- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

CDR: CDA - cypherpunks distributed archive
by Ralph Seberry 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

We offer: reformatted cypherpunks archives at http://www.lanesbry.com/cypherpunks/ some time ago it was noted that the ftp links from the CDA (cypherpunks archives 92-early 94) at http://www.lanesbry.com/cypherpunks/ were unreliable (at least under lynx). ftp access via ftp://ftp.lanesbry.com/pub/cypherpunks was confirmed as a workaround. I've (belatedly?) changed this to use http file links. (and added a robots.txt file to suggest that search engines not index the whole text.) Please advise any problems with this update. [Links to this archive should not need to change.] thanks, Ralph

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CDR: Guys, I need help
by M. Emad Ul Hasan 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

Your anonymizer.com is blocked in Saudi Arabia via proxy. Can you tell me a way I can see this site

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CDR: Austin Cypherpunks: 10-9-00 Physical Meeting
by Jim Choate 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

HEB Central Market Cafe 38th and N. Lamar 7-9pm. http://einstein.ssz.com/cdr/index.html Look for the red covered 'Applied Cryptography' book to identify the table. We normaly meet outside unless the weather is bad. We are expecting continued cool and rainy so we'll likely meet under the outside covered area. Please see the homepage URL for information on joining the mailing lists. ____________________________________________________________________ He is able who thinks he is able. Buddha The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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CDR: Re: Disposable remailers
by despot 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

It is interesting to note the two sides of the same coin...mix protocols in theory vs the realities of implementation on these devices. On Sat, 7 Oct 2000, Sean Roach wrote: > If the net is sufficiently large, then the remailers can be considered to > be registers, each holding one message for a random length of time, and > allow reordering just by that alone. Of course, for this to work, traffic > analysis has to be defeated in another way. Probably in ZKS's planned, but > last I checked, not implemented, constant activity among nodes. This scheme is extremely open to attack, especially when you take into account that many of the nodes will be hostile. Even if the underlying mix protocol were robust enough to protect the sender over hostile nodes, traffic analysis, as you mentioned, is a major weakness (for example, messages could be traced throught the network). The idea and papers brought forth in David's post might be of use here. Instead of passing one message at a time through nodes, a list of messages could filter through the nodes. But, those damned memory constraints... > Of course, the more traffic, the easier it will be for the intranets where > these things are set up to locate them, and take them down. If the devices' communication piggy-backed on common protocols like http, it would be easier to mask, especially in high traffic areas. But, the communication would need to permuted in some way that a generic pattern match would not detect it. Otherwise, IDS vendors and the like will add rules to detect such traffic. > The nodes ping each other on a regular basis, if a node fails to respond to > a ping, that node is written off. Perhaps the next general cover traffic > includes information that such-n-such node appears to be compromised. If a > node receives NO pings, then it might also write itself off, and blank memory. Who do you trust becomes an issue if nodes pass information around. > Or did you mean in addition to disposible remailers, instead of ways to > hide, distribute them? I meant in addition to, but that is an interesting distribution scheme. As the world becomes more and more connected and devices get smaller and more powerful, the opportunity to plant and exploit rogue, networked modules becomes far greater. A person could have a great deal of fun with this stuff. The government already does. -andrew

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CDR: Re: stego for the censored
by Adam Back 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

Steve Furlong wrote: > Not good enough, I'm afraid. As Tim said, if the authorities in an > authoritarian regime _suspect_ secrets are being passed they have > "probable cause" to break out the jumper cables. So what you need is wide scale deployment of the stego decoder in some otherwise popular software. Eg. talk ID Games into putting a stego subliminal channel in doom computer generated character movements so network doom players can talk to each other steganographically by playing a game and typing in some "cheat mode" to switch the mode on. (The stego channel is the RNG). Adam

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ip: Congress on verge of approving warrantless secret searches [Free Republic]]
by David & Linda 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

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ip: Congress on verge of approving warrantless secret searches [Free Republic]]
by David & Linda 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

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None
by kurko kurko 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

ubsubscribe kurk0(a)yahoo.com __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Photos - 35mm Quality Prints, Now Get 15 Free! http://photos.yahoo.com/

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None
by mati99 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

ubsubscribe mati99(a)interklub.pl

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CDR: RE: Rijndael Hitachi
by Anonymous Remailer 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

>You /are/ joking ... right? The AES contest was held in the open, which >should alleviate any concerns about NSA involvement in the desing of >Rijndael. NSA penetrated Crypto AG with ease. Penetrating an open university and its bodyguardless staff is much simpler. Oh, I forgot, authors said this didnt happen !

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