardware solution would affect continued use of software encryption adequately evaluated? Were the comparative costs of software and hardware encryption schemes evaluated? Is this evaluation available for analysis? 83. Current high speed DES processors have encryption rates of approximately 200 megabits per second, while the Clipper Chip has a throughput of 12.5 megabits per second. Within two to five years, 100 Mbs+ technologies, such as Fast Ethernet, FDDI and ATM, will become commonplace. How will the Clipper technology be used in environments where data is sent at 100 Mbs or faster? J. Feasibility/Implementation 84. What testing has been done to verify the ability of Clipper to work across the panoply of new emerging technologies? If the underlying digital transport protocol drops a bit or two, will that interfere with Clipper operation? How critical is synchronization of the bit stream for Clipper operation? Has this technology been tested with ISDN, TDMA, Cellular, CDMA Cellular, ATM, SONET, SMDS, etc. and other emerging technologies? What effect does Clipper have on the Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption (CAVE) algorithm? Are these differences for key generation, authentication, or voice privacy? 85. Does the Administration seek to extend the Clipper Chip proposal to the TDMA and CDMA digital cellular standards? 86. When will the government publish the various Modes of Operation and other documents for Clipper, together with a physical implementation standard (similar to the old FS-1027)? 87. Will the government consider the development of alternate sources for the chip or will vendors be limited to a single, monopoly supplier? 88. Initially, the Clipper Chip is being proposed for telephone technology, but the White House specifically mentions that the technology will be used for electronic data transmission. What is the timetable for implementing this? 89. What is the scope that the Administration envisions for the Clipper Chip's algorithm use? What about Capstone? Is it limited to choice, or does it encompass electronic mail, network encryption, security modems, long-haul bulk encryptors, video applications, computer password protection, Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems ("IVHS"), satellite communications -- both transport and control, electronic funds transfers, etc.? 90. What is the Administration's policy on other security mechanisms beyond privacy, such as message authentication codes for banking and EFT, and for integrity and digital signatures for sender authentication and non-repudiation? What is the impact on international standards such as X.500 and X.509? 91. Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in software, what options are available to those who can benefit from cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on these vendors or of the potential cost to the software industry conducted? 92. What is are the success criterion for the Clipper initiative? Would the government abandon its initiative if the Clipper is shown to be unsuccessful beyond government use? 93. What is the expected useful lifetime of the Clipper technology? What do you expect will render it useless at some point? 94. Is it true that the name "Clipper Chip" is the intellectual property of another company? K. Impact on American Competitiveness 95. As the key-escrow approach is designed to ensure the ability of the American government to access confidential data, do NIST and NSA expect overseas customers (who do not have the protection of due process) to purchase the chip for data protection? 96. In testimony before the House Telecommunications Subcommittee, Mr. Kammer of NIST indicated that if he were a foreign customer, he would not purchase devices that included the Clipper Chip. Doesn't this raise serious balance-of-trade problems? 97. Will the technology, or the Chip itself, be shared with other allied governments (e.g., the UK), or will US. producers of data security products, forced by government standards to develop clipper-based products for the US. market, be permanently closed out of the overseas security market? 98. If Clipper won't be commercially accepted abroad, and export controls continue to prohibit the exportation of other encryption schemes, isn't the US. government limiting American companies to a US. market? 99. Given the restrictions on who can build Clipper devices, how will Clipper keep up with advances in semiconductor speed, power, capacity and integration? Openly available devices, such as Intel-compatible microprocessors, have seen dramatic gains, but only because everyone was free to try to build a better version. 100. Will the Clipper Chip be used nationally and internationally? How will multinational operations accommodate this new system? 101. Banking and finance are truly global today. Most European financial institutions use technology described in standards such as ISO 9796. Many innovative new financial products and services will employ the reversible cryptography described in these standards. Clipper does not comply with these standards. Will US. financial institutions be able to export Clipper? If so, will their overseas customers find Clipper acceptable? 102. If overseas companies provide systems based on algorithms that do not have key escrow schemes that encrypt faster and more securely, how will we compete internationally? We are market leaders in applications software and operating systems. our world leadership in operating systems is dependent on integrating security in internationally distributed systems. 103. Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) is becoming an internationally recognized system for encrypting Electronic Mail. Would Skipjack encryption become a US. standard for encrypting electronic mail while the rest of the world used PEM? How would E-mail traffic between the US. and other countries be encrypted? L. Effect on Export Control Policy 104. In light of the Clipper initiative, will export restrictions on hardware and software encryption regimes using DES and RSA algorithms (which are widely available abroad) remain in place? 105. Will American firms be allowed to sell devices containing the Clipper Chip abroad? Under which governmental regulatory regime would exports of devices containing the Clipper Chip fall? What conditions would be applied to exports of devices containing the Clipper Chip? (E.g., would American firms be allowed to export devices to non-US. customers without the escrow requirement? If not, who would hold the keys?) 106. What governmental regulations will apply to imports of devices containing the Clipper Chip? Given that most US. companies source most customer premise equipment (e.g., telephones, fax machines, etc.) offshore, how will the logistics be handled for the export of the Clipper Chip as a component, and the subsequent import of the device containing the chip? Will the US. permit non-US. manufacturers to have the Clipper algorithm? If not, how will the Administration justify this trade barrier? 107. If the Clipper Chip cannot be reverse-engineered, and if the US. government is capable of decrypting, why would there be any reason to limit Clipper products from being exported? 108. If Clipper is allowed to be exported, does the US. government foresee a problem with other governments? Would the US. government's access to escrow keys be viewed as an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction? M. Implications for Installed-Base/Existing Products 109. What are the implications of NSA/NIST withdrawing the certification of DES? Although it may -- at some point in the future -- no longer be used for government purposes, that is not going to effect commercial or private users' applications of DES. What about the embedded base of DES hardware? 110. Will existing systems need to be replaced? 111. What efforts were spent to make the new encryption approach compatible with the embedded base of equipment? If DES was becoming weak (vulnerable), wouldn't merely extending the DES key length to 80 bits have solved that problem? 112. There are a number of companies that employ non-escrowed cryptography in their products today. These products range from secure voice, data, and fax, to secure e-mail, electronic forms, and software distribution, to name but a few. With over a million such products in use today, what does the Clipper scheme foretell for these products and the many corporations and individuals that are invested in them and use them? Will the investment made by the vendors in encryption-enhanced products be protected? If so, how? Is it envisioned that they will add escrow features to their products or be asked to employ Clipper? N. Process by which Input Will Be Received from Industry/Public Interest Groups 113. If the outcome of the policy review is not pre-ordained, then the process to analyze the issues and arrive at solutions would seem to need a great deal of definition. What roles have been identified for Congress, the private sector, and other interested parties? Who is coordinating the process? 114. Why does the Presidential directive on the review process remain classified? o o o o o ------- End of Forwarded Message

2 1

FOIA Kit [long]
by hibbert＠memex.com 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

A few weeks people were talking here about filing FOIA and Privacy Act requests to find out what info the gov't has on them. Here's a kit on how to file FOIA requsts. It's a relatively standard kit that the Fund for Open Information and Accountability has been making available for years. This version was posted to alt.privacy by Paul Ferguson. He had this advice in addition to what's in the kit: "FOIA requests submitted to either the FBI or CIA concerning an individual (including self) must be notarized to ensure identity." here 'tis: FOIA FILES KIT - INSTRUCTIONS USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REVISED EDITION Fund for Open Information and Accountability, Inc. 339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY 10012 (212) 477-3188 INSTRUCTIONS The Freedom of Information Act entitles you to request any record maintained by a federal Executive branch agency. The agency must release the requested material unless it falls into one of nine exempt categories, such as "national security," "privacy," "confidential source" and the like, in which case the agency may but is not compelled to refuse to disclose the records. This kit contains all the material needed to make FOIA requests for records on an individual, an organization or on a particular subject matter or event. HOW TO MAKE A COMPLETE REQUEST Step 1: Select the appropriate sample letter. Fill in the blanks in the body of the letter. Read the directions printed to the right of each letter in conjunction with the following instructions: For organizational files: In the first blank space insert the full and formal name of the organization whose files you are requesting. In the second blank space insert any other names, acronyms or shortened forms by which the organization is or has ever been known or referred to by itself or others. If some of the organization's work is conducted by sub-groups such as clubs, committees, special programs or through coalitions known by other names, these should be listed. For individual files: Insert the person's full name in the first blank space and any variations in spelling, nicknames, stage names, marriage names, titles and the like in the second blank space. Unlike other requests, the signatures of an individual requesting her/his own file must be notarized. For subject matter or event files: In the first blank space state the formal title of the subject matter or event including relevant dates and locations. In the second blank space provide the names of individuals or group sponsors or participants and/or any other information that would assist the agency in locating the material you are requesting. Step 2: The completed sample letter may be removed, photocopies and mailed as is or retyped on your own stationary. Be sure to keep a copy of each letter. Step 3: Addressing the letters: Consult list of agency addresses. FBI: A complete request requires a minimum of two letters. Sen done letter to FBI Headquarters and separate letter to each FBI field office nearest the location of the individual, the organization or the subject matter/event. Consider the location of residences, schools, work and other activities. INS: Send a request letter to each district office nearest the location of the individual, the organization or the subject matter/event. Address each letter to the FOIA/PA office of the appropriate agency. Be sure to make clearly on the envelope: ATTENTION--FOIA REQUEST. FEE WAIVER You will notice that the sample letters include a request for fee waiver. Many agencies automatically waive fees if a request results in the release of only a small number of documents, e.g. 250 pages or less. Under the Act, you are entitled to a waiver of all search and copy fees associated with your request if the release of the information would primarily benefit the general public. However, in January 1983, the Justice Department issued a memo to all federal agencies listing five criteria which requesters must meet before they are deemed entitled to a fee waiver. Under these criteria, a requester must show that the material sought to be released is already the subject of "genuine public interest" and "meaningfully contributes to the public development or understanding of the subject"; and that she/he has the qualifications to understand and evaluate the materials and the ability to interpret and disseminate the information to th public and is not motivated by any "personal interest." Finally, if the requested information is already "in the public domain," such as in the agency's reading room, no fee waiver will be granted. You should always request a waiver of fees if you believe the information you are seeking will benefit the public. If your request for a waiver is denied, you should appeal that denial, citing the ways in which your request meets the standards set out above. MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF YOUR REQUEST Customarily, you will receive a letter from each agency within 10 days stating that your request has been received and is being processed. You may be asked to be patient and told that requests are handled cafeteria style. You have no alternative but to be somewhat patient. but there is no reason to be complacent and simply sit and wait. A good strategy is to telephone the FOIA office in each agency after about a month if nothing of substance has been received. Ask for a progress report. The name of the person you talk with and the gist of the conversation should be recorded. try to take notes during the conversation focusing especially on what is said by the agency official. Write down all the details you can recall after the call is completed. Continue to call every 4 to 6 weeks. Good record keeping helps avoid time-consuming and frustrating confusion. A looseleaf notebook with a section devoted to each request simplifies this task. Intervening correspondence to and from the agency can be inserted between the notes on phone calls so that all relevant material will be at hand for the various tasks: phone consultations, writing the newsletter, correspondence, articles, preparation for media appearances, congressional testimony or litigation, if that course is adopted. HOW TO MAKE SURE YOU GET EVERYTHING YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ... AND WHAT TO DO IF YOU DO NOT After each agency has searched and processed your request, you will receive a letter that announces the outcome, encloses the released documents, if any, and explains where to direct an appeal if any material has been withheld. There are four possible outcomes: 1. Request granted in full: This response indicates that the agency has released all records pertinent to your request, with no exclusions or withholdings. The documents may be enclosed or, if bulky, may be mailed under separate cover. This is a very rare outcome. Next Step: Check documents for completeness (see instructions below). 2. Requested granted in part and denied in part: This response indicates that the agency is releasing some material but has withheld some documents entirely or excised some passages from the documents released. The released documents may be enclosed or, if bulky, mailed under separate cover. Next step: Check documents released for completeness (see instructions below) and make an administrative appeal of denials or incompleteness (see instructions below). 3. Request denied in full: This response indicates that the agency is asserting that all material in its files pertaining to your request falls under one or the nine FOIA exemptions. These are categories of information that the agency may, at its discretion, refuse to release. Next step: Make an administrative appeal (see instructions below). Since FOIA exemptions are not mandatory, even a complete denial of your request can and should be appeals. 4. No records: This response will state that a search of the agency's files indicates that it has no records corresponding to those you requested. Next step: Check your original request to be sure you have not overlooked anything. If you receive documents from other agencies, review them for indications that there is material in the files of the agency claiming it has none. For example, look for correspondence, or references to correspondence, to or from that agency. If you determine that there are reasonable grounds, file an administrative appeal (see instructions below). HOW TO CHECK FOR COMPLETENESS Step 1: Before reading the documents, turn them over and number the back of each page sequentially. The packet may contain documents from the agency's headquarters as well as several field office files. Separate the documents into their respective office packets. Each of these offices will have assigned the investigation a separate file number. Try to find the numbering system. Usually the lower right hand corner of the first page carries a hand-written file and document number. For instance, an FBI document might be marked "100-7142-22". This would indicate that it is the 22nd document in the 7142nd file in the 100 classification. As you inspect the documents, make a list of these file numbers and which office they represent. In this way you will be able to determine which office created and which office received the document you have in your hand. Often there is a block stamp affixed with the name of the office from whose files this copy was retrieved. the "To/From" heading on a document may also give you corresponding file numbers and will help you puzzle out the origin of the document. When you have finally identified each document's file and serial number and separated the documents into their proper office batches, make a list of all the serial numbers in each batch to see if there any any missing numbers. If there are missing serial numbers and some documents have been withheld, try to determine if the missing numbers might reasonably correspond to the withheld documents. If not, the release may be incomplete and an administrative appeal should be made. Step 2: Read all the document released to you. Keep a list of all document referred to the text--letters, memos, teletypes, reports, etc. Each of these "referred to" documents should turn up in the packet released to you. If any are not in the packet, it is possible they may be among those document withheld; a direct inquiry should be made. In an administrative appeal, ask that each of these "referred to" documents be produced or that the agency state plainly that they are among those withheld. Of course, the totals of unproduced vs. withheld must be within reasons; that is, if the total number of unproduced documents you find referred to the text of the documents produced exceeds the total number of documents withheld, the agency cannot claim that all the referred to documents are accounted for by the withheld category. You will soon get the hand of making logical conclusions from discrepancies in the totals and missing document numbers. Another thing to look for when reading the released documents if the names of persons or agencies to whom the document has been disseminated. the lower left-hand corner is a common location for the typed list of agencies or offices to whom the document has been directed. In addition, there may be additional distribution recorded by hand, there or elsewhere on the cover page. There are published glossaries for some agencies that will help in deciphering these notations when they are not clear. Contact FOIA, Inc., if you need assistance in deciphering the text. Finally, any other file numbers that appear on the document should be noted, particularly in the subject of the file is of interest and is one you have not requested. You may want to make an additional request for some of these files. HOW TO MAKE AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL Under the FOIA, a dissatisfied requester has the right of administrative appeal. the name and address of the proper appeal office will be given to you by each agency in its final response letter. This kit contains a sample appeal letter with suggesting for adapting it to various circumstances. However, you need not make such an elaborate appeal; in fact, you need not offer any reasons at all but rather simply write a letter to the appeals unit stating that "this letter constitutes an appeal of the agency's decision." Of course, if you have identified some real discrepancies, you will want to set them for fully, but even if you have not found any, you may simply ask that the release be reviewed. If you are still dissatisfied after the administrative appeal process, the FOIA gives you the right to bring a lawsuit in federal district court on an expedited basis. SAMPLE FBI REQUEST LETTER Date: To: FOIA/PA Unit Federal Bureau of Investigation This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act. I request a complete and thorough search of all filing systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency pertaining to and/or captioned: ______ _____________________________________________________ [describe records desired and/or insert full and _____________________________________________________ formal name] _____________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________ including, without limitations, files and documents captioned, or whose captions include _____________________________________________________ [insert changes in name, commonly used names, _____________________________________________________ acronyms, sub-groups, and the like] _____________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________ This request specifically includes "main" files and "see references," including, but not limited to numbered and lettered sub files, "DO NOT FILE" files, and control files. I also request a search of the ELSUR Index,a nd the COINTELPRO Index. I request that all records be produced with the administrative pages. I wish to be sent copies of "see reference" cards, abstracts, search slips, including search slips used to process this request, file covers, multiple copies of the same documents if they appear in a file, and tapes of any electronic surveillances. I wish to make it clear that I want all records in you office "identifiable with my request," even though reports on those records have been sent to Headquarters and even though there may be duplication between the two sets of files. I do not want just "interim" documents. I want all documents as they appear in the "main" files and "see references" of all units of your agency. If documents are denied in whole or in part, please specify which exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole document denied. Please provide a complete itemized inventory and a detailed factual justification of total or partial denial of documents. Give the number of pages in each document and the total number of pages pertaining to this request. For "classified" material denied please include the following information: the classification (confidential, secret or top secret); identity of the classifier; date or event for automatic de-classification, classification review, or down-grading; if applicable, identity of official authorizing extension of automatic de-classification or review; and if applicable, the reason for extended classification. I request that excised material be "blacked out" rather than "whited out" or cut out and that the remaining non-exempt portions of documents will be released as provided under the Freedom of Information Act. Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in your office to assure that no records related to this request are destroyed. Please advise of any destruction of records and include the date of and authority for such destruction. As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office and address to which an appeal should be directed. I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since the release of the requested information would primarily benefit the general public and be "in the public interest." I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call rather than write if there are any questions or if you need additional information from me. I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working days, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act. Sincerely, name: _______________________________________________ address: ____________________________________________ ____________________________________________ telephone: __________________________________________ signature: __________________________________________ SAMPLE AGENCY REQUEST LETTER DATE: TO: FOIA/PA Unit This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act. I request a complete and thorough search of all filing systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency pertaining to and/or captioned ______________________________________________________ [describe records desired and/or insert full and ______________________________________________________ formal name] ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ including, without limitation, files and documents captioned, or whose captions include: ______________________________________________________ [insert changes in name, commonly used names, ______________________________________________________ acronyms, sub-groups and the like] ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ I also request all "see references" to these names, a search of the ELSUR Index or any similar technique for locating records of electronic surveillance. This request is also a request for any corresponding files in INS Headquarters or regional offices. Please place any "missing" files pertaining to this request on "special locate" and advise that you have done this. If documents are denied in part or whole, please specify which exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole document denied. Please provide a complete itemized inventory and detailed factual justification of total or partial denial of documents. Specify the number of pates in each document and th total number of pages pertaining to this request. For classified material denied, please include the following information: the classification rating (confidential, secret, or top secret); identify the classifier; date or event for automatic de-classification, classification review or downgrading; if applicable, identify the official authorizing extension of automatic de-classification or review; and, if applicable, give the reason for extended classification. I request that excised material be "blacked out" rather than "whited out" or cut out. I expect, as provided by the Freedom of Information Act, that the remaining non-exempt portions of documents will be released. Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in your office or agency to assure that no records related to this request are destroyed. Please advise of any destruction of records and include the date of and authority for such destruction. As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office and address to which an appeal should be directed. I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since the release of the requested information would primarily benefit the general public and be "in the public interest." I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call rather than write if there are any questions or if you need additional information from me. I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working days, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act. Sincerely, name: _______________________________________________ address: ____________________________________________ ____________________________________________ telephone: (___)_______________________________________ signature: __________________________________________ SAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL LETTER Date: To: FOIA/PA Appeals Office RE: Request number [Add this if the agency has given your request a number] This is an appeal pursuant to subsection (a)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act as amended (5U.S.C. 552). On [date], I received a letter from [name of official] of your agency denying my request for [describe briefly the information you are after]. This reply indicated that an appeal letter could be sent to you. I am enclosing a copy of my exchange of correspondence with your agency so that you can see exactly what files I have requested and the insubstantial grounds on which my request has been denied. [Optional paragraph, to be used if the agency has withheld all or nearly all the material which has been requested]: You will note that your agency has withheld the entire (or nearly the entire) document (or file, or report, or whatever) that I requested. Since the FOIA provides that "any reasonably secregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt," I believe that your agency has not complied with the FOIA. I believe that there must be (additional) secregable portions which do not fall within FOIA exemptions and which must be released. [Optional paragraph, to be used in the agency has used the (b)(1) exemption for national security, to withhold information] Your agency has used the (b)(1) exemption to withhold information [I question whether files relating to events that took place over twenty years ago could realistically harm the national security.] [Because I am familiar with my own activities during the period in question, and know that none of these activities in any way posed a significant threat to the national security, I question the designation of my files or portions of my file as classified and exempt from disclosure because of national security considerations.] [Sample optional argument to be used if the exemption which is claimed does not seem to make sense; you should cite as many specific instances as you care to of items withheld from the documents that you have received. We provide two examples which you might want to adapt to your own case.] "On the memo dated _____________ the second paragraph withheld under the (b)(1) exemption appears to be describing a conversation at an open meeting. If this is the case, it is impossible that the substance of this conversation could be properly classified." Or, "The memo dated _____ refers to a meeting which I attended, but a substantial portion is deleted because of the (b)(6) and (b)(7)(c) exemptions for unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. Since I already know who attended this meeting, no privacy interest is served by the withholding." I trust that upon examination of my request, you will conclude that the records I requested are not properly covered by exemption(s) [here repeat the exemptions which the agency's denial letter claimed applied to your request] of the amended FOIA, and that you will overrule the decision to withhold the information. [Use if an itemized inventory is not supplied originally] If you choose instead to continue to withhold some or all of the material which was denied in my initial request to your agency, I ask that you give me an index of such material, together with the justification for the denial of each item which is still withheld. As provided in the Act, I will expect to receive a reply to this administrative appeal letter within twenty working days. If you deny this appeal and do not adequately explain why the material withheld is properly exempt, I intend to initial a lawsuit to compel its disclosure. [You can say that you intend to sue, if that is your present inclination; you may still decide ultimately not to file suit.] Sincerely yours, name: ____________________________________________ address: ____________________________________________ ____________________________________________ signature: ___________________________________________ [Mark clearly on envelope: Attention: Freedom of Information Appeals] FBI ADDRESSES AND PHONE NUMBERS FBI Headquarters, J. Edgar Hoover Bldg, Washington, D.C., 20535, 202-324-5520 (FOI/PA Unit) Field Offices Albany, NY 12207, U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, 518-465-7551 Albuquerque, NM 87101, Federal Office Bldg., 505-247-1555 Alexandria, VA 22314, 300 N. Lee St., 703-683-2681 Anchorage, AK 99510, Federal bldg., 907-272-6414 Atlanta, GA 30303, 275 Peachtree St. NE, 404-521-3900 Baltimore, MD 21207, 7142 Ambassador Rd., 301-265-8080 Birmingham, AL 35203, Room 1400, 2121 Bldg. 205-252-7705 Boston, MA 02203, J.F. Kennedy Federal Office Bldg., 617-742-5533 Buffalo, NY 14202, 111 W. Huron St., 716-856-7800 Butte, MT 59701, U.S. Courthouse and Federal Bldg., 406-792-2304 Charlotte, NC 28202, Jefferson Standard Life Bldg., 704-372-5485 Chicago, IL 60604, Everett McKinley Dirksen Bldg., 312-431-1333 Cincinnati, OH 45202, 400 U.S. Post Office & Crthse Bldg., 513-421-4310 Cleveland, OH 44199, Federal Office Bldg., 216-522-1401 Columbia, SC 29201, 1529 Hampton St., 803-254-3011 Dallas TX 75201, 1810 Commerce St., 214-741-1851 Denver, CO 80202, Federal Office Bldg., 303-629-7171 Detroit, MI 48226, 477 Michigan Ave., 313-965-2323 El Paso, TX 79901, 202 U.S. Courthouse Bldg., 915-533-7451 Honolulu, HI 96850, 300 Ala Moana Blvd., 808-521-1411 Houston, TX 77002, 6015 Fed. Bldg and U.S.Courthouse, 713-224-1511 Indianapolis, IN 46202, 575 N. Pennsylvania St., 317-639-3301 Jackson, MS 39205, Unifirst Federal and Loan Bldg., 601-948-5000 Jacksonville, FL 32211, 7820 Arlington Expressway, 904-721-1211 Kansas City, MO 64106, 300 U.S. Courthouse Bldg., 816-221-6100 Knoxville, TN 37919, 1111 Northshore Dr., 615-588-8571 Las Vegas, NV 89101, Federal Office Bldg., 702-385-1281 Little Rock, AR 72201, 215 U.S Post Office Bldg., 501-372-7211 Los Angeles, CA 90024, 11000 Wilshire Blvd, 213-272-6161 Louisville, KY 40202, Federal Bldg., 502-583-3941 Memphis, TN 38103, Clifford Davis Federal bldg., 901-525-7373 Miami, FL 33137, 3801 Biscayne Blvd., 305-573-3333 Milwaukee, WI 53202, Federal Bldg and U.S. Courthouse, 414-276-4681 Minneapolis, MN 55401, 392 Federal Bldg., 612-339-7846 Mobile, AL 36602, Federal Bldg., 205-438-3675 Newark, NJ 07101, Gateway I, Market St., 201-622-5613 New Haven, CT 06510, 170 Orange St., 203-777-6311 New Orleans, LA 70113, 701 Loyola Ave., 504-522-4671 New York, NY 10007, 26 Federal Plaza, 212-553-2700 Norfolk, VA, 23502, 870 N. 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Draft Solaris Teleservices API doc, anon ftp
by Marianne Mueller 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

FYI From: stoltz(a)denwa.Eng.Sun.COM (Ben Stoltz) Newsgroups: comp.dcom.isdn,sun.tstech,sun.audio,sun.sw.arch,sun.telco Subject: Draft Solaris Teleservices API document is available for anonymous ftp Date: 11 Jun 1993 18:10:29 GMT A PostScript version of the Solaris Teleservices 1.0 API Programming Guide is available for anonymous ftp from sunsite.unc.edu in the directory /pub/sun-info/white-papers/API_xtel.tar.Z If you have any comments or suggestions, please send email to xtel-api-comments(a)denwa.Eng.Sun.COM. Marketing inquiries should be directed to bob.mckee(a)Eng.Sun.COM (415)336-4840. The IAFA info follows: Document-Name: API_xtel Title: Solaris Teleservices 1.0 API Programming Guide Authors: Jonathan Chang <cjon(a)Eng.Sun.COM> UMTV18-217, Sun Microsystems, Inc., 2550 Garcia Ave. Mountain View, CA 94043-1100 Revision-Date: June 7, 1993 Category: Programming Guide Abstract: This manual is for C++ programmers who are developing Solaris Teleservices (XTEL) applications. A good understanding of the UNIX(tm) operating system and the C++ programming language are required. Example programs are provided that illustrate the concepts in the text. The manual explains how to use XTEL to write applications that: o Place or answer multiple calls o Hold, drop, conference and transfer calls o Provide access to data channels o Enable security and sharing of calls between processes. Format: PostScript Citation: Solaris Teleservices 1.0 API Programming Guide, Draft June 7 1993, SunSoft, Inc. Publication-Status: draft Keywords: Teleservices, Telephony, ISDN, POTS, voice, API, C++ Size: 90 pages

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Link protocol
by Timothy Newsham 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

I just uploaded ami-link1.0lha ami-link1.0-src.lha link1.0.tar.Z link.readme to the soda.berkeley.edu cypherpunks/incoming directory. link.readme says: ---------------------- Link1.0 -------- Link is a protocol designed to provide a secure link over a serial channel. At this time there are ends only for Amiga and Unix. The protocol grabs input bytes, encrypts them with DES and frames them in packets for transfer over a serial channel. The protocol also allows transfers of random DES keys over the channel encrypted with the RSA algorithm. Key exchange happens automatically at startup (in the future there will be options to change keys mid-session). The client end written for Amiga is a vt100 terminal emulator. The server end written for Unix opens a pty and executes a shell. link1.0.tar.Z : This file contains the protocol engine and server to be run on the Unix end. Also contains docs on the protocol engine. Tested on HPUX and SunOS (compiled and tested minimally on an Ultrix at one point in time) ami-link1.0.lha : This file contains the protocol engine and client to be run on the Amiga end. Contains minimal docs pertaining to setup. ami-link1.0-src.lha : Contains the source for the amiga end.

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YAA (yet another article)
by Giuseppe Cimmino 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

PC Week - June 14, 1993 "Clipper security scheme criticized" By Kimberly Patch A proposed National Security Agency standard for voice and data encryption is not winning votes among U.S. executives concerned with security issues. Executives attending hearings held by the federal Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board earlier this month said the proposed Clipper chip encryption standard does not meet their technical or export needs. Under the Clipper guidelines, PCs would be outfitted with a board that contains the encryption chip, while the U.S. government would be privy to a pair of software "escrow keys" used to unlock the encryption. Although the Clipper chip uses an 80-bit encryption scheme, executives said it would be more expensive and slower than more popular software encryption schemes. Moreover, some expressed concern about its security since NSA is keeping the details of how it works secret. "Why would any law-abiding corporation buy equipment that has escrow keys that [allow] the government to [decrypt information] whenever they want without telling the corporation?" asked Ed Zeitler, a vice president at Fidelity Investments, a financial-services firm in Boston. An NSA spokeswoman in Fort Meade, MD., defended the scheme, claiming the keys would be protected and law-enforcement agencies would have to go through a formal legal process to decrypt messages. "People will only have access if they have a legal need for it," she said. Corporate users, however, objected. "[The government] wants [the Clipper standard] to be widely used so that law-enforcement people can listen in on things that are used by criminals," said Steven Walker, president of Trusted Information Systems, Inc., a Boston software company. "The criminals will find some other way to do it, which is the irony of this. It's not going to accomplish what [that government] wants, no matter what." One problem with today's encryption business is that U.S. firms are restrained from exporting software that offers powerful encryption capabilities, the executives said. Currently, U.S. firms can only export products that use a 40-bit key, which would take a fast computer about two and a half weeks to crack, said Zeitler. By contrast, the Data Encryption Standard -- a 56-bit key scheme not approved for export -- would take the same computer 2,200 years to crack, while the proposed Clipper chip, an 80-bit scheme, would take even longer.

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Bidzos responds to "sellout" cry!
by Stanton McCandlish 16 Jun '93

16 Jun '93

I expressed my displeasure over PKP/RSA's apparent support for Clipper/ Capstone/Key Escrow to RSA's head, Jim Bidzos. Here's his reply. Quoth Jim Bidzos, verily I saith unto thee: > From jim(a)RSA.COM Wed Jun 16 13:03:04 1993 > id <AA05248>; Wed, 16 Jun 1993 13:03:01 -0600 > Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 12:01:09 PDT > From: jim(a)RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) > Message-Id: <9306161901.AA16476(a)RSA.COM> > To: anton(a)hydra.unm.edu > In-Reply-To: Stanton McCandlish's message of Sun, 13 Jun 1993 23:01:03 -0600 (MDT) <9306140501.AA13212(a)hydra.unm.edu> > Subject: hmph > > > RSA/PKP supporting Clipper? Where did you hear that? (It's untrue.) > For a year and a half, we have been claiming that DSS is covered by > patents we hold. NIST has finally stopped fighting, and asked for > licensing terms. We provided them. Hardly "support for Clipper." > > --Jim > > -- Stanton McCandlish * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. * anton(a)hydra.unm.edu * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION * FidoNet: 1:301/2 * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! * Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *

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