- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

CDR: Re: proggies
by Ebow0＠aol.com 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

marshall(a)athena.net.dhis.org (David Marshall) writes: >Cypherpunks Industries would be happy to ship you pregnant laboratory >rats, transgenically altered to produce >delta-tetrahydrocannabinol. These pregnant rats have been nicknamed >"preggies" by our staff, in a combination of "pregnant" and "eeeeee," >the sound they make when they're high which, of course, is all the >time. > >We would also like to offer you a special, one-time discount offer on >"hosers," rats which have been transgenically modified to produce a >patented cocktail of ethanol, delta-tetrahydrocannabinol, LSD, >ketamine, and extacy in their urine. Because drug delivery is, of >course, a primary concern when you've got "the bad shakes," the drug >dispenser port, nicknamed "schlong," has also been genetically >enlarged to approximately 20 times its normal size. > >Ask about our great deals on transgenic THC-producing citrus fruit! > >We at Cypherpunks Industries are committed to doing our part in >protest against the War on (Some) Drugs. > >Please reply to cypherpunks(a)openpgp.net with your name, address, >daytime and work telephone numbers, credit card information, a signed >statement declaring that you are not in the employ of or affiliated >with any law enforcement or governmental agency which we can later >wave at a jury in court to no avail, and a list of the products you >wish to purchase. > >Thank you for your interest in Cypherpunks Ind i would just like to say marshall(a)athena.net.dhis.org's response to that loser asking for proggies is one of the funniest damn things i have read in a long time.

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CDR: Niiice kitty....
by James A.. Donald 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

-- At 09:02 PM 05/10/00 -0700, James A.. Donald wrote: > > Big deal. Chomsky tells the reader that somewhere there is some > > underreported evidence that the reports of Khmer Rouge massacres were fake, Reese wrote: > WHERE? WHERE DOES HE SAY THIS? > > Exact source with quote, or shaddup. I have given you the exact source with quote a dozen times, and each time you simply lie about my words. Here it is, yet again: Distortions at Fourth Hand Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman The Nation, June 25, 1977 : : such journals as the Far Eastern Economic Review , the : : London Economist , the Melbourne Journal of Politics , and : : others elsewhere, have provided analyses by highly : : qualified specialists who have studied the full range of : : evidence available, and who concluded that executions have : : numbered at most in the thousands; that these were : : localized in areas of limited Khmer Rouge influence and : : unusual peasant discontent, where brutal revenge killings : : were aggravated by the threat of starvation resulting from : : the American destruction and killing. These reports also : : emphasize both the extraordinary brutality on both sides : : during the civil war (provoked by the American attack) and : : repeated discoveries that massacre reports were false So tell us, where were these discoveries that the massacre reports were false? Who discovered them to be false, and how? Nothing that Chomsky and Herman claim in the above is true, but the most important claim, and the most straightforward lie, is "repeated discoveries that the massacre reports were false." --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG aXL63PmuM9+NuXlKtpqNsr8BvaTgUn5Uywspdco4 4igRb+oqLkHsiouIlTTHIhWUkbGm3R1cE56Sjb/fo

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CDR: Re: proggies
by David Marshall 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

Slyng69(a)aol.com writes: > please send me prggies thanks Cypherpunks Industries would be happy to ship you pregnant laboratory rats, transgenically altered to produce delta-tetrahydrocannabinol. These pregnant rats have been nicknamed "preggies" by our staff, in a combination of "pregnant" and "eeeeee," the sound they make when they're high which, of course, is all the time. We would also like to offer you a special, one-time discount offer on "hosers," rats which have been transgenically modified to produce a patented cocktail of ethanol, delta-tetrahydrocannabinol, LSD, ketamine, and extacy in their urine. Because drug delivery is, of course, a primary concern when you've got "the bad shakes," the drug dispenser port, nicknamed "schlong," has also been genetically enlarged to approximately 20 times its normal size. Ask about our great deals on transgenic THC-producing citrus fruit! We at Cypherpunks Industries are committed to doing our part in protest against the War on (Some) Drugs. Please reply to cypherpunks(a)openpgp.net with your name, address, daytime and work telephone numbers, credit card information, a signed statement declaring that you are not in the employ of or affiliated with any law enforcement or governmental agency which we can later wave at a jury in court to no avail, and a list of the products you wish to purchase. Thank you for your interest in Cypherpunks Industries.

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CDR: re: Shunning, lesbians and liberty
by An Metet 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

k.brown(a)ccs.bbk.ac.uk wrote: >I hope whenever you Americans see on the news what is going on in >Afghanistan you remember that your government paid for their weapons and >their training, that those guys were educated in US-run schools and >guerilla warfare training camps - all because Reagan and Bush came out >with this shit about "totalitarian" being the only bad thing & >non-communists couldn't possibly be "totalitarian". Whatever the Taliban >were, they certainly weren't communists. So in goes the CIA, and the >money, and the guns, and look what came out. I hope when you Brits realize you're not speaking German or Russian to your *elected* masters, you get down on your seldom used knees and kiss America's red, white, & blue ass.

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CDR: proggies
by Slyng69＠aol.com 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

please send me prggies thanks

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CDR: cypherpunks
by billp＠nmol.com 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/8327/ http://members.tripod.com/bill_3_2/ http://www.nmol.com/users/billp/

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CDR: RE: Rijndael & Hitachi
by Lucky Green 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

> -----Original Message----- > From: cypherpunks(a)openpgp.net [mailto:cypherpunks@openpgp.net]On Behalf > Of Julian Assange > Sent: Sunday, October 08, 2000 01:04 > To: Multiple recipients of list > Subject: Re: Rijndael & Hitachi > Not so, inprepid Vin. A Belgian cipher was chosen simply because > the NSA was able to operate with relative impunity in that region, > in which it has huge per-capita deployment, compared to a similar > actions on its own soil. You /are/ joking ... right? The AES contest was held in the open, which should alleviate any concerns about NSA involvement in the desing of Rijndael. --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to> "Anytime you decrypt... its against the law". Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America in a sworn deposition, 2000-06-06

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CDR: Re: Disposable remailers
by despot 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, dmolnar wrote: > On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, despot wrote: > > > But, this disposable remailer idea is solid. As a quick example > > scheme, if there were some sort of remailer protocol that > > functioned like routing protocols, as disposable remailers came > > online, they could announce themselves to other remailers. > > Pseudorandom hopping from one disposable remailer to another could > > occur in a remailer-chained message, instead of manually > > encrypting a message for a chain of remailers. The sender could I will inject one missing piece of my example, the final remailer address (and perhaps even the whole message) should be obfuscated by the hop count. This way only the last disposable remailer before the final remailer has this information. > This reminds me of something I was looking at this spring. Markus > Jakobsson has two papers on "A Practical Mix" and "Flash Mixing" which > look at mix-nets in a different way than we see in remailers. There, > instead of a message being successively encrypted for a particular > path through a series of remailers, the remailers pass a prepared > encrypted message around and perform a distributed computation on it. At > the end of the computation, the decrypted name of the recipient > automagically pops out. > Anyway, both papers deal with a collection of mix servers fixed in > advance. It seems that disposable remailers would work well with > extensions of these protocols modified to deal with dynamic leave and > joins of servers. Add this to wireless and you have mobile disposable > remailers. Ok, I am stretching my memory here, but... I read about mix-nets and the "Flash Mixing" paper months ago, so I may be a bit off. If I remember correctly, you have network of mix servers. Any set of these mix servers can be used to perform the mix, and as long as one is "honest," the result will be private. These servers communicate over some sort of broadcast channel. Lets say C is a list of the ciphertexts (c0...ci) after encrypting messages M (m0...mi) with a public key. C flows through the mix-net where it is re-encrypted, permuted, sorted, etc by each mix server (so each mix server has a modified copy of the list) and out pops C'. C' is a list of ciphertexts corresponding to M. For the Flash Mix, the mix servers can confirm to a high probability that C' was computed correctly. As long as one of the mix servers is honest and an attacker does not know, I think it is, 2 plaintexts corresponding to input ciphertexts, then there is a high probability of privacy. More so, I believe there are even dummy inputs in the list C to help strengthen this scheme against attacks. So, off the top of my head, issues with extending this scheme to disposable remailers... Well, the list size immediately comes to mind for memory-constrained devices. The resistance to attack is dependent on the list size and the number of lists (which corresponds to the number of mix servers used). Adding nodes should have no impact as they would not be part of the current mixes. Dropping nodes not used in any mixes would be fine, but what happens when a node being used in a mix fails? The mix could start over, using pseudorandomly selected nodes perhaps. The system also seems to fall prey to malicious remailers. For the flash mix, I believe, it is assumed that nodes will perform properly more often than not, but this seems to be the rarer case in a disposable remailer structure. The means of communication would need to be looked at, especially with this dynamic environment. How to eliminate nodes that are found to be malfunctioning from being used by other nodes? A few trusted, "honest" nodes should be available to the mixes in order to ensure privacy. And so on... :) > So a further question would be whether we can design a mix protocol > which can > a) take advantage of all these cheap, (hopefully) distinct > devices and their computation power > but > b) doesn't give the commodity devices enough power to > break the mix, even if many (almost all??) of them act in > concert. Indeed... -andrew

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CDR: How the Feds will try to ban strong anonymity
by Declan McCullagh 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

I wrote in another thread: >framework to reasonably exist. Cypherpunkish technology will create >underground markets, anonymous distribution methods, and so on, and the >only way to enforce such regulations will be for the Feds/Mounties to take >drastic steps. (For instance, strong anonymity is an emergent property of >a distributed network combined with strong encryption. Restricting strong >anonymity means key escrow.) Perhaps I overstated my argument above. It seems to me that if the Feds want to restrict strong anonymity, they have some choices: * Make it a felony (death penalty may have some deterrent effect) to take advantage of it. * Require key escrow/key recovery/message recovery/Clipper * Require that anonymous remailers or similar devices implement identity escrow/keep logs * Ban Internet service providers/backbone providers from accepting traffic from an anonymous remailer node (a tricky tactic, this, since end-of-chain remailers are relatively few compared to the middle-of-chain ones, at least today). * Do the same thing with outgoing traffic directed to the first remailer node * Ban the operation or hosting of remailers, and work internationally to do the same thing, through G8, Council of Europe, UN Anything else? -Declan

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CDR: Re: RC4 - To license or not?
by Greg Broiles 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

On Sun, Oct 08, 2000 at 03:12:20AM +0200, Stefan Arentz wrote: > Real-To: Stefan Arentz <stefan.arentz(a)soze.com> > > Applied Crypto says this about RC4. > > So what's the deal with RC4? It's no longer a trade secret, > so presumably anyone can use it. However, RSA DSI will almost > certainly sue anyone who uses unlicensed RC4 in a commercial > product. THey probably won't win, but they will certainly make it > cheaper make it cheaper for a company to license than fight. > > This was in '96. I do not want to buy a complete BSAFE license. > It is too expensive and I only need RC4. > > Anyone experienced with this? Will they sue? No, they almost certainly won't. Over the past few years they've moved away from their former pugilistic stance and their marketing/sales strategy seems to focus more on code quality and diversity of platform support rather than fear. -- Greg Broiles gbroiles(a)netbox.com PO Box 897 Oakland CA 94604

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